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The Student's Manual of Moral Philosophy.

A MANUAL.

MORAL PHILOSOPH

WITH QUOTATIONS AND REFERENCES FOR TH
T USE OF STUDENTS.

BY WILLIAM FLEMING, D.D.,

LATE PROFESSOR OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW

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
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P R E F A C E.

MORAL PHILOSOPHY is the Science of human duty. The knowledge of human duty implies a knowledge of human nature. To understand what man ought to do, it is necessary to know what man is. Not that the Moral Philosopher, before entering upon those inquiries which peculiarly belong to him, must go over the Science of human nature in all its extent. But it is necessary to examine those elements of human nature which have a direct bearing upon human conduct. A full Course of Moral Philosophy should consist, therefore, of two parts : the First—containing an analysis and illustration of those powers and principles by which man is prompted to act, and by the possession of which he is capable of acting under a sense of duty ; the Second—containing an arrangement and exposition of the duties incumbent upon him as the possessor of an active and moral nature. As exhibiting the facts and phenomena presented by an examination of the active and moral nature of man, the First part may be characterized as *Psychological*, and as laying down the duties arising from the various relations in which man, as a moral agent, has been placed ; the Second part may be designated as *Deontological*.



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MANUAL OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.

PART FIRST.

“I study
Virtue ; and that part of philosophy
Will I apply, that treats of happiness,
By virtue specially to be achieved.”—SHAKESPEARE.

INTRODUCTION.

CHAPTER I.

OF HUMAN ACTIONS.

MORAL PHILOSOPHY proposes to direct and regulate human actions as *Right* or *Wrong*.

ACTION is opposed to PASSION; but both imply power,—power to originate or produce change, or power to receive or undergo change. Passive virtue and Active power are both recognized.

The exercise of any power or faculty may be called an *Act* or *Action*. Acts are distinguished as *Elicit* or *Imperative*, *Immanent* or *Transitive*, according as they are confined to, or extend beyond, the faculty or agent.

In common speech, we distinguish between *thought*, *word*, and *deed*. But *to think* is an act, and *to speak* is an act, as well as *to do* anything that may be in our power.

The word *Action* is to be understood *negatively* as well as *positively*. There are acts of *omission* as well as of *commission*. (Reid, *Act. Pow.*, Ess. V. ch. 1.)

Act is individual. *Action* is collective, and may refer to a course of action. *Act* applies chiefly to thought or mind. *Action* to what is external.

By a *human action* is meant an action done by an agent in the full possession and exercise of Intelligence and Will; these being the faculties proper to man as a reasonable being.

Actions have a nature and consequences. Reason enables us to discern the nature and consequences of actions; Will enables us to design or determine actions, with a view to their nature and consequences: so that, when we act intentionally, we have an end in view, to which the action is the means.

To *intend* is to believe that a given act will follow a given volition. Austin's *Jurisprudence*.

An *End* is that for the sake of which an action is done. Hence it has been said to be, *principium in intentione et terminus in executione*.

When one end has been gained, it may be the means of gaining some other end. Hence it is that ends have been distinguished, as *Supreme* and *Ultimate*, or *Subordinate* and *Intermediate*. That which is sought for its own sake, is the *Supreme* and *Ultimate* end of those actions which are done with a view to it. That which is sought for the sake of some other end, is a *Subordinate* and *Intermediate* end.

Ends as *Ultimate*, are distinguished into the end which is *Ultimate Simpliciter*, and ends which are *Ultimate Secundum quid*. An end which is the last that is successively aimed at, in a series of actions, is called *Ultimate secundum quid*. But that which is aimed at, exclusively for its own sake, and is never regarded as a means to any other end, is an *Ultimate end*, simply and absolutely.

There are laws or rules, according to which actions answer their ends; just as there are laws or rules, according to which the events and phenomena of nature take place. The laws of nature are generalized assertions, or inferences from experience, which register the amount of knowledge to which we have attained, but which have no influence over the elements and their changes. The laws of human action are derived from the nature and will of God, and the character and condition of man, and may be understood and adopted by man, as a being endowed with intelligence and will, to be the rules by which to regulate his actions. The laws of nature are assertions only; as, Mars revolves in an ellipse; the laws of human action are commands. These imperative laws we call Rules. (Whewell, *Elements of Morality*, Introd. p. 7.)

To understand such rules and to follow them—to discern the

nature and consequences of actions—to act with deliberation and forethought, and to consider their actions as means to an end—these are the characteristics of rational and responsible agents. Brutes understand not the connection between means and ends, and are prompted to act by mere impulse. But man sees and understands the connection between means and ends, and can deliberately adopt and follow out the rules, according to which the end aimed at may be attained, by the appropriate means. It is when he does so, that his actions are regarded as *human* or *moral* actions.

Human actions are characterized as *Right* or *Wrong*. These words have reference to a law or rule. Where there is no law, there can be neither obedience nor transgression, neither *Rightness* nor *Wrongness*.

Moral laws or rules enjoin certain actions to be done, in order to certain ends; as, Be temperate, in order to preserve health. And an action is said to be right when it is conformable to the law or rule; as, To be temperate, is the right way to preserve health. In this case, the adjective right is used relatively, that is, relatively to the end of the action and the rule for gaining it.

But the end of one action, or course of action, when gained, may be the means of carrying out another action, or course of action, and thus of gaining some higher end. In such cases, the inferior ends derive their value from the higher ends, to which they are made the means. And the rules which prescribe the actions to be done, as means to these ends, derive their force, each from the rule above it.

"The succession of means and ends, with the corresponding series of subordinate and superior rules, must somewhere terminate. And the inferior ends would have no value, as leading to the highest, except the highest had a value of its own. The superior rules could give no validity to the subordinate ones, except there was a supreme rule, from which the validity of all these was ultimately derived. Therefore, there is a supreme rule of human actions."—Whewell, *Elements of Mor.*, book i. ch. 4, sect. 72. Arist., *Eth.*, lib. i. chap. 2.

That which is conformable to the supreme rule is *absolutely* right, and is called *right*, simply, without relation to a special end or rule. The contrary of *right* is *wrong*. *Rightness* and *Wrongness* are the characteristics of moral action.

Such actions as are neither conformable nor contrary to any moral law or rule have been called *Indifferent* actions. The act of

sitting or walking, considered *in specie*, or as a mere attitude or exercise of body, cannot be characterized as *right* or *wrong*. Even when considered *in individuo*, or as done by an agent, with reference to an end, as walking or not walking, for the sake of amusement, an action may be indifferent. But on the other hand, as all moral actions imply knowledge and intention, it is said that they must be either *right* or *wrong*. An action considered *in specie*, is a mere abstraction. A human action is an agent acting deliberately, and his action must either be in accordance with right reason or not.

The Stoics are said to have held that every action is either right or wrong, and that all right actions are equally right and all wrong actions equally wrong. But in themselves and in their circumstances some virtues are more noble and praiseworthy, and some vices more base and odious, than others. (Cicero, *De Finibus*, lib. iv. cap. 27. Grove, pt. ii. lib. vi. Smith, *Theory of Mor. Sent.*, pt. vii. sect. 2, ch. 1. Stewart, *Act. and Mor. Pow.*, book iv. ch. 4, sect. 2.)

The circumstances which may characterize an action as moral, and render the agent more or less worthy of blame or praise, are enumerated in the following versicle:

Quis, quid, ubi, quibus auxiliis, cur, quomodo, quando.

Some things may be done by a magistrate, which cannot be done by a private person. The taking away of human life may be murder, or homicide, or suicide, &c., &c.

An action is said to be *materially right*, when, without regard to the end or the intention of the agent, the action is in conformity with some moral law or rule. An action is said to be *formally right*, when the end or the intention of the agent is *right*, and the action is not *materially wrong*. For a man to give his goods to feed the poor is *materially right*, even though he should not have charity or brotherly love; but when he has charity or brotherly love, and throws even a mite into the treasury of the poor, the action is *formally right*, although, in effect, it may fall short of that which is only *materially right*.

No action which is *materially wrong*, and known to be so, can become *formally right*. To give away what is not our own, does not become right by our intention to show kindness. The intention of an agent is only part of an action. It has its own character of

rightness or wrongness. But the rightness of the intention cannot be transfused into the *matter* of an action which is of a different character.¹

When moral actions have been done they are (by a term borrowed from arithmetic) *imputed* to the agent; and according as they are *right* or *wrong*, he is praised or blamed, rewarded or punished. The actions are called *his* actions; and he is regarded as the cause of what has been done or omitted, as the doing or omitting of the thing depended upon him.

* KNOWLEDGE and INTENTION are implied in every moral action; and the agent is held responsible, according to the nature and amount of his knowledge of the action and its consequences, and the fulness and freedom of determination with which he acts.

The *Knowledge* of a moral agent may be *defective* or *erroneous*.²

Mistake as to the nature and consequences of actions is *Error*. Error is said to be *vitabilis* or *inevitabilis*, according as the mistake is such as could, or could not, have been avoided, by due diligence as to the means of obtaining knowledge.

Want of knowledge as to actions is *Ignorance*. In respect of the action, ignorance is called *efficacious* or *concomitant*, according as the removal of it would, or would not, prevent the action from being done. In respect of the agent, *Ignorance* is said to be *vincible* or *invincible*, according as it could, or could not be removed, by the use of accessible means of knowledge.

Vincible Ignorance is distinguished into *affected* or *wilful*, by which the means of knowing are perversely rejected; and *supine* or *crass*, by which the means of knowing are indolently or stupidly neglected.

Ignorance is said to be *Invincible* in two ways—*In itself, and also in its cause*; as when a man knows not what he does, through disease of body or of mind. *In itself, but not in its cause*; as when a man knows not what he does, through intoxication or passion.

In respect of the *Intention* of the agent, ACTIONS have been distinguished into three classes, viz.:—the *Voluntary*, the *Involuntary*, and the *Mixed*.

A *Voluntary* action proceeds from a principle intrinsic to the agent, and is done designedly, or with a view to an end. It is in

¹ On regulating the motive or intention, see Pascal, *Prov. Letters*, Letter VII. ignorant is simply not to know—naïf.—Bossuet, *Connaisse.*, ch. 1, sect. 14.

² To err is to believe what is not. To be

the power of the agent to do it or not to do it. This he determines by a volition or exercise of will. And whether he act or refrain from acting, he does so knowingly and of purpose.

An *Involuntary* action proceeds from a principle or cause extrinsic to the agent, and may not imply knowledge nor design. When the agent does not determine to do the action, or when he is compelled to do what he determined not to do, his action is *Involuntary*—or rather it is no action of his at all. What is done is the action of the party who prevents the agent from determining, or compels him to do what is contrary to the determination of his will.

There are cases, however, in which an agent, while he is free from external impediment or coaction, and while what he does may be said to be done *volitionally*, yet it is not done with the full consent of his will, nor the full acquiescence of his judgment, but with a degree of reluctance and hesitation, as to the action in its nature and consequences. These are cases of what have been called *Mixed* actions. They are neither simply and absolutely *Voluntary* nor *Involuntary*, but only *secundum quid*. The throwing overboard of his goods by the mariner, to avoid shipwreck—the delivering up of his purse to a robber, by the traveller, from the fear of being murdered—and, in general, the choosing of a lesser evil in order to escape from a greater—may be given as examples of what have been called *Mixed* actions.

But, after these distinctions have been taken, it may still be said, that the actions with which the Moralist has to do are *Voluntary* actions. The causes of these actions are in the agent, and he acts with knowledge and a view to some end. The consent of the will may be more or less full, according as the end is judged to be more or less clearly preferable. But, in all moral action, there is the presence of Knowledge and Intention on the part of the agent. It is only in such cases that the action is imputed to the agent, and he is held to be responsible as the author or cause of the action.

CHAPTER II.

S OF PRINCIPLES OF ACTION.

ACCORDING to Aristotle (*Metaphys.*, lib. iv. cap. 1), “a principle³ (*Αρχή*) is that from whence anything exists, is produced, or is known.” Principles have been distinguished into those of BEING and those of KNOWLEDGE—*principia essendi* and *principia cognoscendi*.

Principles of *Knowledge* are those truths by the medium of which other truths come to be known, but which are themselves known immediately.

Principles of *Being* are distinguished into the principle of *Origination* and the principle of *Dependence*.

The only proper principle of *Origination* is God, who gives essence and existence to all beings. (Hutcheson, *Synop. Metaphys.*, p. 4).

The principle of *Dependence* is distinguished into that of *Causality* and that of *Inherence*—or *Effective Dependence*, as the effect depends upon its cause, and *Subjective Dependence*, as the quality inheres or depends on its subject or substance.

“ Of the things which men do of themselves, and of which they are properly the causes,” Aristotle says (*Rhet.*, lib. i. cap. 10), “ some they do through custom and acquired habit, others through original and natural desire.” Now, in relation to the things which men do of themselves, and of which they are properly the causes, custom and acquired habit, and original and natural desire, are regarded as *Principles*; for a principle of action is anything that moves a man, with more or less deliberation or choice, to act.

When applied to human action, the word principle is used in the sense of the principle of *Dependence*; and to denote that the action depends upon the agent for its being produced. It may signify the dependence of *Causality*—that is, that the action depends for its production on the agent, as its efficient cause; or it may signify the dependence of *Inherence*—that is, that the action depends for its production on some power or energy which inheres in the agent

³ “ The term Principle is always used for that on which something else depends; and thus both for an original law and for an original element. In the former case it is a regulative, in the latter a constitutive principle.”—Reid’s *Works*, p. 762. Note by Sir William Hamilton.

as its subject. Hence it has been said that a principle of action is twofold—the *principium quod*—and the *principium quo*. Thus, man, as an active being, is the *principium quod* or efficient cause of an action being produced; his will, or the power by which he determines to act, is the *principium quo*.

But the will itself is stimulated or moved to exert itself; and in this view may be regarded as the *principium quod*, while that which moves or stimulates it may be regarded as the *principium quo*. Before we act we deliberate—that is, we contemplate the action in its nature and consequences; we then resolve or determine to do it or not to do it, and the performance or omission follows. Volition, then, or an exercise of will, is the immediate antecedent of action. But the will is called into exercise by certain influences which are brought to bear upon it. Some object of sense or of thought is contemplated. We are affected with pleasure or pain. Feelings of complacency or displeacency, of liking or disliking, of satisfaction or disgust, are awakened. Sentiments of approbation or disapprobation are experienced. We pronounce some things to be good, and others to be evil, and feel corresponding inclination or aversion; and under the influence of these states and affections of mind, the will is moved to activity. The forms which these feelings of pleasure or pain, of inclination or tendency, to or from an object, may assume, are many and various; arising partly from the nature of the objects contemplated, and partly from the original constitution and acquired habits of the mind contemplating. But, they are all denominated, in a general way, principles of action; because they are in immediate contact with the will, and have more or less influence upon its determinations.

CHAPTER III.

OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PRINCIPLES OF KNOWLEDGE AND PRINCIPLES OF ACTION.

“MORAL SCIENCE,” says Sir James Mackintosh (*Dissert.*, p. 56, *Whewell’s Edit.*), “is founded on that hitherto unnamed part of the philosophy of human nature (to be constantly and vigilantly distinguished from *Intellectual* philosophy) which contemplates the

laws of sensibility, of emotion, of desire and aversion, of pleasure and pain, of happiness and misery ; and on which arise the august and sacred landmarks that stand conspicuous along the frontier between Right and Wrong."

The phenomena of CONSCIOUSNESS may be reduced under the three heads⁴ of *Intellect* or *Cognition*, *Sensitivity* or *Feeling*, and *Activity* or *Will*; and in every mental manifestation we either *know*, or *feel*, or *do*, something : or we may at the same time be conscious of all these phenomena. Something contemplated or known may give birth to some feeling, and that feeling may influence the will and issue in action. But while *knowing* and *feeling* and *willing* may, and often do, all unite in our mental manifestations, they may, by scientific abstraction, be considered separately. In this way, the principles of action, or those motive influences which operate upon the will, may all be included under the head of *Sensitivity* or *Feeling*, to denote what is characteristic in their exercise or function, as distinguished from *Knowing* and *Willing*.

The primary source of human activity is to be found in the fact, that we are susceptible of pleasure and pain, and consequent inclination and aversion. Certain affections of our bodily frame give us pleasure or pain. Certain objects, when contemplated, awaken emotions of sublimity and beauty, or of contempt and disgust. One course of conduct excites approbation and love, while a different course of conduct excites disapprobation and hatred. We desire to obtain what is Good and makes us happy, to avoid what is Evil and makes us miserable. We incline or tend towards the one, we are averse to or flee from the other. But what is common to all these states or affections of mind—whether they be denominated sensations or sentiments, emotions or desires, likings or dislikings, appetencies or aversions, approbation or disapprobation—is, that they all involve some form or degree of Feeling. And it is in virtue of their doing so, that they influence the Will, and prompt to action. The principles of action may thus, in a general way, be all brought under the head of Sensitivity or Feeling—that is, the

⁴ The classification of Kant, adopted by Sir W. Hamilton (*Lect. 11*), distributes them under the three heads of Cognition, or the faculties of knowledge; Feeling, or the capacities of pleasure and pain; and Desiring and Willing, or the power of Conation. Mr. Mansel (*Metaphysics*, p. 150, note)

classes the desires with the feelings. Under the tendency or inclination which accompanies *Desire* we are passive. But in the *nisus* or conation which we put forth in *relation* we are active. For this and for other reasons they ought not to be classed together.

capacity of experiencing pleasure and pain, and consequent appetence and aversion.

Consciousness testifies that *Knowing* is different from *Feeling*. This difference has been overlooked or obscured by those who resolve all knowledge into sense, and by those who represent the Intellect as the origin of the Sensibility. But the following points of difference between our Powers of Knowledge and our Principles of Action may be noted.⁵

1. In Cognitions, or the phenomena of Intellect, there is a dualism which is not implied in Feelings, or the phenomena of Sensibility.

To know, there must be an object of knowledge; and the *object known* is different from the *subject knowing*. To feel is merely to experience a modification of *self*. A state of feeling is subjective and one. An act of knowing involves the antithesis of subject and object.

"In judgment," says Dr. Reid (*Act. Pow.*, Essay v. ch. 7), "we can distinguish the object about which we judge, from the act of the mind in judging of that object. In mere feeling there is no such distinction." Feelings, it is true, have their occasions, or causes, out of, and different from, self. But these are made known, by an antecedent or concurrent exercise of Intellect; and sometimes we feel pleasure or pain without knowing the cause.

2. Cognitions are characterized as true or false; Feelings as pleasurable or painful, agreeable or disagreeable.

"A feeling," says Dr. Reid (*ut supra*), "is expressed in language either by a single word, or by such a contexture of words as may be the subject of predicate of a proposition, but such as cannot by themselves make a proposition. For it implies neither affirmation nor negation, and therefore cannot have the qualities of true or false, which distinguish propositions from all other forms of speech, and judgments from all other acts of mind."⁶

3. Cognitions are permanent, invariable, and uniform. Feelings are fugitive and variable, and differ not only in different individuals, but in the same individuals at different times.

Knowledge may admit of increase, but not of variation. It may alter in amount, but not in nature. What is true now, remains a

⁵ See *Considérations sur la Sensibilité*. Par C. M. Paffé. 8vo., Paris, 1832.

⁶ We speak of a *true* feeling of *harmony*, a *true* sense of the *sublime*. These are

sentiments. And according to Reid (*Act. Pow.*, Ess. v. ch. 7), "the word *sentiment* never signifies mere feeling, but judgment accompanied with feeling."

truth for ever. What is true to one, is true to all. It is the fixed and certain nature of Knowledge which is the ground of all progress and improvement. But Feeling is unstable. Tastes and likings are various. What pleases one does not please another. What pleases now may not please the same person hereafter; and what displeases him now, may come hereafter to please him.

4. The operations of the Intellect are confirmed, while the exercise of the Sensitivity is weakened, by familiarity and repetition.

Knowledge becomes more clear and steady by being carefully attended to, and by being frequently recalled and reviewed. Feelings, when often excited, become gradually more faint and languid. It is admitted that the feelings, connected with the affections of Country, and Kindred, and Friendship, are confirmed by being long cherished. But, the elements which go to constitute these affections partake more of the Intellect than of the Sensitivity, which, considered by itself, and as a mere capacity of feeling, is weakened by frequent exercise, while the Intellect is strengthened.

5. Cognitions are more firmly retained, and more easily and fully recalled and reviewed, than Feelings.

An object of sense perceived, a relation discerned, a conclusion come to, can be reproduced and represented to the mind, and made the means of increasing our knowledge. Feelings often pass away without leaving any trace behind them. When they are revived, it is very much in virtue of their being connected with Cognitions. And they are revived in a form much less vivid than when first experienced.

6. The Intellect can entertain opposite ideas at the same time; but the Sensitivity cannot, at the same time, experience contrary feelings.

The knowledge of contraries is one. He who knows what motion is, knows also what rest is; and the contrariety between them does not prevent us from thinking of them at the same time; but has the effect of bringing them into our thoughts together. But we cannot, at the same time, feel joy and grief, love and hatred; one feeling displaces another. Feelings succeed one another rather than co-exist.

Farther,—A variety of ideas may sweep simultaneously, or in close succession, through the mind, without losing their individuality, or mingling into one complex and confused idea. But when a great variety of feelings are experienced at the same time they melt, or

mingle into one whole state of enchantment and delight, or consternation and pain.

Lastly,—In general, the cultivation of the Intellect checks the development of the Sensitivity ; and, *vice versa*, the development of the Sensitivity is unfavourable to the exercise and cultivation of the Intellect.

Pain and pleasure, when experienced in a high degree, will prevent or interrupt the exercise of the intellectual faculties. Feelings of false shame deprive the person who experiences them of the full possession of his thoughts and language. Self-conceit and self-interest obscure and obstruct the discernment of what is true and right. The passions, when strongly excited, take away the full use and command of the rational powers. And even the indulgence of the benevolent and social affections has a tendency to weaken the mind for intellectual effort. On the other hand, the cultivation of the Intellect checks and moderates the development of the Feelings ; and when exclusively attended to, may induce a want of due sensibility to the relations and events of social life.

These points of difference may serve to distinguish that part of the philosophy of mind on which moral science is more immediately founded, from Intellectual philosophy, and to separate the philosophy of our Principles of Action from the philosophy of our Powers of Knowledge; inasmuch as our Principles of Action contain an element which is not involved in the exercise of our Powers of Knowledge.

But notwithstanding these points of difference, there are some philosophers who represent the operations of Intellect as processes of Feeling, while others do not regard the susceptibility of Feeling as a peculiar or original element of our mental constitution, but rather as the complement or consequence of the operations of Intellect. Now, Knowledge is a necessary condition of Feeling ; for consciousness is knowledge ; and he who feels must know that he feels. But Knowing and Feeling are not therefore to be confounded.

For, 1. We have feelings of pleasure and pain, as in sickness and in health, in hunger and satiety, when no operation of Intellect has preceded.

2. Although pleasure and pain, joy and sorrow, when purely mental, imply a preceding operation of Intellect, by which the grounds of our joy or sorrow are made known, this knowledge is the occasion or condition, not the cause, of our having the Feeling ; and

is given by the Intellect, co-operating with the Sensitivity. A bodily impression is not a sensation, though it precedes it. Neither is a Cognition to be confounded with the Feeling which follows it.

And, 3. Our Feelings, especially our sympathetic Feelings, are not always regulated in their intensity by the degree of Knowledge we may antecedently have of their object; which they would be, if they were merely the complement or consequence of Cognitions.

CHAPTER IV.

OF THE CLASSIFICATION OF PRINCIPLES OF ACTION.

HAVING shown how principles of action differ from powers of knowledge, it may be proper to arrange and classify them.

The task is interesting and important, but not free from peculiar difficulties. These arise,

1. From the number and variety of the principles of human action.
2. From the combination and connection which may take place among them. And,
3. From the sudden and turbulent way in which they frequently operate.

The principles of human action may be discovered,

1. By examining our own character and conduct. Or,
2. By examining the character and conduct of others.

In the former mode, we are liable to mistake, through partiality and self-love; in the latter, through ignorance and prejudice.

The difficulties which surround this part of philosophy may account for the different theories which have been framed concerning it. "We have determined," says Dr. Reid (*Act. Pow.*, Essay iii. ch. 1), "the forces by which the planets and comets traverse the boundless regions of space; but have not been able to determine, with any degree of unanimity, the forces which every man is conscious of in himself, and by which his conduct is directed." Want of clear and correct knowledge is followed by want of clear and correct language; which makes it still more difficult to define and arrange the principles of human action.

But, if regard be had to the way in which they influence the Will, the principles of human action may be arranged in two great

Classes. As in a watch, or other piece of mechanism, there are some parts which give commencement and continuance to the movement, while there are other parts which direct and moderate that movement; so, in the constitution of the human mind, there are some principles which give impulse and energy to human activity, and there are other principles which direct and regulate that activity. To the one it belongs to rouse and incite—to the other, to guide and govern. Principles of the one Class may be called *Springs of Human Action*; and principles of the other Class may be called *Guides of Human Action*.

In the *First Class* will be included—

INSTINCT,	DESIRE,
APPETITE,	AFFECTION,
EMOTION,	PASSION—

principles to which the epithet *Active* is commonly applied. In connection with these Dr. Reid places DISPOSITION and OPINION.

In the *Second Class* will be included—

A REGARD TO WHAT IS ADVANTAGEOUS, AND
A REGARD TO WHAT IS RIGHT; OR,
REASON, AND
CONSCIENCE,

giving a

SENSE OF PRUDENCE, AND A
SENSE OF DUTY.

These are more commonly called *Rational* and *Governing* principles, or *Rational* and *Moral* principles; but they are also *Active*—they powerfully contribute to the formation of human character and conduct; and the difference between them and the principles which are more commonly called *Active* is, that the influence which they have upon the Will, is not so much in the way of impulse or incitement, as in the way of direction and government.⁷

⁷ Dr. Reid's classification of the principles of human action is as follows:—“There are some principles of action which require no attention, no deliberation, no will. These, for distinction's sake, we shall call *Mechanical*.”—These are Instinct and Habit.

“Another class we may call *Animal*. They are such as operate upon the will and intention, but do not suppose any

exercise of judgment or reason; and are, most of them, to be found in some brute animals, as well as in man.” These are Appetite, Desire, Affection, Passion, Disposition, and Opinion.

“A Third Class we may call *Rational*, being proper to man as a rational creature. In all their exertions they require, not only intention and will, but Judgment or Reason.”—These are a Regard to our good on

the whole, and a Sense of Duty.—*Act. Pow.*, Essay III., part i. ch. 1, part ii. ch. 1, part iii. ch. 1.

Mr. Stewart enumerates and illustrates our active principles in the following order:—Appetites, Desires, Affections, Self-love, and the Moral Faculty. The three first may be distinguished, he says by the title of Instinctive or Implanted Propensities; the two last by the title of Rational and Governing Principles of Action. He adds in a note, “If I had been disposed to examine this part of our constitution with all the minute accuracy of which it is susceptible, I should have preferred the following arrangement to that which I have adopted, as well as to that proposed by

Dr. Reid. 1. Of our *original* principles of action. 2. Of our *acquired* principles of action. The original principles of action may be subdivided into the *Animal* and the *Rational* — to the former of which classes our *Instincts* ought undoubtedly to be referred as well as our *Appetites*. . . . Our *acquired* principles of action comprehend all those propensities to act which we acquire from *Habit*. Such are our artificial appetites and artificial desires, and the various factitious motives of human conduct generated by association and fashion.”—*Phil. of Act. and Mor. Pow.*, vol. i. pp. 12, 13. This arrangement is that of Aristotle; and is engrafted upon the Table given in the Manual at p. 39.

BOOK I.

OF THE SPRINGS OF HUMAN ACTION.

"We have springs of action, an elasticity within us, which is constantly pushing itself outward, and urging us to take part in the scenes among which we live."—HAMPDEN, *Introd. to Mor. Phil.*, Lect. 3.

THE principles of this Class admit of being arranged in *Three Orders*, according to their nature and origin.

The common origin of them all is to be found in our capacity of feeling pleasure or pain—of being affected by good or evil. But these feelings, before they prompt to action, assume the form of Appetence or Aversion—that is, inclination to, or from, an act, or an object; or desire to seek or to shun it, according as we are affected towards it; and the various Springs of action may be classified according to the nature and origin of that element of inclination, or tendency, or propensity, or desire, which gives energy and elasticity to them all.

Now, in some cases, the form of Desire, by which we are prompted to act, is a blind impulse; accompanied by no conception of the act to which it prompts, of the means by which it is to be accomplished, nor of the end to be answered by it. These are cases of *Instinctive* or *Implanted impulse*; and, in this Order, may be included the various manifestations of *Instinct* and *Appetite*, as Springs of action.

In other cases, the feeling of Desire is not a blind impulse; but is accompanied with knowledge of the act to which it prompts.¹ Now, among the many and various objects of human desire and human pursuit, there are some which, from the first moment of their being contemplated or obtained, affect us in a way that is agreeable, while there are others which do not so affect us at first, although they may come afterwards to do so. On the other hand, there are some objects which, from the first moment of their being contemplated or

¹ The distinction was formerly expressed | *citus; ille est inidius creature, hic excitatus est vel innatus vel elicitus ab obiecto.*

conceived of, affect us in a disagreeable manner; although, through the influence of Habit and Association, they may come ultimately to be contemplated without our being affected in a manner that is at all disagreeable, but rather the reverse. Now, between those things, the first conception or acquisition of which is agreeable, and the constitution of the human mind, there is implied an original suitableness or adaptation; while, between those things which do not affect us agreeably at first, but which come to do so afterwards, and the human mind, no original adaptation is implied; and any tendency towards them, or any complacency in them, which may be subsequently experienced, is acquired. These facts furnish a clear ground of distinction between those Springs of action which remain to be arranged.

Those Desires which can be traced to an original adaptation between the object desired and the constitution of the human mind, may be called *Primary* and *Natural*; *Primary*, to denote the affection of the Sensitivity which is experienced on the first presentment of their object; and *Natural*, to denote the fact, that, from an original suitableness between those objects and the human mind, all men experience the correspondent desires, in a greater or lesser degree. The *Desire of knowledge*, the *Desire of society*, &c., may be called *Primary*; inasmuch as there is an adaptation between the objects of these desires and the constitution of the human mind, so that, on their first presentment, they excite a pleasing feeling; and, inasmuch as all men seek after or desire the objects, in a greater or lesser degree, they may be called *Natural*. In like manner, *Joy* and *Sorrow*, *Love* and *Hatred*, *Fear* and *Anger*, may be called *Primary* and *Natural*; because all men are affected by them, under suitable circumstances; and the feelings being cherished in the mind, as an intelligent view of the circumstances will warrant, from mere affections of the Sensitivity, they assume the form of *Passions*. Some of the *Affections* also, such as *Esteem*, *Gratitude*, *Friendship*, &c., may be called *Primary* and *Natural*, rather than *Instinctive* or *Implanted*; because, they are felt by all men, under suitable circumstances, and, because, in their growth and exercise, they are aided and strengthened by our Intellectual and Rational powers.

On the other hand, there are Desires, and Passions, and Affections which are irregular and fantastic, springing from some malformation of mind, or body, or both, or produced by the effect of circumstances which are peculiar, and by the modifying influence of Habit

and Association. Habit and Association, aided by the effect of circumstances, have also a great sway in forming our *Opinions* and practical rules of conduct, as well as our prevailing temper and *Disposition*, and our ordinary manners and mode of life. So that, after having set down, in the Order of *Primary* and *Natural*, such of our *Desires*, and *Passions*, and *Affections*, and *Dispositions*, and *Opinions*, as arise from the constitution of the human mind, and the common circumstances of the human condition, there will still remain to be noticed under the Order of *Secondary* and *Factitious* Springs of action, the power of *Habit* and the influence of *Association*, in altering and modifying all the other Springs of Action, and producing artificial *Appetites*, irregular *Desires*, singular *Passions*, fantastic *Affections*, peculiar *Dispositions*, and eccentric *Opinions*.

According to these views, the classification of the *Springs of Action* will stand thus :—

I. *Instinctive* or *Implanted*. These are blind impulses, which do not imply, in their first manifestations, any knowledge of the end to which they prompt, nor of the means of attaining it. This Order includes *Instinct* and *Appetite*.

II. *Primary* or *Natural*. These are not blind impulses; but are accompanied with knowledge, and intention, and imply an original adaptation between the objects towards which they tend, and the constitution of the human mind. This Order includes *Emotion*, *Desire*, *Passion*, *Affection*—*Disposition*, and *Opinion*.

III. *Secondary* or *Factitious*. Between the Springs of Action in this Order and the objects towards which they tend, there is no original adaptation. They are generated according to the law of repetition, or *Custom*, and acquire form and pressure under the influence of Habit and Association, altering the direction or degree of the original Springs of Action.

In this Classification, a distinction is taken between what is *Instinctive* and what is *Natural*. This is a distinction which has been recognised and applied, in reference to Principles of Knowledge; as many who have objected to the epithet *Innate* being applied to ideas, have agreed to call them *Natural*.² But in a Classification of Springs of Action, there is room for the application of both epithets; inasmuch as some of them are inserted in the human constitution, in full form and elasticity from the first, and may therefore be called

² Hutcheson, *Oratio Inauguralis*, p. 20, | sect. 2. Stewart, *Act. and Mor. Pow.*, vol. I
etc., Glasgow, 1730. Reid, *Inquiry*, ch. i. | p. 351.

Innate, Instinctive or Implanted. There are other Springs of Action which do not come into full play and vigour at first, but are gradually developed, with the development of the human faculties; and as they manifest themselves, in some degree, in all men, when the correspondent objects are presented, they may be called *Primary* and *Natural*—the epithet *Primary* distinguishing them from those Springs of Action which are acquired by *Custom*, and the epithet *Natural* distinguishing them from such as are *Instinctive*, or implanted in full form and vigour from the first:

ORDER I.

INSTINCTIVE OR IMPLANTED.

C H A P T E R I.

OF INSTINCT.

THE word Instinct (*ἐν* or *ἐντος* and *στηγεῖν*, *intus excitare*) signifies an internal stimulus. In its widest acceptation, it has been applied to plants, as well as animals; and may be defined to be, “the power or energy by which all organised forms are preserved in the individual, or continued in the species.”¹ But we never ascribe action to the vegetable tribes. None of the movements of the inferior animals can be called actions, in the sense in which that word is used by the moralist; yet as their movements resemble many things which are done by human beings, and are prompted by Instinct, it may be well to look to the manifestations of this principle in the inferior animals.

¹ Mons. Jouffroy has characterized Instinct as the “*cri d’organisation*,”—the cry, expression, or utterance of organization. It is called by Paley “a propensity prior to instruction, and independent of experience.” “Instinct,” says Leibnitz,

“is the inclination of a living creature to do what is suitable to it, without any conception of the reason for doing it.” The term *Instinct*, says Dr. Whewell, may properly be opposed to *Insight*. Dr. Reid calls it “a natural blind impulse.”

SECTION I.

There are two classes of actions, which, in the inferior animals, have been referred to Instinct as their spring.

1. Those which have reference to the preservation of individuals—as the seeking and discerning the food which is convenient for them, and the using their natural organs of locomotion, and their natural means of defence and attack.
2. Those which have reference to the continuation of the species—as the bringing forth and the bringing up of their young.

These instinctive actions are not done,

1. By *instruction nor tradition*, from generation to generation; for many of the inferior animals are orphans from their birth; and chickens hatched in an oven have the same instincts as those hatched by the hen;
2. Nor from *experience* acquired by the individuals; for the young bird builds its nest as curiously the first time as during any subsequent season;
3. Nor with *any knowledge or design* in the animals; for, while bees work most geometrically, they have no knowledge of geometry; nor any design that the grubs which they enclose and feed in their hexagonal cells shall one day fly out, as the free members of their commonwealth or kingdom, or depart as the germ of a new colony.

Various theories have been proposed to explain the instinctive actions of the inferior animals.

These may be arranged in three classes, according as the phenomena of Instinct are referred to a cause which is *Physical, Psychological, or Hyperpsychical*.

- I. According to the *Physical* theories, the operations of Instinct are all provided for in the structure and organisation of the inferior animals, and do not imply any mind or soul. The principle of life may be developed,
 1. By the *mechanical or automatic play of bodily organs*. This opinion has been supported by Gomez Pereira (in a work entitled *Margarita Antoniana*, published at Medina del Campo, in 1554), by Descartes and his followers, by Cardinal Polignac (in the sixth

book of his Latin poem, entitled *Anti-Lucretius*), and by Mr. Norris (in his *Essay towards the Theory of an Ideal World*, pt. ii. ch. 2).

2. By *Irritability*. The insect tribes are remarkable for the strength and number of their Instincts. Yet they are destitute of brain and the ordinary organs of sensation. Their instinctive movements must therefore be excited by Irritability, and be regarded as the results of the vital principle (*Insect Life*, by David Badham, M.D., Edin., 1845). In like manner, Dr. Mason Good (*Book of Nature*, vol. ii. p. 132) defines Instinct to be "the operation of the living principle." "The life is the law according to which the phenomena of pure Instinct are developed." "But Instinct does not necessarily imply Intelligence or even Sensation."—Virey, *De la Physiologie dans ses Rapports avec la Philosophie* 8vo., Paris, 1844; p. 394.

3. By *Sensation*. "Instinctive Actions have their source, each, in some uneasy Sensation, arising from a specific irritation, and urging animals to adopt the only proper means of getting rid of it. Instinctive Actions appear to be directly connected with *Sensation*, in the same way as certain organic actions are connected with *Irritability*, and rational actions with *Thought*. They seem to stand midway between the two latter, with one or other of which, it is remarkable, that they have been almost constantly confounded."—*The Philosophy of Instinct and Reason*, by Dr. Bushman, p. 178.

Mr. Barlow (*Connection between Physiology and Intellectual Philosophy*) thinks that the instinctive movements of the inferior animals result from impressions on the nerves of sense, and imply little or no intelligence. And the Rev. Will. Kirby (*Bridgewater Treatise*, vol. ii. p. 255) says that, "as bodily appetite is the consequence merely of physical action upon an organisation adapted to respond to it, can we not conceive that the organisation of the brain and nervous system may be so varied and formed by the Creator as to respond, in the way that He wills, to pulses upon them from the physical powers; so as to excite animals to certain operations, for which they were evidently constructed, in a way analogous to the excitement of appetite?"

Among the *Physical* theories, as to Instinct, may be mentioned the doctrine held by Paracelsus and Van Helmont, concerning the *Archæus* or *Vital Principle*, which presides over the nutrition and conservation of every living being; and the doctrine of a *Plastic Nature*, or *Spirit of Nature*, which pervades and assists all cor-

poreal beings. "This," says Dr. Henry More (*Immortality of the Soul*, book iii. ch. 12, 13), "suggests to the spider the fancy of spinning and weaving her web; and to the bee, the framing of her honeycomb; and especially to the silkworm, of conglomerating her both funeral and natal clue; and to the birds, of building their nests, and of their so diligent hatching their eggs." Not widely different was the doctrine of Spinoza, as to the essential activity of matter; and the Nature philosophy, of some modern German and French writers, is nearly the same.

II. According to the *Psychical* theories, the instinctive actions of the inferior animals are the results of mental powers or faculties, possessed by them, analogous to those of Understanding and Reason in man.

1. Mr. Coleridge calls Instinct, "the power of selecting and adapting means to a proximate end." But he thinks "that, when Instinct adapts itself, as it sometimes does, to varying circumstances, there is manifested, by the inferior animals, an Instinctive Intelligence, which is not different, in kind, from Understanding, or the faculty which judges according to sense, in man." (*Aids to Reflection*, vol. i. p. 193, sixth edition; and Green, *Vital Dynamics*, App. F., p. 88; or Coleridge, vol. ii. App. B., p. 5.)

2. Dr. Darwin contends, that what have been called the instinctive actions of the inferior animals, are to be referred to experience and reasoning, as well as those of our own species; though their reasoning is from fewer ideas, is busied about fewer objects, and is exerted with less energy."—*Zoonomia*, vol. i., 4to., pp. 256, 257.

Similar views are maintained by M. Dupont de Nemours, in an article read before the French National Institute in 1807,² and inserted in the *Magazin Encyclop.* (Fevr. 1807, p. 437).

3. Mr. Smellie, instead of regarding the instinctive actions of the inferior animals as the results of Reasoning, regards the power of Reasoning as itself an Instinct (*Phil. of Nat. Hist.*, vol. i., 4to., p. 155). He holds that "all animals are, in some measure, rational beings; and that the dignity and superiority of the human intellect are necessary results of the great variety of instincts which nature has been pleased to confer on the species."—P. 159.

² After listening to Dupont de Nemours arguing in favour of the language of the inferior animals, Talleyrand said, when he went away, "Well, it must be admitted that beasts do talk."

III. According to theories which may be called *Hyperpsychical*, the phenomena of Instinct are the results of an Intelligence different from the human, which emanates upon the inferior animals, from the Supreme Spirit, or some subordinate spirit.

This doctrine is wrapped up in the ancient fable, that the Gods, when pursued by the Titans, fled into Egypt, and took refuge under the form of animals of different kinds; and also in the doctrine of the metempsychosis.

Father Bougeant, in a work entitled *A Philosophical Amusement on the Language⁸ of Beasts*, contends that the bodies of the inferior animals are inhabited by fallen and reprobate spirits; and explains their instinctive acts as the results of spiritual agency.

Mr. French (in the first number of the *Zoological Journal*) holds that the actions of the inferior animals are produced by good and evil spirits; the former being the cause of the *benevolent* and the latter of the *ferocious* instincts.

Others have referred the operations of instinct to the direct agency of the Creator on the inferior animals.

Sir Isaac Newton, in the twentieth question subjoined to the Third Book of his *Optics*, asks, *Unde est Instinctus ille quem vocant, in animalibus?* And intimates, that the explanation of this and other phenomena is to be found in the continual and universal presence of a living, intelligent Spirit.

Addison (*Spectator*, No. 120) adopts this view, and calls Instinct “*an immediate impression from the First Mover, and the Divine Energy acting in the creatures.*”

“When I see an insect working at the construction of a nest or cocoon,” said Bonnet, “I am impressed with respect; because it seems to me that I am at a spectacle, where the Supreme Artist is hid behind the curtain.”

Dr. Hancock (*Essay on Instinct*) thinks that, “while the instinctive actions of the inferior animals are prompted by bodily structure and organization, they are superintended and guided by Divine Intelligence.”

It deserves to be remarked, that all that is attempted by any of these theories is, to assign the proximate cause of Instinct. But when the proximate cause has been assigned, the inquiry concerning final causes may begin, and is not, as some would argue, superseded

⁸ Fabricius de Aquapendente also wrote on the Language of Beasts.

(Stewart, *Phil. of Human Mind*, vol. iii. ch. 2, sect. 1). Paley seems to have thought the theory which explains the instinctive actions of the inferior animals by sensation, unfavourable to the argument from Design. But, whether that or any other of the theories be adopted, the evidence of Intelligence and Design in the universe, and the argument founded on it, remain untouched. (Brougham, *Nat. Theol.*, p. 205.)

It has generally been admitted that, in addition to, and distinct from, their several instincts, the inferior animals have some form and measure of intelligence.

Mr. Stewart says (*Phil. of Human Mind*, vol. iii. pt. iii. ch. 2), "We must allow to the brutes the powers of Sensation, Perception, and Memory. Whether they possess the power of Recollection is more doubtful. If some of the more sagacious of them do, it is certainly in a very inconsiderable degree. That they are not wholly destitute of the faculty of Conception" (by which he means the power of representing absent objects of sense), "we may infer from this, that some of them appear to dream, and to be affected with absent objects, as if they were present." But of Imagination, as the power by which we create new wholes, which are contemplated with delight, they give no sign. Many of the affections are manifested by them, as attachment and gratitude.

The question commonly asked is, Do they reason? "That they do, some of them, in certain instances, reason, seems as evident to me," says Mr. Locke (*Essay on Hum. Under.*, book ii. ch. 11), "as that they have sense; but it is only in particular ideas just as they received them from the senses. They are, the best of them, tied up within these narrow bounds, and have not, as I think, the faculty to enlarge them by any kind of Abstraction."

They can be taught by man, and they learn, of themselves, to do things to which Instinct, by itself, does not prompt. Still, their attainments are limited and barren. There is no germ of expansion or improvement in their nature. The most sagacious of them profit little by their intercourse with man. Those of one species do not imitate or adopt modes of acting in another species, which might be useful to them. Children imitate everything.

"The difference between man and brute, in respect of Intelligence," says Archbp. Whately (*On Instinct*, p. 11), "appears plainly to be, not a difference in mere *degree*, but in *kind*. An intelligent brute is not like a stupid man. The Intelligence and sagacity shown by

the elephant, monkey, and dog, are something very different from the lowest and most stupid of human beings. It is a difference in *kind*, not merely in *degree*."

To express the difference, we may say, that the inferior animals have a faculty which judges according to sense, and enables them to adapt means to a proximate end; but they are altogether destitute of Reason, or the power by which we have necessary and universal ideas. This remains the characteristic distinction and dignity of man.

SECTION II.

Breathing, sucking, and swallowing are given by Dr. Reid (*Act. Pow.*, Essay iii. pt. i. ch. 2), as examples of instinctive actions in man. Dr. Priestley (*Exam. of Reid, &c.*, p. 70) says, that "breathing and swallowing are *Automatic* in their origin, and that sucking is not natural, but acquired." But the term *Automatic*, although at one time limited to mechanical movements, is now applied to the movements of Radiate or Wheel animals, as synonymous with *Instinctive*; and all that we can *acquire* as to such acts as breathing, sucking, and swallowing, is merely some measure of control as to the time and manner of performing them.

Dr. Reid says, also, "that it is by Instinct that infants cry, when they are pained or hurt; that they are afraid when left alone in the dark; that they start when in danger of falling; that they are terrified by an angry tone of voice, and are soothed and comforted by a placid countenance, and by soft and gentle tones of voice." Dr. Priestley would explain all these as the results of Association and Experience.

But, that a sense of pain or danger, or of enjoyment and satisfaction, should express itself by an outward sign, must, surely, be admitted to be instinctive: And, that the understanding or interpreting of such natural signs is also an original part of our constitution, may be argued—

1. From the fact, that the signs being natural, implies a corresponding power of understanding them.

2. From their being interpreted at so early an age, that the power of doing so cannot have been acquired; and

3. From the powerful influence which natural signs have over us.

Our understanding of the natural signs of feeling by others is very much aided and confirmed—

1. By our being conscious that we experience and express similar feelings ourselves; and

2. By our unconsciously imitating the signs of feeling in others; and thus exciting some degree of the same feeling in ourselves.

While the interpretation of natural signs is not altogether the result of pure instinct, neither is it altogether to be resolved into observation and experience, merely because, in the course of observation and experience, we come to interpret them more accurately and more extensively.

Besides the instincts which appear only in infancy, there are, it has been thought, some which continue through life. "Of these," says Dr. Reid, "we may observe *three* classes. *First*, there are many things necessary to be done for our preservation, which, even when we will to do, we know not the means by which they must be done;" as swallowing our food. "A *second* case is, when the action must be so frequently repeated, that, to intend and will it, every time it is done, would occupy too much of our thought, and leave no room for other necessary employments of the mind;" as closing the eyelids. "A *third* case is, when the action must be done so suddenly that there is no time to think and determine;" as recovering our balance.

In all these cases the act is partly voluntary; and, what continues to be instinctive, is the movement of the body consequent upon the volition of mind. The rapidity of the movement may be, partly, in accordance with the law of repetition or *Custom*.

Dr. Reid notices another thing in the nature of man, which he takes to be partly, though not wholly, instinctive—that is, proneness to imitation. The *propensity* and the *power* to imitate are both strong in children. A *sympathetic* or spontaneous imitation is experienced at every period of life. *Reflective* or deliberate imitation is the result of our esteem or admiration. Both call for watchfulness and self-control. *Frequens imitatio transit in mores*.—Quintilian, *De Orat.*, lib. i. 11.

CHAPTER II.

OF APPETITE.

APPETITE, or the *facultas appetendi*, was formerly used to denote, not only our Desires in general, but also the Will itself. It is now

limited to those forms of Desire which originate in certain states of the body, and which are sometimes called bodily Desires.

Dr. Reid says, "Our Appetites are distinguished from all other Desires by the following marks:—

" *First.* Every Appetite is accompanied with an uneasy sensation proper to it, which is strong or weak in proportion to the Desire we have of the object.

" *Second.* Appetites are not constant, but periodical; being sated by their objects, for a time, and returning after certain periods."—*Act. Pow.*, Ess. iii. pt. 2, ch. 1.

As many of our Passions and Desires are *accompanied* by an uneasy sensation, it would be more correct to characterize our Appetites as *originating* in a state of body, which is made known to us by an uneasy sensation; and, in proportion to the vividness of the sensation, is the vividness of the Appetite or of the Desire to obtain that which is to relieve the uneasy sensation. But the fundamental distinction between Appetites and Desires, properly so called, is, that Appetites are blind impulses, and do not imply intelligence, but spring up in full form and strength at first.

Our Appetites are chiefly three, viz., The Appetites of Food, of Drink, and of Sex.

An Appetite may be resolved into two elements, viz., an uneasy sensation and a tendency towards something to remove it. Both manifest themselves, in the first instance, antecedent to all experience.

Dr. Brown (*Lect. 17*) would classify the sensation with other sensations, and the tendency with other tendencies or Desires, and not enumerate Appetite as a separate principle. But—

1. The species of Desire which is involved in Appetite differs from Desire, properly so called, in being blind, and antecedent to any knowledge of its object.

2. There is something peculiar in the connection between this species of Desire and the uneasy sensation which precedes it: And the concurrence of the two elements constitutes Appetite.

The ends answered by Appetite are, chiefly, two—

1. The preservation of individuals; and 2. The continuation of the race.

What is done in obedience to Appetite, considered as an original part of our constitution, as eating when we are hungry, or drinking when we are thirsty, is neither virtuous nor vicious; and yet it may

be invested with all the characteristics of the highest virtue, or of the deepest and most degrading vice, from the manner and circumstances in which it may be done.

By obeying the call of Appetite, the uneasy sensation is not only removed, but positive enjoyment is superadded. On this fact is founded an argument for the Benevolence of the Author of our frame. (Paley, *Nat. Theol.*, ch. xxvi.)

The pleasure which accompanies the gratification of Appetite decreases, in accordance with the law, that sensations become less vivid by being repeated; but the power of Appetite, as a principle of action, increases, in conformity with the law of *Custom* or *Habit*, by which both mind and body become impatient of the want of any indulgence which has been frequently accorded. It is, therefore, most important to watch and regulate our Appetites; but, any attempt to eradicate them is wrong, and it is impossible.

"Appetites, considered in themselves," says Dr. Reid, "are neither social principles of action nor selfish." They tend blindly toward their end or object, and imply neither self-love nor benevolence.

A tendency to activity, which is manifested by the young of all animals, a tendency to rest after fatigue, a tendency to sleep after long waking, and a tendency to seek warmth and shelter, have been noticed as resembling our Appetites. They originate in a state of body, and are accompanied by an uneasy sensation, which prompts instinctively to what is to remove it for a time.

Although our original Appetites are few, those which we acquire are numerous and powerful.

ORDER II.

PRIMARY OR NATURAL.

CHAPTER I.

OF EMOTION.

EMOTION is a word of much latitude and diversity of meaning. Dr. Brown and others call all our feelings which do not spring from an affection of body, *emotional states*. Dr. Cogan by the word

emotion denotes the outward indication of an internal feeling, and speaks of the *emotions* of anger, of fear, &c. Lord Kames limits it to those feelings which, while they do not spring from the body, do yet manifest their existence and character by their peculiar influence upon the body. It is in this last sense that the word is here used. An *Emotion* differs from a *Sensation* by not originating in an affection of body; and from a *Cognition*, by being pleasurable or painful.

Emotions, like other states of feeling, imply knowledge. Something beautiful or deformed, sublime or ridiculous, is known, and contemplated, and on the contemplation springs up the appropriate feeling, followed by the characteristic expression of countenance, or attitude, or manner.

In themselves considered, Emotions⁴ can scarcely be called Springs of Action. They tend rather, while they last, to fix attention on the objects or occurrences which have excited them. In many instances, however, Emotions are succeeded by Desires to obtain possession of the objects which awaken them, or to remove ourselves from the presence of such objects. When an Emotion is thus succeeded by some degree of Desire, it forms, according to Lord Kames and Mr. Tappan, a Passion, and becomes, according to its nature, a powerful and permanent Spring of Action. (Tappan, *Of the Will*, p. 161.)

Emotions, then, are awakened through the medium of the Intellect, and are varied and modified by the conception we form of the objects to which they refer.

Emotions manifest their existence and character by sensible effects upon the body.

Emotions in themselves and by themselves lead to quiescence and contemplation, rather than activity. But they combine with Springs of Action, and give to them a character and a colouring. What is said to be done from Surprise or Shame has its proper Spring—the Surprise or Shame being concomitant.

⁴ "The feelings of beauty, grandeur, and whatever else is comprehended under the name of Taste, do not lead to action, but terminate in delightful contemplation; which constitutes the essential distinction between them and the moral sentiments, to which, in some points of view, they may doubtless be likened."—Mackintosh, *Dissert.* p 238.

CHAPTER II.

OF DESIRE.

ACCORDING to the Classification adopted, the difference between APPETITE and DESIRE may be thus stated.

Appetite is a blind impulse, and does not imply the possession or exercise of intelligence. Desire is not blind, but is accompanied by the exercise of Intelligence as to its object.

Appetite is implanted in full form and vigour, and tends towards its object as strongly before experience as after it. Desire is gradually developed, and receives new power from the development of our intellectual faculties.

In short, Appetite belongs to man because he is possessed of an animal nature, and is a living creature. Desire belongs to him because he is possessed of an intelligent nature, and is a reasonable being. Matter has its attractions and affinities. Brutes have their Instincts and Appetites. Man only has Desires, properly so called.

But, while Desires imply Intelligence, they are not the mere efflux or product of that Intelligence; and, while the objects of our Desires are known, it is not, solely, in consequence of knowing them that we desire them; but rather, because we have a capacity of Desiring. There is a tendency, on our part, towards certain ends or objects, and there is a fitness in them to give us pleasure when they are attained. Our Desires of such ends or objects are NATURAL and PRIMARY. *Natural* but not *Instinctive*, for they imply intelligence; *Primary* and not *Factitious*, for they result from the constitution of things, and the constitution of the human mind, antecedent to experience and education.

It has been maintained, however, that there are no original principles in our nature, carrying us towards particular objects; but that, in the course of experience, we learn what gives us pleasure or pain—what does us good or ill; that we flee from the one class of objects, and follow after the other; that, in this way, likings and dislikings, inclinations and aversions, spring up within us; and that all the various passions and pursuits of human life are produced and prompted by sensibility to pleasure and pain, and a knowledge of what affects that sensibility; and, thus, all our Desires may be resolved into one general Desire of happiness or well-being.

There is room for difference of opinion as to the number of these Desires which are original; but there is little room for doubting that there are some which may be so designated. Every being has a nature. Everything is what it is by having such a nature. Man has a nature; and his nature has an end. This end is indicated by certain tendencies. He feels inclination or Desire towards certain objects, which are suited to his faculties and fitted to improve them. The attainment of these objects gives pleasure—the absence of them is a source of uneasiness. Man seeks them by a natural and spontaneous effort. In seeking them, he comes to know them better and desire them more eagerly. But the intelligence which is gradually developed, and the development which it may give to the Desires, should not lead us to overlook the fact, that the Desires primarily existed as inherent tendencies of our nature, aiming at their correspondent objects; spontaneously, it may be, in the first instance, but gradually gaining clearness and strength by the aid and concurrence of our intellectual and rational powers.

Among those primitive tendencies, belonging to human nature, which at once indicate the destiny and urge forward the improvement of man, the following may be noticed:—

THE DESIRE OF KNOWLEDGE or the PRINCIPLE OF CURIOSITY.

According to Aristotle (*Metaphys.*, lib. i. cap. 1), “All men have a natural Desire of knowledge. This is shown by the avidity with which they seek the informations of the senses. They are sought for their own sake, and independently of their usefulness; especially those of the sense of sight.”

Cicero is understood to be quoting Panætius, a Greek philosopher, when he says (*De Finibus*, lib. v. cap. 18), “The chief characteristic of man is the inquisition and investigation of the truth. Hence it is that, when we are free from necessary duties and cares, we eagerly seek to see, or hear, or learn something new. There is such an inborn love of knowledge and science in us, that it is plain we would be carried toward these things without any inviting prospect of emolument.” The Desire of Knowledge is manifested long before any estimate can be formed of its uses. Had we never sought knowledge till we saw the good it was to do us, much of it would never have been gained; even what was most important for us to know might have been neglected; and the little that we did learn would have been learned as a task. But human happiness and human improvement have been provided for in the constitution of human nature.

Born ignorant, we desire to know. Desiring to know, we delight in the attainment of knowledge; and delighting in the attainment, we are at once rewarded for our exertions, and stimulated to continue and increase them.

THE DESIRE OF SOCIETY is manifested at a very early age. "Attend," says Mr. Smellie (*Phil. of Nat. Hist.*, p. 416), "to the eyes, the features, and gestures of a child, when another child is presented to it; both, instantly, previous to the possibility of instruction or habit, exhibit the most evident expressions of joy. Their eyes sparkle, and their features and gestures demonstrate, in the most unequivocal manner, a mutual attachment." It may be observed, too, that in all their amusements and sports, children are naturally social. And although man, in a more advanced and mature state, may be capable of bearing solitude, and may even, under peculiar circumstances, come to like it, yet still it may be said that, in general, he manifests a strong Desire of Society. He multiplies and prolongs the occasions of meeting with his fellow-men. The intercourse which is necessary to carry forward the business of life is but brief and limited, when compared with the long and happy hours which are spent in the family circle, at the festive board, or in the communion of thought and feeling, at literary, political, or religious associations. In short, Society or social intercourse, under various forms, is an object of natural and strong Desire to man. The important influence which this Desire has, in stimulating his activity and in advancing his intellectual and moral improvement, argues it to be an original element of his nature; and the laws and regulations to which it gives rise, in a state of civilization, instead of being, as Hobbes and others would represent them to be, evidences of a natural enmity between man and man, are the means which man takes to secure and sweeten the charities of family and friendship, amidst the endearments of which he is born, delights to live, and scarcely fears to die.

" And is he dead, whose glorious mind
Lifts thine on high?
To live in hearts we leave behind,
Is not to die." —*Campbell.*

This leads to the notice of another Desire which is natural to man, viz., THE DESIRE OF ESTEEM.

It is impossible to see human beings together, without seeing that they have a strong Desire for the good opinion of one another.

This Desire is manifested in the earliest years. The child, even before it attains to the use or understanding of articulate language, is soothed and pleased by the smiles of the nurse or mother, and is mortified by any indication of neglect. In the whole business of human life it is seen that a Desire to stand well with others is prevalent. Even they who are conscious that they have no strong claim upon the Esteem of their fellow-men, still flatter themselves with the hope, that there is something about them to save them from contempt, which is feared as the greatest of evils. And, for beings who have been born to live in society, it is most important that they should thus have been made sensible of the good or bad opinion of one another.

The Desire of Esteem is so strong as to stretch beyond death; a fact inconsistent with the theory which attempts to resolve this Desire into a love of the pleasure or advantage which the good opinion of others may procure for us. For, what pleasure or advantage can arise from posthumous respect or fame? Yet men often sacrifice their health, and even their life, in seeking to obtain them.

Similar remarks might be made with regard to the DESIRE OF POWER,⁵ or the principle of Ambition, and the DESIRE OF SUPERIORITY, or the principle of Emulation. These cannot be resolved into any other principles more simple, and may be considered as original elements of human nature.

Desire is characteristic of beings whose nature and condition are imperfect. It involves a sense of want or defect, and a tendency to some object or some act which is to relieve or supply it. Our Desires, therefore, may be as many and various as are our wants and defects, and the objects or acts which may relieve or supply them. But the different forms which Desires may assume, or the different names by which they may be denoted, in different circumstances, should not lead us to regard them as so many principles differing in kind. What is common to all forms and degrees of Desire is tendency towards some object or some act, which is to relieve some want, or to supply some defect, or to remove some uneasiness. And, in so far as the want, or defect, or uneasiness is inseparable from the nature and condition of man, the tendency towards what is to relieve, or supply, or remove it, may be regarded as originally belonging to his constitution as a human being.

⁵ "Cupido dominandi cunctis affectibus flagrantior est."—TACITUS.

"Desires," according to Dr. Hutcheson (*Essay on the Passions*, sect. 1), "arise in our mind, from the frame of our nature, upon apprehension of good or evil in objects, actions, or events, to obtain for ourselves or others the agreeable sensation when the object or event is good; or to prevent the uneasy sensation when it is evil." Of such Desires as manifest themselves as primitive tendencies, we can give no further account than to say, that they arise from the frame of our nature. Of the Desire of Society we can only say, man is a social being; while there are other living beings who delight in solitude. Our Primary Desires may, however, be characterised in the following way:—

1. They are such as spring from the frame of our nature; that is, from our very constitution as human beings.
2. They are, therefore, universal; they are found not in individuals, or families, or tribes, or nations only, but in the whole human race.
3. They are also permanent; they manifest themselves throughout the whole term of human existence; they appear in the earliest years, they gather strength with maturing manhood, and do not altogether disappear even in old age.

The Desires which are Primary and natural to man are but few; those which grow up in a state of civilisation, and are subservient to the Primary and Natural Desires, are almost innumerable.

CHAPTER III.

PASSION AND AFFECTION.

"No peculiar place has been set apart by me," says Dr. Brown (*Lect. 65*), "for the *Passions*; the reason of which is, that our Passions are truly no separate class, but merely a name for our Desires, when *very vivid and very permanent*."

Mr. Stewart says (*Outlines*, sect. 4), "This word *Passion* does not belong exclusively to any one class of our active principles; but is applicable to all of them, when they are suffered to *pass the bounds of moderation*. In such cases, a sensible agitation or commotion of the body is produced, and our reason is disturbed; we lose, in some

measure, the power of self-command, and are hurried to action by an almost irresistible impulse."

Dr. Reid distinguishes between *Desire* and *Affection*, by saying that "our *Desires* have *things*, not *persons*, for their object." "But," says he (*Act. Pow.*, Essay iii. pt. ii. ch. 3), "there are various principles of action in man, which have *persons* for their immediate object, and imply, in their very nature, our being well or ill affected to some person, or at least to some animated being. Such principles I shall call by the general name of *Affections*, whether they dispose us to do good or hurt to others." "By the word *Passion*," he says (ch. 6), "he does not mean any principle of action different from *Desires* and *Affections*; but such a *degree of vehemence* as is apt to produce sensible effects upon the body, or to darken the understanding and weaken the power of self-command."

Dr. Hutcheson (*Essay on the Passions*, p. 1) describes the *Affections* and *Passions* as "these modifications or actions of the mind, consequent upon the apprehension of certain objects or events, in which the mind generally conceives good or evil" (p. 26). "When the word *Passion* denotes anything different from *Affection*, it includes a strong brutal *impulse of the will*, attended by some violent *bodily motions*, so as to *prevent all deliberate reasoning*."

In accordance with these explanations, the word *Passion* denotes a vivid and turbulent state of liking or disliking, attended by correspondent effects upon the bodily frame, and upon the powers of reason and self-command. *Affection* denotes a more calm and lasting state of liking or disliking, and has always a person or living being for its object. Taken in connection with these two terms, the word *Emotion*, according to Dr. Cogan, means the sensible effect upon the bodily frame by which a *Passion* or *Affection* may indicate its existence and character. *Fear* is a *Passion*. *Gratitude* is an *Affection*. The *Emotion* in *Fear* is paleness of countenance, or stiffening of the hair, &c.

In *Passion* and *Affection* there is implied *Desire*. If the object of a passion be agreeable, we desire to obtain it; if it be disagreeable, we desire to avoid it. If we are well-affected towards any person, we desire his society and seek his benefit; if we are ill-affected towards any one, we desire to avoid his company, and, perhaps, to do him hurt. Hence it is that all the *Passions* and *Affections* may be reduced to two, and may be regarded, in all their varieties, as so many forms of the primitive or mother principles of *Love* and

Hatred, Appetence and Aversion, or more generally still, of Inclination to, or from, an object.

Before any form or degree of Desire, Passion, or Affection, can be awakened, some object or event must be known ;⁶ and between that object or event and our nature and condition as human beings, there must be some adaptation. The bare knowledge of a thing is no reason why we should either seek or shun it. Before we do so we must have an Emotion—that is, we must be moved in reference to it. It must affect our Sensitivity, in consequence of some adaptation between it and us. There must be some natural tendency carrying us towards it; making us uneasy in the want of it, and pleased with the attainment of it. But what is spontaneous in the first instance may afterwards be reflective; and, when a natural tendency has once been developed, then we may come, on the ground of experience, to estimate the pleasure and the pain, the good and the evil, which objects and events are fitted to give us. And, according to this estimate, one thing is sought and another is shunned, one *Desire* is checked and another is cherished, one *Passion* is yielded to, and another is resisted, one *Affection* is indulged, and another is restrained.

In this advanced and mature stage of their development, our various states of feeling come to be connected with the conceptions which we form of objects and events, as good or evil, and as likely to give us pleasure or pain. Hence it is, that Dr. Hutcheson, while he refers our several natural *Desires* and *Passions* to so many several internal senses, or positive determinations of our nature, still describes them as arising in our mind upon the apprehension of Good or Evil in objects, actions, or events. Mr. Locke says (*Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book ii. ch. 20), “Pleasure and Pain, and that which causes them, Good and Evil, are the hinges on which our *Passions* turn; and if we reflect on ourselves, and observe how these, under various considerations, operate in us; what modifications or tempers of mind, what internal sensations (if I may so call them) they produce in us, we may thence form to ourselves the ideas of our *Passions*. ”

Sir William Hamilton says” (*Metaphys. Lect. 44, 5, 6*), “As the feelings are not primitive and independent states, but merely states

⁶ Quod latet ignotum est; ignoti nulla cupido.

Ἐκ τούτων ὁρατοῦ γένεται τὸ ἔπαυ.

Looking begets liking.

“I'll look to like, if looking liking move.”—Shakespeare.

which accompany the exercise of our faculties, or the excitation of our capacities, they must take their differences from the differences of the powers which they attend. The feelings which accompany the exertion of the sensitive or corporeal powers, whether cognitive or appetent, may be called *Sensations*, whereas the feelings which accompany the energies of the higher powers of mind may be called *Sentiments*."

It may be well to take this common ground, and see how far it will carry us in an attempt to arrange and classify them. This is commonly called a Scheme or Classification of the *Passions*. But many of the states of mind so classified are but ill denoted by the term *Passion*; while all of them may be denoted by the term *Feeling*, without deviating from the common use of language.

CHAPTER IV.

SCHEME OF CLASSIFICATION.

ALL the various forms of Feeling denoted by the words *Desire*, *Passion*, and *Affection*, have, not for the cause, but as the occasion or condition of their development, the conception or contemplation of something as Good or as Evil—that is, as Pleasurable or Painful.

According as the action, object, or event is regarded as Good or as Evil, our states of Feeling may be arranged in two great classes. And as Good and Evil, in objects, actions, or events, may be contemplated in similar aspects, the Feelings in the one class will be the counterparts of those in the other; Joy will be opposed to Grief, Love to Hatred, Hope to Fear; and, in general, the Feelings awakened by the contemplation of Good will be pleasant and agreeable, while those awakened by the contemplation of Evil will be disagreeable and painful.

Good and Evil may be contemplated in reference to ourselves, and affect our Self-love. Or they may be contemplated in reference to others, and affect our Benevolence and Sympathy. This fact has been adopted as the ground of Classification by Dr. Cogan, who, in his *Philosophical Essay on the Passions*, has arranged them under Self-love and Benevolence. The distinction between Good and Evil, or the Pleasurable and the Painful, is more fundamental, and has

the advantage of arranging all the forms and degrees of Feeling in two equal and opposite classes.

The forms and degrees of Feeling will vary, according as the Good or Evil contemplated has *come* or is *coming*; as the consequence of something done *by us*¹ or *by others*. But these circumstances, and the effect which they have in varying the form and degree of the correspondent Feelings, will be best seen in a tabular Scheme or View of all our Springs of Action; while special or disputed points may receive a separate consideration.

C H A P T E R V.

OF RESENTMENT.

WHEN evil comes upon us by means of an unknown, or inanimate, or involuntary instrument, we submit to it; it may be with sorrow or with resignation. But when evil comes upon us by an intelligent being, like ourselves, acting voluntarily, we feel displeasure, and a desire to resist and retaliate. Such is *Anger* or *Resentment*.

Dr. Reid classes Resentment with Emulation, and calls them Malevolent Affections. But there may be Emulation without Envy, and Resentment² without Ill-will. It is only, therefore, to the excess or abuse of these passions that he applies the epithet Malevolent. The Desire to retaliate, which follows the first feeling of Anger, and may be regarded as forming an element of the Passion, is simply defensive, and is intended to prevent the repetition of evil.

Resentment has been distinguished into Sudden and Deliberate, according as it is excited by *mere harm or evil*, or by *wrong or injury, damnum or injuria*, done or intended. This distinction had been hinted at by Hobbes; but was first prominently brought forward by Bishop Butler (*Sermons viii. and ix.*), and has been adopted by subsequent philosophers.

¹ *Nemesius, On the Nature of Man*, ch. 17, says, "Desire (or feeling) may be divided into four parts, according as it has respect to things *good* or *evil*, things *present* or things *expected*." The element of agency should also be taken into account.

² "When first introduced into the Lan-

guage (this was in the seventeenth century; *vix nova in nostra lingua*, Junius), *to resent* meant to have a sense or feeling of that which had been done to us, but whether a sense of gratitude for the good or enmity for the evil the word said nothing, and was employed in both meanings."

PRINCIPLES OF ACTION.

ORIGINAL.	<u>CLASS I.—SPRINGS OF ACTION.</u>		ACQUIRED.
ORDER I.	ORDER II.	ORDER III.	
INSTINCTIVE OR IMPLANTED.	NATURAL OR PRIMARY.	FACTITIOUS OR SECONDARY.	
INSTINCT, MANIFESTED,	EMOTION, DESIRE, PASSION, AFFECTION.		
IN THE INFERIOR ANIMALS, By the discernment of suitable and wholesome food, and the proper use of their organs of locomotion, and of defence and attack; By operations necessary to the continuation of the species, and the assistance of individuals and their young;—	GOOD, ON THE CONTEMPLATION OF AFFECTING OURSELVES;	EVIL, AFFECTING OUR NEIGHBOUR; ARISE:	
IN MAN, By spontaneous bodily movements; By the interpretation of natural signs; And by sympathetic imitation.	IF THE GOOD BE . . . Expected, AS APPETITE, OF HUNGER, OF THIRST, OR SEX.	IF THE EVIL BE FEARED, Apprehended, AND ALSO, Our Own Conscience, { Contentment, Satisfaction, { Gladness, Joy, Delight, { Expected,—Desire, Hope, { Our Own Conscience, { Vanity, Pride, { Our Neighbour's Conscience,—Love, Esteem, { Gratitude, Friendship, If through . . . IF THE GOOD BE . . . Expected, AS APPETITE, OF HUNGER, OF THIRST, OR SEX.	
		IF THE EVIL BE FEARED, Apprehended, AND ALSO, Our Own Conscience, { Self-reproach, Remorse, { Sympathy with { Self-reproach, The Condu ^t of a Third Party,—Sympathy with Indulgence, { Our Neighbour's Conscience,—Congratulation with Approval, If through . . . IF THE GOOD BE . . . Expected, AS APPETITE, OF HUNGER, OF THIRST, OR SEX.	
		IF THE EVIL BE FEARED, Apprehended, AND ALSO, Our Own Conscience, { Self-reproach, Remorse, { Sympathy with { Self-reproach, The Condu ^t of a Third Party,—Sympathy with Indulgence, { Our Neighbour's Conscience,—Congratulation with Approval, If through . . . IF THE GOOD BE . . . Expected, AS APPETITE, OF HUNGER, OF THIRST, OR SEX.	

CLASS II.—GUIDES OF ACTION.

REASON, CONSCIENCE.

...and Illustration of the feelings of the Second Order to have introduced in the Lectures. But there is not much room for discussion till we come to Reciprocal and Malevolent Affections.

Sudden Resentment has been regarded as common to man with the inferior animals, and has been called *Instinctive*. But it may be doubted whether the most sudden ebullitions of Anger are, in any case, purely Instinctive. There must in every case be the feeling of harm, and a reference of that harm to something as its occasion or cause. This may be sufficient to take Resentment out of the class of blind impulses. The modification which Suddenness gives is not confined to this Passion. Grief, Fear, and Shame, when suddenly excited, are very violent, and beyond the control of Reason. But we do not call them *Instinctive*.

Deliberate Resentment frequently succeeds the first ebullitions of *Sudden Anger*. The mere pain or suffering experienced from evil done or intended, awakens *Sudden Resentment*. When farther reflection shows the unjust and injurious consequences of the evil, a settled feeling of *Indignation* is excited; and we cherish the purpose of retaliating upon the agent, or of making him sensible, in some way, that he has done wrong in doing evil to us.

The chief abuses or excesses of the Natural Passion of Resentment are, *Passionateness* and *Peevishness*, *Hatred* and *Revenge* (*Spectator*, No. 488, 1712). The two former arise from an excess of feeling in reference to the evil done, and the two latter from cherishing in an unwarrantable degree the desire of retaliation. But we may be angry and not sin.

CHAPTER VI.

OF BENEVOLENCE AND SYMPATHY.

THAT we are affected by the Good and Evil which come upon others, as well as by what comes upon ourselves, is a fact which cannot be denied; though it has been variously explained. Those principles of our nature, which lead us to take an interest in what concerns others, are all included under the term *Benevolence* or *Good-will*: and of late years, *Sympathy*, although its meaning was originally limited according to its derivation, has been employed to denote our fellow-feelings in general. Sympathy with the enjoyment of Good is *Congratulation*. Sympathy with the suffering of Evil is *Compassion*.

According to Bishop Butler (*Sermons v. and vi.*), *Compassion* is more generally felt than *Congratulation*, and is “an original, distinct, particular affection in human nature; whereas to rejoice in the good of others is only a consequence of the general affection of love and good-will to them.” But Dr. Adam Smith maintains (*Theory of Mor. Sent.*, pt. i. sect. 3, ch. 1) that “our propensity to sympathize with Joy is much stronger than our propensity to sympathize with Sorrow; and that our fellow-feeling for the agreeable emotion approaches, much more nearly, to the vivacity of what is naturally felt by the persons principally concerned, than that which we conceive for the painful one.”

It has been said (*Theory of Mor. Sent.*, pt. i. sect. 1, ch. 1) that “it is by changing places, in fancy, with others, that we come either to conceive or to be affected by what they feel.” But in some cases we sympathize with the feelings of others, without any knowledge of what occasions them. And, in order to arrive at a conception of what the feelings of others are, it may not always be necessary to change places, in fancy, with them.

Dr. Brown says (*Lect. 61*), “Many of the phenomena of Sympathy are referable to the same laws to which we have traced the common phenomena of Suggestion or Association.” Still, he is inclined to think that we have a “peculiar susceptibility of sympathizing emotion, distinct from the mere general tendencies of Suggestion.” Dr. Payne, however, maintains (*Elem. of Ment. and Mor. Science*, p. 270, third edit., 1845), “that the susceptibility of Sympathy, instead of being distinct and original, may be nothing more than the readiness with which the general principle of Suggestion recalls our past feelings of pleasure or pain, when we observe the external symbols of either in others.” But in Sympathy there is more than a revival of feelings of pleasure or of pain, formerly experienced, *in reference to ourselves*—there is the generation of feelings, now for the first time experienced, *in reference to others*. Both classes of feelings are *our* feelings, inasmuch as *we* feel them. But the feelings of the one class have *ourselves* for their object, while the feelings of the other class have *others* for their object. Suggestion may explain the revival of our past feelings, in reference to ourselves, but the generation of the new feelings, in reference to others, cannot be explained, but by our having a susceptibility of Sympathy, a capacity of being affected by the Good and Evil which affect others.

Our sympathetic feelings have others for their objects, and carry

us to do what is in our power to increase their enjoyment, or diminish their suffering. They proceed, therefore, not from Self-love, but from Benevolence or Good-will to others.

There is uneasiness in feeling Compassion, so long as we cannot give relief—But it does not therefore follow, that we relieve the sufferings of others, in order to relieve ourselves from the uneasiness which we experience on witnessing them. If it were so, we would withdraw ourselves from them.

There is satisfaction in witnessing the happiness of others, especially when we are conscious that we have contributed to increase that happiness—But this does not warrant the belief that we do good to others from no feeling of Benevolence or Good-will to them, but from a selfish desire to please ourselves, or to receive good in return.

The knowledge that we are liable to suffer, and to need the Sympathy of others, should lead us to cherish and exercise our sympathetic affections—But let it not, therefore, be said that the sole reason why we show compassion to others is, that we ourselves may receive compassion when we need it. If pity were merely, as Hobbes says, “the fiction of future calamity to ourselves,” “then, a fearful and a compassionate man would be the same character; which every one immediately sees,” says Bishop Butler (*ut supra*), are totally different.”

Men frequently act from selfish and sinister motives—But this does not prove that they are incapable of pure and disinterested kindness.

CHAPTER VII.

OF THE NATURAL AFFECTIONS.

THE *Affections* which are cherished between those who are of the same kindred, may be called *Natural*, rather than *Instinctive*.

Among the inferior animals there are many species who have no knowledge nor care of their offspring; in those in whom something like natural affection is manifested, it grows up by degrees; and, in all, it soon disappears.

It has been thought that, in the human species, there is an *Instinct*

by which those who are of the same kindred know and are kindly affectioned towards one another. But the facts adduced do not, necessarily, imply a special instinct. Those who do not share the same blood, but who are brought up in the same family, have the same affections towards one another as if they were of the same kindred. These *Affections* are *Natural*, inasmuch as they rise out of the constitution of the human mind, and the circumstances of the human condition. He who has not these *Affections* wants what belongs to his nature and condition as a human being—a being who derives his birth and shares his blood, in the way of inheritance and descent, from others, and lives in the society of beings like himself. But he who has these *Affections*, has them, because in him the elements of human nature have been fully and favourably developed, and not in virtue of any blind or inscrutable impulse implanted within him.

The *Affections of Home and of Country* are not so strongly nor so generally felt as those of *Kindred*. Still they may be called *Natural*. And although, in some cases, they manifest themselves like *Instinct*, they can be explained as rising out of the constitution of the human mind and the circumstances of the human condition.

See Smith, *Theory of Mor. Sent.*, pt. vi. sect. 2, ch. 1; Stewart, *Act. and Mor. Pow.*, vol. i. pp. 83, 98–101; Beattie, *Dissertation*, 4to., p. 575.

CHAPTER VIII.

OF DISPOSITION.

Disposition, *diaθεσις*, in general, means the arrangement or relation in which the parts, constituting a whole, stand to one another (Aristotle, *Metaphys.*, lib. v. sect. 19). As applied to mind, it supposes the relation of its powers and principles to one another, and rather the resultant bias or tendency to be moved by some of them means than by others.

Disposition is *Natural* and *Primary*, in so far as it arises from original endowment of body or of mind.

Bodily constitutions, as affecting the prevailing bias of the mind, have been called *Temperaments*; and have been distinguished into

the *Sanguine*, the *Choleric*, the *Melancholic*, and the *Phlegmatic*. To these has been added another, called the *Nervous Temperament* (Feuchtersleben, *Med. Psychology*, p. 109). According as the bodily constitution of individuals can be characterized by one or other of these epithets, a corresponding difference will be found in the general state or *Disposition* of the mind; and there will be a bias or tendency to be moved by certain principles of action rather than by others.

Mind is essentially one. But we speak of it as having a constitution, and as containing certain primary elements; and, according as these elements are combined and balanced, there may be differences in the constitution of individual minds, just as there are differences of bodily *Temperaments*; and these differences may give rise to a *Disposition* or bias, in the one case more directly than in the other. According as Intellect, or Sensitivity, or Will, prevails in any individual mind, there will be a correspondent bias resulting.

But it is in reference to original differences in the *Primary Desires*, that differences of *Disposition* are most observable. Any *Desire*, when powerful, draws over the other tendencies of the mind to its side, gives a colour to the whole character of the man, and manifests its influence throughout all his temper and conduct. His thoughts run in a particular channel, without his being sensible that they do so, except by the result. There is an under-current of feeling, flowing continually within him, which only manifests itself by the direction in which it carries him. This constitutes his temper.* *Disposition* is the sum of a man's desires and feelings.

The inferior animals have not only the powers and instincts common to the species, but characteristics peculiar to the individual; and we say of one horse that he is vicious, and of another that he is well-tempered. So it is with men. All have the great constituent elements of their common nature; but these are differently proportioned and combined; and hence arise differences of *Disposition*. But, in beings capable of reason and reflection, there must also arise, from the general current of their thoughts and feelings, great varieties of *Disposition*; and these varieties are very much increased, by the influence of Association and other circumstances, in the life and experience of individuals. (Galen, *Liber quod animi mores corporis temperamenta sequuntur*. Opera, tom. iv., Lips. 1822.)

* The balance of our animal principles, [^{the} natural temper. (Reid, *Act. Pow.*, *Early*
I think, constitutes what we call a man's] iii. pt. ii. ch. 8.)

CHAPTER IX.

OF OPINION.¹⁰

ASSENT to anything as true is of three kinds or degrees, according to the evidence on which it rests. When we receive anything as true, on evidence which is conclusive to us and to all men, we have *Knowledge*, properly so called—that is, *Certainty* or *Science*. When the evidence on which we receive anything as true is quite sufficient to satisfy us, but not such as all other men must necessarily accept, our *Assent* is called our *Conviction* or *Persuasion*. And when the evidence on which our belief rests is not quite conclusive or satisfactory, but only probable, our yielding to it is called our *Judgment* or *Opinion*. There can be no room for *Opinion* in matters of *Science*, nor in matters of *Fact*, of which we have *Certain Knowledge*. It is only in cases in which the evidence is barely probable, that our belief or judgment is called our *Opinion*. Of two contradictory propositions, one must be true and the other false. Of two *Opinions* contradicting each other, neither may be absurd; because there may be probable evidence in support of both.

As our *Desires*, *Passions*, and *Affections* are connected, in their origin and development, with the knowledge which we have of their objects, *Opinion* may be said to be, not merely the condition of these states of Feeling, but an element of them.

But *Opinion* may also be found, in a separate form, as a principle of action. As beings possessed of understanding and reason, men cannot be carried about by every impulse of blind Feeling; but, looking to actions and their issues, they come to some conclusion concerning them. They make up their minds; they form an *Opinion* concerning situations and circumstances in which they are liable to be placed. The *Opinion* remains when the grounds of it are forgotten, and continues to influence their conduct.

Such *Opinions*, concerning the objects and events of human life, as all men are led necessarily to form, may be called *Natural* and *Primary* principles of action. Of this kind are the principles of common sense, or of ordinary prudence. These, however, are *Regulating* rather than *Impelling* principles; they are *Guides* rather than *Springs* of human conduct.

¹⁰ Opinion is described by Plato as the | Milton calls it "knowledge in the making." transition from ignorance to knowledge: |

In addition to these, there often result, from the experience of individuals, particular *Opinions*, founded on what has been peculiar in that experience, which these individuals adopt and act upon in after-life. But, as these are not original but acquired, they belong properly to the Order of *Secondary* and *Factitious* principles. To this Order, indeed, belong most of the *Opinions* which prevail among the bulk of mankind. They have been instilled into them by authority and education, or adopted through indolence or imitation; and are the result of those innumerable influences, which are continually at work in altering the social character of men. (Reid, *Act. Pow.*, Essay iii. pt. 3, ch. 2; Thomson, *Outlines of Laws of Thought*, p. 304.)

ORDER III.

SECONDARY AND FACTITIOUS.

CHAPTER I.

OF ASSOCIATION.

"THE subject of the *Association* of ideas," says Mr. Stewart (*Phil. of Hum. Mind*, vol. i. ch. 5), "naturally divides itself into two parts. The *First* relates to the influence of *Association* in regulating the succession of our thoughts; the *Second*, to its influence on the Intellectual powers, and on the moral character, by the more indissoluble combinations which it leads us to form in infancy and early youth."

SECTION I.—*The influence of Association in regulating the succession of our Thoughts.*

The doctrine of *Association*, as regulating the succession of our thoughts, can be traced back, through the schoolmen and early fathers of the church, up to Aristotle. Hobbes, who silently follows him, calls it (*Leviathan*, pt. i. ch. 3) "the *con-sequence* or train of imaginations, the train of thoughts and mental discourse." He

says it is of two sorts. The *first* is unguided, without design, and inconstant. The *second* is more constant, as being regulated by some desire and design—that is, it is *Spontaneous* or *Intentional*.

Every kind of mental affection or movement may enter into the train of thought. And the word *Association*, in this use of it, denotes, merely, that those mental movements, or modes of consciousness, follow in a certain succession or order; the inquiry being chiefly as to the laws which regulate this succession or order.

According to Aristotle, the consecution of thoughts is either *Necessary* or *Habitual*. By the *Necessary* consecution of thoughts, it is probable that he meant that connection or dependence subsisting between notions, one of which cannot be thought without our thinking the other; as Cause and Effect, Means and End, Quality and Substance, Body and Space. This consecution or connection of thoughts admits of no further explanation, than to say that such is the constitution of the human mind.

The *Habitual* consecution of thoughts differs in different individuals. But the general laws according to which it is regulated are chiefly three, viz:—The law of *Similar*s, the law of *Contraries*, and the law of *Co-adjacents*.¹¹ From the time of Aristotle, these laws have been noticed and illustrated by all writers on the subject. But, it has been thought that these may be reduced to one supreme and universal law; and Sir James Mackintosh expresses his surprise (*Dissert.* p. 348, *Edit. Whewell*) that Dr. Brown should have spoken of this as a discovery of his own, when the same thing had been hinted by Aristotle, distinctly laid down by Hobbes, and fully unfolded both by Hartley and Condillac.

The brief and obscure text of Aristotle, in his Treatise on Memory and Reminiscence, has been explained as containing the universal law as to the consecution of thoughts (*Reid's Works, Edited by Sir W. Hamilton*, p. 897). It is proposed to call this the law of *Red-integration*. “Thoughts which have, at any time, recent or remote, stood to each other in the relation of co-existence, or immediate consecution, do, when severally reproduced, tend to reproduce each other.” In other words, “The parts of any total thought, when subsequently called into consciousness, are apt to suggest, immediately, the parts to which they were proximately related, and mediately, the whole of which they were co-constituent.”

In generalizing the phenomena of Association many philosophers

¹¹ A portrait suggests the original, a giant a dwarf, one street the street next to it.

have exclusively regarded this law of *Redintegration*;¹² and have satisfied themselves with saying, that "thoughts are recalled together, or associated, because they previously co-existed in the mind." But this reduction, when carefully examined, will be found not altogether satisfactory; although it may hold with ideas of *Sensation* and *Reflection*.

Before the parts of any total thought can be associated, so that the recurrence of one shall infer the reproduction of the others, it is necessary, as a condition, that they have been previously present together in the mind. But the proper cause of the power which one thought may be said to acquire of calling up another, is to be found, not so much in the fact of their previous co-existence, as in some relation perceived between them by the mind; and to the perceiving of which relation their previous co-existence may have furnished occasion and opportunity. Previous co-existence, or the fact of their having been simultaneously experienced, may also constitute a relation between two or more thoughts; and because they have entered as parts into one total thought, the recurrence of any one of the parts may infer the recurrence of any other, or of all the other parts. But previous co-existence is only one of the many relations which subsist between our thoughts; and every relation which has been once perceived has a tendency, more or less, to lead the mind from one thought to another. In order, however, to the perceiving any relation between two or more mental movements, it is necessary that they be present together in the mind. So that previous co-existence is the universal condition under which, rather than the universal law according to which, the recurrence of our thoughts is regulated, and our ideas associated, in the way of Redintegration. But Redintegration is not the only nor universal law according to which Association takes place.

The mind does not necessarily impress a whole upon all the successive trains of our ideas. Neither is it necessary that the facts of a train of associations should have previously co-existed in the mind. "In some cases they have co-existed, and to this fact of their co-existence is owing their tendency to reproduce one another; but more frequently they have had no such previous alliance in the mind. An object never before perceived may suggest an old familiar object; while, again, an object frequently perceived may suggest in different moments very different and even quite new trains of

¹² Hobbes, *Leviathan*, ch. 3; *Hum. Nat.* p. 17; Leibnitz, *Nouv Essais*, I. 2, ch. 23
Mill, *Analysis of Hum. Mind*, ch. 3

thought. Were it not for this characteristic of the principle of association, the field of our knowledge would have been comparatively narrow, confined as it must have been to the relations which, from actual observation, we had stored in our minds.. We could never have been able to get out of the past wheel or circle of our thoughts. As it is, the suggestive capacity continually started by everything around us, is, in all active and cultivated minds, ever entering on fresh fields of intellectual interest, and acquiring fresh stores of knowledge."—Tulloch, *Theism*, pp. 213, 214.

Sir W. Hamilton says (*Lect.*, vol. ii. p. 239), "Out of this universal law (*Redintegration*) every special law of Association may easily be evolved, as they are only so many modified expressions of this common principle, so many applications of it to cases more or less particular." Yet in his *Theory of Mental Reproduction* (Reid's *Works*, p. 912) he says, "We must recur to *Repetition* as an ultimate principle of reproduction, and not rest satisfied, as has been done, with that of *Redintegration*." And he adds, p. 913, "To complete the general laws of reproduction we must recognize the Law of *Preference*, which is that 'Thoughts are suggested not merely by force of the general subjective relation subsisting between themselves; they are also suggested in proportion to the relation of interest (from whatever source), in which these stand to the individual mind.'" This seems to throw the matter back to the position in which it was left by Dr. Reid and Mr. Stewart, when they said that there is no possible relation between our ideas which may not be the ground of association, and that different relations will suggest more readily to different minds and under different circumstances.

SECTION II.—*The influence of Association in forming permanent combinations of Thoughts and Feelings.*

The train of thought is made up not merely of ideas or cognitions, but of feelings and every mental mode of which we are conscious. When these are said to be associated in the train of thought, all that is meant is, that we are conscious of them according to a certain order and succession. But the inquiry now is concerning more permanent combinations of thoughts and feelings which take place in accordance with the law of *Association*.

Associated ideas, in this sense of the phrase, are not to be confounded with *complex ideas*. The ideas or notions which we form of

the sensible qualities which co-exist in one object, as an apple, are not said to be associated; because the qualities naturally and really co-exist, and the ideas we have of them, taken together, make up the complex idea we have of the object to which they belong; and none of the ideas can be regarded as the cause or antecedent condition of the rest.

After having tasted an apple, the mere sight of one, without tasting it, may recal the ideas of its smell and flavour. But neither could these ideas be properly called *associated ideas*; because, although they blend and unite with the idea derived from the sight of an apple, still, they are ideas of qualities which really belong to the object perceived.

But, suppose in eating an apple we had made use of a fruit-knife, then a connection is established in our minds between an apple and a fruit-knife; so that, when the idea of the one is present, the idea of the other also will appear; and those two ideas are said to be *associated* in the way of combination.

Or the same kind of connection may be established between two feelings, or between a cognition and a feeling, or between a feeling and a volition,—between any two or more mental movements.

In cutting anything we may have wounded our finger; and afterwards the sight of the knife will raise a sense or feeling of the wound. Having eaten of honey, we have afterwards suffered pain; and, when honey is again presented, there will be a feeling of dislike, and a purpose to abstain from it.

The *Association* which thus takes place between different mental movements is more than mere juxtaposition of separate things. It amounts to a perfect combination or fusion (James Mill, *Analysis*, ch. 3, p. 75). And, as in matter compounds have properties which are not manifested by any of the component parts, in their separate state, so it is in mind: the result of various thoughts and feelings being fused into one whole, may be to produce a new principle, with properties differing from the separate influence of each individual thought and feeling. In this way many *Secondary* and *Factitious* principles of action are formed. (See Hutcheson, *Inquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue*, sect. 6, pts. iii. xi. xii.; Locke, *On the Hum. Understand.*, book ii. ch. 33; Locke, *On the Conduct of the Understand.*, sect. 41; Whewell, *Preface to Mackintosh's Dissert.*, p. 34.)

CHAPTER II.

OF HABIT.

Habit may be defined to be “*a facility* in doing a thing, and an *inclination* to do it, acquired by having done¹² it more or less frequently.” *Custom* or *use* means the doing of a thing frequently. *Habit* is the resultant effect on mind or body, or on both. “How *use* doth breed a *habit* in a man !”

To Habit, as involving a *facility* in doing things which have been done frequently, may be traced all the arts of human life, and all the progress and improvement of which they are susceptible. But it is of Habit, as implying *tendency* or *inclination* to do what has been done frequently, that the moral philosopher takes cognizance.

In many cases, the *tendency* or *inclination* to do what has been done frequently, is distinctly felt; in other cases, we are scarcely conscious of it. The effects of repetition or *Custom* extend to the body as well as to the mind. Bodily limbs and organs acquire strength and activity by being frequently exercised. The effect of repeated indulgence in any kind of food or drink is to create an artificial appetite, which, like a natural appetite, indicates its existence by a state of body. It is in such cases that we are most distinctly conscious of an *inclination* to do what Habit prompts. But even in those cases in which no effect is known to be produced upon the body, and those in which we are not distinctly conscious of it, some obscure inclination of mind or tendency of body may be presumed—otherwise the act would not be done.

Mr. Stewart was of opinion (*Phil. of Hum. Mind*, pt. i. ch. 2), “That those actions which are originally voluntary always continue so; although in the case of operations which are become habitual in consequence of long practice, we may not be able to recollect every different volition.” On the other hand, Dr. Reid has said (*Act. Pow.*, Essay iii. pt. ii. ch. 3), “I conceive it to be a part of our constitution, that what we have been accustomed to do, we acquire not only a facility but a proneness to do on like occasions; so that it requires a particular will or effort to forbear it, but to do it

¹² It may be said that Habits are formed not only by acts of *commission* but by acts of *omission*. Indolence is a habit formed by neglecting to do what should have been done. But the not doing any outward act is the result of an internal act or determination of mind.

requires, very often, *no will at all.*" Dr. Hartley, *On Man*, vol. i. pp. 108, 109) had previously noticed operations, in reference to which the volitions, growing less and less distinct, at length disappeared and became unnecessary. These he called "cases of volitional acts passing into automatic ones." What, in the time of Hartley, was a mere guess or conjecture, not explained by his hypothesis of vibrations, may now be called an ascertained fact; for later researches in physiology have proved that movements, whether bodily or mental, which were at first made in consequence of a volition, come to be self-repeating, and are made without effort or concurrence, and even without consciousness on our part. (Dr. Carpenter, *Physiology*; Dr. Symons *On Habit Physiologically considered*; Sir Gilbert Blane *On Muscular Motion*.)

How it is that we come to have a mental inclination or a bodily tendency to the doing of what has been done frequently, we cannot explain. But we can note the circumstances under which this inclination or tendency grows up—some of the conditions under which the power of Habit is generated.

1. In order to acquire a Habit, it is necessary that the act be repeated at regular and moderate intervals.

It is not enough to know how a thing is to be done; the act must be repeated. By regularly doing so the body seems to acquire a greater pliability and promptitude in seconding the volitions of the agent; and his determinations, at the same time, become more quick and ready.

2. Inclination or tendency may be acquired, and the power of Habit formed, in reference to things the doing of which is not naturally, nor at first, agreeable.

Many of those articles of food and luxury which are enjoyed with so much relish, and sought with so much eagerness, are not naturally, nor at first, agreeable. Many of the arts, and professions, and pursuits of human life, which are at first engaged in with reluctance, come to be prosecuted with satisfaction. *Optimum vitæ genus eligito, nam consuetudo faciet jucundum.*

3. When a Habit has been fully formed, there is not only pleasure in complying with its tendency or power, but pain and difficulty in resisting it. (Arist. *Eth.* lib. ii. cap. 3.)

The formation of a Habit amounts, in many cases, to the creation of an artificial appetite. Now, appetite consists of a sensation of uneasiness and a desire of relief. The gratification of this desire is

accompanied with pleasure, and the denial of it with pain. In like manner, Habits, when fully formed, call, at recurring intervals, for their indulgence; the repetition of the indulgence removes the uneasy feeling, and is accompanied with pleasure; the delay or denial of it prolongs or increases the uneasy feeling. It is in this way that Habit has any power over us, and comes to be a Spring of Action.

4. Habits may be distinguished,—

a. *Objectively*, into *Generic* and *Specific*, according as they are formed in reference to single, isolated acts or indulgences, or in reference to acts which constitute a course of conduct or a mode of living. A life of solitude and retirement, or a life of active employment—a town life or a country life, is made up of a series or train of acts which have a certain affinity, and give rise to Habits which may be called *Generic*. The use of tobacco, or of any particular food, gives rise to a Habit which may be called *Specific*.

b. *Subjectively*, into *Active* and *Passive*, according as the agent is active or passive as to their formation and power. When Habits manifest themselves by an increased facility of acting, they may be called *Active*; and when they manifest themselves by the recurrence of thoughts, and feelings, and inclinations, which come into the mind readily and of course, by reason of their having been there before, they may be called *Passive*. The use, which we gradually acquire, of the organs of speech in speaking, and of the hand in writing, are examples of *Active Habits*. The readiness with which the meaning of words is understood by us, when we read, and when we hear them pronounced, are examples of *Passive Habits*.

5. While practical Habits are formed and strengthened by repetition, the passive impressions connected with them, by being repeated, grow weaker.

Before any voluntary act is done, in the first instance, some object of sense or thought is present to the mind, and some feeling is excited which prompts to action. We are passive under the impression of the feeling, and the feeling grows weaker by being repeated, while, at the same time, the Habit of acting in accordance with the feeling is confirmed. "Perception of danger," says Butler (*Analogy*, pt. i. ch. 5), "is a natural excitement of passive fear and active caution; and, by being inured to danger, Habits of the latter are gradually wrought, at the same time that the former gradually lessens."

6. As practical Habits are formed and strengthened by repetition

of the acts to which they have reference, so they can only be broken off and weakened by intermission of the acts, or by repeated acts of a contrary kind and tendency. Cease to do evil, learn to do well.

Habits of intemperance can only be got the better of by repeated acts of self-denial and restraint. Reflection, or remonstrance and admonition, are of use only in so far as they may lead to a resolution or purpose; but unless the resolution or purpose is carried out into act, nothing is done effectually to break the power of Habit. Yet no delusion is more common than for men to flatter themselves that the power of evil Habit is giving way within them, while yet they are not doing anything which, in accordance with the law by which the Habit was acquired, can have the slightest tendency to accomplish their deliverance. The causes of this mischievous delusion are various.

1. The pause of exhaustion or repletion, which follows a course of vicious indulgence, is mistaken for the sober re-ascendency of reason.
2. The removal of the means of gratifying vicious Habits is mistaken for the decay of their power.
3. The abandoning of one vicious Habit to indulge more freely in some other, which is less scandalous, is mistaken for reformation.

The capacity of acquiring Habits is only to be found in living beings. The acclimatisation of plants has been thought to resemble Habit. The docility of the inferior animals implies the capacity of acquiring Habits. In them, this capacity is limited. In man, it extends to everything, and is most important for good or evil. (Arist. *Eth.*, lib. iii. cap. 5; Kames, *Criticism*, vol. i. ch. 14; Reid, *Act. Pow.*, Essay iii. pt. i. ch. 3; Forsyth, *Mor. Science*, ch. 18; Hutcheson, *Inquiry Concerning Beauty*, sect. 7; Beattie, *Dissert. of Imagination*, ch. 2; Tucker, *Light of Nature*, vol. ii. ch. 31; Locke, *Conduct of Understand.*, sect. 4; Bacon, *Adv. of Learning*, book vii.)

CHAPTER III.

OF HABIT AND INSTINCT.

THERE are several points in which *Habit* and *Instinct* so closely resemble one another that they are liable to be confounded.

1. They are alike in the *promptitude* with which they urge to action. A man under the influence of a well-formed Habit goes through the movements to which it has reference, as promptly as the animal whose movements are stimulated by Instinct.

2. Instinct and Habit are alike in the *power* which they exercise over those who are subject to their sway. An inveterate Habit is almost as difficult to overcome as an implanted Instinct.

3. Instinct and Habit are alike in the *extent* of their sway. For, while the various tribes of animals have their peculiar and appropriate Instincts, the various tribes and families of men have their peculiar customs and manners—that is, Habits or modes of life.

4. It has been thought that, as Instincts are transmitted from one generation to another, so Habits may also be *transmissible*. But this can only be admitted in a very limited sense. Man derives his bodily frame in the way of inheritance; and, in so far as bodily temperament may lead to particular indulgences, or bodily endowment may fit for performing any manual operation with dexterity, the resultant Habits may be said to have been transmitted; but no farther. Indeed, this is just the prime and cardinal distinction between Instinct and Habit.

1. Instinct is implanted, in full form and vigour, from the first; while Habit is acquired by degrees.

2. Instinct belongs to species; Habit to individuals. All bees and all beavers build their cells and their habitations in the same way, all the world over; but men, in different places, follow different plans.

3. Instinct is always useful, and tends to the conservation of the nature in which it is implanted; Habit may grow up in reference to what is hurtful, as well as in reference to what is useful.

4. The natural gratification of Instinct continues to give pleasure; the indulgence of Habit may cease to do so. What a tumult of satisfaction and alacrity pervades a hive of bees, when pursuing their instinctive operations! How dull and listless are men often seen, when complying with their inveterate Habits!

The attempt to reduce Habit to a kind of Instinct derives plausibility from the fact, that while the passive impressions, or feelings, which prompt to action, in the first instance, grow weaker by the repetition of the action, the practical Habit is, at the same time, strengthened and confirmed. Hence it is that things which are done frequently come to be done without any effort of attention,

and almost without consciousness. Habit, when full formed, operates like an Instinct or blind impulse, prompting to an end or action, without any will or intention on the part of the agent. It was this which led Bishop Berkeley (*Siris*, No. 257) to identify the results of Instinct and Habit, and Dr. Reid to classify them together, as principles which he called Mechanical. The similarity of Instinct and Habit is also implied in the common saying, that Custom is a second nature. But this second nature grows up with our consciousness and concurrence; and although it may come, by degrees, to operate like a first nature, still, the fact that the one is a *primitive* tendency, while the other is an *acquired* tendency, is sufficient to distinguish between Instinct and Habit. Instinct is a blind impulse; Habit implies intelligence and will. Instinct is perfect at first; Habit is perfected by degrees. Instinct is confined to an action or train of actions, from which it never deviates, and beyond which it cannot go; Habit may be acquired in doing anything. Instinct is indestructible; Habit may be abandoned. Instinct is the law of mere conservation or continuance; Habit is the law of progress and improvement, and is suited to beings who are intelligent and free, and whose nature is capable of alteration and advancement. Instinct is stereotyped; Habit is movable, and admits of correction and improvement. Sir H. Holland has said, "Though habits contracted in life often assume the character of instincts in their persistence, regularity, and separation from voluntary control, yet must we regard them in their origin and nature as essentially distinct principles of action." (*Chapters on Physiology*, ch. x.)

CHAPTER IV.

OF HABIT AND ASSOCIATION.

CAN the phenomena of Habit and Association be reduced to one law? And, if so, can Habit explain Association, or can Association explain Habit?

Both views have been taken.

1. Can Association explain the phenomena of Habit?

In Barrow's *Works* (vol. iii., 8vo., Lond., 1846, p. 287) there is a Latin thesis, in which it is attempted to show, that Habit is not

different from Memory, which operates under the influence of Association.

Dr. Hartley professes to explain the power of Habit by Association; yet he makes it a necessary condition to the Association of ideas, that they shall have *co-existed a sufficient number of times*.

Mr. Stewart thinks it more philosophical to resolve the power of Habit into the Association of ideas, than to resolve the Association of ideas into Habit (*Phil. of Hum. Mind*, ch. 5). Yet in his *Outlines* (sect. 6) he says that, “The connecting of different thoughts in such a manner that the one seems spontaneously to follow the other, *is the effect of custom*.”

Dr. Brown uses the term Suggestion as synonymous with Association, and says (*Lect. 43*) that, “What is called the power of Habit is Suggestion, and nothing more.”

But the stated and certain way in which the inclination to perform habitual actions recurs, and the greater strength which the inclination gradually acquires, are not accounted for by Suggestion or Association. (Chalmers, *Nat. Theol.*, book iii. ch. 4; Hazlitt, *On Principles of Human Action*, p. 48.)

2. Can Habit explain the phenomena of Association?

Dr. Reid says (*Intell. Pow.*, Essay iv. ch. 4), “That trains of thinking, which, by *frequent repetition*, have become familiar, should spontaneously offer themselves to our fancy, seems to require no other original quality but the power of Habit.”

On this passage Sir W. Hamilton has remarked (*Reid's Works*, p. 387), “We can as well explain Habit by Association, as Association by Habit.”

But may not the phenomena of both be resolved into the effects of one general law, the law of familiarity, repetition, or *Custom*?

All who treat of Memory, Suggestion, or Association, speak of the influence of repetition, familiarity, or *Custom*; and the formation of Habit goes forward under the same influence; so that the phenomena of both may be reduced to the same law. It has been attempted to show this by Dr. Turnbull. (*Principles of Mor. Phil.*, ch. 3.)

He represented Association of ideas as antecedent or ancillary to Habit. But Association of ideas takes place according to the law of repetition or *Custom*, and may be called Habit. There are Habits of memory, Habits of judging, Habits of feeling, and Habits of reasoning, as well as Habits of acting; and although the term Habit

is usually applied to the doing of some overt act, to the carrying of a volition into practical effect, we acquire the proneness and facility of this kind, in the same way, and in accordance with the same law, as that by which we acquire a facility and proneness to follow particular trains of thoughts, or to cherish particular feelings.

The fact of their having been once simultaneously experienced by the mind, is not, in every case, sufficient to establish a permanent association between two or more mental movements; and the fact of having once done an action is not sufficient to form a practical habit of doing it under similar circumstances. So that previous co-existence is the condition under which, rather than the law according to which, Association of ideas and the formation of Habits take place. It gives occasion for the effects of the law of repetition or *Custom* to be manifested. For, let mental movements be frequently experienced at the same time, and an association is established between them; or, let an action be done frequently, and the recurrence of any of the circumstances under which it was done will awaken the desire to do it again. And, as associated ideas recur more easily from the frequency with which they have recurred, so actions done frequently come to be done more easily also; a greater dexterity in doing them, and a stronger desire to do them being the result. (*Gerard On Genius*, pt. ii. sect. 2; *Beattie On Imagination*, ch. 2, sect. 3.)

H A P T E R V.

OF THE FORMATION OF SECONDARY AND FACTITIOUS PRINCIPLES OF ACTION.

THE influence of the law of repetition or *Custom* extends not only to ideas, but to all our thoughts and feelings. When these are said to be *Associated*, it is *now* meant, not merely that they recur in succession to each other, but that they are so perfectly blended that they can no longer be disjoined. And the result of this union or combination is a *Secondary* or *Factitious* principle of action. The formation of such principles takes place in accordance with the law of repetition or *Custom*.

SECTION I.

In a general view, the influence of this law may be seen in *Education*. Man has a nature. That nature has certain original principles and primitive tendencies. The business of education is to draw out these, and to direct and regulate them in the prosecution of their proper objects. And the whole process of teaching and training, *Doctrina* and *Disciplina*, goes on in accordance with the law of repetition or *Custom*.

It is the same with the influence of *Example*. Man is a social being, and delights in the company and converse of his fellow-creatures. He is prone to imitation; and the language, and manners, and conduct of those with whom he is familiarly associated are gradually adopted by him.

Even the general society in which a man lives has an effect upon his character and conduct. What is *fashionable* in dress or ornament, in the way of speaking, or in the mode of living, is associated with ideas of elegance and comfort, and, under the influence of such views, comes to be desired and followed. (Stewart, *Elem. of Phil.*, vol. i. ch. 5.)

Education, *Example*, and *Fashion* are brought to bear upon a man as the member of a family, a community, or a country. But if he be regarded as an individual, similar influences may be seen to be at work, in a similar way, to alter his character and conduct.

From some peculiarity in his *mental constitution*, or in his *bodily temperament*, a man may be more inclined to gratify some one natural desire or passion—by repeated indulgence it may acquire an undue predominance—other parts and principles of his nature will not be developed—his views and feelings will receive a tinge from his practices, and his whole character and conduct may be modified by the pursuits to which he has devoted himself.

A man's *Experience* of life may have been prosperous or adverse—familiar intercourse with the world and the things of the world may have been followed by satisfaction or disappointment—and according to the issue, his views and feelings, his habits and associations, will be cheerful or melancholy, solitary or social.

Health and *Sickness*, when long continued, have a similar effect; in accordance with the same law of Repetition or Custom. And the gradual *decays of age* work similar changes in a man's views

and feelings, and give rise to new thoughts and principles. (Scott, *Intell. Phil.*, ch. v. sect. 2.)

SECTION II.

If more particular illustration be sought, it can be shown, in reference to the several Springs of Action, that they are all liable to be changed in their intensity or direction, and may give place to principles that are altogether Secondary and Factitious.

Instinct, being a blind impulse, admits of little alteration; and the few acts which have been referred to Instinct in man, such as sucking and swallowing, can scarcely be characterized as virtuous or vicious, as right or wrong.

Our *Appetites* may operate instinctively, in the first instance; but in their future gratification, and development, and direction, they are very much under the influence of the law of Repetition. By repeated indulgence they become more frequent and imperious in their demands. Strange and artificial means are employed to gratify them; and by the growing power of Habit, a man may not only become addicted to the gross and frequent indulgence of his Implanted *Appetites*, but may raise up within him a host of Factitious wants, the cravings of which it may be difficult or next to impossible to deny, and the yielding to which may render his whole existence one continued alternation of indulgence and exhaustion, of excitement and prostration. Look at the victims of luxury, in reference to the *Appetite* of food, or the victims of intemperance, in reference to the *Appetite* of drink, and you may see the strange devices to which an original principle, when perverted or abused, may prompt, and the strange captivity to which a rational and responsible being may be reduced, when he allows the power of Evil Habits to acquire dominion over him. The effect of Association, too, is strikingly seen in the choice and use of articles which are selected to gratify our *Appetites*. Different kinds of meat and drink are relished, at different periods of life, by different classes in society, and by the inhabitants of different countries. In all this the influence of Fashion and Custom is very powerfully exhibited.

The way in which Secondary and Factitious *Desires* are formed is thus stated by Mr. Stewart (*Phil. Hum. Mind*, ch. 5, pt. ii. sect. 3): “Whatever conduces to the gratification of any Natural Appetite, or of any natural *Desire*, is itself desired, on account of the end to

which it is subservient; and by being thus *habitually associated*, in our apprehension, with agreeable objects, it frequently comes, in process of time, to be regarded as valuable in itself, independently of its utility. It is thus that wealth becomes, with many, an ultimate object of pursuit; although, at first, it is undoubtedly valued merely on account of its subserviency to the attainment of other objects.

The formation of Secondary or Factitious *Desires* implies the existence of Primary and Natural tendencies towards particular ends or objects. Some, indeed, have denied this, and have attempted to derive all our *Desires* from one general *Desire* of happiness or well-being. But the very notion of happiness implies tendency towards some object, in the attainment of which happiness consists. So that, unless there were primitive tendencies, carrying us towards particular ends, the very notion of happiness or well-being in general could not be framed.

Factitious and Secondary *Desires* may also arise from *Desires* which are Natural and Primary having received a singular direction or an excessive indulgence. The *Desire* of Society may degenerate into a love of frivolity and amusement, altogether at variance with its primary and proper end and use. The *Desire* of power, instead of manifesting itself by exercising influence over others, may degenerate into oppression and tyranny.

And, when our Natural *Desires* have been thwarted or crossed, they may give rise to principles very different in their tendency. Ambition, when sated or disappointed, may give place to disgust or melancholy; and the love of society may be succeeded by misanthropy and love of solitude.

The *Passions* are peculiarly liable, when indulged to excess, to be altered in their aspect and tendency. The *Passion* of love, after leading to the most absurd extravagancies, has ended in utter loathing of the beloved object. Fear, when too easily and frequently yielded to, degenerates into pusillanimity; and, instead of guarding against danger, fancies it where it is not.

Factitious and Secondary *Passions* may be generated in reference either, 1. To things towards which there is a Natural tendency; or, 2. To things towards which there is no Natural tendency.

1. Our Natural Feelings of the Sublime and Beautiful are not so strong nor permanent as to be called Passions. But, when frequently and vividly excited, they may acquire this form and character. And

hence we speak of a *Passion* for Music, a *Passion* for Painting, a *Passion* for Statuary. The germ of all these is in our Natural sense of the Sublime and Beautiful, which, by being cultivated, expands in different directions, and gives birth to principles which prompt and influence the formation of many an accomplished character, and the pursuits and enjoyments of many a happy life.

2. The characteristic of *Passion* is to stir and agitate the mind. The excitement may not be free from pain, but to many it is full of pleasure. Hence it is that their plan of life is adventurous and bold, and full of alternate hopes and fears. Not satisfied with the amount of uncertainty and excitement to be met with in the ordinary course of human affairs, some seek to increase it, and voluntarily expose themselves to risks from which they are naturally free, in order that they may experience that mental tumult which attends them. In this way, Gambling, Hunting, Horse-racing, and other practices and pursuits, of which some are *passionately* fond, may be said to arise. There is no natural nor primary tendency carrying us to these particular things. But that excitement which is incidental to the working of our *Passions* is awakened by them. By Repetition that excitement becomes more vivid and more necessary. Pleasing associations of various kinds gather round such practices and pursuits, and the *passion* for them, although Secondary and Factitious, usurps a place and obtains an attention from many, which they will not give to things of primary and paramount interest and importance.

The power of Habit and the influence of Association are very obvious in reference to the *Affections*.

The *Malevolent Affections*, when frequently or long indulged, acquire a strength and inveteracy which alter their nature and use, and cause them to extend, beyond their original object, to every person that can in any way be associated or connected with him. "A man," says Locke (*Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book ii. ch. 33), "receives a sensible injury from another, thinks on the man and that action over and over, and by ruminating on them strongly or much in his mind, so cements these two ideas together that he makes them almost one; never thinks on the man, but the pain and displeasure he suffered come into his mind with it, so that he scarce distinguishes them, but has as much aversion for the one as the other. Thus, hatreds are often begotten upon slight and almost innocent occasions, and quarrels propagated and continued in the

world." It is in the same way that party spirit in religion, in politics, and in philosophy is engendered. And many of those unreasonable antipathies and dislikes which mar the beauty of individual character and the happiness of social life are to be accounted for in a similar way. The difference between a hasty and vindictive and a mild and placable disposition may depend, not so much on original difference of constitution and temperament, as on making a wise and happy use of the laws of Association, and turning our thoughts from what is irritating and painful to what is soothing and cheerful.

The *Benevolent Affections* are very much strengthened by exercise. The *passive impressions* may grow weaker, but the *practical principles* of Compassion and Charity grow stronger. If, instead of drawing fancy pictures of distress, we seek out and try to relieve the sad realities of suffering which are around us in the world, we may not shed such copious floods of tears, nor manifest so much visible emotion as those to whom these things are strange, but there will grow up in us a more quick and generous sensibility to the wants and woes of others,—a skill and success in administering to them, and a perseverance and energy, accompanied by a kindliness and dexterity, in our endeavours to mitigate and remove them, which, when compared with our first vague, and uneasy, and undirected feelings of Pity, may be called *new principles of action*.

Esteem and Respect, Gratitude and Friendship, are *Benevolent Affections*, which will be strengthened by new and repeated evidence of worth, and excellence, and kindness. But not only will these *Affections* grow stronger in themselves, and in reference to their proper objects, they will run over, so to speak, upon other things, and give rise to Secondary and Factitious feelings. When we highly esteem any one, we are led to value other things on account of their connection with him. The respect which we cherish towards an individual is extended to his profession or his office. Our gratitude towards our benefactor reaches to those who share his blood or participate in his kindness. Friendship is often cherished to the third or fourth generation.

The *Affections of Kindred and Country* are *Natural*—that is, they arise from the constitution of the human mind and the circumstances of the human condition; yet in their growth and development they are very much under the influence of Association and Habit. But for this influence the place of our birth, the haunts of

our youth, the scenes of our full-grown activity, and the grave of our expected rest, would have failed to touch us. Parent and guardian, kinsman and friend, might have been put far away from us without emotion; and, dull and prone as the inferior animals, we must have passed through life, looking only to the earth that was to satisfy our present and urgent wants. More dull even than the inferior animals must we have been; for they have some dim and shadowy associations, and some touch of that nobility of nature which they engender. "The ox knoweth his owner, and the ass his master's crib."

The *Affections of Kindred* will be fully and warmly developed in one who has been the child of many anxious prayers and hopes—the representative of a long line of ancestry—the heir of large and fair possessions—the object of watchful guardianship, and who proves himself, by his honourable and virtuous success, worthy of the kindness and care which have been shown to him. On the other hand, these *Affections* will be chilled and checked in the case of him who has been committed from infancy to the cold and hireling care of strangers, and has had to struggle through life with the suspicion and jealousy, the rivalry and envy of others. Yet even in him the *Affections of Kindred*, though deprived of their natural objects, will find others upon which to fix their tendrils. The child who has never known a mother clings fondly to the bosom of the nurse who suckles him. The boy whom death has bereaved of a brother bestows a warmer affection on his chosen companion; and with him Friendship has in it somewhat of the blood-heat which belongs to the *Affections of Kindred*. So strong is the yearning of the human heart for objects on which to set its affections, that, in the absence of beings like himself, man will lavish his kindness upon the inferior animals; and even upon such of them as, but for the peculiar circumstances of his condition, he would have regarded with indifference or loathing. The goat and the spider are animals that do not naturally attract our regards; yet by the force of Custom they have become objects of affection to the solitary wanderer and the dungeon captive.

Disposition is a bias or proneness to act in accordance with some principles rather than others. And when this bias is frequently yielded to, it becomes more fixed and steady, and assumes the form and power of a separate principle. Long-continued good health, a course of worldly prosperity, and the kindness and respect of friends,

should encourage an open-hearted and generous Disposition. Sick-
ness, adversity and neglect may, on the contrary, make the temper
sour, morose, and melancholy.

“ Manners with Fortune, Tempers change with Times.”

It only remains to notice that the *Opinions* or conclusions to which men come concerning the objects and events of ordinary life are formed under the influence of Education, Authority, Example, Fashion, and Popularity. The world, it is said, is governed by *Opinion*. But this power by which the world is governed is very much of its own making. And in nothing is the extensive influence of Association and Habit—that is, the effect of the law of Repetition or *Custom*—more clearly seen than in the different *Opinions* which, according to a difference of circumstances, prevail in different countries, and communities, and professions, and individuals. (Hutcheson *On the Passions*, sect. 1; King, *Essay on Evil, Prelim. Dissert.*, p. 42; Tucker, *Light of Nature*, chapter on Translation or Transference.)

BOOK II.

OF THE GUIDES OF HUMAN ACTION.

“ Inter hominem et belluam hoc maxime interest, quod hæc tantum, quantum sensu movetum, ad id solum, quod adest, quodque præsens est, se accommodat, paullulum admodum sentiens præteritum aut futurum. Homo autem, quod rationis est particeps, per quam consequentia cernit, causas rerum videt, earumque progressus, et quasi antecessiones non ignorat, similitudines comparat, et rebus præsentibus adjungit atque annexit futuras; facile totius vitæ cursum videt, ad eamque degendam præparat res necessarias.”—CICERO, *De Officiis*, lib. i. cap. 4.

“ That principle by which we survey, and either approve or disapprove our own heart, temper, and actions, is not only to be considered as what is in its turn to have some influence—which may be said of every passion, of the lowest appetite; but likewise as being superior, as from its very nature manifestly claiming superiority over all others; insomuch that you cannot form a notion of this faculty, Conscience, without taking in judgment, direction, superintendency. This is a constituent part of the idea—that is, of the faculty itself: and to preside and govern, from the very economy and constitution of man, belongs to it. Had it strength, as it has right; had it power, as it has manifest authority, it would absolutely govern the world.”—BUTLER, *Sermon II., On Human Nature*.

AMONG the various springs of Action there is no subordination nor government; but each, in its turn, prompts to its own particular end or gratification, and is satisfied for a time when that has been gained; and not till it has been gained. A creature with no other principles of action but such as have been denominated Springs, would be hurried impulsively from one thing to another, without any scheme of life or plan of conduct; and without being able to resist or control the impulse which was strongest at the time. Such seem to be the nature and condition of the inferior animals. They are altogether under the influence of sense and feeling, and are carried from one object, or one act, to another, according to the impulse which is strongest, and without deliberation or free choice.

But the nature and condition of man are altogether different. He

is subject, no doubt, to many incitements, which prompt him to act with quick and decisive impulse. But, even in doing so, he is not hurried blindly headlong. He has light and power within him, which enable him both to see his way, and how to walk in it. In short, man has not only principles which *impel* him to act, but also principles which *direct* and *regulate* his actions. He has not only *Springs*, but also *Guides* of action; and it is to the consideration of these latter that we now come.

The principles which assume the guidance and assert a control over human conduct are chiefly two, namely, Reason and Conscience. The ends at which they aim are, what is Advantageous and what is Right. In prosecuting the former, we are said to act from a Sense of Prudence, and in prosecuting the latter, from a Sense of Duty.

These two principles are so very much alike, that, by many, they have been regarded as one and the same. The ends at which they aim coincide; and what is Right is also Advantageous. Reason and Conscience resemble each other, in their nature and operation, as powers or faculties of the mind; carrying us forward with deliberation and calmness, in the course of action to which they point. But, notwithstanding the resemblance and affinity between them, they are two distinct principles. What seems Advantageous may differ from what seems Right. To act from a regard to Interest is one thing; to act from a sense of Duty is another thing; and, therefore, it will be proper to treat of them separately.

CHAPTER I.

OF A SENSE OF PRUDENCE, OR A REGARD TO WHAT IS ADVANTAGEOUS.

THIS is a principle which can be found only in a rational being. Appetite and Desire, Passion and Affection, in themselves considered, are mere states of feeling, moving us to act in one way. But when we act from a Regard to what is most for our Advantage, we contemplate ourselves as ends, and other things as means subordinate to us, and select and employ them accordingly; that is, we act reasonably, or employ the faculties which belong to us rational beings. Without the powers of Understanding and Reason we could not frame the

conception of what is most for our advantage, nor make it the end or aim of our actions. It is common, indeed, to say that every living creature naturally seeks what is best for it. But brutes seek it blindly, under the impulse of sense and feeling; and without knowing that what they thus tend towards constitutes the perfection of their nature, and the happiness of their condition. It is the prerogative of man, above the inferior animals, to know what is most for his advantage, and, knowing it, to seek it. This he does in virtue of those powers of intelligence and reflection which are generally comprehended under the name of Reason.

According to Dr. Reid (*Act. Pow.*, Essay iii. pt. iii. ch. 1), Reason has, in all ages, been conceived to have two offices—to *regulate our belief*, and to *regulate our actions and conduct*. As it discharges one or other of these two offices, Reason may be distinguished into Speculative and Practical. As Speculative, Reason is Constitutive, and furnishes and determines our knowledge; as Practical, it is Regulative, and directs and governs our conduct. “To judge of what is true or false in speculative points,” says Dr. Reid (*Act. Pow.*, Essay iii. pt. iii. ch. 2), “is the office of *Speculative Reason*; and to judge of what is good or ill for us upon the whole, is the office of *Practical Reason*.”

It is Reason, as discharging the latter of these two functions, that is now to be considered, so that the sense in which the phrase *Practical Reason* is here employed, is different from that in which it is employed in the philosophy of Kant. By the *Practical Reason*, Kant denoted Conscience, or the Moral Faculty; that is, Reason,¹ revealing to us the Moral Law, and begetting a feeling of reverence for that law—evolving the idea of what is Right, and giving birth to a sense of our obligation to do it. But in the phrase *Practical Reason*, as employed by Dr. Reid, Reason is regarded as contemplating what has been found to be agreeable or disagreeable, useful or hurtful, and, on the ground of experience, coming to some general conclusion or conception of what is most for our advantage, in accordance with which we may regulate our conduct in particular cases.

That men, in general, frame some conception of what is most Advantageous for them, or that they have some leading idea or

¹ “Reason is *Theoretic* when it applies itself to the objects of our knowledge, whether they belong to the order of nature or to that of speculation. Reason is *Prac-*

tical when it determines and fixes the exercise of our moral and appetitive faculties.”
—*Criticism of Practical Reason*, p. 6.

scheme by which the tenor of their conduct should be regulated, will not be denied. It seems to be the natural or necessary result of placing rational beings in a world like this, where they are liable to feel pleasure and pain, and to experience good and evil, with the consequent desire to seek the one and to shun the other. During the stirring and thoughtless period of youth, pleasure and pain, good and evil, may come and go, without leaving any lasting lesson behind them. Unmindful of the past, and careless of the future, men may, for a season, yield to the random influence of fancy and feeling. But in beings "endowed with such large discourse of Reason, looking before and after," a period of reflection must come sooner or later. Under the teaching of experience they will learn to pause and to deliberate, to weigh actions and their consequences, and to adopt that course of conduct which promises, on the whole, to be productive of the greatest advantage.

If, in the course of experience and on the ground of experience, men come to frame some conclusion or conception as to what is best or most Advantageous for them, on the whole, then it is obvious to remark—

1. That this conclusion, or conception, will prove a principle of action, and have an influence in directing and regulating their conduct.

As beings possessed of a sensitive nature, and susceptible of pleasure and pain, we no sooner know anything which gives us feelings of the former kind than we call it good, and have a desire to obtain it; and anything which gives us feelings of the latter kind we regard as evil, and seek to avoid. In like manner, those things which, though they may not directly give us feelings of pleasure or pain, yet do contribute to our happiness or misery, we call useful or hurtful, advantageous or disadvantageous, and have a correspondent desire to seek or to shun them. *Knowing* is different from *Feeling*; but in beings who are capable of feeling, the knowledge of what is likely to affect their susceptibility of pleasure or pain, naturally, perhaps necessarily, stirs some degree of emotion, and leads them to desire and endeavour to obtain the one and to avoid the other. It is plain, then, that such actions, and courses of action, as are contemplated as likely to give more pleasure than pain, to bring more advantage than disadvantage, will be done, and persevered in, by all who have come to any conclusion or conception as to what is best for them on the whole. Present pleasure will be weighed in

the balance against future pain, and temporary inconvenience against permanent benefit, and men will act upon the principle of securing the greatest amount of advantage.

2. A regard to what is Advantageous on the whole will, when entertained, not only prove a principle of action, but a superior and governing principle.

It is a principle different in nature from, and superior in kind to, the incitements of Appetite and Passion. It operates, not blindly nor impulsively, but calmly and with deliberation. It opposes itself to the violence of Appetite and Passion, and takes a careful survey of actions and their consequences; setting one thing over against another. When men act under the influence of this principle, guarding against the errors into which they see others fall, correcting such as they may have made themselves, and cautiously and prudently regulating their conduct, so as to avoid the pains and inconveniences to which they are here exposed, and to secure the greatest possible amount of advantage, they are exercising their powers in the way and to the end for which they were intended, and are acting agreeably to their nature as rational beings. In addition to the advantages which result directly from such conduct, they feel a degree of self-satisfaction and self-gratulation, by which the enjoyment of these advantages is greatly enhanced. They commend and applaud themselves as having acted a prudent and becoming part, and rejoice that they have been able to keep the inferior and more turbulent principles of their nature in subjection to the calm and more authoritative dictates of reason. On the other hand; when men yield to the importunity of Appetite, or to the impetuosity of Passion, when they disregard the counsels of Prudence, and hurry on in a course of conduct which is foolish and hurtful, they are sure, when the season of exhaustion and reflection has arrived, to be filled with shame and self-dissatisfaction, as having acted in a manner unsuitable and disproportioned to their rational nature. (Butler, *Sermon II., On Human Nature, Whewell's Edition*, Nos. 35, 36.)

It thus appears that, in a Rational being, Prudence, or a Regard to what is Advantageous, is a principle of action, and should be a guiding and governing principle of action. "*Ratio habet in se quiddam amplum atque magnificum, ad imperandum magis quam ad parendum, accomodatum.*" (Cicero, *De Finibus*, lib. ii. cap. 14.) "*Ratio praesit, appetitus vero obtemperet.*" (Cicero, *De Offic.*, lib. i.

cap. 28.) This principle may, and should, bring other principles into subjection. The conduct to which it prompts will be, when fairly followed out, in accordance with the nature and condition of man, and will tend to promote his true happiness and his best interest. Still, however, mere Prudence, or an enlightened self-love, cannot be set up as the supreme guide and ultimate arbiter of human actions.

Some of the defects of this principle have been pointed out by Dr. Reid (*Act. Pow.*, Essay iii. pt. iii. ch. 4); and other views of its inadequacy may be added.

1. The influence of this principle does not extend directly to the whole of human conduct.

Prudence, or an enlightened self-love, may lead directly to the performance of many of the duties which a man owes to himself, in promoting his own comfort and advantage. But it has only a remote and indirect influence in leading to the performance of the social and benevolent duties. The discharge of these latter sometimes demands the sacrifice of our own ease and advantage; and, though the sacrifice may be attended with a satisfaction which more than compensates for it, this satisfaction cannot be enjoyed by those who are conscious that, in doing good to others, they were animated chiefly by a desire to promote their own advantage.

2. This principle does not confer the true character of virtue on those actions which flow from it.

The wise and prudent men of the world—they who are animated by an exclusive regard to their own advantage—may be sober and temperate, cautious and discreet, slow to anger and ready to overlook a fault, and may do many things that are lovely and of good report. But, when it is seen that their conduct proceeds from a predominating love of self, and that they walk in paths which are parallel to those of virtue, from the belief that these paths are the safest and the best, our approbation and esteem are diminished. Even they who do good from benevolent and disinterested motives may yet fail in commanding that respect and esteem which are due only to the truly virtuous. While full of kindness, they may be deficient in patience and discretion, and thus mar the amiableness and advantage of their benevolence. By carelessness or folly they may bring themselves into difficulty and danger; and by the indiscriminate and thoughtless diffusion of their liberality, may do more harm than good to others. Prudence may be a virtue, and Bene-

volence may be a virtue; but the essence and formal nature of virtue must lie in something common to both, and to every other virtue. Neither one nor other can give its true dignity and worth to human conduct. Both must be cultivated, in subordination to a higher principle. Virtue must be loved and practised for its own sake, before the human character can reach its true elevation. Prudence, as leading to our own advantage, and Benevolence, as promoting the advantage of others, must be followed, not for the sake of that advantage, but because both are so far right and virtuous. It is only when so followed that they can promote the true perfection and happiness of a rational nature.

3. This principle is not adequate to advance to the utmost the perfection and happiness of human beings.

He who makes his own advantage the chief and ultimate aim of all his actions, may seem to take the surest and the shortest way to secure his happiness. But it is not so. The very anxiety and effort to secure it are self-defeating. Epicurus maintained that Prudence is an anxious and a troublesome virtue. "Disengagement is absolutely necessary to enjoyment; and a person may have so steady and fixed an eye upon his interest, whatever he places it in, as may hinder him from attending to many gratifications within his reach, which others have their minds free and open to." (Butler, *Sermon on the Love of our Neighbour*.) Repose and satisfaction are not likely to be the lot of him who has no sooner obtained one advantage than he sets off in pursuit of another, or who has only surmounted one difficulty to encounter a second; and who, even when his plans and exertions are most successful, fears that they may suddenly meet with interruption or disappointment. "The happy man," says Dr. Reid, "is not he whose happiness is his only care."

4. This principle cannot furnish a clear nor safe rule of human conduct.

It is not easy to determine rightly, in every case, what is most Advantageous. Discussions as to what constitutes the chief good of man have terminated in very different conclusions; and these have had little practical influence upon human conduct. If this principle were their supreme guide, men would be left to act according to their shifting views of expediency. Betwixt ignorance of what is best to be done, in many cases, and the urgency of desire and the eloquence of passion, pleading for their gratification, men

would have no clear nor sure guide for their conduct; and would yield, by turns, to the counsels of caution and the impulses of folly. Nor could they be severely blamed for doing so, as it may be remarked, that—

5. This principle is deficient in authority, and carries with it no sense of obligation.

It may *counsel*, but it cannot *command*. It may lay down a *rule*, but it cannot impose a *law*. “The idea of a law implies something external and superior to the person, something universal, which comprehends and governs the individual. That which is personal, not being superior to the person, cannot in any way oblige.” (Jouffroy, *Droit Nat.*, tom. i. p. 81.) The general rule is supposed to be that we are to do what is most Advantageous. But who are the judges? Ourselves? Our judgment as to what is best may not always be clear; and in such cases we may feel at liberty to do what is Agreeable, rather than what is Advantageous, or to prefer a less advantage to a greater. Such conduct, it is admitted, is foolish. But, on the supposition that we are accountable to no higher tribunal than that of our own mind, we may take the matter into our own hand, seek happiness after our own fashion, and follow pleasure in the way we like best. There must, therefore, for the practical government of human life, be some principle of more authority than a regard to what is Advantageous; some rules of greater clearness and force than those which are derived from calculations of expediency. There must be, as the guide of human conduct, some superior principle, having a just title to enforce submission to its intimations. We see men, in some cases, sacrificing their own interest for the good of others, and parting with advantages which they have gained, for the sake of doing what appears to be their duty. And in such cases they approve themselves and are approved by others. This could not be, unless there were a higher principle, to which self-love, even in its most reasonable form, is altogether subordinate. And,

Lastly. As this principle of a Regard to what is Advantageous does not carry obligation with it, it gives no ground for the rights and duties of social life.

Obligation and Right are correlative. It is only when I am under obligation to do an action that my neighbour has any right to expect or demand that I shall do it. So that, if private interest, well understood, were admitted to be the supreme principle of

human conduct, the rights and duties of social life would need only to be acknowledged and discharged, in so far as might be judged consistent with individual happiness and advantage. But man has not only a rational, but also a moral nature. He can judge not merely between what is Advantageous and Disadvantageous, but also between what is Right, and Wrong. He sees not only what is best for him to do, in given circumstances, but also what is binding upon him, in all circumstances; not merely what is productive of benefit, but also what is promotive of the perfection of his nature.

"A man is prudent," says Dr. Reid, "when he consults his real interest; but he cannot be virtuous, if he has no regard to duty."

CHAPTER II.

OF A SENSE OF DUTY, OR A REGARD TO WHAT IS RIGHT.

It is now proposed to show that man has a moral nature, or, in other words, that he discerns a difference between Right and Wrong; and thus is capable of acting from a Sense of Duty—a principle distinct from, and superior to, a Sense of Prudence.

That we have a Sense of Duty is certain, from experiencing it in ourselves, and recognizing it in each other. (See Butler, *Dissert. on Virtue, and Sermons on Hum. Nature*; Reid, *Act. Pow.*, Essay iii. pt. iii. ch. 5.)

- I. On appealing to Consciousness, it will be found—
 1. That we have ideas of Right and Wrong, and do some actions, and refrain from doing other actions, from a Sense of Duty.
 2. That we experience feelings of satisfaction, or self-approbation, when we do what is Right, and feelings of dissatisfaction, or self-condemnation, when we do what is Wrong.
 3. That the feelings of Resentment, excited by an injury, and of Gratitude, awakened by a benefit, are analogous to our feelings of self-approbation or self-condemnation; and imply the discernment of Right and Wrong, in reference to actions done to us. (Shaftesbury, *Moralists*, pt. iii. sect. 2; Chalmers, *Sketches of Mor. and Ment.* . viii.; Reid, *Act. Pow.*, Essay v. ch. 5.)
- I. From observation of the conduct of others, it appears—

1. That the difference between actions as Right and Wrong is made from the earliest years. Children always passionately interest themselves on that side where kindness and humanity are found; and detest the cruel, the covetous, the selfish, or the treacherous. (*Hutcheson, Inquiry concerning Moral Good and Evil*, sect. iv.) And in all their sports and amusements, young persons make frequent appeals to a sense of what is fair and honourable, or Right.

2. That the difference between Right and Wrong is implied in the ordinary intercourse and business of life. Men believe in testimony, trust to promises, and enter into contracts with one another, on the understanding that the duties of faithfulness and truth, and the evil and baseness of perfidy and deceit, are universally acknowledged.

3. That, in all languages, words expressive of the difference between Right and Wrong have been found, and Essays and Treatises written, to illustrate this difference; while the events and characters of history have been described in corresponding terms of approbation or disapprobation. “Had nature made no such distinction, founded on the original frame and constitution of the mind, the words *honourable* and *shameful*, *lovely* and *odious*, *noble* and *despicable*, never had had place in any language; nor could politicians, had they invented these terms, ever have been able to render them intelligible, or make them convey any idea to the audience.” (*Hume, Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals*, sect. 5.)

4. That in the very existence of civil society there is a recognition of the difference between Right and Wrong. In the reverence which is paid to the social compact—a compact which is implied rather than expressed—in the reluctance with which men rise against the established order of things, even when it is felt to be oppressive—and in the respect shown to artificially or legally created rights and interests—there is implied the belief, that underlying and upholding all these, there is a fundamental difference between what is Right and Wrong.

5. That the uniformity of human laws proves the moral nature of man. Under all the forms of law and government which have obtained in the world, it will be found that the great principles of natural justice have been acknowledged. “Lawgivers and statesmen,” says Sir James Mackintosh (*Discourse on the Law of Nature and Nations*), “but above all, moralists and political philosophers, may plainly discover, in all the useful and beautiful variety of

be loudly and strongly condemned. (See Hume, *Essay* xxi. pt. i.; also a *Dialogue* at the end of his *Essay on the Principles of Morals*; Foissac, *Sur l'Influence des Climats sur l'Homme*, 8vo., Paris, 1837; Montesquieu, *Spirit of Laws*; Charron, *De la Sagesse*, livre i. ch. 37.)

The *Customs and Manners* of a country have also a silent, but powerful, influence, in blinding or biassing the moral judgments of the inhabitants.

Law and Government, in preserving public peace and promoting the public good, may, sometimes, be under the necessity of permitting, or perhaps sanctioning, measures which are not strictly just; and may thus affect public opinion and public principle.

Wrong views of the character of God and the condition of man have led the followers of false religions into the most absurd and immoral practices; and the power of true religion has not always been sufficient to restrain men from the excesses of bigotry and persecution.

It deserves also to be remarked, that actions which are Wrong, and admitted to be Wrong, in themselves, by those who do them, may be done to avoid some apprehended evil, or to obtain some expected good. By the laws of Solon and Lycurgus, deformed and sickly children were killed, to prevent the increase of a burdensome and useless population. The practice of exposing the aged, or of putting them to an unnatural death, originated in the intention to avoid, or shorten, the evils and infirmities of age. The Thug is supported in his trade of murder by the belief, that, by every victim which he slays, he is rendering more propitious the Goddess of Destruction, to whose service he is devoted. And even he who has persecuted, in the name of Christ, may have thought that, in doing so, he was doing both God and man service. These are instances, therefore, not of the *absence*, but of the *aberration* of the Moral Faculty.

All the parts of the human constitution are liable to variation and disorder. "Men's palates differ much," says Dr. Hutcheson, "but who denies a sense of tasting to be natural?" A spectacle which strikes one man with horror, does not move another man. A favour is received coldly by one man, while it throws another into transports of gratitude. But, surely, the capacity of being affected by good and by evil must be admitted to be natural to man. He is a rational being; but how often are his actions at variance with the dictates of reason. The absurd practices which

prevail in the world, are as good arguments to prove that man is destitute of Reason, as the immoral practices which prevail are to prove that he has not a Moral nature.

All men, in all ages, and in all places, have not agreed to call the *same* actions Right and the *same* actions Wrong: but all men, not destitute of the original and essential elements of their nature, have agreed to call *some* actions Right, and *some* actions Wrong; and they could not have done so without having the ideas of Right and Wrong—that is, without having a Moral Faculty.

Observations tending to show how different nations come to form different moral judgments, may be found in Shaftesbury, *Inquiry concerning Virtue*; Price, *Review of the Principal Questions and Difficulties in Morals*, ch. 7; Hutcheson, *Inquiry concerning Moral Good and Evil*, sect. 4; Stewart, *Act. and Mor. Pow.*, vol. i. p. 177; Dr. Thos. Brown, *Lect. 74*; and Adam Smith, in his *Theory of Mor. Sent.*, pt. v. ch. 2, treats of the influence of custom and fashion upon our moral sentiments; and of the influence of fortune upon the sentiments of mankind with regard to the merit or demerit of actions, pt. ii. sect. 3.

Inquiries into the Principles of Morals have reference chiefly to two great questions. First, What is Conscience? and Second, What is Virtue? All inquiries into the powers or capacities by which we discriminate between Right and Wrong, belong to the first question—the answer to which should contain a *Theory of our Moral Sentiments*. All inquiries into that, in action and in disposition, of which the Moral Faculty approves, belong to the second question, which is concerning the nature of Virtue, or what might be distinctively called the *Foundation of Morals or of Virtue*.

These two questions are quite distinct, although they have frequently been confounded. They have been confounded by Paley (*Mor. and Polit. Phil.*, compare book i. ch. 5, with book ii. ch. 6), and also by Bentham (*Principles of Morals and Legislation*, compare ch. 1 with ch. 2). Indeed, Sir James Mackintosh has remarked (*Dissert.*, sect. 1) that “The discrimination has seldom been made by Moral Philosophers; the difference between the two problems has never been uniformly observed by any of them; and they have been not rarely altogether confounded by very eminent men, to the

destruction of all just conception, and of all correct reasoning, in this most important and perhaps most difficult of sciences." The difference between the two problems has been indicated by Hutcheson, *Inquiry concerning Moral Good and Evil*, at the beginning; Adam Smith, *Theory of Mor. Sent.*, pt. vii. sect. 1; Reid, *Act. Pow.*, Essay iii. pt. iii. ch. 5; Stewart, *Phil. of the Act. and Mor. Pow.*, book ii. ch. 5.

The difference amounts to the difference which is now commonly taken between what is *Objective* and what is *Subjective*.³ When we endeavour to find an answer to the question, What is Conscience? our inquiries are into the *Subjective*—that is, man; or those powers and capacities of his nature by which he is constituted a moral being, capable of making a distinction between Right and Wrong. When we seek an answer to the question, What is Virtue? our inquiries are directed towards the *Objective*; or that, in action and in disposition, which is presented to the Moral Faculty, and appreciated by it. As in external perception there is the subjective power in man by which he perceives, and also the quality in the object which is perceived; so in moral perception there is the power or faculty in man by which he discerns between Right and Wrong, and there is that, in action or in disposition, which is discerned. But as, in reference to external perception, it has been maintained that there are no outward objects, or qualities, to be perceived, and that the mind frames to itself ideas which it contemplates as realities; so, in reference to moral perception, it has been held that there is no real difference between Right and Wrong, and that the mind frames and applies conceptions of this kind arbitrarily. It is plain, however, that to ask, *How* do we perceive? and *What* do we perceive? is to

³ *Objective* is now used to describe the absolute, independent state of a thing; but by the elder metaphysicians it was applied to the aspect of things as objects of sense or understanding. So Berkeley: "Natural phenomena are only natural appearances. They are, therefore, such as we see and perceive them. Their *real* and *objective* natures are, therefore, one and the same." *Siris*, a. 292, where *real* and *objective* are expressly distinguished. (See Fitzgerald, *Notes to Aristotle*, p. 191, svo., Dublin, 1850.)

With Aristotle, ὑποκείμενον signified the subject of a proposition and also substance. The Latins translated it *subjectum*. In Greek, object is δικτυακέμενον, translated

oppositum. In the Middle Ages, *subject* meant substance, and has this sense in Descartes and Spinoza; sometimes also in Reid. *Subjective* is used by Will. Occam to denote that which exists independent of mind—*Objective*, that which the mind feigns. This shows what is meant by *realitas objectiva* in Descartes (Med. 3). Kant and Fichte have inverted the meanings. *Subject*, is the mind which knows—*Object*, that which is known. *Subjective*, the varying condition of the knowing mind—*Objective*, that which is in the constant nature of the thing known. See Trendelenburg, *Notes to Aristotle's Logic*, p. 61, svo., Berol., 1842.)

put two different questions; and our inquiries concerning the two questions can be prosecuted *satisfactorily* only by being prosecuted *separately*.

CHAPTER III.

OF CONSCIENCE, OR THE MORAL FACULTY.

Or late years, and by the best authors, the following terms and phrases—namely, *Moral Faculty*, *Moral Judgment*, *Faculty of Moral Perception*, *Moral Sense*, *Conscience*—have all been employed to denote that faculty, or combination of faculties, by which we have ideas of Right and Wrong, and correspondent feelings of praise and blame. This faculty, or combination of faculties, is called into exercise, not only in reference to our own character and conduct, but also in reference to the character and conduct of others; and is not merely reflective, but also prospective, in its operation.

With reference to their views of the nature and constitution of the Moral Faculty, modern philosophers may be arranged in two great schools or sects. The difference between them rests on the prominence and precedence which they assign to Reason or to Feeling, in the exercise of the Moral Faculty; and their respective Theories may be distinctively designated the *Intellectual Theory* and the *Sentimental Theory*. A brief view of the principal arguments in support of each may be found in Hume's *Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals*, sect. 1. But it will be proper to notice the various Forms which the two Theories have been made to assume, by the respective advocates of each.

SECTION I.—*Sentimental Theory.*

Among English philosophers, the earliest indications of the doctrine of a Moral Sense are to be found in the writings of Lord Shaftesbury—*Inquiry concerning Virtue*, book i. pt. ii. sect. 3; also, pt. iii. sect. 1; and, *The Moralists*, sect. 2.

The sum of these passages, on this point, is, That, as we have a natural sense, or feeling, of what is beautiful, in the works of nature and of art, so, in reference to action and disposition, we have a natural sense, or feeling, of what is fair and becoming, or foul and deformed.

and are pleased with, and approve of, the one, and are displeased with, and condemn, the other.

But the great advocate of the doctrine of a Moral Sense, in modern times, was Dr. Hutcheson. He seems to have been, in some measure, sensible of the inadequacy of Mr. Locke's account of the sources of our ideas; and maintained that, in addition to those which we have by means of Sensation and Reflection, we also acquire ideas by means of certain powers of perception, which he called internal and reflex senses. According to his Psychology, our powers of perception may be called *direct* or *antecedent*, and *consequent* or *reflex*. We hear a sound, or see colour, by means of senses which operate directly on their objects; and do not suppose any antecedent perception. But we perceive the harmony of sound, and the beauty of colour, by means of faculties which operate reflexly, or in consequence of some preceding perception. And the Moral Sense was regarded by him as a faculty of this kind. Reflection, from which, according to Mr. Locke, we derive the simple ideas of the passions and affections of mind, was considered by Hutcheson as an *internal* sense or faculty, operating *directly*. But that faculty by which we perceive the beauty or deformity, the virtue or vice, of these passions and affections, was called by Hutcheson a *reflex, internal* sense. (*Illustrations of the Moral Sense*, sect. 1; *Inquiry concerning Moral Good and Evil*, sect. 1; *Mor. Phil.*, book i. ch. 4, sect. 4, and also sect. 5.)

In these passages, two positions are maintained,—

1. That the Moral Faculty is an original sense or instinct belonging to every sound mind.
2. That in its exercise and improvement, it is altogether separate from, and independent of any aid from Reason, or our other powers.

No subsequent philosopher is known to have held both of these positions. Each of them has been disputed—the one by one class of philosophers, and the other by another class; while both of them have been modified by a third; and yet, with these differences, all these philosophers may be regarded as upholding the Sentimental Theory, rather than the Intellectual Theory, as to the constitution of the Moral Faculty.

Notwithstanding the caveat entered by Dr. Hutcheson (*Mor. Phil.*, vol. i. pp. 47, 48) against resolving the Moral Sense into sympathy this attempt has been made by Dr. Adam Smith.

According to him (*Theory of Mor. Sent.*, pt. iii. ch. 1), "We either approve or disapprove of the conduct of another man, according as we feel that, when we bring his case home to ourselves, we either can or cannot entirely sympathize with the sentiments and motives which directed it. And, in the same manner, we either approve or disapprove of our own conduct, according as we feel that, when we place ourselves in the situation of another man, and view it, as it were, with his eyes and from his station, we either can or cannot entirely enter into and sympathize with the sentiments and motives which influenced it."

In approving of the actions of another man, he has said (*Theory of Mor. Sent.*, pt. vii. sect. 3, ch. 3), "That we enter into the gratitude of those who receive the benefit of his actions." And, "when we consider such actions as making a part of a system of behaviour which tends to promote the happiness either of the individual or of society, they appear to derive a new beauty from their utility." From both these sources our sentiments of approbation will receive an increase. But he denied the necessity of supposing the existence of any peculiar faculty called a Moral Sense, to explain these Sentiments; and while he admitted that "Reason is undoubtedly the source of the general rules of morality, and of all the moral judgments which we form by means of them," he thought it "altogether absurd and unintelligible to suppose that the first perceptions of Right and Wrong can be derived from Reason, even in those particular cases upon the experience of which the general rules are formed. These first perceptions, as well as all other experiments upon which any general rules are founded, cannot be the object of Reason, but of immediate sense or feeling."—*Theory of Mor. Sent.*, pt. vii. sect. 3, ch. 2.

The great objection to the theory of Dr. Smith is, that, according to it, our Moral Sentiments are not the result of any *immediate* sense or feeling, but of an antecedent process of sympathy. Till this be gone through, no moral approbation or disapprobation can be experienced. But while the effects of sympathy, as stated and illustrated by Dr. Adam Smith, are admitted, these effects, it is contended, imply some original moral power or capacity, which, by means of sympathy, is rendered more vivid and extensive in its operations. The discrimination between virtue and vice, which he would explain by sympathy, has, in fact, been made before that susceptibility can be appealed to, and his Theory, unrival'd as it is in the accuracy

of its details and the beauty of its illustrations, has been generally regarded as an example of that faulty reasoning which has been technically called *τὸν ἔρεπον τηρέπον*, or putting first what, in truth, is last. Cousin has said, “Smith a pris l’effet pour la cause, et toute sa théorie n’est qu’un long paralogisme.”—*Phil. Mod. Prem., Série*, tom. iv. p. 236.

Dr. Hartley has attempted to explain, not only the intellectual operations of the human mind, but also the origin of the affections and of the Moral Sense, by means of Association. He was stimulated to this attempt by the example of the Rev. Mr. Gay, whose views upon this point were first published in the form of a *Preliminary Dissertation to a Translation of Archbishop King’s Essay on the Origin of Evil*. Mr. Gay was, obviously, well acquainted with the writings of Dr. Hutcheson; and agreed with him in maintaining that a Moral Faculty and benevolent affections belong to human nature. But he differed from Dr. Hutcheson, by holding that these are not primary and original, but secondary and acquired, parts of our mental constitution. According to Mr. Gay, as beings capable of pleasure and pain, we naturally desire and pursue the one, and dislike and avoid the other. In our pursuit of happiness (by which he meant the sum total of pleasures) we may be aided or obstructed by our fellow-men. When their actions are such as diminish our happiness, and are done with that design, we call the actions bad and the agent blameworthy. When their actions are such as add to our happiness, and done with that design, we call the actions good and the agent meritorious. “And from the various combinations of this, which we call merit and its contrary, arise all those various approbations and aversions—all those likings and dislikings which we call moral.” The sum of these is what he would call the Moral Sense; which is not, therefore, an original or separate faculty, operating like an instinct, but is the result of our observation of the tendency of actions to aid or to obstruct us in the prosecution and attainment of happiness.

A similar account of the nature and origin of the Moral Faculty has been given by Paley. (*Mor. and Polit. Phil.*, book i. ch. 5.)

Mr. James Mill (*Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind*, ch. 28) has also endeavoured to explain the origin of our Moral Sentiments by means of Association. Our own actions, and the actions of our fellow-creatures, are the most fruitful causes of our pleasures and our pains. When the ideas of our own actions have

been associated sufficiently often with the benefits which flow from them, they are pleasurable ideas, and become *motives* to repeat the actions. When the ideas of the actions of others have been associated sufficiently often with the benefits which flow from them, they become pleasurable ideas or *affections*. We praise them for the benefit they have done to us; and they praise us when we have done good to them. In this way moral approbation arises, and the practice of virtue is encouraged; and *vice versa*.

Now, Dr. Hartley also maintained the influence of Association in giving birth and strength to the Moral Sentiments. But he did not maintain that these sentiments are, in their origin, selfish. At least, if they should appear first in connection with actions which affect our own happiness, they may, and do at length, become wholly dis interested. "When the Moral Sense is advanced to considerable perfection, a person may be made to love and hate, merely because he ought" (*Observations on Man*, vol. i. p. 497). This Moral Sense he has called "the generated result of external impressions, and our natural frame" (vol. ii. p. 45). The general resemblance, and the particular differences, in the Moral Sense, may be explained by the circumstances under which it is generated and matured. He has noticed the effect of education—the good consequences which flow from virtue, and the ill ones which flow from vice—the advantages arising to us from the virtue of others, and the evils to which we are exposed through their vices—the harmony and beauty of all the virtues, and the disorder and deformity of all the vices—the hopes and fears of a future state, and meditations on the moral perfections of Deity,—as all combining, under the influence of Association, to "beget in us a Moral Sense, and lead us to the love and approbation of virtue, and to the fear, hatred, and abhorrence of vice." So that, while Hartley called the Moral Faculty a Sense, he differed from Hutcheson, by not regarding it as an implanted or separate element of our mental constitution, but rather as a derived and composite, though still a natural, faculty, growing up under the influence of Association, and acquiring strength and consistency from the information and guidance of our rational and intellectual powers in general (vol. ii. p. 338). He has said, "The Moral Sense is generated chiefly by piety, benevolence, and rational self-love."

Similar views as to the origin and formation of Conscience have been adopted by Sir James Mackintosh. According to him, the Moral Faculty is made up of a class of desires and affections which,

have disposition and volitions for their sole object. "All those sentiments, of which the final object is a state of the will, become intimately and inseparably blended; and of that perfect state of solution (if such words may be allowed), the result is Conscience—the judge and arbiter of human life" (*Dissert.*, p. 377). While Hartley regarded the Moral Faculty as much indebted for its development to the intellectual powers, Mackintosh has spoken of it as made up of desires and affections which are in contact with the will. So that, while the one may be considered as leaning rather to the *intellectual* origin of the Moral Faculty, the other leant more to its *sentimental* origin. Both agreed in calling it a Sense; and although they represented it as composite in its origin, and as acquiring unity and independence by degrees, they considered it, though not instinctive or implanted, to be *natural*; inasmuch as Association and the other laws to which they ascribed its formation, are laws to the influence of which all men are naturally subject.

The philosophers who have hitherto been mentioned differ from Dr. Hutcheson, who regarded the Moral Sense as a separate and original faculty, by attempting to resolve it into some other principle or principles of our nature. Those who are now to be noticed agree with him in holding that the Moral Faculty admits of improvement; but differ from him, by holding that this improvement is not without aid from reason and our other powers.

Two continental writers, who seem to have been well acquainted with the writings of Dr. Hutcheson, may be noticed as differing from him on this latter point.

Mons. Burlamaqui, whose work on the *Principles of Natural and Political Law* is well known, has said (pt. ii. ch. 3), "God has invested us with two means of perceiving or discerning moral good and evil; the First is only a kind of Instinct, the Second is Reason or Judgment. Moral Instinct I call that natural bent or inclination which prompts us to approve of certain things as good and commendable, and to condemn others as bad and blamable, independent of reflection. Or, if any one has a mind to distinguish this instinct by the name of Moral Sense, as Mr. Hutcheson has done, I shall then say, that it is a faculty of the mind which instantly discerns, in certain cases, moral good and evil, by a kind of sensation and taste, independent of reason and reflection." "But notwithstanding God has implanted in us this instinct or sense, as the first means of discerning moral good and evil, yet he has not stopt here;

he has also thought proper that the same light which serves to direct us in everything else, that is, Reason, should come to our assistance, in order to enable us the better to discern and comprehend the true rules of conduct."

He then goes on to show that Reason—

1. Verifies and confirms the decisions of the Moral Sense.
2. Unfolds and extends them to other cases.
3. Decides in those complex cases to which sense is not competent.

The late Mons. Thurot (*De l'Entendement et de la Raison*, 2 tom. 8vo., Paris, 1833) has expressed himself to the same effect. He has said (tom. ii. p. 177), "On contemplating moral actions we experience a feeling of an agreeable or of a disagreeable kind, of pleasure or of pain. In the next place, our Reason discerning the character or quality of these actions, by means of the feelings which they awaken, pronounces them to be good or bad." He would not give the name of the Moral Faculty to the feeling, nor to the judgment, separately; but to the concurrence of both. He objected to the name Moral Sense; and would rather call it the Faculty of Moral Perception.

A similar view of the constitution of the Moral Faculty has been given by Bishop Warburton. He has said (*Div. Leg.*, book i. sect. 4), "Each animal hath its *instinct*, implanted by nature to direct it to its greatest good. Amongst these man hath his, to which modern philosophers have given the name of the Moral Sense; whereby we conceive and feel a pleasure in Right, and a distaste and aversion to Wrong, prior to all reflection on their natures or their consequences." "When *instinct* had gone thus far, the reasoning faculty improved upon its dictates. For men, led by reflection to examine the foundation of this *Moral Sense*, soon discerned that there were real, essential differences in the qualities of human actions, established by nature; and consequently, that the love and hatred excited by the *Moral Sense* were not capricious in their operations; for that, in the essential properties of their objects, there was a specific difference."

According to these views, in an exercise of the Moral Faculty there is a Moral Sense, or instinct, or feeling, going before, whereby, on contemplating human actions, we conceive and feel a pleasure or pain, a liking or disliking, prior to all reflection on their nature

or consequences. Reason comes after, and finds that this difference in the feelings is founded on some specific difference in the actions ; and hence they are permanently discriminated as Right or Wrong.

Mr. Hume was a strenuous advocate of the Sentimental Theory as to the nature of the Moral Faculty. In the third book of his *Treatise of Human Nature*, the title of one of the sections is, 'Moral Distinctions derived from a Moral Sense.' But while Dr. Hutcheson maintained that the Moral Sense furnishes not only moral feelings, but moral ideas and judgments, Mr. Hume has employed the phrase to denote a mere capacity of feeling, without judging. In his *Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals*, he has used the word Sentiment, in the same way, to denote a feeling without judgment. He admitted, indeed, that in almost all moral determinations, Reason and Sentiment concur. But reason merely makes known the facts and circumstances of the case ; it discovers no new relation, it pronounces no moral judgment. "The final sentence of approbation or censure, depends upon some internal sense, or feeling, which nature has made universal to the whole species." "After every circumstance, every relation is known, the understanding has no further room to operate, or any object on which to employ itself. The approbation, or blame, which then ensues, cannot be the work of the judgment, but of the heart ; and is not a speculative proposition or affirmation, but an active feeling or sentiment." (*Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals*, sect. 1, and also App. i.)

Dr. Brown's views on this point are very similar to those of Mr. Hume. Instead of employing the phrase Moral Sense, he would prefer to say, that we have, as an original and distinctive element of our nature, a susceptibility of moral emotion. He admitted, of course, that in many cases there is an exercise of Reason necessary to make known all the circumstances. But this preparatory exercise of Reason was not regarded by him as partaking of a moral character. He has said (*Lect. 82*), "It is not the moral principle which sees the agent, and all the circumstances of his action, or which sees the happiness or misery which has flowed from it ; but, when these are seen, it is the moral principle of our nature which then affords the emotion that may afterwards, in our conception, be added to these ideas derived from other sources, and form with them compound notions of all the varieties of actions that are classed by us as forms of virtue or vice." And again, he has said (*ibid.*), "The moral emotions are more akin to *love* or *hate*, than to *perception* or *judg-*

ment. What we call our approbation of an action, inasmuch as the moral principle is concerned, is a sort of moral love, when the action is the action of another; or moral complacency, when the action is our own, and nothing more. It is no exercise of Reason, discovering congruities, and determining an action to be better fitted than another action for affording happiness and relieving misery."

From these historical notices, it will be seen, that there are three forms, easily distinguishable, in which the Sentimental Theory has been held by modern philosophers.

1. That the Moral Faculty is an original and peculiar sense or feeling, improvable by exercise on its proper objects, and needing no aid from Reason or our other powers.
2. That it is not original nor separate, but composite and derivative, and capable of being resolved into some other principle or principles of our nature.
3. That, while in its primary exercise it operates like a sense or instinct, it is confirmed, extended, and improved, by aid from Reason and our other powers.

Paley has put a case (*Mor. and Polit. Phil.*, book i. ch. 5) which, he thought, would determine the question concerning a Moral Sense, in any or in all of its forms. But, in putting this case, not only is there no discrimination made of the different forms under which the doctrine of a Moral Sense has been held, but the Sentimental and Intellectual Theories are confounded, and modes of expression, which mean very different things, are classed together as meaning the same thing. And as to the case put, viz.: "Whether a savage, without experience, and without instruction, cut off in his infancy from all intercourse with his species, and consequently under no possible influence of example, authority, education, sympathy, or habit, would feel any degree of that sentiment of disapprobation which we feel, when the story of a son betraying his father was told to him;" it is an impossible case. It is asking an expression of sentiment from one who does not, and cannot, know what he is to think or feel about. No issue can be framed upon such a case, on which the advocates of either theory would agree to go to proof. Shut up a human being, from the day of his birth to the maturity of his manhood, in utter

and unchanging darkness, and the probability is, that, when you brought him to the light, he could not see. But this would not prove either that the child was born blind or that he could never have come to discern colours. Shut up a human being, from infancy to manhood, in utter solitude and seclusion ; and at the time when, in the natural enjoyment of society, all his faculties would have been in their prime and vigour, he will be little better than an idiot—unable to follow the plainest steps of reasoning, or to discern, in the simplest cases, between Right and Wrong. But you would not argue from this that man is not naturally a rational and moral being.⁴ All our powers of body and of mind—even such as are original and instinctive—require exercise and culture, or occasion and opportunity, for their full development.

“ Nature, crescent, grows not alone
In thews and sinews ; but, as this temple waxes,
The inward service of the mind and soul
Grows wide withal.”

Love and resentment are universally admitted to be original, and by many to be instinctive passions; yet they do not manifest themselves till both mind and body have attained some degree of maturity. In like manner a Moral Faculty may be natural to man—it may be an original or even an instinctive element of his mental constitution—and yet to its development time and opportunity may be necessary. We may learn to see by the Conscience,⁵ just as we learn to see by the eye. The impression which actions make on the faculty of moral perception is as direct and positive as the impression which objects make on the faculty of external perception. By exercising the bodily organ, we learn not only to see, that is, to discriminate colours; but we come at length, it has been said, to see things that are invisible, and to judge of distance by the eye. No one thinks the faculty of visible perception to be less an original and essential element of human nature, on account of the improvement of which it is susceptible. In like manner, we may have our moral sense so exercised, by reason of use, that we may not only be able to discern, in plain and palpable cases, between Right and Wrong, but to decide in difficult and intricate questions of Casuistry.

⁴ The inference from the non-exercise to the non-existence of a faculty is not valid.

⁵ “ Strong meat belongeth to them that

are of full age, who by reason of use have had their senses (*αἰσθατήσια*) exercised to discern between good and evil.”—Heb. v. 14.

But this is no reason why the faculty of moral perception should not be regarded as primary and natural in its origin. The occasions and conditions under which a faculty manifests or improves itself, do not create or confer it; and the question concerning a Moral Sense cannot be settled in the summary way in which Paley has attempted to settle it, or rather to set it aside. (Reid, *Act. Pow.*, Essay iii. pt. iii. ch. 8, observ. i.; Stewart, *Act. and Mor. Pow.*, b. ii. ch. 2, p. 168.)

SECTION II.—*Intellectual Theory.*

According to the *Sentimental Theory*, the contemplation of moral actions excites some sense or feeling; and, in consequence of our being so affected, we proceed to classify actions as Right or Wrong, and to characterize agents as Virtuous or Vicious. According to the *Intellectual Theory*, the process is the converse of this; that is, we first judge of the nature of actions as Right or Wrong, and then we are affected in a manner suitable to the moral judgment formed of them.

That it is not by Sense or Feeling, but by Intellect or Reason, that we discern the morality of actions, is maintained, with much learning and ingenuity, by Ralph Cudworth, D.D., in his *Treatise concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality*. He has shown that even external bodies are not, properly speaking, perceived by the senses, but by the understanding. Sense is not knowledge; it merely furnishes the occasions and conditions on which the mind exerts an active cognoscitive energy, and so begets knowledge within itself. And, if it be the Intellect which comprehends external objects, when presented to it through the medium of the senses, it must be still more plain that the mind must be exerting an internal and independent energy, when it proceeds to frame notions of the *relations* which subsist between external objects—such as the relation of a whole and its parts, unity and multitude, greater and less, and the like. These relations are not objects of sense, and our notions of them must spring from the inherent activity of the Intellect. Still less can the higher things of morality be comprehended by a sense, or by any faculty to which the term sense can properly be applied. What is just and what is unjust are simple, undefinable ideas. We are not indebted for them to sense nor feeling, but to the active energy of the Intellect. They are not φάντασμα, nor διαθήμα, but νοήμα. They are not sensations,

nor feelings, which are passive impressions, but ideas evolved by the activity of the Intellect or Reason.

In reference to Dr. Samuel Clarke, Dr. Hutcheson has remarked (*Illust. of the Mor. Sense*, sect. 2), that "this ingenious author says nothing against the supposition of a Moral sense." But as little has he said anything in favour of it. And, as he places virtue in acting conformably to the eternal reason and fitness of things, it is difficult to see how he could appeal to any other power than Reason as judge and guide in all matters of morality. Accordingly, we find Lowman, who was an admirer and follower of Dr. Clarke, defining morality to be the practice of Reason—that is, the doing of those things which Reason dictates as Right.

Similar remarks might be made in reference to Mr. Woollaston, who, in the *Religion of Nature Delineated*, has placed virtue in a conformity with truth, as it is by Reason that we judge of what is true or false.

The philosopher who, in modern times, has given the fullest analysis of the process of Moral Perception, is Dr. Richard Price, in his work entitled *A Review of the Principal Questions and Difficulties in Morals, with an Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas in general*. Having shown (ch. 1, sect. 2) that the Understanding, or the Reason, is a source of simple ideas, which cannot be resolved into elements derived from experience, he proceeds to show (sect. 3) that our ideas of Right and Wrong are of this kind. On contemplating actions we do not *suffer*, as from a sense or feeling—we *know* or *understand* something concerning them. Actions have a *nature*—that is, some character certainly belongs to them, and somewhat there is that may be truly affirmed of them. This nature, or character, is their Rightness or Wrongness; and the power or faculty by which we are made aware of this is not a Sense, but the Understanding. He has shown further (sect. 3), that "Some emotion or other, and some alteration in the state of the mind, accompany, perhaps, all our perceptions, but more remarkably our perceptions of Right and Wrong. There is a natural aptitude in them to produce some degree of feeling. I cannot perceive an action to be Right without *approving* it, or approve it without being conscious of some degree of satisfaction and complacency. I cannot perceive an action to be wrong without *disapproving* it, or disapprove it without being *displeased* with it. Right actions, then, as such, must be *grateful*, and wrong ones *ungrateful*, to us. The

one must appear *amiable*, and the other *unamiable* and *base*." So that, in addition to the approbation and disapprobation which arise from the contemplation of actions as Right and Wrong, Dr. Price has admitted that there may also be a perception of their beauty and deformity. He has reverted to the old distinction between the τὸ δίκαιον and the τὸ καλόν, the *honestum* and the *pulchrum* (ch. 2). As *Right*, virtue is *approved*; as *Fair*, it is *loved*. Vice, as *Wrong*, is *condemned*; as *Foul*, or *Base*, it is *hated*. Approbation and Condemnation are intellectual judgments, accompanied with a degree of feeling. Love and hatred are in themselves mere states or degrees of feeling; although they imply something which is loved or hated. They will differ in their intensity, under different circumstances, and in different individuals. They may, according to Dr. Price, be referred to a sense or positive determination of our nature; and the final cause assigned for them is, that they come in aid of our intellectual judgments of Right and Wrong; and prompt us to follow the one and to avoid the other, more earnestly than we would have done without them.

This sense of Beauty and Deformity in actions had been much insisted on by Lord Shaftesbury and Dr. Hutcheson; but a more subordinate place, in the process of moral perception, has been assigned to it by Dr. Price. He has thus expressed his general conclusion (ch. 2), "Upon the whole, it appears, I think, that, in contemplating the actions and affections of moral agents, we have both a *perception of the understanding*, and a *feeling of the heart*; and the latter, or the effects in us, accompanying our moral perceptions, are deducible from two springs. They partly depend on the positive constitution of our natures. But the most steady and universal ground of them is, the essential congruity or incongruity between object and faculty."

"*Placet suapte natura—virtus.*"—SENECA.

"*Etiamsi a nullo laudetur, natura est laudabile.*"—CICERO.

Some of the language employed by Dr. Price had previously been employed by Bishop Butler. In the only passage of his writings which bears directly on the constitution of the Moral Faculty (*Dissert. on Virtue*), he has said, "It is manifest that great part of common language, and of common behaviour, over the world, is formed upon supposition of a Moral Faculty; whether called Con-

science, Moral Reason, Moral Sense, or Divine Reason; whether considered as a *perception of the understanding*, or as a *sentiment of the heart*, or, which seems the truth, as *including both*." In other passages (Serm. I. *On Hum. Nat.*), he has called Conscience, a principle of reflection: and in representing it as having a manifest claim to superiority over all other parts of our nature (Serm. II. *On Hum. Nat.*), he has said, "You cannot form a notion of this faculty, Conscience, without taking in judgment, direction, superintendency."

Dr. Reid has maintained (*Act. Pow.*, Essay iii. pt. iii. ch. 6), "That by an original power of the mind, when we come to years of understanding and reflection, we not only have the notions of Right and Wrong in conduct, but perceive certain things to be right and others to be wrong." He had no objection that this original power should be called the Moral Sense. "In its dignity, it is, without doubt, far superior to every other power of the mind; but there is this analogy between it and the external senses, that, as by them, we have not only the original conceptions of the various qualities of bodies, but the original judgment that *this* body hath such a quality, *that* such another; so, by our Moral Faculty, we have both the original conceptions of Right and Wrong in conduct, of merit and demerit, and the original judgments that *this* conduct is right, *that* is wrong; that *this* character has worth, *that* demerit." In the following chapter, he has added, "Our moral judgments are not, like those we form in speculative matters, dry and unaffected, but, from their nature, are necessarily accompanied with affections and feelings." . . . "We approve of good actions, and disapprove of bad; and this approbation and disapprobation, when we analyse it, appears to include, not only a moral judgment of the action, but some affection, favourable or unfavourable, towards the agent, and some feeling in ourselves." And, in concluding his analysis of the Moral Faculty, he has said, "Of this faculty, the operations appear to be, the judging ultimately of what is right, what is wrong, and what is indifferent, in the conduct of moral agents; the approbation of good conduct and disapprobation of bad, in consequence of that judgment; and the agreeable emotions which attend obedience, and disagreeable, which attend disobedience to its dictates." He regarded it, therefore, as both an active and an intellectual power of the mind (ch. 8). "It is an intellectual power, as, by it, we the original conceptions, or ideas, of Right and Wrong in

human conduct. It is an active power, as every truly virtuous action must be more or less influenced by it." In calling Conscience an original power of the mind, Dr. Reid would seem to make a distinction between moral discernment and intellectual discernment. But on what this distinction may rest he has not said; nor how it is manifested, except that our intellectual judgments are not, in general, accompanied with feeling, while our moral judgments are.

A similar view of the Moral Faculty has been given by Mr. Stewart (*Act. and Mor. Pow.*, book ii. ch. 2 and 4). Like Dr. Price and Dr. Reid, he has maintained that the Understanding, or Reason, is a source of simple ideas. Of this kind are our ideas of Right and Wrong. They are awakened by the contemplation of human actions, and are accompanied with feelings of a pleasurable or painful kind, which suggest the conceptions of moral beauty and deformity. But, according to Mr. Stewart, "our perception of moral beauty and deformity is plainly distinguishable from our perception of actions as Right or Wrong." The former is the experience of a feeling on our part; the latter, a judgment concerning what is independent of us. This distinction had been noticed by Dr. Price, who made a sense of beauty and deformity in actions *one* source of the feelings which accompany our moral judgments. And both he and Dr. Reid have spoken more strongly than Mr. Stewart has done, of the feelings of approbation and disapprobation, which naturally flow from our perception of actions as Right or Wrong.

According to those philosophers of the Intellectual school, whose views as to the constitution of the Moral Faculty have been successively exhibited, there is, when this faculty is in exercise, not merely a state of feeling, but also an antecedent act of judging. Actions have a nature or character which is intuitively discerned by Reason; and this discernment is accompanied by the correspondent moral feelings. There are other philosophers, however, who must rank as belonging to the Intellectual school, who hold that actions are discriminated, not by any nature or character belonging to them, but by the consequences which flow from them. It is not by an *intuitive*, but by a *discursive* exercise of our intellectual powers that we discern between good and evil. It is not by any agreement between actions and certain ideas in our mind that we pronounce them to be Right or Wrong; but by observing whether they are followed by consequences which are beneficial or hurtful. Such is the process in our moral determinations, according to those philo-

sophers who hold that Utility is the foundation of virtue. Mr. Hume, indeed, while he held "that Reason must enter for a considerable share in all determinations of this kind, since nothing but that faculty can instruct us in the tendency of qualities and actions, and point out their beneficial consequences," still thought "that the final sentence depends upon some internal sense or feeling." But, in general, those philosophers who have resolved virtue into utility, have held that Reason is the faculty by which we judge of the morality of actions; and, proceeding on the ground of observation and experience, we pronounce those to be Right which are beneficial, those to be Wrong which are hurtful, in their tendencies and and effects.

The advocates of the Intellectual Theory may therefore be arranged in two great classes.

First, Those who hold that Reason intuitively discerns certain actions to be Right and other actions to be Wrong, and that this discernment is accompanied by correspondent moral feelings.

Second, Those who hold that, in the course of observation and experience, we come, by the ordinary use of our rational powers, to discover that certain actions and courses of action are beneficial, and that other actions and courses of action are hurtful; that we call the one Right and the other Wrong, and on the contemplation of them we are affected in a way suitable to the character and classification given to them.

In order to determine whether the Intellectual or the Sentimental Theory serves best to explain the phenomena which are presented by the Moral Faculty when in exercise, it will be necessary to ascertain with precision what these phenomena are.

The object of the Moral Faculty is action, including under that term the active principle which prompted it. In estimating a moral action we always take the principle of it into account. Indeed, it is by the presence of will and intention that a moral action is distinguished from the actions of brutes or a physical event. Dr. Brown is, therefore, so far in the right when he has said (*Lect. 73*) that "an action is a certain agent in certain circumstances, willing and producing a certain effect." But when he has said that "an action, if it do not mean an agent acting, can mean nothing," he has gone too

far in his attempt at simplification. We can and do separate between the action and the agent. We approve and disapprove of principles and dispositions, even when they do not lead to action. And when an action has been done, we distinguish between the nature and consequences of the action and the intention and character of the agent. To mark these distinctions different phrases have been employed, and the same thing has been contemplated under different aspects. In this way, perhaps, some perplexity may have been introduced; and the phenomena presented by the Moral Faculty when in exercise, may have been thought to be more numerous and complicated than they really are. But we are not on that account to run into the opposite extreme, and suppress or overlook what really takes place, for the sake of attaining a fancied simplicity, but a virtual defect, in the statement. For on contemplating a moral action there is certainly more than Dr. Brown has admitted,—namely, the mere awakening of a feeling.

According to Dr. Reid, moral approbation includes—

1. A moral judgment of the action.
2. Some affection favourable to the agent.
3. Some feeling in ourselves.

According to Mr. Stewart, and also Dr. Price, moral approbation includes—

1. The perception of an action as right.
2. An emotion of pleasure, varying in its degree according to the acuteness of our moral sensibility.
3. A perception of the merit of the agent.

The analysis is the same, but the pleasure which we feel on witnessing a Right action done is put third in order by Dr. Reid, while it stands second in order with Mr. Stewart. This feeling of pleasure, however, is not a necessary nor universal element in every act of moral approbation. The capacity of experiencing it is different in different individuals, and constitutes a kind of moral taste or moral sensibility, which may be cultivated by itself, without any corresponding improvement in the Moral Faculty, properly so called; so that, by a strict analysis, this element may be excluded: and an act of moral approbation, when rigorously examined, will contain only a perception or judgment of the action as right, and an affection or feeling favourable to the agent.

In a full exercise of the Moral Faculty, strictly so called, then, there are implied—

First, A perception or judgment of an action as Right or Wrong.

Second, A sentiment or feeling of approbation or disapprobation in consequence of the judgment.

These two elements may be said to constitute the Moral Faculty in man, or that faculty by which he becomes cognizant of Right and Wrong in disposition and conduct. The discerning element, or that by which the judgment of Right and Wrong is attained, belongs to the intellective or rational part of our nature. The sentimental element, in virtue of which we are affected by feelings of approbation and disapprobation, belongs to the emotional or active part of our nature; as it is in consequence more immediately of these feelings that we are prompted to do, or not to do, the action fitted to awaken them. According as the action, contemplated by the Moral Faculty, has already been done or is yet to do, or according as it may be an action of ourselves or of another, our moral judgments and feelings will admit of corresponding variations, which may receive various designations according to the varying circumstances. But this multiplication of moral phrases, or even of moral ideas, need not perplex us as to the nature of the Moral Faculty, to which these phrases and ideas, or the moral elements into which they can be analyzed, must ultimately be referred. The root and ground of them all is to be found in a judgment of Right or Wrong, and a feeling of approbation or disapprobation. *Virtue, Merit, Obligation, Duty,* are terms which originate in the fact that an action or disposition, when contemplated by the Moral Faculty, is judged to be Right or Wrong, and approved or disapproved accordingly; and the different meanings which these terms may have, arise from the different aspects in which the action is contemplated, as done or about to be done, by ourselves or by others, and under peculiar circumstances.

The Moral Faculty, then, is not a mere Sense or Feeling; neither does it consist exclusively of an exercise of Reason or Intellect. Its full operation implies a judgment or conclusion, followed by an affection or feeling. These two elements may not universally appear together. There are some of our moral judgments which are accompanied by no degree of feeling, or by a degree so slight that we are scarcely conscious of it. On the other hand, our moral feelings are sometimes so quickly and vividly excited that we can discover

little or no trace of any conclusion or judgment going before. And these two classes of cases have been laid hold of by the philosophers of the two great schools, and held up as favouring exclusively their respective theories. But it is plain that both classes of cases should be taken into account, as it is only by doing so that we can arrive at a full and proper view of the constitution of the Moral Faculty; They who maintain that Reason is the power by which we ascertain the moral character of actions must admit, that, when it has been ascertained, the actions are contemplated with feelings of approbation or disapprobation. And they who make the Moral Faculty to be a mere sense or feeling will find it difficult, if not impossible, to explain the awakening of this sense or feeling, without supposing some judgment or conclusion going before. So that, to call Conscience a Moral Sense, does not exclude the exercise of Reason or Judgment; and when we say that it is Reason or Judgment by which we ascertain the Rightness or Wrongness of actions, we do not deny that these actions are contemplated with correspondent feelings of approbation and disapprobation.

Much of the disputation that has been carried on as to the constitution of the Moral Faculty, has arisen from overlooking the fact that an emotion or feeling does not spring up without some connection with a judgment or conclusion going before; just as an external sensation is not experienced without an antecedent impression having been made on one of the organs of sense. Now, as in an analysis of the power or faculty of sensation, it would be wrong to omit all reference to the impression made upon the bodily organ, and to look exclusively to the resultant state of mind; so, in analyzing the Moral Faculty, it seems to be equally wrong to dwell exclusively upon the moral feeling awakened, and to omit all reference to the judgment or conclusion going before. Yet this is, very nearly, what has been done by those philosophers who would resolve all moral determinations into the mere exercise of a sense or feeling.

Even Mr. Hume has admitted, "that in moral decisions all the circumstances and relations must be antecedently known; and the mind, from the contemplation of the whole, feels some new impression of affection or disgust, esteem or contempt, approbation or blame." Now, the circumstances and relations of a moral action being known, the action may be judged of intuitively and at once. "A speculative reasoner concerning triangles or circles, considers the several known and given relations of the parts of these figures, and

from thence infers some unknown relation which is dependent upon the former. But, in moral deliberations," continues Mr. Hume (*Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals*, App. i.), "we must be acquainted beforehand with all the objects and all their relations to each other, and, from a comparison of the whole, fix our choice or approbation. No new fact to be ascertained: no new relations to be discovered." But although no new relations are to be discovered—that is, although there be no deduction or inference, there may be an intuition or immediate beholding of the Rightness or Wrongness of the action contemplated. The feeling of approbation or blame follows; and, as Mr. Hume has said, it is not the work of the judgment, but of the heart. What is important to remark, however, is, that the feeling is *in consequence of*, and *in conformity with*, the judgment.

In another passage (*ut supra*) Mr. Hume would seem to deny the necessity of any antecedent judgment, and to argue that, as certain objects in nature give us, directly, emotions of sublimity and beauty, so certain actions, when contemplated, awaken feelings of approbation or blame, not from anything in the nature of the actions being apprehended or judged of, but from our having been so constituted as to be so affected. "All natural beauty," says he, "depends on the proportion, relation, and position of parts; but it would be absurd thence to infer that the perception of beauty, like that of truth in geometrical problems, consists wholly in the perception of relations, and was performed entirely by the understanding, or intellectual faculties." Even, according to Mr. Hume, before the emotion of beauty can be experienced, the proportion, relation, and position of parts in the object must be contemplated. In being contemplated they may be judged of—not deductively and by inference, but directly and by intuition—and the emotion follows in connection and in conformity with the judgment. Mr. Hume has endeavoured to separate the two things,—viz., the judgment and the emotion. But his own words indicate a connection between them. He has said (*ut supra*), "In all decisions of taste or external beauty, all the relations are beforehand obvious to the eye; and we thence proceed to feel a sentiment of complacency or disgust, according to the nature of the object and the disposition of our organs." *According to the nature of the object!* Now, how is the object perceived, or how is the nature of it determined by us, but by means of judgment? Mr. Hume, indeed, has spoken of our *proceeding* to feel a sentiment of complacency or disgust,

as if this were a separate and independent act. But it is not so. The nature of the object, and our perception of it, settle the nature of the sentiment or feeling. We cannot refuse to feel, and we cannot alter or modify the feeling, so long as the nature of the object and our perception of it remain the same.

What it becomes the advocates of the Sentimental Theory to prove is, that we have moral feelings in reference to an action, without having formed any judgment concerning it. But all that they can show is, that we have certain feelings; while, on the other hand, it is contended that we have these feelings in consequence of a judgment as to the nature and character of the action, and that the feelings are altogether regulated and determined by the judgment. "The perception that actions are Right or Wrong," it has been said (*Essay on Moral Agency*, 12mo., Lond., 1842), "is not obtained from a peculiar feeling excited, previous to any perception, but the feeling results from the perception, or is produced by it. A certain action is perceived as Wrong; can it be perceived as such without something being known as Right, to which it is opposed, or without some standard or rule on which it infringes? Feelings anterior to, or independent of, knowledge or perception, must be purely physical, and if our moral judgments were the result of such feelings, this would again land us in the conclusion that our moral judgments are physical—a plain contradiction in terms." (See also Cogan, *Ethical Questions*, Question iii.)

The principal objections to the Theory which regards the Moral Faculty as Intellectual in its origin, are to be found in the Remarks of Sir James Mackintosh on the views of those philosophers who have adopted this Theory.

1. In his Remarks on the Ethical views of Dr. Samuel Clarke (*Dissert.*, p. 151), he has objected that the Theory which resolves the Moral Faculty into Reason, contains no means of explaining the moral feelings.

But how far does the Sentimental Theory go towards an explanation? It merely states the fact that moral feelings do arise on the contemplation of moral actions. The Intellectual Theory states farther, that they arise in consequence of, and in conformity with, a Judgment, or conclusion come to, that the actions contemplated are Right or Wrong. It is true that Dr. Clarke, being chiefly concerned to show that Virtue is founded in the nature and fitness of things, and can only be judged of by Reason, pays little or no attention to

the feelings which the contemplation of moral actions awakens. But Dr. Price and others, who are strenuous in maintaining the Intellectual origin of our Moral Faculty, have suggested several reasons by way of accounting for our moral feelings. 1. An adaptation or fitness in virtue and vice to give pleasure or disgust, when contemplated by a rational being. 2. A beauty and deformity in virtue and vice, which may affect a moral taste or sense. And 3. A view of the beneficial and hurtful effects of virtue and vice, which may engage our benevolent feelings in favour of the one and against the other. (See Alexander Smith, *Phil. of Mor.*, vol. i. p. 165; Jouffroy, *Droit Naturel*, tom. iii. p. 189.)

2. It is farther objected to the Intellectual Theory, that it does not account for the completion of any moral purpose, or the carrying out of any moral conduct.

"Reason," it is said (*Dissert.*, p. 152), "as Reason, can never be a motive to action." "When the conclusion of a process of reasoning presents to the mind an object of desire, or the means of obtaining it, a motive of action begins to operate; and Reason may then, but not till then, have a powerful, though indirect, influence upon the conduct."

The amount of this objection is, that a mere conviction of the Reason or conclusion of the understanding, is no motive to action; and that no change of conduct can take place till some form of the Sensitivity is touched—till some desire to avoid threatened evil, or to obtain promised good, has been awakened. It has been common, however, in all ages, and among all nations, to speak of some actions and courses of action, as taking their rise from conviction and reason, in opposition to other actions and courses of action, which are prompted by feeling and passion. And, in accordance with this view, Prudence, or a Regard to what is Advantageous, has been treated of as a principle, and a leading and governing principle, of human conduct. If it be said, that when Reason does guide and govern men, it does not do so in virtue of mere conviction, but in virtue of awakening our self-love; and that thus "the influence of Reason on the will is indirect, and arises only from its being one of the channels by which the objects of desire or aversion are brought near to these springs of voluntary action;" this may be admitted. But if the natural and necessary consequence of a conviction of the Reason be to present some object of desire, and thus to have some influence on the will, the fact that this influence is often overcome by that of passion, which

is stronger and more direct in its impulse, does not prove that convictions of the Reason have *no* influence ; and still less does it prove, that, with reasonable beings, they ought not to have *more* influence than they actually have. So that, even although Conscience were to be identified with Reason, as has been done by Dr. Clarke, it must still be admitted to be a principle of action, and a principle powerful with reasonable beings. A desire to do what is reasonable—to act in accordance with the convictions of our own mind—does not appear absurd. And, although the desire may be subsequent to the conviction, yet, if it naturally and necessarily follow it, and thus come into more immediate contact with the will, the action which is done in consequence may be said to be done from conviction, as well as from feeling. Now, so it is in moral action, according to the Intellectual Theory. (Grove, *Mor. Phil.*, pt. ii. ch. 2 and 3 ; Price, *Review*, p. 313.)

In a work entitled *Intuitive Morals*, p. 146, Kant is said to maintain “that Reason appears to have a causality of a peculiar kind of its own, a power of begetting a feeling of *amenity*, in the discharge of duty.”

Before we do a moral action, we have a conviction that the action is Right. This conviction involves, or is accompanied with, the sense of obligation. If the action be done, this sense of obligation, or the feeling that we ought to do it, is what may be said to move the will, and the action, when done, may be said to have been done from a sense of duty or obligation. But this sense of obligation is so intimately connected with the discernment of Rightness, that by many of the advocates of the Intellectual Theory they are completely identified. According to them, *Rightness* and *Oughtness*, or *Obligatoriness*, are words of the same meaning ; and, in seeing an action to be Right, we feel that we ought to do it. (See Price, *Review*, ch. 8 ; Alex. Smith, *Phil. of Mor.*, vol. i. p. 146 ; Tissot, *Ethique, ou Science des Mœurs*, 8vo., Paris, 1840, ch. 6.)

Should this view of the complete synthesis between Rightness and Oughtness not be accepted, the Intellectual Theory must still be allowed to account for the performance of moral actions, by the promptings of those feelings of approbation and disapprobation which accompany the exercise of the Moral Faculty ; and which must have been admitted by Sir James Mackintosh to be in immediate contact with the will, and to be the proper springs of voluntary conduct. In the system of Dr. Clarke, Conscience is represented

as a mere exercise of Reason. But Reason, when exercised upon moral ideas, is necessarily productive of feelings which prompt to moral action.

3. The great and crowning objection to the Intellectual Theory is stated by Sir James Mackintosh, in his remarks on the Ethical Views of Mr. Stewart (*Dissert.*, p. 332), "No advocate of the Intellectual origin of the Moral Faculty has yet stated a case in which a mere operation of Reason or Judgment, unattended by emotion, could, consistently with the universal opinion of mankind, as it is exhibited by the structure of language, be said to have the nature or to produce the effects of Conscience."

Now, if, by having the nature and producing the effects of Conscience, be meant the discerning and pronouncing an action to be Right or Wrong, the cases in which this is done by a mere operation of Reason or Judgment, unattended by emotion, are so numerous that they can only be overlooked in consequence of their familiarity. It is Right to discharge a just debt—it is Wrong to retain a pledge, after the purpose for which it was given has been fulfilled. These are propositions which describe actions, the Rightness of which can be perceived by a mere operation of Reason or Judgment, unattended by emotion. And what is more, the actions may be contemplated as done by ourselves or by others; yet this contemplation, while it reveals the Rightness of the actions, may be unattended by any emotion. But the neglecting to do these actions—the refusing to pay a debt or to restore a pledge—would be judged to be Wrong; and this judgment would be attended with feelings of disapprobation. Now, this disapprobation would, undoubtedly, be called an effect of Conscience. Yet both cases are cases of moral action, and are contemplated by the Moral Faculty. And the circumstances which explain the presence of some degree of feeling in the one case, also furnish an explanation of the absence of all degree of feeling in the other case. If *all* the effects of what is commonly called Conscience are looked for, then a case must be taken in which there is a clear perception, or judgment of an action as Right or Wrong, followed by a vivid feeling of approbation or disapprobation. To demand a case in which a judgment concerning the Rightness or Wrongness of an action shall produce *all the effects* which, in popular language, are comprehended under the term Conscience, is to ask for a case in which a *mere operation* of Reason or Judgment, shall be *that and something more*—that is, shall be both an intellectual act

and an emotional state. It is not maintained by the advocates of the Intellectual Theory, that Conscience, or the Moral Faculty, consists exclusively of an operation of Reason; but of an operation of Reason, followed by some degree of feeling. In some cases, however, the moral discernment is made without producing any degree of feeling that is perceptible. But no degree of feeling can arise, in reference to a moral action, unless some judgment as to the nature of that action has gone before, and to which judgment the feeling corresponds. So that, if the Moral Faculty, which in its constitution is complex, is to take its designation from one of the two elements which go to constitute it, it is argued that it should be from that one which is primary and distinctive—viz., the operation of Reason, rather than from the feeling which follows, and which in some cases is so slight as scarcely to be perceptible; while, in other instances, through familiarity, it may disappear.

They who hold the doctrine of a Moral Sense or Instinct, strictly so called, must regard Conscience as an original and separate power of the mind.

Even those of the Sentimental school, who hold that the Moral Faculty is secondary in its origin, and composite as to its constitution, may yet, in respect of the unity and independence to which it ultimately attains, regard it as a distinct power or faculty.

With respect to the advocates of the Intellectual Theory, there are some who consider Conscience as a separate power or faculty, and others who think that it is Reason exercised upon moral subjects.

The question is attended with some difficulty, from a want of clear and precise terms in which to state or discuss it. The perception of form is a different perception than that of colour: but we do not refer the one to one faculty and the other to a different faculty; but both to the same. Now, the perception of a moral truth, or the pronouncing of a moral judgment, may be different from the perception of a mathematical truth, or the coming to a logical conclusion; but the question is, is the difference such as to imply a difference of faculty; or may not the same faculty which

discerns between what is true and what is false be also competent to discern between what is Right and what is Wrong?

In support of the doctrine which holds Reason and Conscience to be the same, it is said that we can scarcely conceive a being possessed of Reason to be ignorant of the distinction between Right and Wrong; and as little can we conceive a being capable of distinguishing between Right and Wrong to be destitute of Reason (Alex. Smith, *Phil. of Mor.*, vol. i. p. 36). Dr. Hutcheson, however, in representing the Moral Sense as independent of Reason, has entertained the latter supposition as by no means absurd.

It has farther been said that Reason is the faculty which judges of necessary truths. The first principles of morals are ranked by Dr. Reid and Mr. Stewart among necessary truths. To admit a separate and peculiar faculty to judge of necessary truths in morals, would be to destroy the unity of truth, or to shake its foundations altogether (A. Smith, *Phil. of Mor.*, vol. i. p. 37). Cudworth, Clarke, Wollaston, Balguy, Price, and other philosophers, completely identify Reason and Conscience.

Butler has called Conscience a *superior* principle of reflection; but there is nothing in his language inconsistent with the opinion that Conscience is Reason or Reflection exercised upon matters of morality. Reid and Stewart have spoken of the Moral Faculty as an original and distinct power of the mind. At the same time, by classifying it along with a Regard to our good upon the whole, and calling them both Rational principles of action, they do not seem to have considered Conscience as a power different in kind from Reason or Intellect, but as being comprehended under it.

Let it be observed, however, that the ideas of Right and Wrong, which we refer to Conscience, are quite peculiar and *sui generis*. *Duty* and *Interest*, what is *Right* and what is *Advantageous*, express conceptions totally different. The question is, are they so different as to imply different faculties? The distinctive peculiarity of our moral conceptions is, that they involve a sense of obligation. Reason *convinces*, Conscience *commands*. It claims a supremacy over all the other parts and principles of our nature. This may, perhaps, justify the setting it down as a distinct power of the mind. Or, if it be considered as essentially the same with Reason, this peculiarity in the exercise of our Rational powers upon a class of ideas which we call moral, deserves to be carefully noted.

On the natural supremacy of Conscience, the advocates of both

theories, as to its origin and constitution, are equally clear and strong. The point was prominently insisted on by Butler, in the second of his *Sermons on Human Nature*. Dr. Hutcheson was equally strenuous in maintaining it (*Introd. to Mor. Phil.*, book i. ch. 1, sect. 12). Dr. Price thought that the supremacy of Conscience could be consistently maintained, upon no other supposition than that the Moral Faculty is the Understanding or Intellect. Dr. Adam Smith, though he rather inclined to the Sentimental Theory, was strong in maintaining its natural and rightful authority (*Theory of Mor. Sentiments*, pt. iii. ch. 5). Dr. Hartley has said (vol. i. p. 497); "This Moral Sense carries its own authority with it, inasmuch as it is the sum total of all the rest, and the ultimate result from them; and employs the force and authority of the whole nature of man against any particular part of it, that rebels against the determination and commands of the Conscience or Moral Judgment." Lord Kames (*Essays on Morality*, Essay ii. ch. 5) has represented it as "the sole province of Conscience to instruct us which of our principles of action we may indulge, and which of them we must restrain." Dr. Reid has said (*Act. Pow.*, Essay iii. pt. iii. ch. 8), "The authority of Conscience over the other active principles of the mind I do not consider as a point that requires proof by argument, but as self-evident." Mr. Stewart has quoted with approbation the passage in which Dr. Adam Smith has asserted the supremacy of the Conscience, and has said (*Act. and Mor. Pow.*, vol. i. p. 302), "I have only to add that the supreme authority of Conscience is felt and tacitly acknowledged by the worst, no less than by the best of men; for even they who have thrown off all hypocrisy with the world are at pains to conceal their real character from their own eyes." Sir James Mackintosh, although he has maintained that the Moral Faculty is derivative and composite in its origin, has strenuously asserted the unity and independence to which it attains, and the universality and supremacy of its control. (*Dissert.*, p. 200.)

Much of the language employed by philosophers in asserting the supremacy of Conscience may seem to favour the doctrine, that Conscience is the ultimate and infallible arbiter in all matters of morality, to which every man in all cases of doubt or difficulty may have recourse, in full confidence that he will obtain the true decision; so that, in acting in conformity with the dictates of his conscience, he must act rightly. But this is a doctrine which would justify

the grossest inconsistencies; as the Conscience of one man allows or approves of actions which that of another prohibits and condemns. To arrive at the true meaning of the supremacy of Conscience, it is only necessary to trace the several steps in the progress of its growth and development, by which it attains to any control which it has.

Whether we have moral ideas or moral judgments first, it is plain that these ideas and judgments will speedily be applied to new cases. As reflection and experience become more mature and extensive, these cases will multiply, till, by degrees, there will be laid up a number of rules for the guidance of moral conduct. Conscience, considered as the repository of these rules, these *communes notitiae*, or general maxims, which are regarded as first principles in morals, was called by the early Christian Moralists *ουντίρησις*; and was spoken of as the *Law-conserver*, or *Lawgiver*. The consciousness of our conduct being in accordance with the precepts of morality, or in contradiction to them, was called *ουνείδησις*; and Conscience, under this aspect, was called the *Witness*, who accused or excused. These moralists represented the operations of Conscience by the three members of a syllogism; of which the first contained the Law, the second the testimony of the *Witness*, and the third the decision of the *Judge*. But Conscience not only pronounces sentence; it carries its sentence into effect. He who has transgressed any of the rules of which Conscience is the repository, is punished by the reproaches of his own mind. He who has obeyed these rules is acquitted and rewarded by feelings of complacency and self-approbation.

Now, he who acts contrary to the decision of his Conscience, he who goes against the highest rule of which he has knowledge, is always wrong. To him who knoweth or thinketh anything to be sin, and yet doeth it, it is sin. But the question may be put, Is he who acts according to his Conscience always right? In reference to this question, let it be observed—

1. That Conscience, considered as a repository of moral laws, is of slow and difficult growth—requiring exercise and culture—and, in the progress of its development, liable to many influences by which it may be blinded or biassed, strengthened or enfeebled, and rendered slow and dull, or tender and scrupulous. It is our duty to guard, to instruct, and to enlighten it. We are to obey its dictates, as embodying the highest and clearest knowledge of duty to which we have attained. But we must see that its dictates are in accord-

ance with the law of absolute rectitude. It is only in so far as they are so that these dictates are true and valid. For it may be noticed—

2. That Conscience, in promulgating its law, does so with reference to a law higher than its own, and to a lawgiver more powerful to punish and reward than itself. "Hence," said Butler, "when it has given its sentence, it *naturally* and *always of course* goes on to anticipate a higher and more effectual sentence, which shall hereafter second and affirm its own." So that, while Conscience is a principle higher in kind than any of the other principles which assume the guidance of human conduct, it derives its authority from a law higher than its own, and a lawgiver higher than itself. (See Whewell, *Elem. of Mor.*, book iii. ch. 14, art. 369-373.)

Should the Intellectual Theory as to the constitution of the Moral Faculty be adopted, the result of the foregoing observations may be thus articulately stated.

Ideas of Right and Wrong are natural to the human mind, in its mature and sound state.

Ideas of Right and Wrong arise in the same way and from the same source as other simple ideas,—that is, from the Intellect or Reason. And, as on witnessing phenomena and changes, we ascend to the ideas of Substance and Power; so, when we contemplate human character and conduct, we rise to the ideas of Right and Wrong, and pronounce one action to be Right and another Wrong; one agent to be virtuous and another to be vicious.

"Our moral judgments are not, like those we form in speculative matters, dry and unaffectioning, but, from their nature, are necessarily accompanied with feelings of approbation or of disapprobation." (Reid.)

Neither the moral judgment by itself, nor the moral feeling by itself, but the concurrence of both, constitutes the Moral Faculty.

In respect of its constitution, the Moral Faculty contains no peculiar power, as it consists of a perception or judgment, and an emotion or feeling—the perception proceeding on the Rightness or Wrongness of the action, and the feeling corresponding to the perception.

But, in the operation of the Moral Faculty, there is this peculiarity, that it extends to all the parts and principles of human conduct, and asserts a control and supremacy over them.

This prerogative of Conscience, as the master and governing principle, is thought sufficient to designate it as a distinct and peculiar power of our mental constitution.

The propriety of doing so is not lessened, but increased, when it is seen under the following head of inquiry, that the authority which Conscience exercises, although it be supreme over all our other principles, is yet a derived and delegated authority; and that this faculty in its actings has reference to a law or rule of life which is ultimate, and to the will of One who is Head over all.

CHAPTER IV.

OF THE NATURE OR FOUNDATION OF VIRTUE.

THE principal theories of classical antiquity, as to the nature of Virtue, may be briefly noticed, on account of the influence which they have had on the moral theories of later times.

According to Plato, the supreme and governing power in man is Reason. The Passions and Appetites he arranged in two classes,—namely, the Irascible, which spring from a love of honour and superiority, and the Concupiscent, which spring from a love of ease and pleasure. The Soul, as in connection with, and partly in subjection to, the body and the desires which spring from it, he regarded as in a state of degradation and exile. And the great aim of philosophy should be to check and govern the lower principles of our nature, and to give full scope and development to the Reason, and thus to prepare the Soul for that higher state to which it will return, when freed from the incumbrances of the body.

According to Aristotle and the Peripatetics, virtuous conduct consists in pursuing a middle course, equally remote from the extreme on either side. Thus, Fortitude or true Courage is the medium between Rashness on the one hand, and Cowardice on the other. Temperance or Moderation consists in taking the course intermediate

between Austerity and Indulgence. Plato frequently referred to the Soul as having existed before its life in the body, and as destined to live after the death of the body. Aristotle confined his views to the present state. The chief difference between the two philosophers was, that the latter regarded Virtue as a practical habit—that is, a frame or disposition of mind resulting from the regular performance of virtuous actions; while the former thought that just sentiments and reasonable conclusions, as to what was fit to be done or avoided, were sufficient to lead to perfect virtue.

The ethical formula of the Stoicks was, *Vivere convenienter naturæ*. According to Zeno, every being is entrusted with the preservation of its own existence, and the perfecting of its own nature. Man, therefore, ought to pursue that course of conduct which tends to preserve the body and its powers, and the mind and its faculties, in the best possible state. But we are not to regard ourselves as insulated individuals, but as members of one great community, as parts of a whole. While *we* have an end to accomplish, other beings have the same thing to do. All are but parts of one mighty scheme, which, under the guidance of Providence, is hastening to its happy accomplishment. Everything that can befall us here, whether we call it prosperous or adverse, is tending to the perfection and happiness of the whole. In contemplating the wisdom and the certainty of these results, and in discharging the part which has been assigned to us towards their completion, we put ourselves in alliance with the Power and Goodness which govern all things, and live in harmony with the scheme of universal nature.

According to Epicurus and his followers, “the most perfect state of human nature—the most complete happiness which man was capable of enjoying—consisted in ease of body and tranquillity of mind. To obtain this great end of natural desire was the sole object of all the virtues, which, according to them, were not desirable upon their own account, but solely upon account of their tendency to bring about this situation.” “The system of Epicurus agreed with those of Plato, Aristotle, and Zeno, in making Virtue consist in acting in the most suitable manner to obtain primary objects of natural desire. It differed from all of them in two other respects: *First*, in the account which it gave of these primary objects of natural desire; and, *Secondly*, in the account which it gave of the excellence of Virtue, or of the reason why that quality ought to be esteemed.”—See Smith, *Theory of Mor. Sent.*, pt. vii. sect. 2.

Feuchtersleben says (*Med. Psych.*, p. 28), "In these four types, the entire philosophy of antiquity is represented, and if we pursue them to their whole depth and extent, we may with truth affirm that they symbolise every direction of human thought which has assumed a complete and consistent character. If we would express their general scope in few words, we might, perhaps, say that Plato represents the freedom of rational ideality, Aristotle the legality of intelligible realism, Zeno the intellectual view of the world; Epicurus the material view—tendencies which are repeated at all times and in all places."

"The writings of Hobbes," says Sir James Mackintosh (*Dissert.*, p. 112), "gave rise to those ethical controversies which more peculiarly belong to modern times." The passage which is usually quoted, as containing the views of Hobbes as to the nature of Virtue, is the following, from his work entitled *Leviathan* (*Of Man*, ch. 6). "Whatsoever is the object of any man's appetite or desire, that is it which he, for his part, calleth *Good*; and the object of his hate and aversion, *Evil*; and of his contempt, *Vile* and *inconsiderable*. For these words, *Good* and *Evil* and *Contemptible*, are ever used with relation to the person that useth them: there being nothing simply nor absolutely so; nor any common rule of *Good* and *Evil* to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves; but from the person of the man (where there is no commonwealth), or in a commonwealth, from the person that representeth it; or person, or arbitrator, or judge, whom men, disagreeing, shall by consent set up and make his sentence the rule thereof." Passages to the same purport may be found, *De Cive*, cap. 4, sect. 17; *De Homine*, cap. 11.

Hobbes is commonly represented as holding that the difference between Virtue and Vice is altogether arbitrary, and not founded in the nature of actions, but depending entirely on the opinion or prejudice of individuals, or the authority of public law and rule. A similar doctrine seems to have been held in ancient times: for we find it noticed and condemned by the ancient Philosophers. (See Plato, *De Legibus*, lib. x., and his Dialogue entitled *Theætetus*; *Andronicus Rhodius*, lib. v. cap. 10; Cicero, *De Legibus*, lib. ii. cap. 1.)

In opposition to this doctrine, it has been shown, that Law is an

exposition, not an *origination* of Duty. The Law *declares* what is Right, but does not *constitute* anything Right. (Price, *Review*, ch. 1, sect. 1; Hutcheson, *Inquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of Virtue*; Stewart, *Act. and Mor. Pow.*, vol. i. p. 241.)¹

There is a difference between a *Rule* and the *reason* of a Rule, between a *Law* and the *principle* of a Law, which it is of importance to attend to in this controversy. (See Wardlaw, *Christ. Ethics*, lect. 2.)

But although Virtue does not originate in the law or will of man, may it not originate in the law or will of God? This opinion was started in ancient times, as may be seen from one of the Dialogues of Plato, entitled *Euthyphro*; it was held by many of the scholastic divines; and is an opinion to which the philosophy of Descartes has been represented as favourable (Cudworth, *Eternal and Immutable Mor.*, book i. ch. 3). It is maintained by Archbishop King in his *Essay on the Origin of Evil*, ch. 5, sect. 1, subsect. 4; Gale, *Court of the Gentiles*, pt. iv. book ii. ch. 5, sect. 8, p. 350.

The question has been stated thus: Is an action Right because God willed and commanded it? Or, Did God will and command the action because it is Right? Grave objections offer themselves on either side. But the two opinions, at first sight irreconcileable, are brought somewhat nearer to each other when it is recollect that the asserters of both maintain, that the will of God is, and can only be, exerted in accordance with the perfection of his nature. In short, the Divine will² is the manifestation of the Divine nature; and if rectitude belong to the Divine nature it must be manifested in the Divine will, which is the expression of that nature. "The being of God," said Hooker (*Eccles. Pol.*, book i. sect. 2), "is a law to his working (and consequently to his will); for that perfection which God is, giveth perfection to what he doeth." To the same purpose, Dr. Sam. Clarke has said, "Governing according to *law* and *reason*, and governing according to *will* and *pleasure*, are, on earth, the two most opposite forms of government; while, in heaven, they are nothing but two different names for the same thing." The doctrine, when

¹ "Regula enim legem (ut acus nautica polos) indicat non statuit."—Bacon, *De Aug-mentis*, VIII. 385.

² Thomas Aquinas (*Sum. Theol. Pars Prima*, Qu. xix. art. i.) has said, "Sicut suum intelligere est suum esse, ita et suum esse est suum velle." And (*Id. art. iv.*) "Quia essentia Dei est ejus intelligere et

velle." The will of God is thus identified with his Intelligence, as both are with his nature or essence. Plato held that in God there was an identification of the *velle* and the *esse*. Dr. Price has said (*Review*, &c., ch. 5), "we ought to distinguish between the *will* of God and his *nature*." We may distinguish, but we cannot difference.

thus understood, differs more in expression than in reality from those theories which resolve Virtue into the eternal reason and fitness of things.

Now, the various theories concerning virtue may be arranged, according as they place the foundation of it—

- I. In the nature of things, or
- II. In the nature of man. (See Butler, *Pref. to Sermons*; Hampden, *Introd. to Mor. Phil.*, lect. vii. p. 240.)

I.—Theories according to which Virtue is founded in the nature of things.

Dr. Cudworth wrote his *Treatise concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality*, to show that nothing can be Good or Just by mere will or arbitrary law, without at the same time having a *good or just nature*, (book i. ch. 2). He maintained that Right and Wrong, Just and Unjust, differ in their nature; and that these terms do not merely denote the fact, that certain actions have been willed and commanded to be done or not to be done, but that these actions have a nature or character belonging to them, and which may be predicated of them; and that, in virtue of this nature or character belonging to them, we are under obligation to do them or not to do them, antecedent to any will or law commanding or forbidding.

The views of Dr. Samuel Clarke are substantially the same.⁸ They are embodied in the following proposition :—"That, from the eternal and necessary differences of things, there naturally and necessarily arise certain moral obligations, which are of themselves incumbent on all rational creatures, antecedent to all positive institution and to all expectation of reward and punishment." The proofs and illustrations of the several parts of this proposition are given in his *Discourse concerning the unchangeable obligations of Natural Religion*, &c., at the beginning. From these it appears, that while Clarke maintained, with Cudworth, that actions have a nature or character antecedent to all will or law, he farther maintained, that this nature or character arises from the congruity between certain actions and certain relations; which relations are founded on the eternal and necessary differences of things, and the

⁸ Sir James Macintosh (*Dissert.*, p. 157) has taken a distinction between the theory of Cudworth and that of Clarke; which Dr. Wardlaw (*Christ. Ethics*, Note D) has shown to have little foundation.

congruity between which relations and the suitable actions is perceived by Reason.

In reference to this theory, let it be remarked—

1. That it is not to be understood as making Virtue consist in “a conformity to the relations of things universally, and Vice in a disregard of them.” This is the view given of it by Sir James Mackintosh. But it is a theory of moral action, and is to be understood as applying only to moral agents, and the relations in which they may be placed. (See Wardlaw, *Christ. Ethics*, Note E.)

2. That in this theory the term “fitness” does not mean the adaptation of an action as a means towards some end designed by the agent, but a congruity, proportion, or suitableness between an action and the relations in which, as a moral being, the agent stands. Dr. Clarke has been misunderstood on this point by Dr. Brown (*Lect. 76*) and others.

Differing in expression more than in reality from the theory which places virtue in a conformity to the nature, reason, and fitness of things, is that of Mr. Wollaston, who has placed it in a conformity to truth. His views, as contained in the *Religion of Nature Delinated*, are to the following purport. Those propositions are true which express things as they are; or, truth is the conformity of those words or signs by which things are expressed to the things themselves. Now, a true proposition may be denied, or things may be denied to be what they are, by deeds as well as by words. And no action that interferes with any true proposition, or denies anything to be what it is, can be Right. For example—if A should enter into a compact with B, by which he promises and engages never to do some certain thing, and afterwards does this thing; in this case his act interferes with his promise, and is contrary to it, consequently, it is Wrong. Again, when a man lives as if he had an amount of income which he has not, or as if he was in other respects what he is not, he does Wrong. His whole conduct breathes untruth. He may be said to live a lie.

Various objections have been taken against resolving Virtue into a conformity with Truth. The real objection against setting up this as a separate theory is, that before an action can be said to affirm or deny a true proposition, that action has been previously determined to be Right or Wrong.

The theory which holds virtue to consist in a conformity to the

nature, reason, and fitness of things, has been maintained without any change of phraseology, by John Balguy in *Tracts on the Foundation of Moral Goodness*, 8vo., Lond., 1734; and the Rev. Will. Law, in *Reply to Mandeville's Fable of the Bees*.

Dr. Price has maintained, like Cudworth and Clarke, that morality is eternal and immutable (*Review*, ch. 1, sect. 3). “Actions have a *nature*—that is, *some character* certainly belongs to them, and somewhat there is that may be *truly affirmed* of them. *Right* and *Wrong* denote what actions *are*. Now, whatever anything *is*, that it is not by will, or decree, or power, but by *nature and necessity*.” According to him, the terms Right and Wrong denote simple ideas, which cannot be defined (ch. 10.) These expressions, acting suitably to the natures of things, treating things as they are, conformity to truth, agreement and disagreement, congruity and incongruity between actions and relations, have little meaning, he thought, if considered as intended to define virtue. But he admitted that this language may be of use when employed, as it is, to “show that morality is *founded* on truth and reason, or that it is equally necessary and immutable, and perceived by the same power with the natural proportions and essential differences of things” (ch. 6). In short, his views as to the foundation of virtue did not differ from those of Cudworth; and his objection to the use of the explanatory phrases introduced by Clarke and others was, that they seemed to deny an *immediate perception of morality* by Reason, but without reasoning.

In a Sermon by Dr. Adams, on the *Nature and Obligation of Virtue*, published in 1754, which is noticed with approbation by Dr. Price and Mr. Stewart, similar views are expressed. “Actions are plainly an object to the Understanding (or Reason); and when surveyed or contemplated, their characters appear with them. We necessarily see them under the characters of Right, Indifferent, or Wrong. This Right in actions is not ordinarily discovered by any process of Reason (reasoning), but by simple perception. The Understanding sees it; and we may as well ask of the most obvious quantities, why some are greater than others—why the square, for instance, is greater than the root—as why some actions are better than others.” “Moral discernment is as natural and essential to reason as logical. To suppose a man without the faculty of distinguishing truth from falsehood, is to suppose him void of reason and the power of thought. To suppose him incapable of discerning

Right from Wrong, is in like manner to divest him of understanding, and to degrade him to a level with the brutes."

Dr. Reid's views in reference to this part of our inquiry may be shortly stated in his own words. (*Act. Pow.*, Essay iii. pt. iii. ch. 5.)

"If we examine the abstract notion of Duty or Moral Obligation, appears to be neither any real quality of the action considered by itself, nor of the agent considered without respect to the action, but a certain relation between the one and the other. When we say a man ought to do such a thing, the *ought* which expresses the moral obligation has a respect, on the one hand, to the person who ought, and on the other, to the action which he ought to do. These two correlates are essential to every moral obligation; take away either, and it has no existence. So that if we seek the place of moral obligation among the categories, it belongs to the category of *relation*. There are many relations of things, of which we have the most distinct conceptions, without being able to define them logically. Equality and proportion are relations between quantities which every man understands, but no man can define. Moral Obligation is a relation of its own kind, which every man understands, but is perhaps too simple to admit of logical definition."⁴

According to Mr. Stewart, the ideas of Right and Wrong are simple ideas, which admit neither of definition nor analysis. Whether these ideas are derived from a sense which discerns the nature or character of actions, in the same way that our bodily senses give us a knowledge of the primary qualities of matter, or whether they arise from an intuitive exercise of Reason, he thought the reality and immutability of moral distinctions to be equally safe and certain. But he obviously inclined to refer our ideas of Right and Wrong to Reason as their source (*Act. and Mor. Pow.*, vol. i. p. 266); and maintained that when we affirm of actions that they are Right or Wrong, the affirmation has respect not to any feelings or effects which they produce in us, but to what they are in themselves.

The following may be given as an outline of the views of those philosophers who place the foundation of Virtue in the nature, reason, and fitness of things.

Everything is what it is, by having a nature. As all things have not the same nature, there must be different *relations*, *respects*, or

⁴ "The ancients rightly founded the καλὸν or *honestum* on the πρέπεον or *deorum*—that is, they considered an action to be virtuous which was performed in har-

mony with the relations necessary and accidental of the agent."—*Note by Sir W. Hamilton.*

proportions of some things towards others, and a consequent *fitness* or *unfitness* in the application of different things, or different relations to one another. It is the same with *persons*. There is a *fitness* or *suitableness* of certain circumstances to certain *persons*, and an *unsuitableness* of others. And from the different relations of *different persons to one another*, there necessarily arises a *fitness* or *unfitness* of certain *manners of behaviour* of some persons towards others, as well as in respect to the things and circumstances with which they are surrounded. Now, we stand in various relations to God, as our Creator, our Preserver, our Benefactor, our Governor, and our Judge. We cannot contemplate these relations, without seeing and feeling a Rectitude or Rightness in cherishing certain affections and discharging certain services towards him, and a Wrongness in neglecting to do so, or in manifesting a different disposition, or following a different course of action. We stand, also, in various relations to our fellow-creatures; some of them inseparable from our nature and condition as human beings—such as the relations of parent and child, brother and friend; and others which may be voluntarily established—such as the relations of husband and wife, master and servant. And we cannot conceive of these relations, without at the same time seeing a Rectitude or Rightness in cherishing suitable affections and following a suitable course of action. Not to do so we see and feel to be Wrong. We may even be said to stand in various relations to the objects around us in the world; and when we contemplate our nature and condition, we cannot fail to see, in certain manners of behaviour, a suitableness or unsuitableness to the circumstances in which we have been placed. Now, Rectitude, or conformity with those relations which arise from the nature and condition of man, is nothing arbitrary or fictitious. It is founded in the nature of things. God was under no necessity to create human beings. But, in calling them into existence, he must have given them a nature, and thus have constituted the relations in which they stand to Him and to other beings. There is a suitableness or congruity between these relations and certain manners of behaviour. Reason, or the Moral Faculty, perceives and approves of this suitableness or congruity. The Divine mind must do the same; for the relations were constituted by God when he called things into being; and conformity to them must be in accordance with his will. So that Conscience, when truly enlightened, is a ray from the Divine Reason; and the moral law, which it reveals to us,

is Eternal and Immutable as the nature of God and the nature of things.

The philosophers whose views have been stated under this head may be considered as so many opponents of Hobbes, inasmuch as they have all maintained that actions and dispositions have a nature or character, and that Right and Wrong are not the mere expression of Will nor the creation of Law. They may be said to be *Realists* in morality; while Hobbes and his followers may be called *Nominalists*. (Shaftesbury, *Moralists*, pt. ii. sect. 2, p. 157.)

Another class of philosophers, in opposing the opinions of Hobbes, took a different way; and instead of arguing from the abstract nature and reason of things, they argued from the natural disposition of man, to do good to his fellow-creatures and to approve of it when done by others; and from the subordination and arrangement among the principles of the human mind, by which it is fitted for the practice of virtue. Virtue was thus shown to be founded in the nature and constitution of man as a moral being.

II.—*Theories according to which Virtue is founded in the nature of Man.*

At the head of this class may be placed Cumberland, Bishop of Peterborough. His work, *De Legibus Naturæ*, first published at London in 1672, has been a kind of storehouse from which subsequent moralists have derived some of their most valuable materials. In opposition to Hobbes, who held that, in a state of nature, men are enemies to one another, and that justice and other social virtues are created by law, Cumberland maintained that, antecedent to all institutions and laws, we have, as an original principle of human nature, Benevolence, or a desire to do good to our fellow-creatures; and in doing good to them we at the same time insure our own satisfaction and happiness. His theory of virtue may be resolved into two parts. Virtue, regarded as a practical principle or disposition in a moral agent, is Benevolence; in reference to the action, it is the tendency of the action to produce happiness. So that, according to Cumberland, Benevolence, or kind affection, constitutes an agent virtuous; and Utility, or beneficial tendency, constitutes an action right. The former of these views has been adopted by some philosophers, and the latter by others.

Among those who have followed Cumberland in maintaining that

Benevolence, or kind affection, constitutes an agent virtuous, may be reckoned Lord Shaftesbury. He held that there are in human nature not only principles which prompt us to seek our own good, but also such as lead us to be pleased with the well-being of others. We are not, therefore, to consider ourselves as insulated individuals, and to pursue exclusively our own interest; but as members of society we are to seek the good of the whole. This can only be done by keeping a proper balance between the private and public affections—between those principles of our nature which terminate on ourselves, and those which carry us out towards the happiness of others. It is not, however, the mere fact of the affections being in a right state and due balance that constitutes an agent truly virtuous. If such a state of the affections could be the result of a happy temperament of body, or mind, or both, it would merely constitute him in whom it was found, a *good creature*,—just as some of the inferior animals, from the gentleness of their disposition, are called *good*. But man can reflect on what passes within him. He not only has kind affections, but these affections become the objects of reflection; and when reflected on by him he sees a beauty and worth in them, and a deformity and ill-desert in their opposites. It is when, in consequence of the exercise of this reflex sense, we cherish the kind affections of our nature, and check those that would lead us to do ill to others, that we deserve to be called virtuous. And if we would rise to the highest pitch of virtue, we must raise our affections beyond the order of human society, and contemplate the beauty and harmony of the universe, and the wisdom and goodness by which it is governed. “Virtue is not complete but in piety; since, where the latter is wanting, there can be neither the same benignity, firmness, nor constancy; the same good composure of the affections, or uniformity of mind.” (*Inquiry concerning Virtue*, book i. at the end. See also book ii. pt. i. sect. 1, and book i. pt. ii. sect. 3.) “If, through hope merely of reward, or fear of punishment, the creature be incited to do the good he hates, or restrained from doing the ill to which he is not otherwise in the least degree averse, there is in this case no virtue or goodness whatever. There is no more of Rectitude, Piety, or Sanctity in a creature thus reformed, than there is meekness or gentleness in a tiger strongly chained, or innocence and sobriety in a monkey under the discipline of the whip.” (Shaftesbury’s *Charact.*, vol. ii. pp. 38, 39.)

But, if we cherish such large and generous affections towards

others, may not our private interest and individual happiness be neglected or impaired? In reply to this objection he undertakes to prove (*Inquiry concerning Virtue*, book i. pt. ii. sect. 1), "That to have the natural affections (such as are founded in Love, Complacency, and Good-will, and in a sympathy with the kind or species) is to have the chief means and power of self-enjoyment, and that to want them is certain misery and ill."⁵

The well-known metaphysical divine, Jonathan Edwards, had a theory as to the nature of Virtue, coinciding, to some extent, with those now noticed; but also going beyond them. According to him (*Dissertation on the Nature of True Virtue*, ch. 1), "True virtue most essentially consists in benevolence to being in general. Or perhaps, to speak more accurately, it is that consent, propensity, and union of heart, to being in general, that is immediately exercised in a general good-will." This benevolence, or love to being, is simply good-will. It has no reference to the character of those beings towards whom it is exercised. It embraces all intelligent beings; but has in it nothing of the love of Complacence, which implies esteem for the character of the being beloved. But, "when any one under the influence of general benevolence sees another being possessed of the like general benevolence, this attaches his heart to him, and draws forth greater love to him than merely his having existence." "He looks on a benevolent propensity to being in general, wherever he sees it, as the beauty of the being in whom it is; an excellency that renders him worthy of esteem, complacence, and the greater good-will." So that, according to Edwards, we first love or are benevolently affected towards being in general, or every being, because he is possessed of being; and, in the next place, our benevolence is increased when the being or beings towards whom it is exercised possess and manifest benevolence. This excites in us the love of Complacence or Moral Esteem. But this is not all. "If being, simply considered, be the first object of a truly virtuous benevolence, then that being, who has *most* of being, or has the greatest share of existence, will have the *greatest* share of the propensity and benevolent affection of the heart." "I say," continues Edwards in a note, "in proportion to the *degree of existence*, because one being may have more *existence* than another, as he may be greater than another. That which is *great* has more existence, and is farther

⁵ "The merciful man doeth good to his own soul: but he that is cruel troubleth his own flesh."—Prov. xi. 17.

removed from nothing than that which is little." . . . "An archangel must be supposed to have more existence and to be every way farther removed from nonentity, than a worm." Now, as God is infinite in his being and perfections, he has the greatest amount of existence and of excellence; and as he is the greatest and the best of beings, he deserves, on both grounds, to be supremely loved, and other beings in proportion as they resemble him. The theory of Edwards thus ultimately resolves virtue into Love to God. He has said (ch. 2), "He that has true virtue, consisting in benevolence to being in general, and in that complacence in virtue or moral beauty, and benevolence to virtuous being, must necessarily have a supreme love to God, both of benevolence and complacence. And all true virtue must radically and essentially, and as it were, summarily consist in this. Because God is not only infinitely greater and more excellent than all other beings, but he is the Head of the universal system of existence; the foundation and fountain of all being and all beauty; from whom all is perfectly derived, and on whom all is most absolutely and perfectly dependent; of whom, and through whom, and to whom is all being and all perfection; and whose being and beauty is, as it were, the sum and comprehension of all existence and excellence, much more than the sun is the fountain and summary comprehension of all the light and brightness of the day."

Dr. Hutcheson held, that, in contemplating human actions, the great element which awakens our approbation is to be found in the indications which they give of benevolent intention or kind affection in the agent. He has said (*Inquiry concerning Moral Good and Evil*, sect. 3), "If we examine all the actions which are counted amiable anywhere, and inquire into the grounds upon which they are approved, we shall find that, in the opinion of the person who approves them, they generally appear as benevolent, or flowing from good-will to others, and a study of their happiness, whether the approver be one of the persons beloved, or profited, or not; so that all those kind affections which incline us to make others happy, and all actions supposed to flow from such affections, appear morally good, if, while they are benevolent towards some persons, they be not pernicious to others." Kind affection, or, as he has called it (*Inquiry concerning Moral Good and Evil*, sect. 2), Love towards rational agents, may be distinguished into Love of Complacence or Esteem, and Love of Benevolence or Good-will. The former denotes approbation of any person by the Moral Sense, and is a perception

rather than an affection. The latter is the desire of the happiness o. another, and may denote—

1. A calm affection of good-will towards all beings capable of happiness or misery.
2. A calm affection towards the happiness of certain smaller systems or individuals ; such as patriotism, friendship, or parental affection.
3. The several particular affections of love, pity, sympathy, and congratulation.

The distinction of Love to rational agents into Love of Esteem and Love of Good-will accords with the distinction taken by Edwards. But the theory of Hutcheson has been represented as having an advantage over that of Edwards, and also that of Cumberland, by its not including the Supreme Being among those rational agents whose happiness we are to desire or seek. (See Hallam, *Liter. Hist. of Europe*, vol. iv. p. 322.) There can be no doubt, however, that Hutcheson thought that his theory of virtue was capable of being extended to our duties towards God as well as to the personal and social duties. (*Inquiry concerning Moral Good and Evil*, sect. 3.) According to him, gratitude towards God and kind affection towards an earthly benefactor are approved on the same ground. The fact that God cannot be benefited, while an earthly benefactor may be benefited, by the conduct to which this love will lead, does not affect the virtuousness of the agent who cherishes it.

“A grateful mind
By owing, owes not, but still pays, at once
Indebted and discharged.”

This theory is easily and directly applicable to the social virtues. We approve and applaud the man who is just and generous from a regard to the rights and happiness of others. But we do not reckon that man truly just who discharges the duties of justice from a fear of the compulsion or punishment of the law ; nor do we reckon him truly generous who bestows a favour from the expectation of a return, or from the desire of applause. So that we count a man virtuous, in his conduct towards others, in proportion as it proceeds from benevolence or kind affection. (*Inquiry concerning Moral Good and Evil*, sect. 3.) And if the term Benevolence be taken, in the first of the senses assigned to it by Hutcheson, to denote “a calm,

extensive affection, or good-will towards all beings capable of happiness or misery," then, even the personal virtues may be traced to this affection. Accordingly, he has maintained that there is no incompatibility, or rather, that there is a perfect compatibility, between Benevolence and Self-love: that he who cherishes kind affection towards all may also love himself; may love himself as a part of the whole system of rational and sentient beings; may promote his own happiness in preference to that of another who is not more deserving of his love; and may be innocently solicitous about himself, while he is wisely benevolent towards all. (*Inquiry concerning Moral Good and Evil*, sect. 3; and Rev. Mr. Jameson, *Essay on Virtue and Harmony*, p. 148.) But if a man, in seeking his own interest, forgets that he is but one of the many who have equal or stronger desires and claims for happiness with himself, or if, in the knowledge of this, he tramples on their claims to prosecute his own, and stifles all kind affection by an absorbing selfishness, then that which he calls prudence, being altogether dissociated from benevolence, no longer deserves nor obtains the character of virtue. Should a man, however, so love himself, and so seek his private interest, that he may show more love and do more good to others, then his prudent conduct is also virtuous conduct; for he benefits his neighbour by doing good to himself.

Both Shaftesbury and Hutcheson maintained that the Supreme Being is the proper object of our reverence, gratitude, and love. But in urging the cultivation of these affections they referred chiefly to the tendency which they have in producing in us a happy composure and elevation of mind, and in leading us to promote the well-being of others. The theory of Edwards, which resolves virtue into love to God, manifesting itself by love to our neighbour, and government of ourselves, is, perhaps, on the whole, the most comprehensive and consistent of those theories according to which an agent is reckoned virtuous in proportion as he cherishes kind affections. But kind affections are not the whole, nor even the highest part, of human nature. Reason and conscience are the supreme and governing principles of a responsible or moral agent; and it may be thought that it is only in so far as he feels and shows a deference to their dictates that he can deserve the appellation of virtuous. A theory, accordingly, has been framed which places virtue, not in the proper state and direction of the kind affections only, but in the due subordination and exercise of all the parts and principles of human

nature, regarded as a constitution or system designed for the practice of it.

The theory of Bishop Butler is contained in his *Sermons on Human Nature*, and the *Dissertation on Virtue*. It may be regarded as the sequel and the complement of the theories of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson—more especially of the former. That kind and disinterested affections form a part of human nature, was maintained by Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, and has been clearly shown by Butler in the First of his *Sermons*; so that this common ground has been occupied by all the three philosophers, in opposition to Hobbes and the followers of the selfish system. But, while Shaftesbury resolved virtue, as predicated of an agent, *very much*, and Hutcheson resolved it *altogether*, into Benevolence, or kind affection, Butler paused at this point, and said, “Without inquiring how far, and in what sense, virtue is resolvable into Benevolence, and vice into the want of it, it may be proper to observe, that Benevolence and the want of it, simply considered, are in no sort the whole of virtue and vice.”

A leading idea in the writings of Shaftesbury was, that men and things are not to be viewed individually and apart from each other, but rather as bearing relation to each other, as parts to a whole, and thus constituting an economy or system. Now, the moral theory of Butler starts from the idea of a constitution or system; but it is not the constitution or system of the universe of rational beings, to which Edwards and Hutcheson extended their theories, nor even the system of human society, considered as a whole, but the human mind, or rather human nature, as made up of principles which have relation or respect to one another, and which, taken as a whole, form a constitution or economy adapted to an end or purpose. Among the principles of human nature, there are some which prompt us to seek our own good, and there are others which lead us to seek the good of our neighbour. But neither the selfish, nor the benevolent principles, nor both taken together, and viewed in relation to each other, can give us the idea of human nature as a whole. We must take into account a principle of Reflection or Conscience, which is supreme over all the rest, and tells us, authoritatively, what principles are, in any case, to be resisted or obeyed. By thus regarding it as a constitution, economy, or system, it is seen that human nature, in its normal state, was designed for the practice of virtue. For, “If the real nature of any creature leads him, and is adapted to such and such purposes only, or more than any other, this is a reason to

believe that the Author of that nature intended it for these purposes." Virtue is thus shown to be founded in the nature of man and the will of God, and not to be the offspring of varying opinion and custom. Man, by his very make, or constitution, is a law to himself; and the law which results from regarding his nature as an economy or system, is the law of Him who is the Author of that nature, in its right and normal state. The law of God is promulgated by the nature of man, and to live agreeably to the end designed in that nature is Virtue.

The theory of Butler has been called "the system of Zeno baptized into Christ." According to the Stoical philosophy, Virtue consisted in living agreeably to nature. By one class of its followers, this formula was interpreted to mean universal nature; and by another, human nature. In the latter sense, the formula was adopted by Butler; and he maintained, that, if human nature be considered as a system or constitution, "it will as fully appear, that this our nature, that is, constitution, is adapted to virtue, as, from the idea of a watch, it appears that its nature, that is, constitution or system, is adapted to measure time." But, in framing an adequate idea of human nature, we must take in, not only the several appetites, passions, and affections, but also Reason and Conscience, and the relations which these several parts have to each other. And we must always remember, "that one of the principles of action, Conscience or Reflection, compared with the rest, as they all stand together in the nature of man, plainly bears upon it marks of authority over all the rest, and claims the absolute direction of them all, to allow or forbid their gratification; a disapprobation of Reflection being in itself a principle manifestly superior to a mere propension." A clear and determinate sense is thus given to the precept, *Follow nature*. It is not to yield to any natural impulse which may be strongest at the time, but to keep all the parts and principles of our complex constitution in their proper place and subordination; and, above all, to allow to the highest principle of Reflection or Conscience, that supreme control which rightfully belongs to it. In short, to live agreeably to nature, according to the theory of Butler, is to live in all good conscience before God and man.

"In Plato's *Dialogue on the Republic*, as in Butler's *Sermons*, the human soul is represented as a system, a constitution, an organized whole, in which the different elements have not merely their places side by side, but their places above and below each other, with their

appointed offices; and virtue or moral rightness consists in the due operation of this constitution—the actual realization of this organized subordination.”—Whewell, *Pref. to Butler's Sermons.*

In accordance with this view are the words of Cicero—*Natura juris ab hominis repetenda natura est.*

Many of those who maintain that Benevolence or kind affection is what makes an agent *virtuous*, also maintain that utility or beneficial tendency is what makes an action *right*. But some who maintain that utility or beneficial tendency is what makes an action right, hold that a virtuous agent may be prompted by Self-love as well as by Benevolence, or partly by both; and the beneficial tendency of actions has, by some, been viewed solely in reference to this life, while, by others, it has been extended to a future state; and the obligation to do such actions has been represented as arising from the rewards and punishments of that future state, as made known by the light of nature and by revelation.

In his *Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals*, which was first published in 1751, Mr. Hume propounded the doctrine of Utility, without reference to the being or providence of God, or to any belief in a future state. He endeavoured to prove, “That every quality of mind which is *useful or agreeable to the person himself or to others*, communicates a pleasure to the spectator, engages his esteem, and is admired under the honourable denomination of virtue or merit.” “But usefulness,” said Mr. Hume (*Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals*, sect. 5), “is only a tendency to a certain end; and it is a contradiction in terms that anything pleases, as means to an end, where the end itself does no way affect us. If, therefore, usefulness be a source of moral sentiment, and if this usefulness be not always considered with a reference to self, it follows that everything which contributes to the happiness of society recommends itself directly to our approbation and good-will.” He is not, therefore, to be classed with those moralists, like Epicurus and his followers in ancient times, and Hobbes and his followers in modern times, who would trace all our moral sentiments to self-love as their single source. He contended that Benevolence or Humanity, by which we take an interest in the happiness of others, is an original and essential part of human nature as well as Self-love, and an equally fruitful source of moral sentiments. He had, therefore, a twofold answer to give to the question—Why Utility pleases? We are pleased with, and approve of, such actions as are useful and agreeable to ourselves,

because we are so constituted as to desire our own happiness; and we are pleased with, and approve of, such actions as are useful and agreeable to others, because we are so constituted as to have a fellow-feeling with them.

It was with limitations, which nullified his adherence, that Dr. Adam Smith went along with Mr. Hume in maintaining the doctrine of Utility, both in *Aesthetics* and in *Morals*. He admitted that no qualities of mind are approved as virtuous but such as are useful or agreeable, either to the person himself or to others; and that no qualities are disapproved as vicious, but such as have a contrary tendency. But still he affirmed (*Theory of Mor. Sent.* pt. iv. ch. 2), "That it is not the view of this utility or hurtfulness which is either the first or principal source of our approbation or disapprobation." And he offered two specific objections against this doctrine,—one resting on an alleged impossibility or absurdity in its being true, and the other amounting to the assertion of a different doctrine. For, "First of all, it seems impossible that the approbation of virtue should be a sentiment of the same kind with that by which we approve of a convenient and well-contrived building, or that we should have no other reason for praising a man than that for which we commend a chest of drawers; and, Secundly, it will be found, upon examination, that the usefulness of any disposition of mind is seldom the first ground of approbation, and that the sentiment of approbation always involves in it a sense of *propriety*, quite distinct from the perception of utility."

The first of these objections had been anticipated by Mr. Hume in a note to his *Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals*, sect. 5; and in this view of the doctrine he had been anticipated by Dr. Hutcheson (*Inquiry concerning Moral Good and Evil*, sect. 1.) The objection, however, has been adopted and reiterated by Dr. Brown, (*Lect. 77*). But, inasmuch as it compares things that are incongruous, or confounds things that are quite distinct, the objection is not valid. We do not *commend* a chest of drawers—we *value* it. We may commend the skill shown by the maker; and if this skill has been exerted to please or to benefit others, we may *praise* him for his kind affection and benevolent intention. But the fact that the chest of drawers has *value*, does not prove that the maker cannot have *merit*. Neither does it prove that the ground on which the chest of drawers is reckoned *valuable* is the same, or not the same, with that on which the maker is to be reckoned *virtuous*. The

doctrine of Utility may be true, or it may not be true, in the science of value or political economy; but this can argue nothing for or against the doctrine in the science of virtue or moral philosophy. The usefulness of a chest of drawers arises necessarily from the nature and construction of the parts. The usefulness of the maker, regarded as a moral agent, according to the views of Mr. Hume, may be traced to the cherished and habitual exercise of benevolent disposition, directed to the accomplishment of wise and happy ends by intention and free choice. The same term may be applied to both, but they are quite different; and no valid objection to the doctrine of Utility can be derived from bringing together things so disparate as a well-constructed machine and a well-intentioned man.

The truth, and nothing but the truth, should be the aim of all philosophy. In no other view does Mr. Hume deserve that anything should be said to show that his doctrine of Utility is not liable to this objection; for, with a forgetfulness or inconsistency which is characteristic of scepticism, he has himself urged the same objection, on as inadequate grounds, against the doctrine, that Virtue is founded on certain relations arising from the nature and fitness of things. (See the *Treatise on Human Nature*, book iii. pt. i. sect. 1.⁶)

In the second objection which he advanced against the doctrine of *Utility*, Dr. Adam Smith has brought forward the doctrine of *Propriety*. He held that we approve of a moral agent, first, on the ground of Propriety, or because the sentiment or affection of heart from which his action proceeds, is suitable or proportioned to the cause or object which excites it. In this consists the propriety or impropriety, the decency or ungracefulness, of the consequent action. On this ground we sympathize or enter into the feelings and views of the agent, and approve of his character and conduct. When we also see that the end contemplated by his action was a useful end, and that the action has answered the end which the agent had in view, and has been followed by beneficial consequences, our approbation rises higher, we enter into the gratitude of those who are

⁶ In an advertisement to the latest edition of his *Essays*, Mr. Hume complained that his philosophical principles had been attacked, as stated in his *Human Nature*—a work which he never acknowledged; and he desired that henceforth his sentiments should be judged of only from the *Essays*. After this declaration, Mr. Stewart (*Dissert.*

pt. ii. p. 172) thinks it would be uncandid to impute to Mr. Hume any philosophical principles not to be found in the *Essays* as well as in the *Treatise on Human Nature*. But the doctrine that Virtue is founded in the nature and fitness of things is opposed in both these works.

benefited by these consequences, and we not only pronounce the action to be right and proper, but the agent to be meritorious and deserving of reward. So that the *rectitude* of an action consists in the suitableness or propriety of the principle or motive from which it springs, and the *merit* of it, or rather of the agent, lies in the beneficial nature of the effects which it was intended and fitted to produce.

Dr. Brown, also, has shown, at great length, and with great eloquence (*Lect. 77 and 78*), that Utility is neither the primary nor the principal ground of those sentiments of approbation with which right actions are regarded.

But the fundamental objection to the views of Mr. Hume, and to the doctrine of Utility, under all its modifications, is that taken by Dr. Reid (*Act. Pow.*, Essay v. ch. 5), viz., "that agreeableness and utility are not moral conceptions, nor have they any connection with morality. What a man does, merely because it is agreeable, is not virtue. Therefore the Epicurean system was justly thought by Cicero, and the best moralists among the ancients, to subvert morality, and to substitute another principle in its room; and this system is liable to the same censure." "*Honestum, igitur, id intelligimus, quod tale est, ut, detracta omni utilitate, sine ulla premiis fructibusve, per seipsum jure possit laudari.*"—*De Finibus*, ii. 14.

After Mr. Hume, the most strenuous advocate of the doctrine of Utility, looking no farther than the present life, has been Mr. Jeremy Bentham. In his *Fragment on Government*, which appeared in 1776, he introduced Utility as the fundamental principle of political morality: as the test, for instance, when resistance to Government is allowable, (ch. 4, art. xx.; ch. 1, art. xlvi.) In an *Essay on Government*, published in 1768, Dr. Priestley had introduced, in italics, as the only reasonable and proper object of Government, "*the greatest happiness of the greatest number.*" Mr. Bentham adopted this phrase, instead of the term Utility; and to his system of morality, constructed upon this principle, he gave the title of Deontology. It would appear, however, that he was not altogether satisfied with the phraseology employed, either by himself or others, on the subject of morality. But we must take his views as he has expressed them. According to him, morality is the art of maximizing happiness. Nothing that is called virtue is entitled to the name, unless, and in so far as, it contributes to happiness. And nothing that is called vice is properly designated, unless, and in so far as, it

is productive of unhappiness. If vice produced happiness, it would be virtue; and if virtue produced unhappiness, it would be vice. "I have taken," said he (*Deontol.*, vol. ii. pref. p. 8), "the principle of Utility for my guide. I will follow wheresoever it leads me. No prejudices shall force me to quit the road. No interest shall seduce me. No superstitions shall appal me." Yet he had formerly said (*Deontol.*, vol. i. p. 35), that "The word utility, with its conjugates, useless and useful, usefulness and uselessness, has not been found applicable to all the cases where the principle itself is brought into operation. In some instances, the term utility, with its conjugates, appears too weak to express the force of obligation of which it is desirable to give the idea. The mind will not be satisfied with such phrases as these. *It is useless to commit murder*, or, *it would be useful to prevent it*; and so of incendiarism and acts of great magnitude of mischief."

Now, the reason why the mind is not satisfied with such phrases is, that they are altogether inadequate to describe its perceptions and feelings in reference to such actions. The committing or the preventing of murder is not a matter of utility or inutility, but of Right and Wrong; and no terms but these, or terms equivalent to these, are sufficient to describe the state of our mind in reference to such cases of action. Mr. Bentham has said that the word Propriety, with its conjugates, proper and improper, will supply best what is wanting in the term Utility, with its conjugates, as applicable to cases of great good or evil. But this substitution of the term Propriety for the term Utility amounts to a shifting of the ground of moral approbation. The term Utility⁷ is either sufficient adequately to denote that in actions, on the ground of which we approve them, or it is not. If it is, let it be retained. If it is not, let it be dismissed. But the theory denoted by it must be dismissed along with it; for it will not do to cling to the doctrine of Utility, and attempt to bolster it up by using terms which imply something more than, or something different from, what is meant by Utility and its conjugates.

It may also be noticed that there is an admission, fatal to the sufficiency of the doctrine of Utility, involved in saying that "the

⁷ In a note to his *Utilitarianism*, p. 9, Mr. J. S. Mill says he has reason for believing himself to be the first person who brought the word Utilitarian into use. He complains that the word is misunder-

stood as denoting the rejection of pleasure in some of its forms, as of beauty, ornament, or amusement. But see what Dr. Reid says,

term Utility is too weak to express the force of the obligation of which it is desirable to give the idea." It never can be desirable to give any idea of the force of obligation, but the idea of it as it really exists and is felt. The term Utility cannot be said to carry with it the idea of obligation at all. (Jouffroy, *Introd. to Ethics*, vol. ii. p. 95.) To the Reason, the term Propriety may suggest some idea of obligation. But it is the term Rectitude which speaks to us with the authority of a law—a law the validity of which Conscience immediately recognizes, and in obeying which we experience the highest satisfaction of which our nature is capable. "The moral faculty converts our perception of the quality of actions into an affection of the strongest kind; nor can we be satisfied with any account of our moral sentiments which excludes this feature in the process." (Whewell, *Preface to Mackintosh's Dissert.*, p. 29.) In a word, the sense of obligation, which is involved in the perception of an action as Right, is altogether unexplained by the doctrine of Utility. And the wonder is, that, seeing and acknowledging this, Bentham should still have held by the doctrine, and tried to defend it by the introduction of language which is not compatible with it.

According to Bentham (*Deontol.*, vol. ii. Introd. p. 19), "the Deontologist is but an arithmetician, whose cyphers are pains and pleasures; his science is that of addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division." He seems, however, to have been quite aware that this science, when reduced to practice by individuals, and applied to particular cases, is very liable to be abused. And, accordingly, we find him urging very strenuously (*Deontol.*, vol. ii. ch. 1), the framing of general rules and conforming to them, so as to avoid the temptations of frailty and passion in particular cases. The probability is that the rules thus framed, on the ground of Utility, would not differ from the practical precepts of morality laid down by those who maintain that there is a nature or character belonging to actions, on the ground of which we approve of them, without regard to their consequences. Indeed, Sir James Mackintosh has expressly asserted, that, what the moral faculty prescribes will agree with the rules that are rightly framed on the principle of producing the greatest happiness. (*Dissert.*, p. 382.) Let it be observed, however, that the general rules framed on the ground of Utility, can never attain to the character of absolute universality; and consequently can never have the authority of laws. According to Kant, if you

can universalize your conduct, you may be sure that it is in conformity with the moral law—that is, if the action which you contemplate is such that you could approve of it as done by you and by all men, then you may conclude that it is right—that it is not the rule of a selfish and shifting expediency, but the law of right reason. But, while the rules framed on the ground of Utility are admitted to be useful, they are not so unbending as to admit of no relaxation. Indeed, some of the advocates of that doctrine have not hesitated to say, that “Moral Philosophy cannot pronounce any rule of morality to be so rigid as to bend to no exceptions;” so that, after all their precautions, they leave the principle of Self-love to be the ultimate and supreme guide of human conduct.

Of those who hold it with reference to the rewards and punishments of a future state, one of the most strenuous advocates of the doctrine, that Utility is the ground of approbation in matters of morality, was Dr. Thomas Rutherford. In 1744, he published an *Essay on the Nature and Obligations of Virtue*, in which he maintained, that “no eternal and necessary differences, no fitness or unfitness of things, can be the cause of moral obligation.” According to him, what constitutes any unfitness a *moral unfitness*, is, that it is capable of producing unhappiness and misery; and what makes a *moral fitness*, is, that which is calculated to advance happiness and secure well-being. He defined Virtue (*Essay*, p. 6) to be “that quality in our actions by which they are fitted to do good to *others*, or to prevent their harm.” “A virtuous action is called so, not because it makes *him* happy *who does it*, or prevents *his* misery; but because *others*, in proper circumstances, will feel one of these effects from it.” (*Essay*, p. 15.) By these passages, the epithet *virtuous* was confined to those actions which are done towards others. Yet he held that the principle which prompted such actions was not Benevolence but Self-love. Every man’s own happiness is the ultimate end which reason teaches him to pursue. And the obligation under which we lie to the constant and uniform practice of virtue towards all mankind, is, not the happiness which attends or follows the practice of it, but because Revelation has informed us that God will make us finally happy for it in a life after this. (*Essay*, p. 273.) So that the reason why we should do good to others is, that we thus insure our own ultimate good.

The doctrine of Utility was also maintained by Mr. Tucker, the author of the *Light of Nature Pursued*. Paley has candidly ac-

knowledged the obligations under which he lay to that lively and ingenious work. He was also much indebted to the *Preliminary Dissertation concerning the fundamental principle of Virtue or Morality*, which is prefixed to Archbishop King's *Essay on the Origin of Evil*, published in 1781, and which was written by the Rev. Mr. Gay. The *Dissertation*, however, though full of pregnant passages, is but short; and the fullest and most popular exposition of the doctrine of Utility is that given by Paley, in his work entitled *Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy*, which was first published in 1785.

Virtue is defined to be (book i. ch. 7), “*the doing good to mankind, in obedience to the will of God, and for the sake of everlasting happiness.*” According to which definition, “the good of mankind” is the *subject*; “the will of God” the *rule*; and “everlasting happiness” the *motive* of human virtue. The same definition of Virtue had been given in a paper following Mr. Gay's *Preliminary Dissertation*. The Author, if not Mr. Gay himself, probably agreed with him in including *personal* Virtue under Prudence, and *religious* Virtue under Piety; so that by him this definition was applied only to *social* Virtue. By Paley it is given as a definition of all Virtue; and in this view it is inadequate.⁸ It is true that the personal virtues of temperance, sobriety, and prudence, may do good to others as well as to those who practise them; and they may be prompted partly by benevolence or kind affection. (Butler, *Second Sermon on Love of our Neighbour*.) And it may also be said, that a regard to the good of mankind, and to the peace and happiness of society, may lead to the discharge of the duties of religion. But it is only in a secondary and subordinate sense that this can be said.

Notwithstanding this inadequacy in the definition, it may seem to be safe, so long as the will of God is regarded as the rule of our duty. But how is the will of God to be ascertained? “There are two methods of coming at the will of God on any point: *First*, By his express declarations, when they are to be had, and which must be sought for in Scripture. *Second*, By what we can discover of his designs and disposition from his works; or, as we usually call it, the light of nature.” (Book ii. ch. 4.)

The Scriptures being admitted to be of divine authority, the express declarations of God's will, which they contain, are to be received as the rule of our conduct in all matters to which they extend, without farther deliberation.

* See Wainwright, *Vindication of Paley*, 8vo., Lond. 1830, p. 72.

"The method of coming at the will of God concerning any action, by the light of nature, is to inquire into the 'tendency of the action to promote or to diminish the general happiness.' This rule proceeds upon the presumption that God Almighty wills and wishes the happiness of his creatures; and consequently that those actions which promote that will and wish must be agreeable to him; and the contrary."

Paley then entered upon an argument to prove the Divine Benevolence (book ii. ch. 5). And this being proved, he thought that we are at liberty to go on with the rule built upon it. And accordingly he has said (book ii. ch. 6), "So, then, actions are to be estimated by their tendency to promote happiness. Whatever is expedient is right. It is the utility of any moral rule which constitutes the obligation to obey it." But, as moral government can only be administered according to general laws, he has added (book ii. ch. 8), that whatever is expedient "must be expedient upon the whole, at the long run, in all its effects, collateral and remote, as well as in those which are immediate and direct; as it is obvious that, in computing consequences, it makes no difference in what way, or at what distance, they ensue." This has led him to insist upon the framing of general rules, the propriety of which has always been acknowledged. "*Formula quædam constituenda est: quam si sequemur in comparatione rerum, ab officio nunquam recedemus,*" said Cicero. But, according to Paley, even those general rules, which are so useful, admit of cases in which it may be expedient to break them. And who is to be judge of this expediency? Every man for himself. Surely, there is much room for misunderstanding or misapplying a doctrine like this.

Besides, instead of limiting expediency to cases in which the light of nature is our only guide, he has extended the principle, as applicable to cases in which the will of God has been expressly revealed. Thus (book ii. ch. 6), after laying it down as his fundamental position, "*Whatever is expedient is right,*" he has noticed an objection, that in some cases murder and perjury may be useful. And instead of replying, as he might have done, that these have been expressly forbidden by the Word of God, he has said, "these actions, after all, are not useful, and *for that reason, and for that alone, are not right.*" What becomes now of the express declarations of God's will, *Thou shalt not kill; Thou shalt not forswear thyself?*

Now, here there is surely a shifting of the ground formerly taken.

In the theory of Bentham, Utility does not necessarily count any kindred with the will of God. The doctrine is propounded, and may be held very much, if not altogether, without reference to the will, or even to the existence, of God. But, according to Mr. Gay (*Prelim. Dissert.*, p. 31), "The will of God is the immediate criterion of virtue, and the happiness of mankind the criterion of the will of God; and therefore the happiness of mankind may be said to be the criterion of virtue, *but once removed.*" Now Paley, by his definition, had declared the will of God to be the rule of human duty. But, having proved the Divine benevolence, he has then brought forward expediency as the universal ground and measure of all human virtue. He may be said, in this way, to have slipped the cable which should have bound him to the will of God. All farther reference to that will is dropped, and virtue is resolved altogether into expediency. What he set out with stating separately as two distinct things—the will of God and the good of man—the *subject* and the *rule* of human virtue—are run into one. Utility, or a tendency to produce happiness, is the reason why any actions have been expressly enjoined by God, and the only and universal reason why any actions ought to be done by man; so that expediency comes to be the ultimate rule and supreme guide of human conduct.

But neither the truth nor authority of the principle of expediency necessarily follows from admitting that God is good and that we ought to imitate his goodness. The production of happiness may be the guiding and governing principle in the Divine mind; the production of happiness may be the aim of all the Divine declarations, and the end of all the Divine dispensations; and yet it may not follow that the production of happiness should be *our* supreme or exclusive aim, or a tendency to produce happiness the only ground on which we should regard actions as virtuous. What is right and competent to a being of infinite perfection, may be neither right nor competent to us. To say so would lead to the rejection of divine revelation. God has seen fit expressly to declare his will concerning certain actions that they are right,—and to be done by us; and concerning other actions, that they are wrong,—and not to be done by us. It may be true that the ground or reason of his declaration is that the actions to be done by us have a tendency to produce happiness, and that the actions which are forbidden have a tendency to destroy or to prevent happiness. But the enjoining of the one and

the prohibiting of the other imply that we are not competent judges of the tendencies of such actions. So that to set up expediency as the sole or universal ground of what is right and binding upon us, is really to set up reason above revelation, or rather to put down revelation as altogether unnecessary; seeing that in the tendency of actions to produce or to prevent happiness, we have the reason which influences and governs the Divine mind in all its manifestations, and which ought to influence and govern us in all moral decisions.

But the doctrine of expediency is not only incompatible with the supreme authority of revelation; it is altogether incomprehensible, and consequently impracticable, to a being like man. The rule is, Do what is expedient. But it is what is expedient, upon the whole, and at the long run; not for one, but for all, and for ever. Such a rule cannot be comprehended, nor acted on, by a being like man. In the language of our great moralist, Dr. Samuel Johnson, "It pre-supposes more knowledge of the universal system than man has attained," or ever can attain. "In instances the most level to our capacities," says Mr. Gisborne (*Mor. Phil.*, p. 59), "we perceive no more than a part of the effects which may result from our conduct; a part, perhaps, which, in point either of extent or importance, bears no assignable proportion to that which remains unseen." "As well might a man determine," says Dr. Dwight (*Sermon xcix.*), "that a path, whose direction he can discover only for a furlong, will conduct him in a straight course to a city, distant from him a thousand miles, as to determine that an action, whose immediate tendency he perceives to be useful, will, therefore, be useful through a thousand years, or even through ten. How much less able must he be to perceive what will be its real tendency in the remote ages of endless duration." God may consult for the happiness of the universe, or of the world, for He knows in what that happiness consists, and how to promote it. But, to a feeble and short-sighted being like man, some more comprehensible rule than that of universal expediency is necessary. It is admitted, indeed, by Paley, that, in the Word of God such a rule has been given, as to many special points. Now, the rule of God's Word may, or indeed must, ultimately coincide with the rule of God's government, which is assumed to be the production of happiness. But from the ultimate coincidence of the two rules, it does not follow that man is entitled to substitute the rule of God's universal government for the special

rule of his Word, or to interpret the latter by the former. Before he could be warranted in doing so, man must have risen above all the imperfections of his nature and his condition, and have become able to form clear and correct views of what constitutes the happiness of all, and of what best contributes to promote that happiness. In short, to use the language of Bishop Butler (*Dissertation on Virtue*), "The happiness of the world is the concern of Him who is the Lord and Proprietor of it: nor do we know what we are about, when we endeavour to promote the good of mankind in any ways but those which He has directed." (See Colston, *Basis of Mor. Science*, p. 17.)

And although we should suppose man to be endowed with knowledge sufficient to comprehend the rule of universal expediency, it might still be doubted whether, to a being like him, it would be either a right or a safe rule. It would not necessarily follow that it was the right rule; because, man being a creature, his Creator may have seen fit to make him subject to some other rule. It could not necessarily be a safe rule, unless it were supposed that the knowledge of it was accompanied with the subjection or absence of everything tending to transgress it—that is, unless we suppose man perfect in holiness, as well as infinite in knowledge, or, in other words, equal to God. But, looking at a man as he is—a frail and short-sighted creature—the rule of doing what is expedient upon the whole seems far from being a safe one. The prevalence of Self-love would lead him to form exaggerated views as to the expediency of those actions, the consequences of which were near and likely to affect those related to him by the ties of friendship and of blood. The predominance of any passion, or the power of any habit, would extenuate the evils which were seen to result from the indulgence of it; and, through the influence of fanaticism or ambition, the greatest atrocities might be perpetrated, under the plea of its being expedient, by all means, to propagate opinions which were reckoned true and important, or to extend a sway which was regarded as mild and happy. In ordinary life, the adoption of this rule would lead every one to judge what was expedient for himself to be expedient upon the whole, and open a door for the indulgence of the most grasping selfishness. Of course, the supporters of the rule will be ready to say that this would be an abuse or perversion of it. And so, no doubt, it would; just as in the case of those who put darkness for light, or who know what is right and do what is wrong. But, if

the rule of expediency be peculiarly liable to abuse, this furnishes a presumption against the doctrine from which it is derived. In this view the doctrine of Utility might be argued to be self-destructive or contradictory. For, if no higher rule for human conduct can be given than to aim at the production of happiness, and if men are peculiarly liable to turn aside or to be drawn away from this aim, then the consequences of their conduct will be unhappy, and not in accordance with the alleged principle of the Divine government; from which this rule has been illicitly drawn.

“The will of Heaven, judged by a private breast,
Is often what’s our private interest.
And, therefore, they who would that will obey,
Without their interest must their *duty* weigh.”—DRYDEN.

This brings us back to the fundamental, and continually recurring, objection to the theory of Utility, viz., that it does not include nor explain what is peculiar in our moral judgments and moral feelings. Views of their utility may, in some cases, heighten our approbation of actions. But there are many things which we call Right, without reference to their utility. “There are certain dispositions of mind, and certain actions,” says Bishop Butler (*Note to Second Sermon on the Love of our Neighbour*), “which are in themselves approved or disapproved by mankind, abstracted from the consideration of their tendency to the happiness or misery of the world; approved or disapproved by reflection, by that principle within which is the Guide of Life, the Judge of Right and Wrong. Numberless instances of this kind might be mentioned. There are pieces of treachery, which, in themselves, appear base and detestable to every one. There are actions which, perhaps, can scarce have any other general name given to them than indecencies, which yet are odious and shocking to human nature. There is such a thing as meanness, a little mind, which, as it is quite distinct from incapacity, so it raises a dislike and disapprobation quite different from that contempt men are too apt to have of mere folly. On the other hand, what we call greatness of mind is the object of another sort of approbation than superior understanding. Fidelity, honour, strict justice, are themselves approved in the highest degree, abstracted from the consideration of their tendency.” “Of the duties of justice, fidelity, and gratitude,” says Dr. Adams (*Sermon on the Nature and Obligation of Virtue*), “we may surely affirm that these appear to the conscience of every

man to be indispensable and necessary, without inquiring into their consequences either on our own or the happiness of others." Duty and Interest, what is Right and what is Expedient, express judgments and give rise to feelings which are quite different; and to substitute the one for the other is to mistake or to mis-state the whole question as to the nature or foundation of Virtue.

And even if the tendency of an action to produce happiness were to be regarded as what constituted the action virtuous, the theory of Utility would be altogether inadequate and inept as a moral theory. For one of the chief elements of human happiness is the approbation which we feel when we have done a right action ourselves, or beheld it done by another. This feeling is altogether different in kind from the satisfaction which we experience on the attainment of some advantage by ourselves or others. Yet, of this feeling, the utilitarian moralist takes no account in summing up the items of human happiness; of this feeling he gives no explanation when he tells us of the tendency of moral actions, because the feeling springs from a contemplation of actions, not in tendency or effect, but in their nature and character. It is the Rightness or Wrongness of actions in themselves which determines their tendency to produce beneficial or hurtful consequences; and not these consequences which determine actions to be Right or Wrong. And if human happiness includes, as one of its most important ingredients, the approving feeling which springs from doing or contemplating right actions, then the production of happiness depends upon the love and practice of what is right; and Utility is not the foundation of Virtue, but Virtue is the foundation of Utility. (See Whewell, *Hist. of Mor. Phil.*, lect. 14 and 15.)

But even those actions which are universally acknowledged to be virtuous are not always followed by beneficial consequences in this life. Hume thought that, in general, and on the whole, they were; if they were not, he had nothing farther to say. But Paley thought that a system of morality could only be satisfactorily established on the doctrine of a future state of reward and punishment. And accordingly this doctrine is assumed as the basis of his theory of virtue. This leads to the consideration of his views as to the nature of Obligation.

He has said (book ii. ch. 3), "Moral obligation is like all other obligations; and all obligation is nothing more than an *inducement* of sufficient strength, resulting in some way from the command of

another." "A man is said to be obliged when he is urged by a violent motive, resulting from the command of another." A violent motive is a motive compliance or non-compliance with which is not indifferent, but followed by happiness or misery, by punishment or reward. We can be obliged to nothing but what we ourselves are to gain or lose something by. "As we should not be obliged to obey the laws or the magistrate, unless rewards or punishments, pleasure or pain, somehow or other, depended upon our obedience; so neither should we, without the same reason, be obliged to do what is right, to practise virtue, or to obey the commands of God." And now, Let it be asked, Why am I obliged to keep my word? And the answer will be, Because I am urged to do so by a violent motive (namely, the expectation of being, after this life, rewarded, if I do, or punished for it, if I do not), resulting from the command of another (namely of God). This solution goes to the bottom of the subject, as no further question can be reasonably asked. Therefore, private happiness is our *motive*, and the will of God our *rule*." And, with regard to the difference which is generally understood to be between an act of prudence and an act of duty, he has said, that in the one case, we consider what we shall gain or lose, in the present world; and in the other case, we consider also what we shall gain or lose, in the world to come; but, in both cases, we consider solely what we shall gain or lose. In thus making the attainment of personal happiness the motive of human virtue and the ground of human obligation, Paley has trampled upon the distinction between what is advantageous and what is right, and the difference in the feelings to which the prosecution and attainment of them give birth. He has virtually given his adherence to the selfish system (not of morality, for it obliterates all true morality, but) of philosophizing, which attempts to trace all human actions to the single principle of self-love, or the desire of individual happiness. According to his theory, an action prompted by generosity or benevolence cannot properly be called a virtue; it may even be denominated an act of imprudence, which does not differ, in kind, from an act of vice. Obedience to the will of God is not virtuous, except in so far as it is rendered for the sake of our own everlasting happiness. And, if his definition be strictly interpreted, no action can be reputed virtuous, unless a view to our happiness in another life is present to the mind, at the time, as its prompting motive. Or, if it be thought that Paley has obviated this objection, by referring to the influence of

habit, which is often effective without being distinctly felt, still this does not meet the farther objection, taken by Professor Sedgwick (*Discourse on the Studies of the University*, App., Note E), against his definition of virtue, viz., that it excludes, from the character of virtuous, all actions done by heathens, who, having no sure knowledge of a future life, cannot be influenced by the belief of it. Now, it is generally admitted that the difference between Right and Wrong is made known by the light of nature or Reason. And it is written that, when "they who have not the law (revealed) do, by nature, the things contained in the law, they are a law unto themselves, their conscience also bearing witness, and accusing or excusing them." Paley, however, thought, that without the doctrine of a future state, in which rewards and punishments are to be distributed, there was no sufficient foundation on which to rest a system of morality. And he is right in saying that, by and to Christians, morality should be taught in connection and harmony with the discoveries of that Revelation which they acknowledge. Yet, after all, it may be questioned whether Paley, by putting the *sanctions* of virtue in the place of the *obligations* of virtue, has set morality on the foundation recognised in Scripture. In Scripture^{*} actions are enjoined because they are Right, and because it is the will of God that we do them. The beneficial consequences which flow from right actions are held out as motives or inducements to comply with the will of God. But these consequences are never spoken of, in Scripture, as constituting the actions Right, nor as forming the ground of our obligation to do them. And the doctrine of Utility, when brought forward as the exponent of the Divine will, is not easily to be reconciled to the supreme authority and obligation of that will, nor to the necessity and usefulness of the special and express revelation given of it in the Divine Word.

But the doctrine of Utility has been held in a higher form. According to Dr. Dwight (*Sermon XCIX.*), the glory and excellence of the Supreme Being consist in the production and enjoyment of happiness; in the manifestation of his perfections in the creation and superintendence of a scheme of universal benevolence. Our duty and happiness are to be found in loving, admiring, and imitating his glorious perfections, by doing good to all men as we have opportunity.

* "The statutes of the Lord are right."—*Psalm xix. 8.* for this is right."—*Ephes. vi. 1.*
 "Children, obey your parents in the Lord,"—*Ephes. vi. 6.* "Doing the will of God from the heart."

Benevolence, or the love of doing good, is the glory and excellence of God, and a disposition to produce happiness is virtue in man. But what is virtue in the action? Dr. Dwight has argued strenuously against resolving virtue, as predicable of an action, into the mere will of God, commanding the action to be done. He has said, "It is, I apprehend, evident that the foundation of Virtue is not in the will of God, but in the nature of things. The next object of inquiry, therefore, is, Where, in the nature of things, shall we find this foundation?" We find it, according to him, in the tendency of virtuous actions to produce happiness. But this is confounding the tendency or result of actions with their real nature or character—a confusion which is common to the doctrine of Utility in all its forms. From this confusion it might have been thought that Dr. Dwight would have escaped, after denying, on the one hand, that virtue in actions is founded in mere will, and asserting, on the other hand, that it is founded in the nature of things. Having taken the position that virtue is founded in the nature of things, his course of inquiry should have been upwards, to the nature of Him from whom all things derive their being; and not downwards, to the consequences of virtuous actions. The fountain is to be reached by *ascending*, not by *descending*, the stream; and if there be purity in the stream, it is because it is derived from a pure fountain. Right or virtuous actions are productive of happiness; but they are not right or virtuous because they are productive of happiness. It is a consequence of their having a right nature that they have a beneficial tendency; and they have a right nature because they are in accordance with the rectitude of the Divine nature and the benevolence of the Divine will.

But, while Dr. Dwight thought that it was their beneficial tendency which constituted actions virtuous, he refused to admit that expediency, or any calculation of consequences which we can make, might be adopted as the rule of our moral conduct. "This," said he, "is the error of Godwin, and, in an indefinite degree, of Paley, and several other writers. Were we omniscient, and able to discern the true nature of all the effects of our conduct, this consequence must undoubtedly be admitted. To the eye of God it is the real rule. It will not, I trust, be denied that He has chosen, and required, that to be done, by his intelligent creatures, which is most useful; or, in other words, most productive of good to the universe and of glory to Himself, rather than that which is less so. But to us,

Utility; as judged by ourselves, cannot be a proper rule of moral conduct."

In this passage, what is useful is explained to mean what is productive of good to the universe and of glory to God. In another passage, Dr. Dwight has said, "Let any good man ask himself what that is for which he chiefly values his own virtue, and he will find every idea which he forms of it completely summed up in these two things, that it is the means of glory to God and of good to his creatures." The virtue of an action is thus made to rest on its being the means of glory to God as well as of good to all. The question then comes to be, which of these, as ends—glory to God or good to the universe—goes first in the nature of things, or in the contemplation of the Divine mind. Did God require the duty which He has required of man—did He give to man a rational and moral nature, and did He reveal a rule for man's guidance—primarily with a view to the production of happiness? Or, is not the manifestation of the nature and will of God, or, in other words, his glory, the first cause and the last end of all things?

It is admitted that God is good, and delights in the production of happiness. It is argued that, in the creation and conservation of all things, his will is indicated by the tendency of all things to accomplish a scheme of universal good ; and as the aim or end of the Divine dispensations is the production of happiness, the production of happiness must be the foundation of human virtue. But it may be asked, Why and how is the production of happiness the end of the Divine administration ? Because it is in accordance with the perfection and rectitude of the Divine nature. The manifestation of the Divine perfections and the glory of the Divine nature are exhibited in the works of creation and in the ways of providence. The production of happiness is the result ; and it is so because, when the Divine perfections are put forth, they must produce their proper effect ; and the proper effect of the manifestation of the Divine perfections is the production of happiness. But the manifestation of the Divine perfections, rather than the production of happiness—the glory of God, rather than the good of the universe—may be said to be the first cause and the last end of all things. It is true that the glory of God is promoted, in the sight of his creatures, by the production of happiness. And it is also true that God, in manifesting or showing forth His glory, contemplated and designed the production of happiness. He saw and pronounced all things to be good. But

still the production of happiness is not the prompting or moving cause of the exercise of the Divine perfections. . This *punctum saliens*, this living spring, is in the perfection and excellence of the Divine nature.

"Absolute and eternal rectitude,"¹⁰ says Dr. Price (*Review of the Principal Questions and Difficulties in Morals*, ch. 10), "or a regard to what is in all cases most fit and righteous, is properly the ultimate principle of the Divine conduct, and the sole guide of his power. In this *Goodness* is first and principally included. But *Goodness* and *Rectitude*, how far soever they may coincide, are far from being entirely identical. The former results from the latter, and is but a part of it. Which, therefore, stands first in the Divine Mind, and which should give way, supposing an interference ever possible, can (one would think) admit of no controversy. For will any person say, that it is not because it is *right* that the Deity promotes the happiness of His creatures, or that He would promote it in any *instances*, or in any *manner*, wherein it would be *wrong* to promote it?" Jonathan Edwards has said (*Dissertation concerning the End for which God created the World*), "When God was about to create the world, he had respect to that emanation of his glory, which is actually the consequence of the creation. And he had regard to it also as the emanation was to the creature. And God had regard to it in this manner, as he had a supreme regard to himself and value for his own infinite eternal glory." For the same reason that we should love God, that is, because He is the greatest and the best of beings, for the same reason God must infinitely love himself. And this love of himself is what Edwards calls *virtue* in God, just as love to God is virtue in man. It follows that God can act only from a regard to himself and his perfections, and that the end of all his working is to manifest the glories of his nature.

A modern writer, Mr. Foster, has said (*Elements of Jurisprudence*, p. 35-6, Lond. 1853), "It may be truth morally certain, that in the fact of creation God designed the happiness of his creatures; but even then it could not be his main and ultimate design. It is not merely an utterance of devotion, it is the expression of a scientific truth, which is contained in the aspiration 'Glory to God in the Highest.' Upon any system whatever which professes to explain the government of the human race upon moral principles, the glory

¹⁰ During the latter half of the last century, there was a controversy concerning the spring of action in the Deity. Balguy

held it to be *rectitude*; Bayes, *benevolence*, and Grove, *wisdom*.

of the Chief of Beings must be an end to which all other objects are subordinate. *If the happiness of his creation be the final purpose of the Creator, He exists for an end inferior to Himself.*

Sir Thomas Brown, in his *Religio Medici*, sect. 35, has said, "God made all things for himself, and it is impossible he should make them for any other end than his own glory." Rev. iv. 11; Col. i. 16.

If these views be correct, a regard to the glory of God, rather than to the production of happiness, is that which constitutes an agent virtuous. On the other hand, an action is virtuous, not in consequence of its producing happiness, but, being done with a view to the glory of God, and in accordance with His will, it promotes that glory—that glory being manifested in the exercise of His perfections, and the exercise of His perfections producing happiness as their proper result. The foundation of virtue is thus placed in the nature of things—or rather in the nature of God, from whom all things originally derived their *essence* and *existence*. The production of happiness is a tendency or result, rather than a principle or cause. Utility, instead of constituting the essence of virtue, is merely a consequence of it. Right actions produce good or beneficial effects. But they are not right because they produce these effects. They are right because they have a right nature; and they have a right nature because they are done from a regard to the will of God, and because they promote His glory. God's will, in accordance with the perfection of His nature, is to promote His glory by the diffusion of happiness; and right actions produce happiness because they are in accordance with the will of God, and serve to manifest the excellence and glory of His nature. But, because happiness accompanies or flows from right actions, it will not do to say that they are right because they are productive of happiness. Utility and Rectitude are not convertible terms. All attempts to represent Utility as the foundation of virtue ignore or obscure the real question, and proceed on the assumption that *pleasure*, *interest*, and *duty*, are words of the same meaning. What is denoted by all these words may coincide, and an act of duty may be accompanied with satisfaction and productive of advantage. But this is no reason for resolving the one into the other. The difference between virtue and vice lies not in the tendency of the one to produce happiness, and of the other to produce misery. But the production of happiness by the one, and of misery by the other, is the consequence of the moral difference in their nature. It is rectitude, or the want of rectitude, that deter-

mimes the tendency or result of an action, and not its tendency or result which gives its nature or character to an action. An action is not right because it is productive of happiness, but it is productive of happiness because it is right. Utility is not a *cause*, but a *consequence* of rectitude. It is not the *constituent*, but it may be the *indication* of rectitude. It does not *make* an action to be right, but it may *mark* it to be so. It is not the *ratio essendi*, but it may be the *ratio cognoscendi*. An action has a nature or character belonging to it. There is something true of it in itself. This nature or character may be indicated or made plain, but is not conferred by the consequences of the action. It belongs to it as an action originally and inherently.

When it is admitted that actions are right or virtuous, not by their consequences, but by their nature, to say that this rectitude or rightness of nature arises from the nature and fitness of things—that is, from the congruity of the action to the relations of the agent, and to say that it arises from its conformity to the rectitude of the Divine nature and holiness of the Divine will, are, in truth, but two ways of expressing the same thing. Dr. Dwight has said that virtue is founded in the nature of things. He then asks, Where, in the nature of things, shall we find this foundation? To which he answers, that virtue is what it is because it is the means of glory to God and of good to his creatures. Dr. Samuel Clarke, who maintained that virtue is founded in the eternal and necessary relations of things, has also maintained that acting conformably to the fitness and unfitness arising out of these relations, tends by direct and natural consequence to make all creatures happy. He has further maintained, that the will of God determines itself in conformity to these relations, in order to the welfare of the whole universe; and, therefore, all rational beings should govern their actions by the same rules for the good of the public in their respective stations, (*Evidence of Nat. and Rev. Relig.*, p. 4). Now, here is the point at which an attempt might be made to reconcile theories, which, in form and expression, more than in substance and reality, seem to be rival and remote from one another.

It is admitted that virtue is productive of happiness. Happiness may be explained so as to include the glory of God as well as the good of man. The happiness of the Divine Being may be viewed as consisting in the sufficiency and perfection of his nature, and in the manifestation of that nature in the scheme of the universe. In accordance with the perfection of that nature, that scheme is carried forward by justice, wisdom, goodness, and truth, or in conformity

with those relations which arise from the eternal and necessary differences of things. The eternal and necessary differences of things are the expressions of the essential rectitude of the Divine nature. The Divine Being, in all His administrations, acts in conformity with the perfection of His nature; and all created beings must find their duty and their happiness in conforming to His will and imitating His perfections. The foundation of virtue is thus placed in the rectitude of the Divine nature. Conformity to the relations that different things bear to one another is conformity to the will of God, which always determines to act only what is agreeable to justice, goodness, and truth. What is agreeable to justice, goodness, and truth is the means of good to man as well as of glory to God. It is the manifestation at once of His nature and of His will; and furnishes us with both a rule and a reason for our conduct. That conduct is right, when it is in accordance with the rectitude of the Divine nature, and in obedience to the Divine will. The perfections of the Divine nature and the intimations of the Divine will, are made known to us in the Divine Word. That Word is our imperative rule or law, in all matters on which it hath spoken. And in matters on which it is silent, we have for our guides Reason and Conscience, enlightened and influenced by reverence for the authority and will of God.

The views of Dr. Thomas Brown, on this head, could not well have been stated either as coinciding or contrasting with any of those which have been successively noticed. The defectiveness of his views as to the foundation of virtue, may be traced to the defectiveness of his views as to the nature and constitution of the Moral Faculty. According to him, we have a susceptibility of moral emotions; and these emotions spring directly from the contemplation of actions, without any exercise of judgment or comparison, by which the actions are referred to any previous notions of Right or Wrong. Indeed, according to Dr. Brown, our notions of Right and Wrong are derived from our moral emotions; and those rules of propriety, to which actions are referred, are not previous to the emotions; but the emotions are previous to the rules, and are the ground on which they rest. Now, the omission or denial of any moral judgment preceding our moral feelings, may not necessarily involve the denial of a moral nature or character as really belonging to actions. Dr. Price objected to the doctrine of a moral sense on this ground;

because he thought, that calling the faculty, by which moral distinctions are perceived, a sense, denied the objective reality of these distinctions, and made Virtue and Vice mere states of feeling, like heat and cold. But the objection proceeds upon a misconception, against which Dr. Hutcheson had successfully guarded himself; and Dr. Reid and Mr. Stewart, who adopted the Intellectual theory, as to the constitution of the moral faculty, would not have objected to call it a sense; on the understanding that the objects of this sense or faculty, rightness and wrongness, in action and in disposition, were as really perceived as the primary qualities of matter. Dr. Brown's doctrine of a susceptibility of moral emotions was exposed to a similar objection; and he might have guarded against it. But he has rejected all such defence, and has adopted the objection as the truth. For, while he has asserted, on the one hand, that certain actions awaken certain emotions, he has left no room for supposing that the emotions are awakened by anything in the nature or character of the actions. He has said (*Lect. 75.*), “*Virtue is nothing in itself*; but is only a general name for certain actions, which excite, when contemplated by us, certain emotions. It is a *felt relation to certain emotions, and nothing more*; with no other universality, therefore, than that of the minds in which, on the contemplation of the same actions, the same emotions arise.” Notwithstanding his subsequent adoption of the doctrine of Utility, language similar to that of Dr. Brown had been used by Mr. Hume, in his earliest philosophical work, (*Hum. Nat.*, book iii. sect. 1). Mr. Bentham also had expressed himself in a similar way, (*Deontol.* chap. 10). And for the use of such unguarded language, he and his disciples have been severely blamed by Sir James Mackintosh. (*Dissert.*, p. 285.)

The dangerous and unfounded nature of Dr. Brown's views is minutely exposed by one who is an ardent admirer and follower of his philosophy in general. (See Dr. Payne, *Elem. of Ment. and Mor. Science.*) And anything that has been said by Dr. Chalmers, in the Preface prefixed to Dr. Brown's *Ethics*, partakes more of the nature of an apology than of a Defence or Recommendation. It amounts merely to saying, that, “if Dr. Brown had revised his rapidly prepared Lectures into a wary and well-digested treatise, *it is to be hoped*, that not one expression would have escaped from him which would have at all countenanced the idea, that virtue was a thing of mere arbitrary constitution, or at all dependent, for its reality and being, on the mere organism of man's moral nature.” What effect

longer and deeper reflection might have had, in altering or modifying Dr. Brown's views, it is impossible to say. Different persons will judge, as they act, differently, in this respect. Some, when danger or defect is pointed out in the conclusions, are disposed to examine and amend the premises. Others, without thinking of the premises, only cling more closely to the conclusions, and attempt to justify them. The danger and defect of Dr. Brown's views, as to the foundation of virtue, flow from his erroneous and defective views as to the mental constitution of man; and the correction of the former would have implied a dereliction or remodelling of the whole system of his philosophy. His Ethics are the natural consequence of his Psychology. And, if some of those who were merely *hearers* of these Lectures, were so fascinated, by their persuasive eloquence, as to think little of the danger of the conclusions, it would not be charging the *author* of them with any want of candour or ingenuousness, to say, that it would have been difficult for him to see and to acknowledge this danger by any attempt to avert it. To remedy the defectiveness, and to guard against the dangerousness of his views, it has been recommended, in the Preface above alluded to, to read the *Sermons of Bishop Butler* and the *Philosophy of Mr. Dugald Stewart*, in connection with the *Ethics of Dr. Brown*. Now, it may be well to practise a wise Eclecticism in our inquiries, and to take out and put together what appears to be true and right in the various systems of Moral Philosophy. But, in doing so, we must see that there is a congruity or coherence between the views which we select—otherwise, our opinions can never assume any stable or consistent form, but will resemble the image which was partly of clay, and partly of brass, and partly of gold, and which was speedily broken in pieces, and became like the chaff on the summer threshing-floor. There is no affinity between the philosophy of Stewart and the philosophy of Brown. The latter was pronounced to be an open revolt from the former. It is impossible to reconcile them in their various parts. And he who adopts the psychology of Reid and Stewart cannot, consistently, nor indeed in any way, accept the ethical views of Brown. To attempt to do so would not be *Eclecticism*, but *Syncretism*. The recommendation of *Brown's Ethics* must, therefore, be limited to the beauty of the moral pictures which he has drawn; and even this recommendation must be qualified by the regret, that such fair and lively colours should have been laid upon so cold, or rather upon so dead, a ground.

Moral Philosophy may be taught in two ways—either by the teacher expounding, dogmatically, those views which seem to him to be correct and well-founded—or by his stating, impartially, the different views which have been entertained, and leaving the issue to the force of truth and the candour of his hearers. The former plan is likely to be more agreeable to a teacher who has made up his own mind—the latter is more likely to be useful to the student, who is supposed to be seeking for information and guidance; and, for this reason, it has been here followed. Should the statement, thus rendered necessary, of opinions so various and conflicting, have had the effect of startling or perplexing the mind of any, let it be remembered, that this very diversity of opinion is at once a proof and a fruit of the importance, as much, perhaps, as of any peculiar difficulty, which belongs to the Philosophy of Morals. It has been examined, in all ages, with so much anxiety and care; men have been so desirous to impress upon others, views which seemed important and interesting to themselves, that, in this way, many more questions have been mooted in this than in other departments of inquiry, which are not more clear or free from difficulty, but which, from their comparative unimportance, have not called forth so much earnest discussion. And it is worth noticing, that amidst much diversity of opinion, as to minor points, the great principles of Morals are generally admitted and acquiesced in. It is agreed—

1. That men, in all ages and in all nations of the world, have acknowledged a distinction between *some* actions as *right* and *others* as *wrong*.

2. That this distinction is recognized by means of a separate power or peculiar faculty of the mind, or by Reason, evolving peculiar ideas and operating under peculiar sanctions.

3. That the existence of a separate power or faculty, or this peculiarity in the exercise of Reason, implies some correspondent nature, or character, or relation, predicable of human actions, of which Conscience is the arbiter or judge.

Lastly. That the connection between the Moral Faculty and that in human actions to which it has reference, is a connection that is permanent and unalterable; for they who call Conscience a sense admit that its decisions are not arbitrary, but determined by the nature of its objects; and they who call virtue a relation, admit that it is a relation which, while the nature of God and the nature of man remain the same, cannot be changed. The constitution of

things and the course of Providence, or, in one word, the will of God, is the high and clear point to which all moral discussions tend, and in which all moral actions terminate. And should we, at any time, be ungrateful enough to forget this, or impious enough to doubt it, by feigning that morality is a thing of man's making, the first violence or insult, which we offer to our moral nature, is vindicated in a way that is sufficient to enlighten, if not to reclaim us. Conscience claims her high prerogative. Virtue asserts her heavenly origin; and we are made to see and feel, that the ties by which we are drawn into conformity with the will of God are indeed the cords of love and the bands of a man—the means and measures of infinite goodness, fitted to a rational but imperfect nature; for they bind us to happiness, by binding us to duty; and lead us to seek God's glory, because in doing so we accomplish our own perfection and blessedness.

CHAPTER V.

EXPLANATION OF TERMS.

THE following explanations of terms and phrases may be useful in appreciating the various moral doctrines which have been successively stated, and also in the farther prosecution of ethical inquiries.

Conscience,¹ or the *Moral Faculty*, is that Faculty by which we discern between what is Right and what is Wrong, in action and in disposition. This discernment is distinguished from a judgment on other matters, in being accompanied with feelings of approbation or disapprobation, and by a sense of obligation, or a persuasion that the action contemplated ought, or ought not, to be done; that the disposition contemplated ought, or ought not, to be cherished. All inquiries into the nature and constitution of this power or faculty, belong to what may be called the *Theory of Moral Sentiments*.

Conscience governs and is governed. It both gives and receives

¹ "Conscience is a Faculty or Habit of the Practical Intellect, by which the mind of man doth, by Discourse of Reason, apply the Light which is in it, to its own particular moral acts" (Sanderson, *Prefect. I.*

§ 2). This definition makes the exercise of the moral faculty merely personal. According to Dr. Adam Smith, men judge first of the conduct of others. Reid has said the same thing.

the law. Hence it has been said to be “*Regulans et Regulata, Deo subdita, ut ministra; homini præposita, ut Domina.*” (Sanderson, *De Obligatione Conscientiæ, Prælect. Secunda.*)

As the supreme and governing principle in man, Conscience has authority to say whether and how far other principles should be yielded to. An agent is wrong when he goes against the dictates of Conscience. But these dictates are Right only when they are in accordance with Right Reason, which is the immediate Law or Rule of Conscience. This Law, however, has reference to a higher, and, in enforcing obedience to it, Conscience exercises a delegated authority. The law of Reason is Right only when it is in conformity with the Law of absolute rectitude, which is the will of God. “Thus Conscience is ultimately resolved into a Law imposed on the rational creature by God, the supreme and only Legislator and Judge.” (Sanderson, *ut supra.*)

“Conscience hath three offices or acts, *Synteresis, Syneidesis, and Epicrisis.*” (Hale’s *Prim. Orig.*, ch. ii. sect. 1.)

“The offices of Conscience are to *dictate*, and to *testify* or *bear witness*, to *accuse* or *excuse*, and to *loose* or *bind*.” (Bp. Jeremy Taylor, *Of Conscience*, book i. ch. 1, rule 1.)

Conscience, considered as the seat of the first principles in morals, and as the repository of those plain rules which every reasonable mind deduces from them, was called *συντίρησις*. And in drawing out from this repository the great law of Right and Wrong, whether in the form of a first truth, or a particular precept plainly deducible from it, and applying it to the direction and regulation of Human conduct, Conscience is spoken of as a *Legislator* or *Lawgiver*.

The consequence of a Law being laid down, is that the action in reference to which it is laid down must be either in conformity with the law or contrary to it. As moral action implies knowledge and intention, the agent must be conscious of having done it, and of the law applicable to it. And this joint knowledge of the moral law and of the particular action was called *συνείδησις*. In giving this joint knowledge, or consciousness of an action in reference to the moral law, Conscience is said to *testify*, or to *bear witness*, for or against us.

The calling to mind an action done, and the law in reference to it, is preparatory to a decision, as to whether the action is, or is not, in conformity with the law. In coming to such a decision, Conscience is said to discharge the office of *Judge*—to *accuse* or *excuse*, to *acquit* or *condemn*.

But Conscience carries its own sentence, so far, into effect; and hence it is said to *bind* and to *loose*. By its acquittal it looses or frees us from any reproach or fear as to the nature and consequences of our conduct, and encourages us to go on in the path of rectitude with joyful hearts. By its condemnation it delivers us up to the punishment of our own mind, and binds us over to the apprehension of deeper punishment.

“ Prima est haec ultio, quod, se
Judice, nemo nocens absolvitur, improba quamvis
Gratia fallacis Prætoris vicerit urnam.”

According to Sanderson (*Prælect. Quarta*, sect. 20), “The will of God is shown,—1. In what he does; and, 2. In what he commands.

“ a. The will of God, shown *in what he does*, is not a law for what we are to do; but it appertains to Conscience, inasmuch as it determines what we are to suffer; in this sense that we are obliged, in Conscience, to bear with resignation every infliction, when it appears by the event that God wills it. For this is the dictate of Right Reason, that the ordinances of Providence, which must be perfectly right, ought not to displease us.”

“ b. The will of God, shown *in what he commands*, is the Rule of Conscience. And this Rule is made known to us by the Light of the Mind—which Light is *Innate*, *Revealed*, or *Acquired*,—that is, the Light of Nature, the Light of Scripture, and the Light of Learning.”

“ It is with the Innate Light of the Mind, or the Light of Nature, that the Moral Philosopher has chiefly to do.”

§ 24. “God has given to brute (and inanimate) creatures a natural Instinct, which impels them to do things congruous to their nature and suited to their preservation. This is called a Law. Psalm cxlviii. 6, ‘*He hath given them a law which shall not be broken.*’ In like manner he has given to man a natural Law, proportioned to his nature as a rational creature; and thus more elevated, more noble, more divine, than the other; which Law impels him to do those things which are congruous to his nature as man; that is, in a word, to *live agreeably to nature*.

“ This natural law is the impression and copy (*εκτυπον*) of an archetypal Law which exists in the Divine Mind, and is part of the

image of God in which man was made. By it we know that some things are, by the will of God our Creator, congruous to our nature, and that other things are not so; of these we deem that they are good, and that we ought to do them—of the others, that they are bad, and that we ought to abstain from them."

§ 25. "This natural Law consists of various practical principles, all resolving themselves into the general bipartite law; that we are to do good and to avoid evil, just as all the precepts of the Decalogue resolve themselves into the general bipartite law, that we are to love God and our neighbour. This general law, thus retained in the *Synteresis*, has other particular laws derived from it, as conclusions from premises; some of these being among the 'first dictates of nature' (as the expression is), and closely approaching to the general law—others more remotely and secondarily connected with it. The first dictates of nature are assented to as soon as they are presented to us. We cannot doubt or err about them when once we know the meaning of the terms; such are the maxims, that, God is to be worshipped, that, we must do no wrong to any. The latter kind of moral principles are subject to doubt and error, in consequence of variety of circumstances and length of deduction, as is implied by the two maxims: From circumstances arise error; and, In reasoning downwards, error enters. Of this kind are the precepts that our parents are to be honoured—that our children are to be brought up—that the lives of our neighbours are to be preserved—that what is committed to our trust is to be restored. These are to be observed for the most part, but yet admit of exceptions. Thus, the command of a parent may be set aside by the command of God; there may be sufficient grounds for casting off a child—putting to death a neighbour; we are not to restore a sword committed to us by a madman. The Stoics recognized this distinction of perfect duties and common duties. In order to direct our Conscience, we are as much as possible to refer our actions to these general, self-evident moral maxims. Of this general natural law is to be understood what Cicero says, *De Republica*, iii. 17, 'Est quidem vera lex, recta ratio, naturæ congruens, diffusa in omnes, constans, sempiterna; quæ vocet ad officium jubendo, vetando a fraude deterreat. Huic legi nec obrogari fas est, nec derogari ex hac aliquid licet, neque tota abrogari potest: nec vero, aut per senatum aut per populum, solvi hac lege possumus; nec est quærendus explanator, aut interpres ejus alias: nec erit alia lex Romæ, alia Athenis; alia nunc, alia posthaec; sed

et omnes gentes, et omni tempore, una lex et sempiterna et immortalis continebit, unusque erit communis quasi magister et imperator omnium Deus, ille legis hujus inventor, disceptator, lator; cui qui non parebit, ipse se fugiet, ac naturam hominis aspernabitur; atque hoc ipso luet maximas poenas, etiam si cetera supplicia, quæ putantur, effugerit."

The law of nature has been characterised in similar terms, in other passages, by Cicero. "Est igitur haec, judices, non scripta, sed nata lex, quam non didicimus, accepimus, legimus, verum ex natura ipsa arripiimus, hausimus, expressimus; ad quam non docti, sed facti, non instituti, sed imbuti sumus."—*Oratio pro Milone*, cap. 4.

"Sed vero intelligi sic oportet, jussa ac vetita populorum, vim non habere ad recte facta vocandi, et a peccatis avocandi: quæ vis non modo senior est, quam ætas populorum et civitatum, sed æqualis illius cœlum atque terras tuentes et regentis Dei. . . . Nec si regnante Tarquinio, nulla erat Romæ scripta lex de stupris, idcirco non contra illam legem sempiternam Sext. Tarquinius vim Lucretiæ, Tricipitini filiæ, attulit. Erat enim ratio profecta a rerum natura, et ad recte faciendum impellens, et a delicto avocans; quæ non tum denique incipit lex esse, quum scripta est, sed tum, quum orta est. Orta autem simul est cum mente divina. Quamobrem lex vera atque princeps, apta ad jubendum et ad vetandum, ratio est recta summi Jovis."—*De Legibus*, lib. ii. cap. 4.

In respect of its *Law or Rule*, Conscience may be—

1. *True*—that is, it may be, plainly and clearly, in accordance with the will of God, or the ultimate and absolute Rule of Rectitude.

2. *Erroneous*—that is, its decisions, instead of being in accordance with Right Reason and the Revealed will of God, may be not in conformity with the one or the other. And this *Error* may be *Vincible* or *Invincible*, according as it might and ought to have been, or as it could not have been, removed by the diligent use of means to enlighten and correct the Conscience.

Conscience, as *Erroneous*, has been denominated—

1. *Lax*, when on slight grounds it judges an action not to be vicious which is truly vicious, or slightly vicious when it is greatly so.

2. *Scrupulous*, when on slight grounds it judges an action to be

vicious when it is not truly vicious, or greatly vicious when it is not so.

3. *Perplexed*, when it judges that there will be sin, whether the action is done or not done.

In respect of its *Certainty*, Conscience is said to be— .

1. *Certain* or *Clear*, when there is no fear of error as to our judgment of an action as right or wrong.

2. *Probable*, when in reference to two actions, or courses of action, it determines that the probability is, that the one is right rather than the other.

3. *Doubtful*, when it cannot clearly determine whether an action is or is not in accordance with the law of absolute Rectitude.

The phrase, *Foundation of Morals*, as used distinctively from the phrase, *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, may denote an inquiry into the grounds upon which the Moral Faculty proceeds, in discriminating between actions and dispositions as Right or Wrong. The phrase, *Foundation of Virtue*, is precisely of the same import.

If a term is to be selected to denote that, in action and in disposition, of which the Moral Faculty approves, perhaps the most precise and appropriate is *Rectitude* or *Rightness*. Dr. Adams has remarked (*Sermon on the Nature and Obligation of Virtue*), “The man who acts *virtuously* is said to act *rightly*. This appears more proper than to say he acts *according to truth*; and more clear and distinct than to say that he acts *according to the nature and reason of things*; the meaning of which will, in all cases, be found to be only this—that he acts according to what reason, in the present circumstances of the agent, and the relation he stands in to the objects before him, pronounces to be right.” In like manner, Dr. Reid has said (*Act. Pow.*, Essay v. ch. 5), “Prudence is a virtue, Benevolence is a virtue; but the essence and formal nature of virtue must lie in something that is common to all these, and to every other virtue. And this I conceive can be nothing else but the *Rectitude of such conduct, and Turpitude of the contrary*, which is discerned by a good man. And so far only he is virtuous as he pursues the former and avoids the latter.” *Rectitude*, then, is that,

in action and in disposition, of which the Moral Faculty approves. The contrary of what is *Right* is *Wrong*. *Rightness* and *Wrongness*, then, are the characteristics of action and disposition, as contemplated by the moralist. So that the *Foundation of Morals*, the ground upon which moral distinctions are taken, is in the essential difference between what is *Right* and what is *Wrong*.

But what is *Rectitude* or *Rightness* as the characteristic of an action? According to Price and others, this term denotes a simple and primitive idea, and cannot be explained. It might as well be asked, What is *Truth*? as the characteristic of a proposition. It is a capacity of our rational nature to see and acknowledge truth; but we cannot explain what truth is. We call it the conformity of our thoughts with the reality of things. But it may be doubted how far this explanation makes the nature of truth more intelligible. In like manner, some explain *Rectitude* by saying, that it consists in a congruity between an action and the relations of the agent. It is the idea we form of an action when it is, in every way, conformable to the relations of the agent and the circumstances in which he is placed. On contemplating such an action we approve of it, and feel that, if we were placed in such circumstances and in such relations, we should be under an obligation to perform it. Now, the circumstances and relations in which man is placed arise from his nature, and from the nature of things in general. And hence it has been said, that *Rectitude is founded in the nature and fitness of things*; that is, an action is Right when it is fit or suitable to all the relations and circumstances of the agent; and of this fitness Conscience or the Moral Reason is the Judge. Conscience or the Moral Reason does not constitute the relations; these arise from the nature of man and the nature of things; but Conscience or the Moral Reason judges and determines as to the conformity of actions to those relations; and those relations, arising necessarily from the very nature of things, the conformity with them, which constitutes *Rectitude*, is said to be eternal and immutable.

The term *Virtue*, as predicated of an action, is synonymous with *Rectitude*. The *Virtue* of an action is its *Rightness*, that in it of which we approve—that is, its congruity with the various relations of the agent and the circumstances under which he acted.

As predicated of the agent, *Virtue* means the *regard he has to Rectitude*, the degree of energy with which he cherishes affections and performs actions that are in harmony with the various relations in

which he stands. In this application of the term, it implies trial and difficulty, and denotes the degree of determination and energy with which an agent adheres to *Rectitude*. We do not say of the Deity that He is *Virtuous*—He is *Holy*. He is not liable to trial or difficulty. His nature is holiness, and manifests itself by doing always what is right; by conformity, in all His dispensations, to the several relations which subsist between Him and all His creatures. So that *Rectitude* in God is the same as *Rectitude* in man—congruity to relations. But He being Holy, His will is always in accordance with absolute *Rectitude*; whereas, man being imperfect and exposed to trial, his will is not always in accordance with the moral law; and it is *Virtue* in man vigorously to strive against temptation, and earnestly to adhere to *Rectitude*.

Merit is a word of the same signification as *Virtue*. The *Merit*, or good desert, of an action, is its *Virtue* or *Rectitude*. The *Merit*, or good desert, of an agent, implies that he is liable to temptation and difficulty, and denotes the degree of energy and resolution with which he adheres to *Rectitude*; and the impression made on the mind of others, that he deserves, and will receive, approbation and reward. This sense of good and ill desert is virtually implied in the approbation and disapprobation with which actions are contemplated. But it is more prominently brought out when, speaking of the agents, we say that they are well-deserving or ill-deserving. This cannot so properly be said of actions;² and this shade of difference in the meaning of the two words may serve to show the convenience of confining the use of the one, *Merit*, to agents, and of the other, *Virtue*, to actions.

• *Standard of Duty or Virtue*.—A standard is something set up by which to measure the quantity or quality of some other thing. Now, *Rectitude* is the foundation of *Virtue*. The standard of *Virtue* is some law or rule by which *Rectitude* can be measured. To the law of God, and to the testimony of an enlightened conscience, if they agree not, it is because there is no truth nor rightness in them. Now, the will of God, as declared by the constitution and course of nature, or as revealed by His Word, is a standard by which we may measure the amount of *Rectitude*, in action or disposition. According as

² “The epithets *Right* and *Wrong* are, with strict propriety, applied to actions themselves; but *Good* and *Ill Desert* belong rather to the agent than his actions. ‘Tis

the agent alone who is the subject of happiness or misery; and, therefore, it is he alone that properly can be said to deserve these.”—Price, *Review*, ch. 4.

they agree, in a greater or lesser degree, with the indications of the Divine will, in the same proportion are they right, or in accordance with Rectitude. The standard of Virtue, then, is the will of God, as declared in His Word, or some law or rule deduced from the constitution of nature and the course of Providence. The Foundation of Virtue is the ground or reason on which the law or rule rests.

Criterion of Virtue or Duty.—The meaning of *Criterion*³ is something by which we judge or discern between other things. There is the Criterion *per quod*, and the Criterion *secundum quod*. The Criterion *per quod*, in reference to Duty or Virtue, is the part or power of our nature, the *organ*, by which we discern between Right and Wrong—that is, the Moral Faculty or Conscience. The Criterion *secundum quod*, is the law or rule according to which the Conscience judges and discerns between Right and Wrong. It is the same, then, in signification, as the Standard of Virtue or of Duty.

Sanction of Duty or Virtue.—To sanction anything is to ratify and confirm the doing of it, by every encouragement and support which it may be in our power to give. The *Sanction*⁴ of *Duty* is to be found in the good effects which follow the discharge of it, and in the bad effects which follow the neglect of it. The consequences which naturally attend virtue and vice are the Sanction of Duty, as they are intended to encourage us to the discharge of it, and to deter us from the breach or neglect of it. And these natural consequences of virtue and vice are also a declaration, on the part of God, that He is in favour of the one and against the other, and are intimations that His love of the one and His hatred of the other may be more fully manifested hereafter: while the rewards and punishments of a future state are held out, in His Word, as the sanction of His law, to encourage us to virtue and deter us from vice.

Obligation, Duty—What we ought to do—What we should do.—These words and phrases all mean nearly the same thing. According to Etymologists *should* and *ought* are both past tenses of synonymous infinitives, meaning to owe or to be owing a debt. The

³ “The Criterion of anything is a rule or measure by a conformity with which anything is known to be of this or that sort, or of this or that degree.”—Gay, *Prelim. Dissert.* sect. 1.

⁴ “I shall declare the *Sanction* of this law of nature—viz., those rewards which God hath ordained for the observation of it, and those punishments He hath ap-

pointed for its breach or transgression.” (Tyrell, *On Law of Nature*, p. 126). By Cumberland, Locke, Paley, and Bentham, the term *sanction* is applied to reward as well as to punishment. But Mr. Austin (*Prin. of Jurisprud. Determined*, 8vo., London, 1832, p. 10) confines it to the latter—perhaps because human laws do not reward.

former, it is said, implies a conformity to usage; as, "we *should* follow the fashion;" while the latter implies a conformity to rectitude; as, "we *ought* to serve those who have served us." In like manner, *Duty* may mean something to be done in conformity to *custom*; as, "my *Duty* remembered;" or, something to be done in consequence of its being *right* to do it; as, "my *Duty* was, clearly, to do as I have done."

Obligation comes to us from the Latin, and signifies *binding*, or the *act of binding*. According to Dr. Price (*Review*, ch. 6), *obligatory* answers to *oportet*, *debet*, *debitum*, in Latin; and to *δει*, *δέον ἔστι*, *θεμιτὸν*, *καθήκον*, *δίκαιον*, in Greek. It supposes an agent to be under some law or rule, and supplies the reason for his acting in conformity with it. Why am I obliged to keep my word? Because it is right to do so, and because it is agreeable to the will of God.

Obligation has, therefore, been distinguished as *Internal* and *External*, according as the reason for acting arises in the mind of the agent, or from the will of another.

Internal Obligation. It has been said by Dr. Whewell (*Elem. of Mor.*, vol. i. p. 37), "The question *Why?* respecting human actions, demands a reason, which may be given by a reference from a lower rule to a higher. *Why* ought I to be frugal and industrious? In order that I may not want a maintenance. *Why* must I avoid want? Because I must seek to act independently? *Why* should I seek to act independently? That I may act right. Hence, with regard to the supreme rule, the question *Why?* admits of no further answer. *Why* must I do what is right? Because it is right."

Bishop Butler, in asserting the supremacy of Conscience, has strongly insisted on the obligation which arises from the very perception of what is Right. "Every being endowed with Reason and conscious of Right and Wrong, is, as such, necessarily a law to himself."

Dr. Samuel Clarke has said (*Evid. of Nat. and Rev. Relig.*, pp. 43, 44), "The Judgment and Conscience of a man's own mind, concerning the reasonableness and fitness of the thing, that his action should be conformed to such or such a law or rule, is the truest and formallest obligation."

According to Dr. Price (*Review*, ch. 6), "Obligation to action and *Rightness* of action are plainly coincident and identical; so far, that we cannot form a notion of the one without taking in the other."

"It is not indeed plainer that figure implies something figured, solidity resistance, or an effect a cause, than it is that *rightness* implies *oughtness* (if I may be allowed this word), or *obligatoriness*."

In like manner, Dr. Adams (*Sermon on the Nature and Obligation of Virtue*) has said, "Right implies duty in its idea. To perceive that an action is Right, is to see a reason for doing it in the action itself, abstracted from all other considerations whatsoever. Now, this perception, this acknowledged rectitude in the action, is the very essence of *Obligation*—that which commands the approbation and choice, and binds the conscience of every rational being. External circumstances may make it our interest or prudence to act; but this alone can make or constitute *Duty*."

Bal guy (*On Moral Goodness*, p. 68) and Bishop Burnet (in *Hutcheson's Works*, vol. iii. pp. 70, 71) have expressed themselves to the same effect. And, not to multiply quotations unnecessarily, Mr. Stewart has said (*Act. and Mor. Pow.*, vol. ii. p. 294), "The very notion of *Virtue* implies the notion of *Obligation*. Every being who is conscious of the distinction between Right and Wrong carries about with him a law which he is bound to observe, notwithstanding he may be in total ignorance of a future state."

Here, then, is the first ground of Obligation. In seeing a thing to be right, we are under obligation to do it. This is *Internal Obligation*, or that reason for acting which arises in the mind of the agent along with the perception of the Rightness of the action. It is also called *Rational Obligation*.

External Obligation is a reason for acting which arises from the will of another having authority to impose a law. It is also called *Authoritative Obligation*.

Bishop Warburton has contended (*Div. Leg.*, book i. sect. 4) that all *obligation* necessarily implies an *obtiger*, different from the party obliged; and moral obligation being the obligation of a free agent implies a law; and a law implies a lawgiver. The will of God, therefore, is the true ground of all obligation, strictly and properly so called. The perception of the difference between Right and Wrong can be said to oblige only as an indication of the will of God. And instead of calling the one ground of obligation the *Internal* and the other the *External*, he has said that it would be more exact to call the one obligation *Proper* and the other

* Bishop Horsley has expressed himself to the same effect. The

obligation arising from our perception of the difference between Right and Wrong he has resolved altogether into the will of God; and our perception of that difference he has represented as binding only in consequence of its being a declaration of God's will. So that the law which is revealed in Scripture, and that which is revealed by the moral nature of man, are both declarations of the Divine will; and it is in this view that they are grounds of obligation. But while Bishop Horsley has maintained that the fitness or propriety of certain actions is not the formal ground of our obligation to do them, but merely an indication of God's will concerning them, he has also maintained that in commanding such actions to be done, the will of God was determined by their fitness or propriety. So that while the will of God, as made known by His Word and by our moral constitution, is the law which we are under obligation to obey, the principle or reason of that law, or in other words, the foundation of virtue, is to be found in the fitness of things, or, as that phrase has been explained, in the rectitude of the Divine nature, of which the Divine will is the manifestation or expression.

It is not necessary, however, that the *External* ground of obligation should be maintained to the exclusion, or to the prejudice, of the *Internal* ground; as there is not only no incompatibility, but a natural concurrence between them, the acknowledgment of the one leading to the acknowledgment of the other.

What is Right approves itself to our mind, and the doing of it is accompanied by a grateful feeling; while the neglect to do it is accompanied by a self-condemning feeling. But as these perceptions and feelings have reference to a nature and character in actions, and a constitution of mind, between which there is an evident correspondence, it is seen that this state of things has been arranged for our guidance and government, and that in conforming to it, by doing what we see to be Right, we are conforming to the will of our Maker; while in going against our knowledge of what is Right, we are punished by the very constitution of our mind, and led to look for farther and deeper condemnation. Our moral judgments and feelings thus bear testimony to a law of Rectitude in the very nature and constitution of things—a law derived from and supported by the authority of Him who is the fountain of all being and of all order; and conformity to whose will should be the high and happy aim of all His creatures. The subjection in which we

find ourselves to the approval or the condemnation of our own mind, and the happiness or misery dispensed in our own bosom, lead us to think of the government and will of Him to whom we and all our destinies are subject. In short, the experience of our being amenable to the punishment or reward of our Conscience lifts our thoughts to the distributions of a higher judgment-seat; and the little tribunal which is in our own bosom serves as a stepping-stone from which we descry the throne of the Eternal. "The sense of a governing principle within begets in all men the sentiment of a living governor above them; and it does so with all the speed of an instantaneous feeling; yet it is not an impression, it is an inference."—Chalmers, *Bridgewater Treatise*, vol. i. p. 78.

Conscience, as giving the knowledge of Right and Wrong, carries with it authority and obligation. But this Internal Obligation carries us out of ourselves and above ourselves, to the Obligation which arises from the authority and will of God. It is this latter which gives to the former ground of Obligation much of its clearness and strength. The dictates of Conscience derive much of their power from being regarded as intimations of the will of God, and from their pointing forwards to a farther manifestation of that will. For, it has been said (Whewell, *Sermons on the Foundation of Morals*, pp. 26, 70), "It is impossible for us to conceive that the Creator of the world, having placed in us a faculty which, duly developed and faithfully consulted, condemns and loathes all that is base and vile and unjust and wicked, is Himself an indifferent spectator of good and bad, of vice and virtue, of pollution and purity, of the highest and most degraded impulses of our nature. . . . Man's nature thus compelling him to refer to a law of rectitude and purity, he is irresistibly led onwards to believe his Maker to be a God infinitely righteous and holy, so that our recognition of the supreme authority of Conscience within, is so far from being inconsistent with our obedience to God above, that these two habits of the soul are closely connected in their origin, and strongly confirm each other; so that the hope of the favour of God, who is Holy, Just, and Pure, is so far from being inconsistent with the love of Goodness, for its own sake, that the two affections, as we advance in our moral and Christian condition, tend to coalesce, and finally flow on together in one bright and glowing stream."

By some philosophers, however, this stream of living waters has been parted. They have grounded Obligation altogether on the will

of God, and have overlooked or made light of the Obligation which arises from our perception of rectitude. Language to this effect has been ascribed to Mr. Locke, (*Life*, by Lord King, vol. ii. p. 129. See also *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book ii. ch. 26, sect. 6; and Dr. Gastrell, *Of Religion*, p. 94.) And both Warburton and Horsley, as well as Paley and his followers, have given too much, if not an exclusive prominence to the rewards and punishments of a future life, as prompting to the practice of virtue. But, although God, in accommodation to the weakness of our nature and the perils of our condition, has condescended to quicken us, in the discharge of our duty, by appealing to our hopes and fears, both in regard to the life that now is and that which is to come, it does not follow that self-love, or a concern for our own happiness, should be the only, or even the chief spring of our obedience. On the contrary, obedience to the Divine will may spring from veneration and love to the Divine character, arising from the most thorough conviction of the rectitude, wisdom, and goodness of the divine arrangements. And that this, more than a regard to the rewards of everlasting life, is the proper spring of virtuous conduct, is as plain as it is important to remark. To do what is Right, even for the sake of everlasting life, is evidently acting from a motive far inferior, in purity and power, to love and veneration for the character and commands of Him who is Just and Good, in a sense and to an extent to which our most elevated conceptions are inadequate. That which should bind us to the throne of the Eternal is not the iron chain of selfishness, but the golden links of a love to all that is Right; and our aspirations to the realms of bliss should be breathings after the prevalence of universal purity, rather than desires of our own individual happiness. Self and its little circle is too narrow to hold the heart of man, when it is touched with a sense of its true dignity, and enlightened with the knowledge of its lofty destination. It swells with generous admiration of all that is Right and Good; and expands with a love which refuses to acknowledge any limits but the limits of life and the capacities of enjoyment. In the nature and will of Him from whom all being and all happiness proceed, it acknowledges the only proper object of its adoration and submission; and, in surrendering itself to His authority, is purified from all the dross of selfishness, and cheered by the light of a calm and unquenchable love to all that is Right and Good.

BOOK III.

OF THE WILL.

"By the term *Will* I do not mean to express a more or less highly developed faculty of *Desiring*; but that innate intellectual energy which, unfolding itself from all the other forces of the mind, like a flower from its petals, radiates through the whole sphere of our activity—a faculty which we are better able to feel than to define, and which we might, perhaps, most appropriately designate as the purely practical faculty of man. . . . This force constitutes man's individuality, gives the first impulse to reason and imagination, and reveals the wonders of our spiritual life. It is on this faculty that the Moralist, the Legislator, the Schoolmaster, the Physician, must act—above all others, he who would regimen his own mind, in order that he may acquire dominion over it."—FEUCHTERSLEBEN, *Dietetics of the Soul*, p. 53.

SOME modern philosophers have employed the term Activity as synonymous with Will. But the former is of wider signification than the latter. Activity is the power of producing change—whatever the change may be. Will is the power of producing acts of willing. Active power may be predicated of the body as well as of the mind; and there are other operations of mind, beside those of the Will, in which Active power is manifested.

CHAPTER I.

OF WILLING.

In the Peripatetic philosophy the powers of the mind were distinguished into the Gnostic or Cognitive, and the Orectic or Appetent; and hence the common division of them into powers of Understand-

ing and powers of Will. In this use of it, the term Will not only denoted the power of willing, but comprehended all the modes of appetence which might move or incite it to act. It is here used to denote merely the power by which we determine to do or not to do something which we conceive to be in our power. "Every man is conscious of a power to determine," says Dr. Reid (*Act. Pow.*, Essay ii. ch. 1), "in things which he conceives to depend upon his determination. To this power we give the name of *Will*."

An act or exercise of this power is called a *Volition*. Volition, being a simple state of mind, does not admit of a logical definition. The nature of it may be explained by the following remarks.

1. *Every volition or act of will must have an object.* "He that wills," says Dr. Reid (*Act. Pow.*, Essay ii. ch. 1), "must will something; and that which he wills is called the *object* of his volition. As a man cannot think without thinking of something, nor remember without remembering something, so, neither can he will without willing something. Every act of will, therefore, must have an object, and the person who wills must have some conception, more or less distinct, of what he wills." By this remark Dr. Reid meant to distinguish between things done in consequence of a volition, and things done from the force of instinct or from the power of habit; in which cases there may be no conception of an object, or end, nor of the means of accomplishing it.

2. *The object of our volition is always something which we conceive to be in our power.* It is in our power to walk, or to stand still, or to sit down; and we may determine, by a volition, to do any one of these things. But it is not in our power to move through the air like a bird; and we never determine or will to do so. We may determine to do what turns out to be beyond our power to do. But, at the time we make the volition, we believe that the object of it is in our power.

3. *The object of a volition is always something future.* "A volition," it has been said by Mr. Upham (*On the Will*, pt. i. ch. 4, sect. 42), "is futuritive in its very nature. An intellective or perceptive act rests in itself. As soon as it assumes the form of a cognition or knowledge, it accomplishes, so far as its own nature is concerned, the mission for which it was sent." It may be called *un fait accompli*. But volition has reference to an act yet to be done. It is true that some of our emotional states, such as hope and fear, have reference to things distant and future. But, when

these feelings are very lively, the objects of them acquire a present existence and exert a present influence; whereas a volition may remain long quiescent; and, even when fondly cherished, it still has reference to something yet to be done.

4. When the time for accomplishing the object of our volition is come, *the volition is accompanied by a proportionate exertion of active power.* Consciousness testifies, that when we have a volition or purpose, we make an effort to accomplish it. There is a corresponding *nusus*, or a directing of the energy, or active power, which belongs to us, to do what we have determined to do. "This effort we are conscious of," says Dr. Reid, "if we will but give attention to it; and there is nothing in which we are in a more strict sense active."

CHAPTER II.

OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN DESIRING AND WILLING.

WILLING and desiring are acts of mind which have often been confounded. The former use of the term Will, to denote not merely the power of willing, but also the various Desires and Feelings which may influence it, may have led to this confounding. And, in the ordinary actions of daily life, we so frequently do what we desire to do, that the separate and successive states of *Desiring*, and *Willing*, and *Doing*, are not distinctly marked.

"But he that shall turn his thoughts inwards upon what passes in his mind when *he wills*," says Mr. Locke (*Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book ii. ch. 21), "shall see that the Will or power of volition is conversant about nothing but that particular determination of mind whereby, barely by a thought, the mind endeavours to give rise, continuation, or stop, to any action which it takes to be in its power. This, well considered, plainly shows that the *Will* is perfectly distinguished from *Desire*; which, in the very same action, may have a quite contrary tendency from that which our Will sets us upon."

According to Mr. Stewart (*Act. and Mor. Pow.*, App., p. 471), the substance of Mr. Locke's remarks on the appropriate meaning

of these two terms amounts to the two following propositions:—
 1. That at the same moment a man may desire one thing and will another. 2. That at the same moment a man may have contrary desires, but cannot have contrary wills. The notions, therefore, which ought to be annexed to the words *Will* and *Desire* are essentially different."

According to Dr. Reid (*Act. Pow.*, Essay ii. ch. 2), the distinction between Desiring and Willing is, "That what we *will* must be an action, and our own action; what we *desire* may not be our own action; it may be no action at all. A man desires that his children may be happy, and that they may behave well. Their being happy is no action at all; their behaving well is not his action, but theirs. With regard to our own actions, we may desire what we do not will, and will what we do not desire; nay, what we have a great aversion to. A man athirst has a strong desire to drink, but, for some particular reason, he determines not to gratify his desire. A man, for health, may take a nauseous draught, for which he has no desire, but a great aversion. Desire, therefore, even when its object is some action of our own, is only an *incitement* to will, but it is not *volition*. The *determination* of the mind may be, not to do what we *desire* to do."

The correctness of these distinctions has been challenged by Mr. Ballantyne (*Examin. of the Hum. Mind*, ch. 3, sect. 1); but not on sufficient grounds. At the same time, it may be proper to note that there is a difference between a *command* and a *volition*; and also between a *command* and a *desire*. These differences are clearly pointed out by Dr. Reid (*ut supra*). "A *command* being a voluntary action, there must be a *will* (volition) to give the command. Some *desire* is commonly the motive to that act of will, and the command is the effect of it. A desire may be expressed by language when there is no command; and there may possibly be a command without any desire that the thing commanded should be done. There have been instances of tyrants who have laid grievous commands upon their subjects, in order to reap the penalty of their disobedience, or to furnish a pretence for their punishment. We might farther observe that a command is a *social* act. Desire and Will are *solitary acts*."

According to Spinoza, *Voluntas et Intellectus unum et idem sunt*. "The will," says Hobbes (*Leviathan*, p. 28, edit. 1651), "is the last appetite (desire) in deliberating."

Among modern philosophers, who have confounded or identified Volition with Desire, may be noticed Dr. Thomas Brown. In his *Inquiry into the Relation between Cause and Effect*, pt. i. sect. 8, he has said, "These brief feelings, which the body immediately obeys—that is to say, on which certain bodily movements are immediately consequent—are commonly termed *Volitions*; while the more lasting wishes, which have no such direct termination, are simply denominated *Desires*. Thus we are said to *desire* wealth, and to *will* the motion of our hand; but, if the motion of our hand had not followed our desire of moving it, we should then have been said not to *will* but to *desire* its motion. The distance, or the immediate attainableness, of the good, is thus the sole difference; but, as the words are at present used, they have served to produce a belief that, in the case of any simple bodily movement, there are both a desire and a volition. . . . Of this complex mental process, however, we have no consciousness; the desire of moving a limb being directly followed by its motion."

Mr. Austin has said (*Prov. of Jurisprud. Determined*, vol. i. p. 87), "By the will or by volitions, we mean desires which consummate themselves,"—as I will to move my hand, and the movement *immediately* follows. But a volition to recollect anything is not followed *immediately* by recollection.

Now, it may be difficult, in every voluntary motion of the body, to detect the presence of a desire to do so, followed by a volition or determination to do so. Our voluntary motions begin so early, and are repeated so frequently, that all sense of succession between the different steps in the process gradually disappears. But the difference is made plain by an appeal to consciousness. I have a strong desire to drink of some grateful beverage, or to eat of some tempting food; but I find or fear that to do so might be injurious to my health. I pause, and hesitate; but at length decline the dangerous gratification. According to Dr. Brown, and those who identify Volition with Desire, there is nothing in this case but the desire of eating or drinking being overcome by the desire of health—that is, a weaker desire being overcome by a stronger. But in this and all similar cases, there are three things of which we are distinctly conscious—viz., a desire felt, another desire which interferes with the gratification of the desire first felt, and then a Volition or Determination either to gratify the first desire, or to yield to the desire which is incompatible with the gratification of it. Now, this Volition or Determination is

different from the Desire which it rejects, and it is equally different from the Desire with the promptings of which it concurs. And whether we seek to check and to resist some turbulent and vicious propensity, or to cherish and enflame some feeble but virtuous inclination, we feel that, in doing so, we put forth an act of Will; an act which, although it may be prompted and influenced by Desire, is altogether different from and superior to its impulse; and is no more to be confounded with it than any act or operation of mind is to be confounded with the act or operation which may have preceded it.

And when, from attending to what passes in our own bosom, we turn to contemplate the conduct of others, we are brought to the same conclusion.

We see some one placed in circumstances of trial and difficulty. He has an inordinate love of wealth, and an opportunity offers by which this desire may be gratified. The opportunity, though tempting, is not without its hazards. He pauses, and hesitates, and at length determines to check the desire of wealth, which would urge him to some doubtful enterprise, and holds fast his integrity and prudence. We applaud and esteem the man—and why? Because he has not yielded to the desire of increasing his wealth, but has resisted it—because the higher and better elements of his nature have triumphed over the lower and less worthy. It may be said, perhaps, that the love of reputation or safety prevailed over the love of wealth, and that, after all, the man yielded to the desire which was strongest. But, if there were nothing but the contest of weaker and stronger desires, why should we applaud or esteem him for yielding to one desire rather than another? If such were the true state of the case it could scarcely be said that there was a man, a person, an agent at all. It is Will which gives birth to conduct and character, and makes the difference between a person and a thing. If there were no power to interpose between desire and action, there could be no room for self-government. Every one would be just what his natural impulses made him; and there could be no more ground for praise or blame, in reference to his conduct, than there is in reference to the rising or falling of the tide.

The difference between Desiring and Willing is implied, not only in our estimate of character or conduct as prudent or foolish, but more clearly in our estimate of character and conduct as virtuous or vicious.

In obeying the impulse of their instincts and appetites, the inferior

animals act in accordance with the nature given to them; and in calling some cruel and rapacious, and others gentle and harmless, we imply neither praise nor blame. But men see, not only what is agreeable and desirable, but also what is fit and right. They have a sense of duty or obligation, which often prompts them to curb and to control their desires. If it be said, that the sense of duty or the feeling of obligation is merely a modification of desire, and that it is sometimes the strongest desire, and may thus prevail, an appeal to consciousness will convince every one of the difference between doing what is seen to be right, and doing what is felt to be agreeable. Conscience is different, in kind, from Desire, and is superior to it in authority. It tells us when desire may be gratified, and when it ought to be restrained. Desire may urge in one direction, Conscience may point in another, and the Will determines. Action follows, and character is formed by action. Some characters we esteem and praise; other characters we condemn and blame. In this it is implied, that in the conduct of rational and responsible agents there is not the mere yielding to impulse, but a struggle between contending principles, and that they have, and exercise, a power by which it is determined which of these principles shall prevail. According to the nature of the principle is the nature of the action, and according to the nature of the action is the character of the agent. Of two who stand in the relation of parent, one may be so swayed by parental affection that he cannot, or at least does not, correct his children when they do wrong, while the other is so governed by a sense of duty that he will not allow their faults to go unpunished. Both are so far influenced by the impulse of natural affection, and both are conscious of a sense of duty; but, in the case of the one, natural affection, and in the case of the other, a sense of duty, prevails. In the case of both, however, there may have been a struggle, and it was an exercise of Will which put an end to the struggle, by determining, in the case of the one parent, to punish the fault, and in the case of the other, to pass by it. We blame the one and praise the other; but, it is plain that we could not do so, if there was nothing in either case but an impulsive principle prompting the conduct. Praise and blame imply that the parties praised or blamed had knowledge of more ways of acting than one, and that, while various considerations might urge them to act in one way rather than another, it was by an exercise of Will that they determined to act in the way they did.

"Appetite is the Will's Solicitor, and the Will is Appetite's Controller; what we covet according to the one, by the other we often reject."—Hooker, *Eccles. Pol.*, book i.

"Desire is the very opposite of the Will, inasmuch as the two reciprocally strive to limit each other—yea, rather to destroy each other. Appetite, as hunger or thirst, involuntarily springing up from the deep ground of mere feeling, and from a sensible need, has its sole attraction towards self, and seeks to satisfy itself; and in its ascendancy indicates an absence, or rather a passiveness, of the Will and of Intelligence. Hence the *desirous* man (or man in a state of desire) is not only something very different from the *willing* man, but the direct contrary of him."—Bockshammer, *On the Will*, 12mo., Andover, 1835, p. 34. (See also Morell, *Hist. of Mod. Phil.* pt. ii. ch. 4, sect. 1.)

CHAPTER III.

OF PREFERRING, CHOOSING, AND WILLING.

"SUCH is the difficulty of explaining and giving clear notions of internal actions by sounds, that I must here warn my reader," said Mr. Locke (*Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book ii. ch. 21, sect. 15), "that *ordering*, *directing*, *choosing*, *preferring*, &c., which I have made use of, will not distinctly enough express volition, unless he will reflect on what he himself does when he wills. For example, *preferring*, which seems, perhaps, best to express the act of volition, does it not precisely. For though a man would *prefer* flying to walking, yet who can say he ever *wills* it?" From this illustration it is plain that, according to Mr. Locke, *preference* might be directed towards what is not in our power, while *volition* implies that the object of it is something which is conceived to be in our power to do or not to do—that the former may be speculative and inactive, while the latter is practical and accompanied or followed by effort. In a subsequent passage (sect. 17) Mr. Locke has said, that "the will signifies nothing but a power or ability to *prefer* or *choose*."

This latter word, with its conjugates, was employed by Edwards to denote the will and its acts. He has said (*Inquiry*, pt. i. sect. 1),

"The *will* is that by which the mind *chooses* anything. The faculty of the *will* is that faculty or power by which it is capable of *choosing*; an act of the *will* is the same as an act of *choosing* or *choice*. . . . Whatever names we call the act of the will by, *choosing*, *refusing*, *approving*, *disapproving*, *liking*, *disliking*, *embracing*, *rejecting*, *determining*, *directing*, *commanding*, *forbidding*, *inclining*, or being *averse*, a being *pleased* or *displeased* with;—all may be reduced to this of *choosing*. For the soul to act *voluntarily* is evermore to act *electively*."

But although a voluntary action implies election or choice,¹ that is, power to do or not to do, it does not follow that *willing* is always and precisely of the same meaning as *choosing* or *preferring*, or those other words here enumerated as equivalent to it. *Approving* and *disapproving*, primarily and properly denote acts of the Judgment or Reason; *liking* and *disliking*, *inclination* and *aversion*, *pleasure* and *displeasure*, are states of feeling. These may have an influence upon the will in reference to its determination. But none of these words, nor the words *preferring* and *choosing*, are always used in a sense precisely synonymous with *willing*. Such is the poverty of language or want of discrimination in the use of it, that the words *preference* and *choice* are employed to denote a command of the conscience, or a conclusion of the reason, a state of desire or affection, or a volition or act of will. But commands of the conscience may be disobeyed, conclusions of the reason may be rejected, and a man may will or determine to do what he knows to be wrong, or sees to be imprudent. In like manner, inclinations and desires, though strong, may be resisted and overcome. So that the words *preferring* and *choosing* can be considered as synonymous with *willing* only when employed to denote the *determining* or *resolving* to act in accordance with conviction and inclination, that is, not the grounds or reasons of *preferring* or *choosing*, but the mental act by which an agent fixes or sets himself to the doing of one thing and not of another. This is *Willing*² or *Volition*—a manifestation of mind to be distinguished from the operations of Intellect, and from the impulses of the Sensitivity. (See Tappan, *Doctrine of the Will*, ch. 3, sect. 4 and 5.)

¹ "Choice there is not, unless the thing we take be so in our power that we might have refused and left it. If fire consumeth the stubble, it chooseth not so to do, because the nature thereof is such that it can do no other. To choose is to will one thing before

another."—HOOKER, *Eccles. Pol.*, book i.

² "To choose simply is not to will; simply to resolve is not to will. To will is to resolve upon choice."—ROBERTS, *God and His Works*, p. 113.

But while a distinction should be made between *preference* and *choice*, when used to denote *volition* or the act of will, and when used as including the grounds or reasons on which the will acts, it is not meant to insinuate that the Will does or can act without grounds or reasons. In all determinations of the mind that are of any importance, the determination is come to in the presence, or with the consciousness and consideration, of grounds or reasons, on which the agent may determine to act or not to act.

CHAPTER IV.

OF MOTIVES.

"By *motive*," said Edwards (*Inquiry*, pt. i. sect. 2), "I mean the whole of that which moves, excites, or invites the mind to volition, whether that be one thing singly, or many things conjunctly. Many particular things may concur and unite their strength to induce the mind; and when it is so, all together are, as it were, one complex motive. . . . Whatever is a motive, in this sense, must be something that is *extant in the view or apprehension of the understanding, or perceiving faculty*. Nothing can induce or invite the mind to will or act anything, any further than it is perceived, or is in some way or other in the mind's view; for what is wholly unperceived, and perfectly out of the mind's view, cannot affect the mind at all."

Hence it has been common to distinguish Motives as *External* or *Objective*, and as *Internal* or *Subjective*. Regarded *Objectively*, Motives are those external objects or circumstances which, when contemplated, give rise to views or feelings which prompt or influence the Will. Regarded *Subjectively*, Motives are those internal views or feelings which arise on the contemplation of external objects or circumstances. In common language, the term Motive is applied indifferently to the external object, and to the state of mind to which the apprehension or contemplation of it may give rise. The explanation of Edwards includes both. Dr. Reid said that he "understood a motive, when applied to a human being, to be that for the sake of which he acts, and, therefore, that what he never was conscious of can no more be a motive to determine his will than it can be an

argument to determine his judgment." (*Correspondence prefixed to his Works*, p. 87.) In his *Act. Pow.* (Essay iv. ch. 4) he said, "Everything that can be called a motive is addressed either to the animal or to the rational part of our nature." Here the word Motive is applied *Objectively* to those external things which, when contemplated, affect our Intelligence or our Sensitivity. But, in the very next sentence, he has said, "Motives of the former kind are common to us with the brutes." Here the word Motive is applied *Subjectively* to those internal principles of our nature, such as Appetite, Desire, Passion, &c., which are excited by the contemplation of external objects adapted and addressed to them.

But, in order to a more precise use of the term Motive, let it be noted, that, in regard to it, there are three things clearly distinguishable, although it may not be common, nor easy, always to speak of them distinctively. These are, the external object, the internal principle, and the state or affection of mind resulting from the one being addressed to the other. For example,—Bread, or food of any kind, is the external object, which is adapted to an internal principle which is called Appetite, and Hunger, or the desire of food, is the internal feeling which is excited or allayed, as the circumstances may be, by the presentment of the external object to the internal principle. In popular language, the term Motive might be applied to any one of these three; and it might be said that the motive for such an action was *bread*, or *appetite*, or *hunger*. But, strictly speaking, the feeling of hunger was the motive; it was that, in the preceding state of mind, which disposed or inclined the agent to act in one way rather than in any other. The same may be said of motives of every kind. In every case there may be observed the external object, the internal principle, and the resultant state or affection of mind; and the term motive may be applied, separately and successively, to any one of them; but, speaking strictly, it should be applied to the terminating state or affection of mind which arises from a principle of human nature having been addressed by an object adapted to it; because it is this state or affection of mind which prompts to action. The motive of an agent, in some particular action, may be said to have been *injury*, or *resentment*, or *anger*—meaning by the first of these words, the wrongous behaviour of another, by the second, the principle in human nature affected by such behaviour, and by the third, the resultant state of mind in the agent. When it is said that a man acted *prudently*, it may intimate

that his conduct was in accordance with the rules of propriety and prudence; or, that he adopted it, after careful consideration and forethought, or, from a sense of the benefit and advantage to be derived from it. In like manner, when it is said that a man acted *conscientiously*, it may mean that the particular action was regarded, not as a matter of interest, but of duty, or, that his moral faculty approved of it as Right, or, that he felt himself under a Sense of Obligation to do it. In all these cases, the term Motive is strictly applicable to the terminating state or affection of mind which immediately precedes the volition or determination to act.

To the question, therefore, whether Motive means something in the mind or out of it, it is replied, that, what moves the will is something in the preceding state of mind. That state of mind may have reference to something out of the mind. But what is out of the mind must be apprehended or contemplated—must be brought within the view of the mind, before it can in any way affect it. It is only in a secondary or remote sense, therefore, that external objects or circumstances can be called Motives, or be said to move the will. Motives are, strictly speaking, *Subjective*—as they are internal states or affections of mind in the agent.

And Motives may be called *Subjective*, not only in contradistinction to the external objects and circumstances which may be the occasion of them, but also in regard to the different effect which the same objects and circumstances may have, not only upon different individuals, but even upon the same individuals at different times.

A man of slow and narrow intellect is unable to perceive the value or importance of an object when presented to him, or the propriety and advantage of a course of conduct that may be pointed out to him, so clearly or so quickly as a man of large and vigorous intellect. The consequence will be, that, with the same Motives (*objectively* considered) presented to them, the one may remain indifferent and indolent in reference to the advantage held out, while the other will at once apprehend and pursue it. A man of cold and dull affections will contemplate a spectacle of pain or want, without feeling any desire or making any exertion to relieve it; while he whose sensibilities are more acute and lively will instantly be moved to the most active and generous efforts. An injury done to one man will rouse him at once to a phrenzy of indignation, which will prompt him to the most extravagant measures of retaliation or revenge; while, in another man, it will only give rise to a moderate

feeling of resentment. An action which will be contemplated with horror by a man of a tender conscience, will be done without compunction by him whose moral sense has not been sufficiently exercised to discern between good and evil. In short, anything external to the mind will be modified in its effect, according to the constitution and training of the different minds within the view of which it may be brought.

And not only may the same objects differently affect different minds, but also the same minds, at different times or under different circumstances. He who is suffering the pain of hunger may be tempted to steal, in order to satisfy his hunger; but he who has bread enough and to spare is under no such temptation. A sum of money which might be sufficient to bribe one man would be no trial to the honesty of another. Under the impulse of any violent passion, considerations of prudence and propriety have not the same weight as in calmer moments. The young are not so cautious, in circumstances of danger and difficulty, as those who have attained to greater age and experience. Objects appear to us in very different colours, in health and in sickness, in prosperity and in adversity, in society and in solitude, in prospect and in possession.

It would thus appear, that motives are in their nature *Subjective*, in their influence *Individual*, and in their issue *Variable*.

CHAPTER V.

OF THE CLASSIFICATION OF MOTIVES.

ACCORDING to Dr. Reid, the Animal and the Rational principles of our nature may, when addressed by their proper objects, produce those states or affections of mind which have an influence on our voluntary determinations. He therefore has said that Motives are of two kinds; which he designates Animal and Rational. Of the former kind are all those Motives which have their origin in Appetite, Affection, and Passion; and of the latter kind are those which take their rise from Reason and Conscience. This classification gives no place to those Motives which may be traced to Instinct and Habit. The reason of this is, that Dr. Reid classified Instinct and Habit as

mechanical principles of action, and characterized them as involving in their exercise no attention, no deliberation, no will; and therefore he did not regard them as having any influence on our voluntary determinations.

Now, it may be true that there are acts which we perform instinctively and habitually, with no attention and no deliberation; but the same¹ acts may also be performed with attention and after deliberation, and the Will may be exercised concerning them. And whether such acts be performed consciously or unconsciously, deliberately or without deliberation, there can be no doubt that Instinct and Habit exert a powerful influence on our voluntary determinations; and should not be excluded from any classification of Motives, or those states or affections of mind which incline us to determine in one way rather than in any other. According to some, the passion of Anger is instinctive in some of its manifestations. By others, the Affections of Kindred and of Country are regarded as instinctive in their origin. And Habit exerts a very powerful influence over our voluntary determinations—in so much, that, according to the presence or the absence of its power, in reference to any particular act or indulgence, the determination of the Will may be predicted with a certainty almost infallible. Hold out a bribe to a man of dishonest habits—or a draught of intoxicating liquor to a man of intemperate habits—and, under ordinary circumstances, you may be almost certain of the result. The bribe and the draught will, in all probability, be taken. It may be said that, in the one case, the love of gain, and, in the other, the love of liquor, is the motive which prevails with the agent. But, how did the love of gain or the love of liquor come to have so much influence on his voluntary determination? Was it not from their having been frequently indulged? In other words, have they not acquired inordinate power, in accordance with the law of repetition or custom? Now this is a law in accordance with which the human mind is so extensively and so unceasingly operated upon, for good or for evil, that Habit, which results from it, should not be omitted in any enumeration of those sources of influence which may be brought to bear on the determinations of the Will.

It is true that if Instinct and Habit be rigorously analysed, they

¹ "The actions of instinct and those of volition run imperceptibly into each other, so that what was at first instinctive, may afterwards come to be matter of deliberate choice."—SIR GILBERT BLANE, *Dissert. on Muscular Mot.*, p. 261.

will be found to contain, as their essential element, a state of propension or tendency towards some act or object. And it may be said that any influence which they can have on voluntary determinations is virtually included under Appetite or Desire. But the separate and substantive form which the manifestations of Instinct and Habit so often assume demands that they should be distinctly specified. Besides, if this view of the matter be prosecuted to its ultimate results, it will be found that in all our principles of action there may be detected, pervading or underlying them, the same element of propension or tendency towards an act or an object. In truth, it is this element which gives to these principles any influence on our voluntary determinations. If there were no such element—nothing inclining us to determine in one way rather than in another—we would remain altogether irresolute and inactive. In actions to which we are prompted by Appetite or Passion, we are distinctly conscious of the presence of this element. But something analogous to it may be detected even when our actions are guided by Reason and Conscience. In such cases there is the conviction of the Reason that the action is prudent, or the dictate of the Conscience that the action is right. But in matters of moment, when the conviction of the Reason is strong and the dictate of the Conscience clear, there accompanies or follows them a *sense* of prudence and a *sense* of duty; and we are made, not only to *know*, but also to *feel*, that we should act in accordance with the conclusions of the one and the commands of the other. Now, the feeling which we thus experience partakes of the nature of tendency, inclination, or desire, towards an act or an object; and it is in virtue of this that it comes to have an influence on our voluntary determinations. It is true that the forms or modifications of feeling which accompany or enter into the exercise of Reason and Conscience, are very different from the turbulent and impetuous feelings which are found in connection with the other active principles of our nature. And it is on this difference, in the way in which they operate upon and influence the will of an agent, that a classification of Motives should be founded.

Some motives operate directly upon the will, and carry a man violently towards an act or an object, without much thought of anything but the uneasiness to be removed or the gratification to be enjoyed, by the performance of the act or the attainment of the object. There are other motives which operate in a calm and dispassionate manner, and under the influence of which the agent has

full room for the exercise of deliberation and free choice. Motives of the former kind might be called *Impulsive*, and motives of the latter kind *Suasive*.

The ground of this Classification is the same with that adopted by Dr. Reid. But, by substituting the designation *Impulsive* in place of *Animal*, the first of the two classes may, without impropriety, include those motive influences which spring from Instinct and Habit. These influences operate upon the Will in a way somewhat similar to the influences which take their rise from Appetite, Affection, and Passion, viz., in the way of tendency or inclination, more or less sensibly and vehemently felt, and more or less impeding or excluding the exercise of Reason and Conscience. The second class includes those motives which take their rise in convictions of the Reason and commands of the Conscience, and which operate in a calm and considerate way, carrying the agent with less vehemence, but with more confidence and clearness, towards the end in view. The designation *Suasive*, as applied to this class, may be vindicated to those who regard the moral faculty as a sense or feeling, by the fact that the moral emotion, under the influence of which an agent is prompted to act, implies the preceding of a moral judgment or conclusion—a rational conviction or persuasion of the rightness of the action.

Mr. Upham (*On the Will*, pt. ii. ch. 8, sect. 126) has proposed to classify Motives as *Natural* and *Moral*—including, under the former class, all those which operate in the way of desire or tendency towards an act or an object, and, under the latter, those which spring from a sense of obligation or duty. But those principles which are called *Moral* are natural, as well as those to which the designation of *natural* is peculiarly applied. This objection might be obviated by calling the one class of motives *Physical*, or those which have respect to some physical good, and the other class *Moral*, or those which have respect to what is morally right. But motives merely reasonable—that is, springing from a regard to what is advantageous—could not at all be designated *Physical*; while, as not fully involving obligation, they could not well be called *Moral*. Yet motives that are properly moral may well be called *Suasive*; because, whatever difference there may be between Reason and Conscience in respect of authority, they both operate in the way of conviction or persuasion.

On the whole, the difference between the two great classes of

motives seems to be most correctly indicated by calling the one class *Impulsive*, and the other *Suasive*. And these designations correspond to the classification of the principles of action into *Springs* and *Guides*—the *Springs* giving rise to *Impulsive* motives, and the *Guides* to *Suasive* motives. Motives of the one class have reference to some act or object as desirable, and they operate in the way of impulse or tendency. Motives of the other class have reference to some action or course of action as advantageous or right, and they operate in the way of conviction or persuasion. To one or other of these classes, all the motives which influence human conduct may be reduced. Motives of the *Suasive* class are superior in authority to those of the *Impulsive* class. Reason and Conscience are the guiding and governing powers in man. Any motive derived from these may check and control those which spring from Appetite and Passion. Motives of the latter class may be more loud and vehement, and imperious in their operation ; but, when brought to the bar of Reason and Conscience, they are found to be destitute of all lawful authority. Men may yield, and too often do yield, to their usurpation. But when they have done so, and their clamorous impulses have been gratified, they find that they ought not to have done so ; but that they ought rather to have hearkened to the still small voice of Reason and Conscience.

CHAPTER VI.

OF THE WILL IN RELATION TO OTHER FACULTIES.

THE preceding remarks on Motives may serve to show what position the Will holds in our mental constitution. It may be said to lie in the very interior of the mind. It is placed, as it were, behind the Intellect and the Sensitivity, and is only to be approached through them. He who endeavours to determine the Will must do so by enlightening the Understanding, and by moving the Feelings. It is only through them that he can reach the central power of the Will.

SECTION I.—*Of the Will in relation to the Intellect.*

Every volition has an object; for he that wills must will something, and must know what he wills. There must be an act of Intellect preceding an act of Will. Something must be known before anything can be willed or determined on.

But while it is admitted that where there is no Intellect there can be no Will properly so called, there is a difference of opinion as to the relation between the Intellect and the Will. According to some it is immediate and direct; according to others it is indirect and remote. Knowledge is necessary before the Will can determine; and according to some, Knowledge is all that is necessary; for when an object is apprehended as Good or Evil, the Will immediately determines to seek or to shun it. According to others, Knowledge is a preliminary, but merely a preliminary, to an act of Will. Knowledge may be increased to any possible amount, but it cannot, of itself, give rise to an act of Will. It must first excite a desire to obtain, or to avoid, the object; and then, but not till then, the Will is moved to determine. The Intellect, according to this view, is not in immediate contact with the Will, but reaches it through the medium of the Sensitivity.

The point in dispute is, whether the Will is called into activity by the dictate or decision of the Intellect, or whether that dictate or decision must first awaken some feeling or desire before it can reach or move the Will. Now, the function of the Intellect is to give knowledge. When the knowledge of any object or event contemplated or apprehended has been gained, the proper function of the Intellect has been fulfilled. But an exercise of the Will does not, necessarily nor immediately, follow. Many of the dictates of the Understanding or conclusions of the Intellect have no direct bearing upon human happiness or misery. The knowledge gained leads to no practical use or effort, yet the possession or the contemplation of it may give us pleasure; and the desire of increasing this pleasure may prompt us to seek more knowledge of a similar kind; and, in this indirect way, our volitions and conduct may be influenced. But the conclusions and contemplations of the Intellect are, in many instances, quickly followed by very vivid feelings. Thus, the contemplation of wealth—the consideration of the many advantages which it confers, and of the many evils which it wards

off—gives rise to a strong desire to obtain it,—this desire moves the Will, and leads to the most earnest resolutions and the most strenuous exertions. In like manner, the various objects of human ambition and pursuit are not barely contemplated, or coldly conceived of, by the Intellect; they are felt to be suitable to our nature and condition,—this suitableness stimulates our desires, and quickens our determinations and endeavours to obtain them. So it is also in reference to moral perceptions and conclusions. We may see and acknowledge an action to be right, without experiencing any very vivid feeling in reference to the doing of it. It may be an ordinary or everyday act of duty, which we have now come to do without any pressing or present sense of its obligation. At first, however, it was done, not in consequence of the bare intellectual perception of its rightness, but under a sense of duty or obligation. So that, with regard to perceptions or cognitions, whether intellectual or moral, as mere cognitions or states of knowing, it is said, they do not come into immediate contact with the Will. Our knowledge of objects and events as likely to affect us for good or for evil, awakens corresponding feelings of appetite or aversion; and these feelings operating upon the Will, we determine to flee from the one and to follow after the other. Our knowledge of actions as right or wrong is accompanied by feelings of obligation, which prompt us to do the one and avoid the other. But, if our knowledge of objects, whether intellectually or morally discerned, were not accompanied by some degree of feeling, it would lead to no purpose nor action, and we should remain indifferent and inactive. "In the constitution of the human mind," says Mr. Upham (*On the Will*, pt. i. ch. i. sect. 16), "the Sensibilities, which are as different from the Will as from the Understanding, are located between the two. They form the connecting link which binds them together. Strike out the Sensibilities, therefore, and you necessarily excavate a gulf of separation between the Intellect and the Will, which is for ever impassable. There is, from that moment, no medium of communication, no bond of union, no reciprocal action."

"Without some kind or another of complacency with an object there could be no tendency, no protension of the mind to attain this object as an end; and we could therefore determine ourselves to no overt action. The mere cognition leaves us cold and unexcited; the awakened feeling infuses warmth and life into us and our action; it supplies action with an interest, and, without an

interest, there is for us no voluntary action possible. Without the intervention of feeling, the cognition stands divorced from the co-nation; and apart from feeling, all conscious endeavours after anything would be altogether incomprehensible." (Biunde, *quoted by* Sir W. Hamilton, *Lect.* 41.)

On the question, whether the connection between the Intellect and the Will be direct or indirect, Mr. Locke has told us (*Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book i. ch. 21, sect. 35 and 46) that he changed his opinion, and, "upon stricter inquiry was forced to conclude, that good, the greater good, *though apprehended and acknowledged to be so*, does not determine the Will, until our *desire*, raised proportionally to it, *makes us uneasy in the want of it*." The opinion which he rejected, viz., "that the greater good determines the Will," implies that there is a direct connection between the dictate of the Understanding and the determination of the Will. Yet this opinion, as held and explained by Edwards, is not contrary to that which was ultimately acquiesced in by Locke. Edwards maintained that "the will always is as the greatest apparent good." "But then," said he (*Inquiry*, pt. i. sect. 2), "it must be observed in what sense I use the term *good*; namely, as of the same import with *agreeable*. To appear good to the mind, as I use the phrase, is the same as to appear agreeable or seem pleasing to the mind." But, by using the term *good* in the sense of *agreeable*, Edwards has admitted that both the Understanding and the Sensitivity must be addressed before the Will is moved—that an object or action must not only be apprehended or known, but that some form or degree of feeling must be awakened, before we determine to seek or shun it, to do it or not to do it.

Other writers have expressed themselves in a way which may be interpreted to mean, that there is a direct communication between the Understanding and the Will, and that what is approved of by the one is immediately embraced by the other. (See Dr. Turnbull, *Christ. Phil.*, p. 196; Dr. Whitby, *Discourse on the Five Points*, second edition, p. 211.) But there is an intermediate step, which, though it follows naturally on the first, should not be omitted in a psychological account of the process. It seems to be the following:—Some object, action, or event, is known or contemplated by the Intellect, the Sensitivity is suitably affected by the contemplation, and some form or degree of Desire is awakened, under the influence of which the Will is inclined or determined to seek or to shun it. When the object presented to our contemplation is adapted

to some natural appetite or passion, the desire awakened may be vivid and strong, and we may be quite sensible of its influence upon the determination of the Will. When Conscience is appealed to, and we see clearly that a particular action or a particular course of conduct is our duty, the sense of obligation may be lively, and our moral feelings may urgently influence our purpose. In other cases, when the object presented does not address any natural appetite or passion, or when the action contemplated does not touch very sensibly our moral feelings, it may seem that the Will is moved solely and directly by the dictate of the Understanding. The object may be indifferent, and not fitted to affect us with pleasure or pain, or the action may be one of ordinary prudence or of common honesty, about which there is no difficulty in deciding, and little or no temptation to decide wrong. Custom or familiarity, too, may lend its influence to make objects indifferent or actions easy. Yet still it must be admitted, that before we determine to seek or to shun any object, some form or degree of feeling in reference to it must be more or less sensibly experienced. If we were utterly incapable of feeling pleasure or pain, appetite or aversion, we could neither form a resolution nor carry it into effect; but would sit still in indolent contemplation. Now, appetite and aversion— inclination to or from an act or an object—belong to the Sensitivity, not to the Understanding. The one dictates or judges, the other feels or desires. And, regarding the mind as a constitution or economy, it may be said that Feeling or Desire comes after the dictate of the Understanding, but goes before the determination of the Will.

SECTION II.—*Of the Will in relation to the Sensitivity.*

Sensitivity is a general term, including every kind or degree of feeling of which the mind is susceptible. And the inquiry now is concerning the relation which subsists between the Sensitivity and the Will. According to Mr. Upham (*On the Will*, pt. i. ch. 3), this relation may be regarded as twofold; and the Will may be influenced by feelings of Desire and by feelings of Obligation. Objects fitted to give us pleasure or pain excite in us Desires to obtain or to avoid them; and, under the influence of these Desires, the Will may be moved to put forth a volition in one way rather than in any other. Actions which we contemplate as Right or Wrong awaken emotions of approval or of disapproval—these emotions are followed by feelings

of obligation ; and, under the influence of these feelings, the Will may be moved to embrace what is right and avoid what is wrong. So that, according to this view, the Will may be said to be in contact with the Sensitivity at two points ; and may be approached and influenced through our Natural Desires and through our Moral Feelings. Our Natural Desires are such as are connected with Instinct, Appetite, Affection, and Passion. Our feelings of Obligation are connected with the exercise of Conscience, and arise from the recognition of the difference between Right and Wrong. The former have reference to what is physically good or agreeable, the latter to what is morally right and binding ; and both come into immediate contact with the Will, and may have an influence upon its exercise.

These views are in accordance with Mr. Upham's classification of Motives as Natural and Moral. They are well founded so far as they go. But they do not allow proper place or prominence to a sense of Prudence, a form of feeling which exercises a powerful influence over human conduct. A sense of Prudence is different from a sense of Duty, and cannot be called a purely moral feeling. Neither can it be called a Desire. It holds partly of the Reason and partly of the Conscience. According to Bishop Butler, Prudence partakes of the nature of virtue. And a regard to our good upon the whole is a sentiment—that is, a feeling founded upon a judgment—which operates in the same way upon the Will as a regard to what is right. A sense of Prudence and a sense of Duty influence the mind in the way of conviction and suasion, while feelings of Desire influence it in the way of impulse. So that, while the Sensitivity in all its modifications is in immediate contact with the will, the nature and amount of the influence which feelings have, or ought to have, should be determined by the nature and origin of the feelings. Those which spring from Appetite and Passion are urgent and importunate in their solicitations ; but they do not carry authority with them. We may yield to them ; but when we do so, it is not with any acknowledgment of their right to bear the sway over us. And when we resist and overcome their impetuosity, so far from feeling any disquiet, we are filled with complacency. It is quite otherwise with feelings that are founded on conclusions of the Reason or commands of the Conscience. They may be said to speak with demonstration of the Spirit and with power. They carry the warrant for our obedience with them. It is true we may refuse to yield to their influence ; but, when we do so, the result is far different from what

we experience when we resist our feelings of natural Desire. Instead of complacency or triumph we are filled with regret and dismay. Reason condemns our imprudence, and Conscience, instead of cowering under the opposition that has been made to her authority, rises in all her strength to avenge the insult; and we are made to see and feel, in bitterness of soul, that while we have done foolishly and wrong, we ought to have done wisely and right.

But granting this difference in authority between the feelings which accompany the impulse of natural Desire, and those which flow from convictions of the Reason and commands of the Conscience, is there not something in common to both these classes of feelings? or rather does not the experience of these feelings issue in a state of mind which in both cases may be characterised as very much the same?

Now, Mr. Locke has maintained (*Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book ii. ch. 21, sect. 31-40), "that our Desires and Passions are accompanied by uneasiness, and that it is this uneasiness which moves the will and leads to action." Mr. Locke has not extended this remark to the feelings which are included in a sense of Prudence and a sense of Duty. But he might have done so. When Reason points to a course of conduct as prudent and advantageous, we are uneasy till we have entered upon it; and when Conscience tells us that some action is clearly and imperatively binding upon us, we are not at ease till we have done it. In acting from a sense of Prudence or from a sense of Duty, we are obeying higher principles of our nature than when we gratify some natural appetite or passion. But there is this general resemblance in the state of the mind antecedent to our obeying the one or gratifying the other, that in both cases it may be described as a state of uneasiness. It is to obtain relief from this uneasiness that we are prompted to act.

These remarks may be sufficient to show the relation in which the Will stands to our other faculties. The Intellect furnishes it with objects; for there can be no volition or choice without objects between which to choose. These objects, when contemplated by the Intellect, affect the Sensitivity and awaken feelings corresponding to their nature and to our conceptions of them. The feelings which are thus awakened are reducible to two great classes—which may be designated *Impulsive* and *Suasive*. Under the influence of both classes of feelings the mind is in a state of uneasiness, and the Will is called into activity to remove that uneasiness, and to produce

a change of state, by gratifying some natural Desire, or by following some dictate of Prudence, or obeying some command of Conscience. And the inquiry next to be made is, In what sense and to what extent are men free to do so?

CHAPTER VII.

OF LIBERTY AND NECESSITY.

AMONG philosophers some predicate Liberty or Necessity of man, as a moral agent, while others predicate Liberty or Necessity of the Will, as a power or faculty of his mind.

Locke, in conformity to what had previously been noted by Hobbes, has said (*Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book ii. ch. 21), that, "Liberty, which is but a power, belongs only to agents, and cannot be an attribute or modification of the Will; which is also but a power."¹ To the same effect Edwards has said (*Inquiry*, pt. i. sect. 5), "To be free is the property of an agent who is possessed of powers and faculties, as much as to be cunning, valiant, bountiful, or zealous. But these qualities are the properties of men or persons, and not the properties of properties." On this point Dr. Reid agrees with the preceding writers, and attributes the power over the determinations of the Will to the moral agent. Mr. Stewart has acquiesced in the propriety of doing so (*Act. and Mor. Pow.*, Append. p. 474). And a later writer ascribes the determinative power to the personality of the agent, or to the fact that he possesses a spontaneity of action, (Morell, *Hist. of Mod. Phil.* vol. i. pp. 482, 483.)

On the other hand, many modern philosophers continue to predicate liberty or freedom of the Will. (See *Cousin, Jouffroy, Garnier, &c.*) According to them, the other faculties of the human mind are subject to the law of necessity; but the essential characteristic of the Will is to be free. The Judgment must pronounce in accordance with the evidence which is presented to it; and we cannot say that is true which we see to be false. The Sensitivity is affected according to the nature or qualities of the objects which impress it; and

¹ By scholastic divines it was disputed whether Liberty is an *Act* or a *Habit* or a *Power*. It is enumerated as a mental power or faculty co-ordinate with Intellect, Sensitivity and Will, by *Bouvier*. (*Inst. Phil.*, para. iii. cap. 1, 12mo., Paris, 1850.)

we cannot feel pleasure when that which is fitted to give pain is inflicted. But Volition implies election or choice—that is, the presentation of two or more objects or ends, with power to choose one and reject the others. Liberty is therefore essential to the existence and exercise of Will; and a Will not free is a contradiction in terms. We may be compelled to *do* what we do not *will*; but to *will* what we *do not will* is impossible.

But although the Will, considered as a faculty, may not be subject to that law of necessity in accordance with which it is alleged that our other faculties operate, it may yet have a law of its own. It requires objects upon which to be exercised, and the knowledge of these objects is furnished by the Intellect. It requires motives before it can have a volition in one way rather than in another; and motives, in so far as they can be said to influence the Will, are forms or affections of the Sensibility. The Will does not operate singly and independently. It is conditioned in its exercise by its connection with other faculties; and to understand the nature or amount of any liberty which may be ascribed to it, we must know the result of that connection. In a moral action the whole man is concerned, and not merely a single power or faculty. And although it may be proper to distinguish between the several powers or faculties of the human mind, and to mark how, and how far, they contribute and concur to action; yet, when that action is regarded as right or wrong, as deserving of praise or blame, reward or punishment, it is regarded as the work of an intelligent and responsible agent—that is, of an agent who not only *wills* or determines to act, but who *knows* and understands the end of the action, and who *feels* and estimates the influence and authority of the motives in accordance with which he wills and determines to act. On the whole, therefore, it seems more correct to attribute Liberty or Necessity to a moral action or to a moral agent, than to the particular power or faculty which is in exercise immediately antecedent to the performance of the action.

It has been common to distinguish Liberty into *Freedom from Co-action*, and *Freedom from Necessity*.

Freedom from Co-action implies, on the one hand, the absence of all impediment or restraint, and, on the other hand, the absence of all compulsion or violence. If we are prevented from doing what is in our power, when we desire and will to do it, or if we are compelled to do it, when we desire and will not to do it, we are not free from

Co-action. This general explanation of Freedom agrees equally with *bodily* freedom, *mental* freedom, and *moral* freedom. Indeed, although it is common to make a distinction between these, there is no difference, except what is denoted by the different epithets introduced. We have *bodily* freedom when our body is not subjected to restraint or compulsion—*mental* freedom when no impediment or violence prevents us from duly exercising our powers of mind—and *moral* freedom when our moral principles and feelings are allowed to operate within the sphere which has been assigned to them. Now, it is with freedom regarded as *moral* that we have here to do: it is with freedom as the attribute of a being who possesses a moral nature, and who exerts the active power which belongs to him, in the light of reason and under a sense of responsibility. Liberty of this kind is called *Freedom from Necessity*.

Freedom from Necessity is also called *Liberty of Election*, or power to choose, and implies freedom from anything invincibly determining a moral agent. It has been distinguished into *Liberty of Contrariety*, or the power of determining to do either of two actions which are contrary, as right or wrong, good or evil; and *Liberty of Contradiction*, or the power of determining to do either of two actions which are contradictory, as to walk or to sit still, to walk in one direction or in another.

Freedom from Necessity is sometimes also called *Liberty of Indifference*, because, before he makes his election, the agent has not determined in favour of one action more than another. *Liberty of Indifference*, however, does not mean, as some would have it, liberty of equilibrium, or that the agent has no more inclination towards one action or one mode of action than towards another; for although he may have motives prompting more urgently to one action or course of action, he still has *Liberty of Election*, if he has the power of determining in favour of another action or another course of action. Still less can the phrase *Liberty of Indifference* be understood as denoting a power to determine in opposition to all motives, or in absence of any motive. A being with *Liberty of Indifference*, in the former of these senses, would not be a reasonable being; and an action done without a motive is an action done without an end in view, that is, without intention or design, and, in that respect, could not be called a moral action, though done by a moral agent. *Liberty of Indetermination* would be a more correct phrase than *Liberty of*

A difference, however, has been taken between the absolute necessity with which the effect follows from the operation of its physical cause and the infallible certainty with which an action follows from the influence of motives upon a moral agent. In the one case, the cause is blind, and operates in accordance with the laws of matter. In the other case, the influence is moral, and is brought to bear upon the mind. The result in the one case is fatal Necessity, while in the other it is a rational Determinism. Now, the law in accordance with which mind and matter manifest their phenomena may be one and the same. Or mind and matter may manifest their phenomena according to different laws. If so, then man, as consisting of soul and body, may be subject to the laws of both, or to a law resulting from both. The question is, What is the law of moral agency? Is it to be called the law of Liberty or the law of Necessity?

CHAPTER VIII.

OF MORAL AGENCY.

In a moral agent, the exercise of active power may be *Spontaneous*, *Volitional*, and *Free*, or *not Free*—that is, *Necessary*.

1. Those operations of mind which go on in the train of thought, without effort or attention, and sometimes without distinct consciousness, may be called *Spontaneous*. The train of thought springs naturally from the activity of the mind, as the circulation of the blood from the principle of life. The train of thought, however, can be checked or changed—attention can be directed towards it—and one thought or class of thoughts can be detained and cherished, while another thought or class of thoughts may be disregarded or dismissed. In such cases the exercise of active power by the agent may be called—

2. *Volitional*—meaning simply that the power which the agent has, or is thought to have, over the operations of his mind, has been exercised in consequence of a volition or determination to do so. But, in calling it *volitional*, this exercise of activity is characterized as the result neither of Liberty nor of Necessity, but only of Will, or of the faculty of determining.

3. Let it be supposed, however, that before this volition was framed, there had been deliberation, and doubt, and difficulty, in the mind of the agent. He may have been pleased with the previous current of his thoughts, and desirous that they should continue to run on in the same channel; while Reason and Conscience may have suggested that it would be wiser and better to have the current of his thoughts changed. In such circumstances, can the agent exert the active power which belongs to him, by determining either to yield to his inclinations or to obey the dictates of Reason and Conscience? By some it is contended that the agent will be determined according as his love of ease and pleasure, or his sense of prudence and of duty may be most powerful. By others it is contended that the power of determining rests with the agent himself—that he may determine in accordance with either, and that, when he determines in accordance with the one, he knows and feels that he might determine in accordance with the other. By both parties the determination may be called *Volitional*—because Will is the faculty by which an agent determines. But by one party, the agent is regarded as determining *necessarily*, because he could only determine in accordance with the one class of motives which was the strongest, and in accordance with which he did determine. By the other party, the agent is regarded as determining *freely*, because, while he determined in accordance with one class of motives, he might have determined in accordance with the other.

The introduction of some such epithet as *Volitional*, *Volitive*, or *Intentional*, may prevent, what has been common, the confounding what is *Voluntary* with what is *Free*—a confusion which obscures or rather obliterates the point in dispute. Bossuet has remarked (*Traité du libre Arbitre*) that “we often take *Freedom* and *Will*, *Voluntary* and *Free*, to mean the same thing. *Libere*, from which comes *Libertas*, seems to mean the same as *Velle*, from which comes *Voluntas*; and we may in this way confound *Freedom* and *Will*—what we do *libentissime* with what we do *liberrime*.² Now, an action to be called *Free* must be done voluntarily; but every action done voluntarily cannot be called *Free*. An action may be known as to its character and consequences—may be more or less deliberated

* Gassendi also took a distinction between *volentia* and *voluntas*, between *libentia* and *libertas* (*Discourse of Liberty*, by M. de Bernier, p. 377). *Voluntary* is

not opposed to *Necessary*, but to *Involuntary*. (LEIBNITZ, *Nouveaux Essais*, livre ii. sect. xi.)

about, and at length determined upon; and because, when done, it is done in accordance with the determination of the agent, it may be called Voluntary or Volitional. But it cannot be called a free action, unless the agent, at the time when he determined to do it, had power to determine not to do it. After he had determined to do the action, the doing of it, if he was free from *co-action*, would follow as a matter of course. But the question is, was he free from *necessity*? When he determined to do the action, had he power to have determined not to do it? They who maintain that man is a Free agent say he had; they who maintain that man is a Necessary agent say he had not.

"By the Liberty of a Moral agent," said Dr. Reid (*Act. Pow.*, Essay iv. ch. 1), "I understand a power over the determinations of his own will. If in any action he had power to will what he did, or not to will it, in that action he is free. But if, in every voluntary action, the determination of his will be the necessary consequence of something involuntary in the state of his mind, or of something in his external circumstances, he is not free; he has not what I call the Liberty of a Moral agent, but is subject to necessity."

According to Hobbes, a Free agent is "one that can do if he will, and forbear if he will." And Edwards has said (*Inquiry respecting Freedom of Will*, pt. i. sect. 5), "power and opportunity for one to do and conduct as he will, or according to his choice, is all that is meant by Liberty; without taking into the meaning of the word anything of the cause or original of that choice, or at all considering how the person came to have such a volition, whether it was caused by some external motive or habitual internal bias; whether it was determined by some internal antecedent volition, or whether it happened without a cause; whether it was necessarily connected with something foregoing, or not connected. Let the person come by his volition or choice how he will, yet if he is able, and there is nothing in the way, to hinder his pursuing and executing his will, the man is fully and perfectly free, according to the primary notion of freedom."

Without descending to any differences between the several theories as to Liberty and Necessity, or in the mode of expressing them, the point in question may be stated, with sufficient precision, thus:— Whether the same agent, in the same circumstances, can only frame one and the same volition, and follow one and the same course of conduct; or whether he may frame a different volition, and follow a

different course of conduct? And this statement may be made more plain by putting a case in illustration.

Macbeth murdered King Duncan.

They who maintain that man is a Free agent maintain, that the determination or exercise of Will which preceded this act was not the necessary nor inevitable consequence of anything involuntary in the state of mind, or in the external circumstances of the agent; but that, the state of mind and circumstances antecedent being the same, he had power to have framed a contrary volition, and, instead of embruing his hands in the blood of his sovereign, to have preserved untainted his loyalty and innocence.

They who maintain that man is a Necessary agent, while they denominate the act of murder a free act, as it was done in consequence of a volition or exercise of will, maintain that this particular volition was the necessary result of the mental state of the agent, and of the motives which influenced him; and that, with his ambitious views and weak principles, Macbeth could have framed no volition, and followed no course of conduct, but that which issued in the murder of King Duncan. The action may be called free, in so far as it was voluntary; but the agent was a necessary agent, because guided and influenced by views and feelings which he could not counteract nor resist.

CHAPTER IX.

ARGUMENTS FOR LIBERTY.

THE chief arguments adduced to prove that man is endowed with moral Liberty are the following:—

I. “We have, by our constitution, a natural conviction or belief that we act freely—a conviction so early, so universal, and so necessary in most of our rational operations, that it must be the result of our constitution, and the work of Him that made us.”

“We have, in truth, the same constant and necessary consciousness of liberty that we have that we think, choose, will, or even exist; and whatever to the contrary any persons may say, it is impossible for them in earnest to think they have no active, self-moving powers, and

are not the causes of *their own* volitions, or not to ascribe to *themselves* what they must be conscious *they* think and do."—Price, *Review*, pp. 306-7; Descartes, *Prin. Phil.*, pars i. sect. 29; Dugald Stewart, *Works*, vol. vi. p. 40.

This argument has been called the argument from Consciousness; and some have expressed themselves in reference to it as if Consciousness testified directly to the fact that we are Free agents. But Dr. Reid, in whose words the argument is stated above, did not so regard it. He has said (*Act. Pow.*, Essay i. ch. 1), "We have very early, from our constitution, a conviction or belief of some active power in ourselves. This belief, however, is not Consciousness, for we may be deceived in it; but the testimony of Consciousness can never deceive. Thus, a man who is struck with a palsy in the night commonly knows not that he has lost the power of speech till he attempts to speak: he knows not whether he can move his hands and arms till he makes the trial; and if, without making trial, he consults his Consciousness ever so attentively,¹ it will give him no information whether he has lost these powers or still retains them.

But, although Consciousness may not testify directly to the fact that we are Free agents, it furnishes evidence in support of that fact. So clear and strong is this evidence that the conviction of being free has been regarded as one of the *communes notitiae*, or universal beliefs, which are naturally embraced by the human mind. Buffier (*Of First Truths*, pt. i. ch. 7, nos. 59, 60, 61, 62) has set down the proposition, *That man is truly free* as a first truth—a common sentiment—resting on the common sense of mankind. Dr. Reid has put our natural conviction of Free agency on the same ground of evidence "as our belief of the existence of a material world; our belief that those we converse with are living and intelligent beings; our belief that those things did really happen which we distinctly remember; and our belief that we continue the same identical persons," (*Act. Pow.*, Essay 4, ch. 6). Dr. Samuel Clarke (*Reply to Collins*) has remarked, "That all our actions do now in experience *seem* to us to be *free*, exactly in the same manner as they would do upon the supposition of our being really Free agents. And though this alone does not amount to a strict demonstration of our being free, yet it leaves on the other side of the question nothing

¹ A man cannot be conscious of acting | acting, may he not be conscious of freely freely "without making trial." But before | determining to act?

but a *bare possibility* of our being so framed by the Author of nature as to be unavoidably deceived in this matter, by every experience and every action we perform. The case is exactly the same" (continues Dr. Clarke) "as in that notable question, Whether the world exist or no? There is no demonstration of it from experience. There always remains a *bare possibility* that the Supreme Being may have so framed my mind as that I shall always necessarily be deceived in every one of my perceptions as in a dream, though possibly there be *no material world*, nor any other creature whatsoever existing besides myself. Of this, I say, there always remains a bare possibility; and yet no man in his senses argues from thence, that experience is no proof to us of the *existence of things*."

D'Alembert has made a similar comparison, and has said (*Mélanges*, tom. iv. no. 7) that "the only proof of which this truth [of free agency] admits is analogous to that of the existence of external objects." "Beings really free could not have a more lively feeling of their freedom than that which we have of ours. We ought, therefore, to believe that we are free."

The testimony of Consciousness may be examined at three different stages. 1. Before we enter upon an action or course of conduct; 2. While we are performing an action, or following out a course of conduct; and, 3. After we have completed the one or the other. And it is argued, that, at all these different stages, the testimony of Consciousness is in favour of the conviction or belief that we are free.

To use the words of Bishop Butler (*Analogy*, pt. i. ch. 6), "It may justly be concluded, that since the whole process of action, through every step of it, suspense, deliberation, inclining one way, determining, and at last doing as we determine, is as if we were free; *therefore we are so*." Even Kant has said, "Whatever individual cannot, from the constitution of his nature, but act *under the idea of freedom*, is, on that very account, in a practical relation free."

This reasoning has been challenged and redargued in more ways than one.

Spinoza (*Ethic.*, pars i., Append., p. 34) contended "that the ground on which men think themselves to be free, is, that they are conscious of their desires and volitions, but ignorant of the causes predisposing them to desire and will." In another passage (*Ethic.*,

pars ii. p. 73) he has said, "Men are deceived in thinking themselves free—a belief which rests only on this, that, while they are conscious of their actions, they are ignorant of the causes by which they are determined." See also p. 99, and *Epist.*, no. 62, p. 58, where he has said, "that a drunk man believes that he utters freely things which, when sober, he kept secret."

To the same purpose Leibnitz has said (*Opera*, tom. i. p. 155), "The argument of Descartes to prove the independence of our free actions drawn from an alleged lively internal feeling of it, has no force. We are not properly conscious of our independence, nor do we always perceive the reasons of our choice, as they sometimes are incognizable. It is as if the magnetic needle² should exult in pointing to the pole; and should think that it did so independently of any cause, as it did not perceive the insensible movements of the magnetic fluid."

Lord Kames, on the ground of the principle of causality, adopted the doctrine of necessity; yet he admitted that we have a natural conviction or belief that we act freely. "Though man in truth is a necessary agent; yet, this being concealed from him, he acts with the conviction of being a free agent." The conviction or belief is not founded on the truth and reality of things, but it is given for wise and good ends. "It appears most fit and wise that we should be endued with a sense of liberty; without which man must have been ill qualified for acting his present part. That artificial light, in which the feeling of liberty presents the moral world to our view, answers all the good purposes of making the actions of man entirely dependent upon himself. His happiness and misery *appear* to be in his own power. He *appears* praiseworthy or culpable, according as he improves or neglects his rational faculties. The idea of his being an accountable creature arises. Reward *seems* due to merit; punishment to crimes. He feels the force of moral obligation. In short, new passions arise, and a variety of new springs are set in motion, to make way for new exertions of reason and activity: in all which, though man is *really actuated by laws of necessary influence*, yet he *seems to move himself*; and whilst the universal system is gradually carried on to perfection by the first mover, that powerful hand which winds up and directs the great machine is never brought

² Bayle had previously given the illustration of a conscious weathercock; and Spinoza that of a stone acquiring con-

sciousness, as it was moving, in consequence of motion having been communicated to it.

into sight."—*Essays on Morality and Religion*, first edit., Edin., 1751, p. 206.

If this view of our nature and condition were correct, well might we exclaim with the poet,—

"Free will is but necessity in play,
The clattering of the golden reins which guide
The thunder-footed coursers of the sun ;
And thus with man,
To God he is but working out his will."—BAILEY.

But, if it be admitted that we have a natural conviction or belief that we act freely, it is difficult to see why this conviction or belief must give way to another natural conviction or belief resting upon the same ground. The belief that every change implies the operation of a cause, which is the foundation of the doctrine of necessity, is of no higher origin nor authority than the belief that we act freely. They both rest upon the common sense of mankind. In some aspects they may seem to be incompatible; and it may be difficult or impossible for us to reconcile them with each other, in all their bearings; but that is not a sufficient reason to make the one displace the other. Besides, if the evidence of consciousness in favour of one truth is to be distrusted or disallowed, it may also be fallacious in respect of other truths, or of all truth, and the constitution of human nature thus be turned into a lie, the author of that nature represented as deceiving his creatures, and all human knowledge rendered impossible.

"I claim for the mind," says Dr. McCosh (*Intuitions of the Mind*, 8vo. 1860, p. 308), "a power to choose, and when it chooses, a consciousness that it might choose otherwise. This truth is revealed to us by immediate consciousness, and is not to be set aside by any other truth whatever. It is a first truth, equal to the highest, to no one of which will it ever yield. It cannot be set aside by any other truth whatever, nor even by any other first truth, and certainly by no derived truth. Whatever other proposition is true, this is true also, that man's will is free. If there be any other truth apparently inconsistent with it, care must be taken so to express it that it may not be truly contradictory."

"The freedom of the will is so far from being, as it is generally considered, a controvertible question of philosophy, that it is the fundamental postulate, without which all action and all speculation, philosophy in all its branches, and human consciousness itself, would

be impossible. . . . It is as certain, from the testimony of consciousness, that we are free agents, as that our ideas occur in succession one after another. . . . Two alternative motives are manifested in consciousness as both influencing, but neither compelling; and the freedom of the will consists, not in being absolutely uninfluenced, but in the power of determining which of the two influences shall prevail. . . . But if we are conscious that we are free, we are free in reality; for as regards the personal self, consciousness *is* reality." (Mansel, *Metaphysics*, p. 363.)

Dr. Hartley has denied that any evidence, true or fallacious, in favour of free agency, can be derived from internal feeling or consciousness; or, rather, he has asserted that the evidence from this source is in favour of necessity. "To prove that a man has free will in the sense opposite to mechanism (*i. e.* necessity), he ought to feel that he can do different things while the motives remain the same. And here, I apprehend, the internal feelings are *entirely against free will*, when the motives are of a sufficient magnitude to be evident. When they are not, nothing can be proved." (*On Man*, vol. i. p. 507.)

Mr. Belsham has said (*Elem. of Mor. Phil.*, p. 278), "The pretended consciousness of free will amounts to nothing more than forgetfulness of the motive." Dr. Priestley has expressed himself to the same effect (*Illust. of Phil. Necessity*, p. 99), "A man when he reproaches himself for any *particular action* in his past conduct, may fancy that if he was in the same situation again, he would have acted differently. But this is a mere *deception*; and if he examines himself *strictly*, and takes in all circumstances, he may be satisfied that, with the *same inward disposition of mind*, and with precisely the *same views of things* that he had then, and exclusive of all others that he has acquired by reflection *since*, he could not have acted otherwise than he did."

But the conviction or belief that we might have acted differently is not confined to the time when we are reproaching ourselves for any particular action. We had the same conviction or belief when we were meditating or performing the action. It is this fact which leads us afterwards to reproach ourselves, and not our self-reproach that gives birth to the fancy that we might have acted differently. And as for the assertion, that "if a man examines himself *strictly*, and takes in all circumstances, he may be satisfied that, with the *same inward disposition of mind*, he could not have acted otherwise

than he did"—it is either an assertion at variance with the testimony of consciousness; or it amounts merely to an identical proposition. For, if among the circumstances previous to action the volition be included, this is just saying that, the volition being the same, the action will be the same.

But is the evidence of Consciousness clear and uniform in favour of free agency? Or are there not cases in which we may feel and say that we were under a necessity to will and act as we have done?

But these cases, so far from weakening the evidence in favour of free agency will be found, it is said, to confirm it. "We call a man a free agent," said Dr. Reid (*ut supra*), "in the same way as we call him a reasonable agent. In many things he is not guided by reason, but by principles similar to those of the brutes. His reason is weak at best. It is liable to be impaired or lost by his own fault, or by other means. In like manner he may be a free agent, though his freedom of action may have many similar limitations."

Some of these limitations may here be noted.

1. Free agency is not fully developed nor enjoyed till a man's powers of body and of mind have attained to full maturity and exercise.
2. Free agency is liable to be impaired or lost by disease of body or derangement of mind.
3. Free agency may be impaired or lost by the inveterate power of Habit.
4. Free agency may be abridged or overborne by the force of circumstances.

Lastly. Free agency in man is limited in its nature, and may be over-ruled in its exercise by the will and power of God.

These limitations, it is thought, are in no way incompatible with Liberty, but quite irreconcilable with Necessity. A free agent may act more or less freely at one period of life than at another—in one state of health than in another—in some actions than in others—and in some situations and circumstances than in others. Some actions may be easy to him and others may be difficult; and on the ground of these differences he blames or praises himself and others. All which proceeds on the conviction or belief that he and others are free agents, although free agency has its conditions and limitations.

Another argument in favour of Free agency has been thus stated by Dr. Reid. (*Act. Pow.*, Essay iv. ch. viii.)

II. "That man has power over his own actions and volitions appears, because he is capable of carrying on, wisely and prudently, a system of conduct which he has before conceived in his mind and resolved to prosecute."

Before any one who may have it in his power to choose his path or profession in life, does so, he considers, among several which may be open to him, which is most suited to his abilities and most congenial to his disposition and habits. Having fixed upon it, he determines to devote himself to the prosecution of it with steadfast perseverance, and to allow nothing to divert him from the attainment of that happiness and respectability to which it promises to lead. It is true, that, in many cases, in which purposes of this kind have been formed, they have not been kept; but it is equally true, that, in as many more cases, they have been kept; and both classes of cases, it is argued, go to prove the doctrine of free agency. In those cases in which the resolution to follow a particular profession or course of life has not been kept, the parties making it have not made it with sufficient foresight and firmness, but have allowed themselves to be surprised and disappointed by difficulties, which they might have provided against, and have yielded to the solicitations of indolence or amusement, which they might have withheld. In those cases, again, where the original choice has been adhered to, that choice has been made with discretion and fortitude, difficulties have been anticipated and prepared for, temptations have been resisted and overcome, the mind has been kept in activity and exercise by the energy of the will, and perseverance has been rewarded by increasing happiness and success, and stimulated to higher exertions and nobler rewards. In short, the failure to follow out a deliberately formed purpose proceeds not from want of power, but from want of steadiness; and the following out of such a purpose shows that nothing which is within the reach of human power can be ultimately withheld from strenuous and persevering exertion. The thousands who have wisely formed and steadily kept their aim through life are so many witnesses to prove that man is not the passive subject of some dark and invincible necessity, but that his happiness and misery are in his own hand, and that he has not only understanding to discern between good and evil, but liberty to choose, and power to adhere to that choice, till it be carried out to its final and happy accomplishment.

Should it be said that the original purpose and the subsequent

adherence to it are the result of motives, and may therefore be called necessary; it is replied, that the framing of the purpose and the prosecution of it are carried forward in the presence of motives; for we are speaking of the conduct of an intelligent and reasonable being. Man does not resolve nor act without motives; but motives cannot act of themselves. They have no existence out of the mind of an agent. He weighs and considers them, and then determines, not in blind submission to the greater strength of this motive or of that motive, but from a conjunct view of all the circumstances of the case; and, having determined, he proceeds to select and employ the means to carry his determination into effect; thus proving that what he had firmness and wisdom to resolve upon, he has power and liberty to accomplish.

"If a lucky concourse of motives," said Dr. Reid, "could produce the conduct of an Alexander or a Julius Cæsar, no reason can be given why a lucky concourse of atoms might not produce the planetary system. If, therefore, wise conduct in a man demonstrates that he has some degree of wisdom, it demonstrates with equal force and evidence that he has some degree of power over his own determinations."

In short, as the framing of a plan implies an intelligent agent, so the carrying of it into effect implies an agent who is free—that is, who has some degree of power over his voluntary determinations. "Motives have not understanding to conceive a plan and intend its execution. We must, therefore, go back beyond motives, to some intelligent being who had the power of arranging these motives and applying them in their proper order and season, so as to bring about the end." And this intelligent being, it is contended, is the agent himself.

This argument in favour of free agency, and the argument *à posteriori*, in proof of the being and perfections of God, rest on the same ground. "The works of human art, proving man to be possessed of voluntary intelligence and active power, form the basis of the great argument, that the marks of design and power in nature prove it to be the work of an intelligent and all-powerful agent; but where is the legitimacy or force of this argument, if all causative or originating energy is denied to created mind? If human skill be no cause in the mechanism of a watch, how shall it be proved that Divine skill is any in the mechanism of a world? It will be said, this skill is not a result of the human will. I answer, it is greatly

so, inasmuch as it is the result of the voluntary, resolute, and protracted application of the human faculties." (M'Combie, *On Moral Agency*, 12mo., Lond. 1842, pp. 34, 35; Green, *Mental Dynamics*,

But the great argument in favour of free agency in man is founded on the fact,

III. That he is a moral and accountable being.

That there is a real and unalterable distinction between right and wrong—that we are under obligation to do the one and to avoid the other—and that we are liable to be called to account by our own minds, in the first instance, and by our Supreme Governor and Judge, in the last resort, for the way in which we acknowledge and discharge the obligations under which He has laid us by the constitution of our nature, and by the course of his providence—these are truths which are all but universally acknowledged ; and they afford an obvious and, as some have thought, an invincible argument that man is endowed with moral liberty. (Reid, *Act. Pow.*, Essay iv. ch. 7.)

This argument has been spoken of as a first truth, which all men believe and act upon. "It seems to be regarded by all persons without exception as a dictate of common sense, and as a first principle of our nature, that men are morally accountable, and are the subjects of moral responsibility, in any respect whatever, *only in so far as they possess freedom both of the outward action and of the will.*" (Upham, *On the Will*, sect. 163.)

"It has always been the *general*, and it is evidently the *natural* sense of mankind, that they cannot be accountable for what they have no power to avoid. . . . The whole language of men, all their practical sentiments and schemes, and the whole frame and order of human affairs, are founded upon the notion of liberty, and are utterly inconsistent with the supposition that nothing is made to depend upon ourselves, or that our purposes and determinations are not subjected to our own command, but the result of an invincible natural necessity." (Price, *Review, &c.*, ch. 8.)

In the philosophy of Kant, the same view is differently stated. The argument runs thus:—The Practical Reason (or Conscience) reveals to us the moral law. In doing so, it speaks to us in the categorical imperative—that is, in seeing an action to be right, we feel that we are under obligation to do it. The inference, therefore, is, that we have power and freedom to do it. "If there be obli-

gation laid upon man, he must have power to discharge it. Man would be a monster if he were not free; for he would be, on the one hand, bound to obey a law, and, on the other hand, without power to obey it freely. We may, therefore, according to the rules of the severest logic, reason in this way—Man is under obligation, therefore he is free.” (*Cousin, Sur le Beau, &c., prem. édit.* p. 328.)

“ That no man can be under a moral obligation to do what it is impossible for him to do, or to forbear what it is impossible for him to forbear,” said Dr. Reid, “ is an axiom as self-evident as any in mathematics. It cannot be contradicted without overturning all moral obligation; nor can there be any exception to it when it is rightly understood.”

“ If the things which move the will are not in our power,” says Cicero (*De Fato*, cap. 17), “ then neither our actions nor our volitions are free—then there is no room for praise or blame, for reward or punishment.” But as this conclusion is faulty, it follows that we are free, and things do not follow by necessity or fate.

The strength of this argument is candidly admitted by some of the advocates of Necessity. Lord Kames has said (*Essays on Mor. and Nat. Rel.*, p. 195), “ That the difficulty which this argument presents is great, and never has been surmounted by the advocates for Necessity.”

The argument appears the more clear and strong, the more carefully the elements of our moral nature are examined. The fact that a power has been given to us by which we distinguish between Right and Wrong implies that we have liberty to use it. The same thing is implied in the sense of obligation which accompanies the perception of the distinction between Right and Wrong. The feelings of approbation and disapprobation which we experience in our minds—the sentiments of praise and blame with which we contemplate the character and conduct of our fellow-men—and the ideas of merit and demerit, reward and punishment, which we cannot help entertaining in reference to ourselves and others,—all proceed upon the fact that man has been endowed with some measure of active power and freedom in the use of it.

“ If we adopt the system of necessity,” said Dr. Reid, “ the terms *moral obligation* and *accountableness*, *praise* and *blame*, *merit* and *demerit*, *justice* and *injustice*, *reward* and *punishment*, *wisdom* and *folly*, *virtue* and *vice*, ought to be disused, or to have new meanings given to them, when they are used in religion, in morals, or in civil

government; for upon that system, there can be no such things as they have been always used to signify." (See Hamilton's *Reid*, note, p. 417.)

IV. Human law and government proceed upon the fact that man is a free agent.

Man, as possessing a moral nature, is liable to be called to account by his Maker and by his own mind. But he is also liable to be called to account by the laws and government of civil society; and this liability rests on the ground of his being a free agent.⁸ Man is not only a law to himself, but makes laws for others. Proceeding on the difference between right and wrong, and also on the fact that some actions are beneficial and others hurtful in their consequences, man has made arrangements by which, in so far as his power extends, actions reckoned good are encouraged and protected, while actions reckoned evil are condemned and punished. The same actions may not everywhere have been characterized in the same way. But wherever law and government have been recognized, some things have been prohibited and punished, while other things have been allowed. This, it is argued, proceeds upon the fact that men are free agents—that they believe themselves and others to possess a power to do or not to do—to do this or to do that—to avoid what is prohibited, and to perform what is enjoined. If all human actions are necessary, and cannot be otherwise than they are, then, all attempts to regulate and restrain them would be useless, and law and government would give place to the stern dominion of an unalterable destiny. Yet from the beginning of the world to the present hour, men have acted on the belief that they can regulate their own individual conduct, and have endeavoured to regulate the conduct of one another by law and government. The different results which have flowed from different schemes of human policy, show that the human character is not the fixed and unvarying product of necessity, but the result of knowledge and of free choice, and that when

⁸ "All political discussion, whether speculative or practical, constantly assumes that man is a self-moving agent, that he determines his own will, that he has the power of choosing or rejecting any given course of conduct, and that he is responsible for his own acts. All the proceedings of a government rest upon the same assumption."—CORNWALL LEWIS,

On Politics, ch. 23, sect. 10.—"If nothing be in our power, then our laws are superfluous; but every nation useth some laws naturally, as knowing that they have power to do such things as their laws enjoin."—NEMESIUS, *De Natura Hominitis*. Englished by Geo. Wither, ch. 39, Lond. 1636.

full scope is given to the rational and responsible nature of man, he rises to the true dignity of his being, and rejoices in the liberty wherewith his Creator made him free.

It has also been argued—

V. That the whole business of human life proceeds on the fact that men are free agents.

But as this argument and some others of a like kind have been urged, in terms not widely different, on both sides of the question, it is unnecessary to dwell on them.

CHAPTER X.

ARGUMENTS FOR NECESSITY.

By the advocates of Necessity it is argued—

I. That Liberty, as implying a self-determining power, is inconceivable and absurd.

“Liberty,” say the Necessitarians, “consists only in a power to act as we will; and it is impossible to conceive in any being a greater liberty than this. Hence, it follows that liberty does not extend to the determinations of the will, but only to the actions consequent to its determinations, and depending upon the will. To say that we have power to will such an action, is to say that we may will it if we will. This supposes the will to be determined by a prior will; and for the same reason, that will must be determined by a will prior to it, and so on in an infinite series of wills, which is absurd. To act freely, therefore, can mean nothing more than to act voluntarily; and this is all the Liberty that can be conceived in man or in any being.”

According to this reasoning, Liberty can be predicated only of the actions done in consequence of volitions, and does not extend to the volitions themselves. A free agent is, therefore, defined by Hobbes to be, “he that can do if he will, and forbear if he will.” And this definition has been adopted¹ by Leibnitz, Collins, Edwards

¹ “It is carefully to be remembered,” | b. ii. ch. 21, § 25), “that freedom consists says Mr. Locke (*On Hum. Understand.*, | in the dependence of the existence or non-

(*Inquiry*, pt. i. sect. 5), and the later Necessitarians in general. Any other idea of Liberty is pronounced to be—1. Inconceivable; and 2. Absurd or self-contradictory.

1. Liberty, as denoting “a power to act as we will,” is not the only nor the true and adequate sense of the term. Dr. Reid has mentioned three distinct senses in which it is common to use it. (*Act. Pow.*, Essay iv. ch. 1.) 1. *Physical Liberty*—When we are free from bodily confinement or force, and have “power to act as we will.” 2. *Legal Liberty*—When we are not restrained by the authority of law. 3. *Moral Liberty*—When we are free from necessity, and determine to act in one way or in a different way.

Now, Hobbes and the Necessitarians identify *physical* liberty with *moral* liberty, and maintain that when man is free from bodily confinement or force, and has “power to act as he will,” he has all the freedom that can be conceived of in man or in any being. But he who is under no physical impediment to act may be under the restraints of law, or he may be determined to act by something involuntary in the state of his own mind, and so may not be free. Thus a man is *physically* free to fire off a loaded pistol when the pistol is ready in his hand, the muscles of which will draw the trigger in obedience to his volition. But if the contents of the pistol are to be discharged into the bosom of a fellow-creature, he is not *legally* free to do so; for the law prohibits the taking away the life of another without reason. Should the man be told, however, that unless he takes away the life of another that other will take away his life, then the prohibition of the law is removed; but the man is not *morally* free,—he has no room for choice, and the determination of his will is the necessary consequence of his external circumstances. So that *moral* freedom implies freedom not only from *physical* force, but also from *legal* restraint, and from everything which takes from the agent power to determine on any one of two or more ways of acting.

Such, it is contended by Libertarians, is the true and adequate notion of Liberty, in accordance with which we estimate the character and conduct of moral agents. We praise them highly when they resist strong temptations; but we do not blame them highly

existence of any action upon our volition of it, not on our preference. He that is a prisoner in a room twenty feet square, being at the north side, is at liberty to walk twenty feet southward, because he

can walk or not walk: but is not at liberty to walk twenty feet northward.” This is a definition, says Mr. Solly, which might be expected from a philosophical turn-key.

when they fall under trials which are unusually severe. We condemn the man who tells a deliberate falsehood for a paltry bribe; but we are not so stern in condemning him who reveals a secret to save his life. Why? Because in the one case the man was not assailed by anything which impaired his full freedom of choice; but in the other case the man was so assailed. Constituted as human nature is, a paltry bribe can be easily weighed against the duty of speaking the truth; but the torture of the rack and the fear of death are such violent motives that they may unhinge the mind and impair the exercise of free choice. Therefore it is, that in estimating moral conduct, we take into account the whole circumstances of the case, and see, not only whether the agent is free from bodily impediment and legal restraint, but also from anything or everything that can impair the full exercise of free choice; for liberty would be but a mockery, if, while he was not restrained by the hand of force or the voice of law, the actions of a moral agent should be the necessary consequence of something involuntary in the state of his mind, or of something in his external circumstances.

"Whether this notion of moral liberty be conceivable or not," said Dr. Reid (*Act. Pow.*, Essay iv. ch. 2), "every man must judge for himself. To me there appears no difficulty in conceiving it. I consider the determination of the will as an effect. This effect must have a cause which had power to produce it; and the cause must be either the person himself, whose will it is, or some other being. The first is as easily conceived as the last. If the person was the cause of that determination of his own will, he was free in that action, and it is justly imputed to him, whether it be good or bad. But if another being was the cause of this determination, either by producing it immediately, or by means and instruments under his direction, then the determination is the act and deed of that being, and is solely imputable to him."

In this passage Dr. Reid, like some other advocates of Liberty, has placed the power of determining, not in the Will as a faculty, but in the person as a moral agent. And, that a moral agent should possess such a power, he thought was easily conceivable. He accepted as valid the reasoning of Dr. Samuel Clarke (*Demonst. of the Being, &c.*, prop. ix. and x.), to prove that the Deity is a free agent himself, and that no contradiction is implied in supposing free agency communicated to His creatures. "If he is pleased to communicate to the work of his hands some degree of his wisdom, no reason can

be assigned why he may not communicate some degree of his power as the talent which wisdom is to employ." As to their existence, creatures are dependent; but as to their power of acting, they may be so far independent as to be capable of originating changes in themselves. And that man is an *ἀρχή*, or principle in himself, and is the author and originator of his volitions and actions, is the ground, it is thought, of all moral science.

On the other hand, it is contended that we can frame no notion of absolute commencement or proper origination, and that to predicate such a power of a moral agent is unwarranted. The agent, it is said, determines his volitions, and is, therefore, the free cause of his actions. But it may be asked, what determines the agent to determine his volitions? or is he an undetermined determinant? If he is determined by motives, then he is not free from moral necessity; and if he is self-determined, or determined without motives, then he is not a moral agent, but acting at random.

2. The same or similar difficulty, it is contended, attaches to the self-determining power when it is predicated of the Will. The well-known argument against it by Dr. Jonathan Edwards (*Inquiry*, pt. ii. sect. 1) is to the following effect: "If the will determines itself, it must be by an antecedent volition—that volition again must be determined by another going before it, and so on in an infinite series; otherwise we must come to a first volition, which has not been determined by an antecedent act of will, and therefore is not free. But if this first act of will, which determines the subsequent acts, is not free, none of the subsequent acts can be free."

In this argument it is assumed that, if the will determines itself, it must be by an antecedent volition to do so, because volition is the only act of which the will is capable; and as the will determines the movements of the body by a volition, it must determine itself in the same way. But, in opposition to this, it is contended that the fact that our volitions are followed by certain outward effects does not warrant the conclusion that these volitions are themselves the results of antecedent volitions. Consciousness testifies that before we walk, we determine or put forth a volition to do so. But consciousness does not testify that before we determine to walk, there is an antecedent determination so to determine.² The determination

² Plato in his *Charmides* says: "We have a desire of pleasure—but have we a desire of desire? We have not. We will this and that, but we have not a will to will, a volition of a volition."

or volition to walk is referred at once to the power of willing as its cause. "Will in relation to volition is just what any cause is in relation to its effects. Will causing volitions causes them just as any cause causes its effects. There is no intervention of anything between the cause and effect, between will and volition. A cause producing its phenomena by phenomena is a manifest absurdity. In making the will a self-determiner, we do not imply this absurdity."

—Tappan, *Review of Edwards*, p. 187. (See also Cousin, *Psychology*, ch. 10; Morell, *Hist. of Mod. Phil.*, pt. ii. ch. 4, sect. 1; Cairns *On Moral Freedom*, p. 266.)

It is argued, however, that volition is an effect altogether peculiar. "It implies selection or determination in one direction rather than in another, and therefore, in inquiring after its cause, we inquire not merely after the energy (or faculty) which makes it existent, but also after the cause of its particular determination in one direction rather than in another." Our having volitions may be referred to the Will as a faculty; but the mere possession of such a faculty does not account for our volitions being as they are and not otherwise—being in one direction and not in another.

To this a twofold answer has been given.

1. Every effect is particular. It is one thing and not another. The cause which produces it gives to it its character. The power which produces motion produces it in one particular direction. The faculty which puts forth volition must put it forth in some particular way. Volition has an object, and the volition must either be towards its object or away from it. (Dr. Graves, *Predestination and Necessity*, Appendix, Note 1, p. 150.)

2. Every cause is selective, and in that sense self-determined.

The magnet attracts or selects iron, and not wood. Fire burns wood, but not stone. In chemistry there are many substances which have a mutual affinity, which may be called selection. The cause selects its proper objects, and produces particular phenomena. In that sense it may be said to be self-determined. But is it necessarily determined? Is there such a correlation between the cause and its objects that the particular phenomena which the cause is fitted to produce *must* follow? With regard to physical causes this is admitted. There is such a correlation between fire and wood, that when brought together combustion *must* follow. Is it so with moral causes? Will, as a cause, is selective. But is the correlation between will and its proper objects such that the will must nec-

sarily put forth a volition in one way, without the possibility of determining in any other way?

In support of a self-determining power cases have been appealed to in which the objects presented to the will are in all respects so perfectly alike or equal, that there can be no reason for selecting one rather than another, and, therefore, it is argued that in such cases the will must determine itself. Such cases of indifference, as they have been called, have been considered by Dr. Jonathan Edwards (*Inquiry*, pt. ii. sect. 6), who has pronounced the supposition of the will determining itself by its own sovereignty to be absurd and self-contradictory. But as such cases are not, in general, cases of moral action, it is not very important to consider them. And "the doctrine of free agency does not necessarily require us to suppose that the will, in any case, acts without a motive; but only that in following one motive rather than another, it is not in any case drawn or impelled by a power in the motive, but chooses to act from that motive in preference to the other, by a power of its own; a power exerting itself independently of the strength of either motive."—Alex. Smith, *Phil. of Morals*, vol. ii. p. 99 But the truth is, it is not the *will* but the *man* that determines himself. And although Edwards's argument were good as against the will, it may not hold as against the *man*. Dr. Young, *The Mystery*, pp. 143-4.

By the advocates of Necessity it is argued—

II. That Liberty is impossible.

This argument is founded on the truth that every change implies the operation of a cause. A determination of Will is a change for which there must be an adequate cause; and this cause, according to the doctrine of Necessity, is the power or the prevalence of motives. Motives are the causes of volitions; and they are causes which operate certainly, invariably and necessarily. The actions which are done in consequence of volitions are free actions; for we will or determine to do them. But they are not, on that account, the less necessary; for our determination of will to do them is the necessary result of the influence of motives; and mind as well as matter can undergo no change which is not the effect of an antecedent adequate cause.

"Man is a necessary agent," said Collins (*Inquiry*, p. 57, fourth edit.), "because all his actions have a beginning. For whatever has a beginning must have a cause; and every cause is a necessary

cause. . . . Liberty, therefore, or a power to act or not to act, to do this or another thing under the same causes, is an impossibility and atheistical."

"I conceive," said Hobbes, "that nothing taketh beginning from itself, but from the action of some other immediate agent without itself. And that, therefore, when first a man hath an appetite or will to something to which immediately before he had no appetite nor will, the cause of his will is not the will itself, but something else not in his own disposing. So that whereas it is out of controversy that of voluntary actions the will is the necessary cause, and by this which is said, the will is also caused by other things whereof it disposeth not, it followeth that voluntary actions have all of them necessary causes, and therefore are necessitated."

Mr. Hume, Dr. Priestley, Dr. Crombie, and other advocates of the doctrine of Necessity, have expressed themselves to the same effect.

The principle of a sufficient reason, as maintained by Leibnitz, when applied to the question concerning free agency, decides it in a similar way. "The determination of the will is an event for which there must be a sufficient reason—that is, something previous which was necessarily followed by that determination, and could not be followed by any other determination; therefore it was necessary." Let it be observed, however, that in the previous state of the mind by which it was determined to act, Leibnitz included every disposition the mind can have to act voluntarily. "Motives do not act upon the mind as weights upon a balance; but it is rather the mind which acts by virtue of the motives, which are its dispositions to act. To prefer the weaker motive to the stronger, or to be indifferent to motives, is to separate between the mind and motives, as if they were out of it, as the weights are separate from the balance; and as if there were other dispositions to act in the mind besides motives, in virtue of which it could accept or reject motives. In truth, motives comprehend all the dispositions the mind can have to act voluntarily: for they comprehend not only the reasons but also the inclinations which spring from the passions and other precedent impressions. So that, if the mind preferred a feeble inclination to a stronger, it would act contrary to itself and otherwise than it is disposed to act."—Leibnitz, *Fifth Paper to Dr. Clarke*, sect. 15.

The advocates of free agency do not question the truth of the maxim, that every change implies the operation of a cause. But

Mr. Stewart has remarked, that "this maxim, although true with respect to inanimate matter, does not apply to intelligent agents, which cannot be conceived without the power of self-determination." And physical causes have characteristics which may be confined to them.

1. In physical phenomena what is called the Cause belongs to a body different from that in which the Effect is manifested. One ball moves another ball. One body attracts another. But may there not be causes which change their own state? And may not the mind of a voluntary agent be such a cause?

2. Physical causes are necessarily productive only of one definite change. This is expressed by saying that there is a constant conjunction between causes and their effects. But, although physical causes produce their effects according to one necessary and uniform law, why may there not be causes capable of operating freely, and of producing effects in one way or in another? And why may not man be such a cause? That he is such a cause is contended by Cousin (*Sur le Beau, &c.*, p. 377), by Bockshammer (*On the Will*, p. 41), and by Dr. Reid (*Act. Pow.*, Essay iv. ch. 9).

On the other hand, Dr. Jonathan Edwards has maintained (*Inquiry*, pt. ii. sect. 10), that all the acts of the will are excited by motives. If the acts of the will are excited by motives, then motives are the causes of their being excited. And if so, the existence of the acts of the will is properly the effect of their motives. And if volitions are properly the effects of their motives, then they are necessarily connected with their motives; for every effect is necessarily connected with that which is the proper ground and reason of its existence. Thus it is manifest that volition is necessary, and not from any self-determining power.

The advocates of free agency are ready to admit, that the self-determining power of an agent is called into activity by the presence or presentment of motives. But they contend that motives are not the *causes* but merely the *occasions* of our volitions. (See Price, *Review*, ch. viii.; Henry, *Translat. of Cousin's Psychology*, p. 327; Morell, *Hist. of Mod. Phil.*, pt. ii. ch. iv. sect. 1.) But is the mere presence or presentment of motives all that is necessary to call forth the self-determining power of an agent? Is the relation between motive and action nothing more than that of juxtaposition? Has the one no influence in producing the other? Mr. Hume and Dr.

Priestley reason as if the advocates of free agency held that motives had no influence in producing actions, and Leibnitz imputed such an opinion to Dr. King. But the advocates of free agency in general, admit not only the *presence*, but also the *influence* of motives in calling forth the self-determining power of the agent. All that they contend for is, that the influence of motives upon mind is not the same with the influence of force upon matter. In the words of the Thesis defended by Dr. James Gregory (*Essays*, 2 vols. 8vo., Edin. 1792), they hold that “There is in mind a certain independent self-governing power which there is not in body; in consequence of which there is a great difference between the relation of motive and action, and that of cause and effect in physics; and by means of which, a person, in all common cases, may, at his own discretion, act either according to, or in opposition to, any motive, or combination of motives, applied to him; while body, in all cases, irresistibly undergoes the change corresponding to the cause or combination of causes applied to it.” “Motives,” says Dr. Reid, “may be compared to advice or exhortation, which leaves a man still at liberty. For in vain is advice given where there is not a power either to do or to forbear, what it recommends. In like manner motives suppose liberty in the agent, otherwise they have no influence at all.”

According to the advocates of Necessity, however, motives are the causes of volitions, and like physical causes they operate certainly and necessarily—so that the will always is, and must be, in accordance with the strongest motive. When motives on one side only are presented, the mind yields to their influence; and when contrary or competing motives are presented, the mind is determined by that motive or class of motives which is felt to be strongest. Hence it is, that when we know men’s motives, we can tell beforehand what their conduct will be. But if motives had not a definite and uniform influence, human life would be one universal scene of confusion and chance-medley. We could tell what *had been*, what men *had done*; but never what *was to be*, nor what men were *likely to do*. Experience would be altogether useless; and we could form no conjecture beforehand as to the conduct of ourselves and others. Men could not be the subjects of moral discipline or government.

To the latter part of this reasoning, which has been strongly and eloquently expanded by Mr. Hume and others, it is replied by the advocates of free agency, that all moral discipline and government proceed on the fact, that motives have an influence in forming the

character and conduct of men. And when their character has been observed and known, their conduct, in ordinary circumstances, may be counted on—not as a necessary physical result, but as morally certain or probable. As to the case in which only one motive, or motives only on one side, may be presented, Dr. Reid has said, "It never can be proved that when there is a motive *on one side only*, that motive must determine the action. . . . Is there no such thing as wilfulness, caprice, or obstinacy among mankind? If there be not, it is wonderful that they should have names in all languages. If there be such things, a single motive, or even many motives, may be resisted." True. But the advocate of Necessity may reply, that the desire to indulge the wilfulness or caprice, or obstinacy by which motives are resisted, is just another and a stronger motive. Mr. Stewart, however, has said, that "it may be questioned if the word strength conveys any idea when applied to motives. It is obviously an analogical or metaphorical expression, borrowed from a class of phenomena essentially different." Motives cannot be measured nor estimated like forces in physical science. They are not fixed powers or determinate quantities. Their influence varies according to circumstances. A bribe which will be greedily grasped by one man, will be indignantly rejected by another. The solicitations of sensual pleasure, which cannot easily be resisted in the season of high health and spirits, have no power to move amidst the weakness and depression of pain and sickness. So that it is impossible to speak positively or precisely as to the strength of motives. There is no way of estimating the strength of different motives, but by the result of their being presented to the mind of an intelligent agent; and in calling any motive the strongest, all that we say is, that it is the motive in accordance with which the agent determined in some particular case. On some future occasion the same motive may not be yielded to by the same individual. He may choose to act in accordance with a motive which on a former occasion he set aside. So that the same motive may be alternately the weakest and the strongest; the one according to which the agent determines at one time and not at another. And thus the *dictum* of Edwards and the Necessitarians, that the will is always determined by the strongest motive, resolves itself into the palpable truism, that the will always is as it is. (See Dr. Witherspoon, *Lect. 13.*) "When we say, in vulgar speech, that motives or reasons determine a man; 'tis nothing," says Dr. Sam. Clarke (*Reply to Collins*, p. 11), "but a mere figure or metaphor.

"Tis the man that freely determines himself to act. Reasons or perceptions of the understanding can no more (properly and strictly speaking) determine an action, than an abstract notion can be a substance or agent, can strike or move a piece of matter." "A motive," says Dr. Reid (*Act. Pow.*, Essay iv. ch. 4), "is not a thing that exists, but a thing that is conceived; it is what the schoolmen call an *ens rationis*. A motive may influence to action, but cannot act." But, if the influence of motives be determinate and necessary, the action will be a determinate action, and the agent a necessary agent. The fact that the influence of motives may, in some degree, be modified by the mind and circumstances of the agent, will not warrant the conclusion that he may act altogether independently of their influence. It may be true that man may, to some extent, make or mould his motives, and modify and regulate their influence. "If, then," says Coleridge (*Aids to Reflection*, vol. i. p. 44), "the man determines the motive, what determines the man? The intelligent will, or the self-determining power? True—in part it is; and, therefore, the will is pre-eminently the spiritual constituent in our being. But will any man admit, that his own will is the only and sufficient determinant of all he is, and all he does? Is nothing to be attributed to the harmony of the system to which he belongs, and to the pre-established fitness of the objects and agents, known and unknown, that surround him, as acting on the will, though, doubtless, with it likewise?—a process which the co-instantaneous yet reciprocal action of the air and the vital energy of the lungs in breathing, may help to render intelligible." Coleridge is a strenuous advocate of free agency; but the view here taken is not much different from the doctrine of Determinism, as held by Leibnitz. (See Green, *Ment. Dynam.*, p. 54; Aristotle's *Ethics*, by Grant, vol. ii. p. 114, note; Thompson, *Christ. Theism*, b. i. ch. 3.)

By the advocates of Necessity it is argued— .

III. That Liberty in man is incompatible with the foreknowledge of God.

That God is omniscient, and knows not only what is past and what is present, but also what is future, is universally admitted. But great difficulty has always been felt in reconciling the certain knowledge which God has of the future with the free agency of man. (See *Philosophorum Sententiae de Fato*, ab Grotio (Hug.) collectæ, 12mo., Amst., 1648.) Bernardine Ochinus wrote a work, entitled

Labyrinths, in which he pointed out *First*, The difficulties arising from holding the freedom of the human will in connection with the foreknowledge of God; and *Secondly*, The difficulties arising from denying the freedom of the human will, and holding the foreknowledge of God. He then endeavoured to indicate a way by which to extricate ourselves from the Labyrinths in which we find ourselves involved according to either view. The attempt, though vigorous, can scarcely be called completely successful, and the one doctrine still continues to be brought forward as limiting or nullifying the other.

In later times the argument drawn from the foreknowledge of God in favour of Necessity, has been strongly urged by Dr. Jonathan Edwards (*Inquiry*, pt. ii. sect. 11 and 12.) It has been replied to by Dr. Sam. Clarke (in his *Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God*), and by Dr. Reid (*Act. Pow.*, Essay iv. ch. 10).

Edwards begins by proving (sect. 11) that God has a certain and infallible foreknowledge of the volitions of moral agents. He then proceeds to argue (sect. 13), that this foreknowledge on the part of God infers the necessity of human actions. This argument consists of three parts:—

I. He commences by saying, that in things which are past their past existence is now necessary. The foreknowledge of God is a thing which already *has*, and long ago *had*, existence; and so, now its existence is necessary. He then affirms that those things which are indissolubly connected with other things that are necessary, are themselves necessary. But things infallibly foreknown have an indissoluble connection with that foreknowledge, and are therefore necessary. Hence the volitions of moral agents, being infallibly foreknown, are indissolubly connected with that foreknowledge, and are therefore necessary.

To this part of his reasoning it has been objected, that Edwards has not made the distinction between the *fact* of a thing happening and the *mode* of its happening. God foreknows the volitions of moral agents, and therefore these volitions shall *certainly* take place; but it does not follow that they shall take place *necessarily*. “I know no rule of reasoning,” says Dr. Reid, “by which it can be inferred that because an event *certainly* shall be, therefore its production must be *necessary*. The manner of its production, whether free or necessary, cannot be concluded from the time of its production, whether it be past, present, or future. That it shall be, no more implies

that it shall be *necessarily*, than that it shall be *freely* produced; for neither present, past, nor future have any more connection with necessity, than they have with freedom. I grant, therefore, that from events being foreseen, it may justly be concluded they are *certainly future*, but from their being certainly future, it does not follow that they are necessary."

But in the reasoning of Edwards it is not so much the fact of their being *future* as the fact of their being *foreknown*, that implies the necessity of human volitions. Knowledge, however, being an *immanent*³ act has no effect upon the thing known. God foreknows the volitions of moral agents. But His foreknowledge is not the cause of these volitions. The fact that these volitions will certainly take place is the ground or reason of His foreknowledge. He foreknows them because they will certainly take place; and they would take place although He did not foreknow them—if such a supposition were possible—but they would take place in consequence of the operation of their own proper cause; and whether that cause be a cause operating freely or not, is a fact which is not affected by the result having been foreknown or not foreknown.⁴

The reasoning of Edwards on this part of his argument has been compared by Tappan (*Review of Edwards' Inquiry*, 12mo., New York, 1839, p. 255) to a sort of puzzle which is sometimes employed for exercising the student of Logic in the detection of fallacies. "For example: a man in a given place must *necessarily* either stay in that place or go away from that place; therefore, whether he stays or goes away he acts *necessarily*. Now, it is necessary, in the nature of things, that a man, as well as any other body, should be in some place; but then it does not follow from this that his determination whether to stay or go, is a necessary determination. His necessary condition as a body is entirely distinct from the question respecting the necessity or contingency of his volitions. And so also in respect of the Divine foreknowledge: all human volitions, as events occurring in time, are subject to the necessary condition of being foreknown by that Being 'who inhabiteth eternity:' but this

³ "Logicians," says Dr. Reid (*Intell. Pow.*, Essay ii. ch. 14), "distinguish two kinds of operations of mind: the first kind

external object."

⁴ In reference to our first parents, Milton says,—

immanent acts; the second *transitive*. All intellectual operations belong to the first class; they produce no effect upon any

necessary condition of their existence neither proves nor disproves the necessity or the contingency of their particular causation."

II. In the second part of his argument, Edwards endeavours to prove, "That no future event can be certainly foreknown, whose existence is contingent, and without all necessity; or, in other words—that a free action which in future cannot be foreknown." His reasoning in support of this may be thus stated syllogistically.

It is impossible for a thing to be certainly known to any intellect without evidence.

A contingent future event is without evidence—

Therefore, a contingent future event is not a possible object of knowledge.

But neither of these premises will be granted by the advocates of free agency. The *First* holds that to be true of God which is true of man. Much of our knowledge is the result of evidence or proof—that is, it is mediate or inferential. We know one thing by means of another. But we are not so to conceive of the knowledge of God. He who knows all things must know them directly and intuitively. His knowledge is not got by reasoning or deducing one thing from another. It is the immediate beholding of all things as they really are. He sees them not through media or evidence, but in the light of their actual or possible existence. Our⁵ knowledge extends only to phenomena or effects; and all that we know of causes is merely that they produce such phenomena or effects; but what the causes are in themselves, or what other effects, besides these we have witnessed, they may be capable of producing, we know not. But the knowledge of God is a knowledge of things in themselves. It extends beyond phenomena and effects to the causes which produce them. He sees effects in their causes, and knows directly and at once, not only what has happened, but what will happen, and all that by possibility can happen. All things are continually present to Him in their essential nature and consequences.

The *Second* premise—viz., That a contingent future event is without evidence—cannot be maintained in these terms. It is admitted that a contingent future event is not self-evident. That the volition or determination of a moral agent shall at some future time be to do this action and not to do that, is a proposition which to our minds does not carry its evidence in itself, like the proposition that twice

⁵ "Divina cognitio non est inquisitiva, | cognitio rerum absque discurso."—
non per rationem causa, sed immaterialis | AQUINAS, *Adversus Gentes*, I. 92.

two are equal to four. The truth of the latter is necessary : we see it at once to be true, and we cannot conceive it to be otherwise. The truth of the former is contingent—that is, while it is implied that the moral agent shall determine in one way, it is possible that he may determine in either way. In truth of this kind, all the knowledge to which we can attain is knowledge of the possibility implied, and the event is to us contingent. But contingency is opposed to necessity of existence, and not to the operation of a cause. The cause of the volitions of moral agents is the will. That cause is known in its very essence to God. He knows all the effects which it is capable of producing, and therefore He may know the effects which it will produce. To beings of knowledge so limited as ours, events which we call contingent, because they depend upon causes which operate not necessarily but freely, may not be knowable, or can only be known as probable : but to Him to whom all causes and their conditions and modes of operation are known, an event which depends for its existence upon a free cause may be known with as much clearness and certainty as an event which is produced by a necessary cause.

III. All this, however, appears to Edwards to be self-contradictory ; and, in the third part of his reasoning, he proceeds to argue, that, “To suppose the future volitions of moral agents not to be necessary events ; or, which is the same thing, events which it is not impossible but that they may not come to pass ; and yet to suppose that God certainly foreknows them, and knows all things, is to suppose God’s knowledge to be inconsistent with itself. For to say that God certainly, and without all conjecture, knows that a thing will infallibly be, which at the same time He knows to be so *contingent* that it may possibly not be, is to suppose his knowledge inconsistent with itself ; or that one thing that He knows is utterly inconsistent with another thing that He knows. It is the same thing as to say He now knows a proposition to be of certain infallible truth, which He knows to be of contingent uncertain truth.”

The substance of this reasoning, according to Tappan (*Review of Edwards’ Inquiry*, p. 273), is this, “That inasmuch as a contingent future event is *uncertain* from its very nature and definition, it cannot be called an object of certain knowledge to any mind, not even to the Divine mind, without a manifest contradiction.” But it is answered, that in this, as in the First part of his argument, Edwards has overlooked the distinction between the certainty of a

future volition as a mere fact, and the manner in which that fact will come to pass. The future volitions of moral agents will *certainly* come to pass: when they do come to pass, they come to pass *contingently*—that is, not without a cause—nor by a necessary cause—but by a cause operating freely. God, who knoweth all things, knows certainly that the future volitions of moral agents will come to pass; and as He knows not merely events, but their causes, He knows that they will come to pass freely. He is a free agent himself—He hath endowed the will of man with liberty, and He knows not merely the acts of his own perfect will, but all the actual and possible manifestations of that feeble and perverted will which belongs to man. So that there is no contradiction, as Edwards has argued, between the certainty of Divine knowledge and the contingency of human volitions. These volitions will certainly take place, and this certainty is the ground of the Divine knowledge, which is therefore infallible; but when these volitions take place it will be by a cause operating freely. But the nature and operation of this cause are known to the Divine mind as well as the result, and therefore the future volitions of moral agents may be foreknown as contingent or free.

Such knowledge, it may be admitted, is too wonderful for us; “it is high, we cannot attain unto it.” We can scarcely even conceive of it. But it is not, therefore, to be pronounced impossible or absurd, as has been done by Edwards. (*Inquiry*, pt. ii. sect. 12.) “The previous certainty of things to come,” says Bishop Horsley (*Sermon on Matt. xvi. 21*), “is one of those truths which are not easily comprehended. The difficulty seems to arise from a habit that we have of measuring all intellectual powers by the standard of human intellect. There is nothing in the nature of *certainty*, abstractedly considered, to connect with past time or with the present, more than with the future. But human knowledge extends in so small a degree to future things, that scarce anything becomes certain to *us* till it is come to pass; and therefore we are apt to imagine that things *acquire* their certainty from their accomplishment. But this is a gross fallacy. The proof of an event to *us* always depends either upon the testimony of others, or the evidence of our own senses; but the certainty of events in themselves arises from their *natural connection with their proper causes*. Hence, to that Great Being who knows things, not by testimony, not by sense, but by their causes, as being himself the first cause, the source of

activity and power to all other causes, to Him everything that ever shall be is at all times infinitely more certain than anything either past or present can be to any man, except, perhaps, the simple fact of his own existence, and some other necessary truths which are evidenced to every man, not by his bodily senses, but by that internal perception which seems to be the first act of created intellect."

Dr. Reid thought that the difficulty of conceiving how the future actions of free agents can be certainly foreseen is lessened by the fact, that by memory we have certain knowledge of past actions, although the certainty of our knowledge has no reference to these as done freely or necessarily, and that there is a great analogy between the prescience of future contingents, and the memory of past events—every argument brought to prove the impossibility of prescience, proving, with equal force, the impossibility of memory. The correctness of this analogy, however, has been questioned. (Reid, *Act. Pow.*, Essay iv. ch. 10, *Note* by Sir William Hamilton.)

But although it may be difficult to reconcile the foreknowledge of God with the free agency of man, it would not follow that we are at liberty to reject either or both, but rather to receive both, in so far as they are rested on their own proper grounds. Mr. Locke, in one of his letters to Mr. Molyneux, has said, "I cannot make freedom in man consistent with Omnipotence and Omniscience in God, *though I am as fully persuaded of both* as of any truths I most fully assent to." The only condition which would make it necessary for the advocates of free agency to sacrifice their faith, either in human liberty or Divine foreknowledge, would be that there was an absolute contradiction between these two ideas; such a contradiction as there would be between the two propositions, two and two make four, and two and two do not make four. "In this case, but in this case only," said Jouffroy (*Introd. to Ethics*, vol. i. p. 116), "where reason distinctly perceived it to be impossible that what we conceive of God, and what we feel in ourselves, should both be absolutely true, should we be bound to sacrifice⁶ the conception to the fact, or the fact to the conception; for then, and then only, would all chance of reconciling the conflicting evidence on which they rest be destroyed."

⁶ In this case Mr. Locke would have suggested the question, "Whether it be impossible for God to make a free agent?"

and Mr. Stewart, "Whether there are some events, the foreknowledge of which implies an impossibility?"

It cannot be maintained, however, that there is such a conflict in this case. It cannot be shown that there is an absolute and irreconcilable contradiction between the foreknowledge of God and the free agency of man. The advocates of liberty, therefore, think themselves entitled to hold by both truths, each being vouched for by its own proper and competent evidence. "The liberty of man and the foreknowledge of God," says Bishop Horsley (*Sermon on Matt. xvi. 24*), "are equally certain, although the proof of each rests upon different principles. Our feelings prove to every one of us that we are free; reason and revelation teach us that the Deity knows all things—that 'even the thoughts of man He understandeth long before'—long before the thoughts arise—long before the man himself is born who is to think them. Now, when two distinct propositions are separately proved, each by its proper evidence, it is not a reason for denying either, that the human mind, upon the first hasty view, imagines a repugnance, and may perhaps find a difficulty in connecting them, even after the distinct proof of each is clearly perceived and understood."

In reference to this imagined repugnance between the free agency of man and the foreknowledge of God, it has been said that "the prescience of the Deity is different, not only in degree, but in kind, from any knowledge we can attain of futurity." "The faculty of knowledge as knowing objects under the relations of time and space, is the faculty as given in man. The faculty of knowledge as knowing objects under no limitations, is the faculty under its divine and infinite form. God's knowledge is an eternal *now*—an omnipresent *here*—that is, all that is possible and actual is known to Him. His knowledge ought not to be spoken of in relation to time and space; it is infinite and absolute knowledge, from eternity to eternity, the same; it is unchangeable, because it is perfect; it can neither be increased nor diminished." (Tappan, *Review of Edwards' Inquiry*, p. 298.) To the same effect Toplady (*Christ. and Phil. Necessity Asserted*, c. 2) has said, "Properly speaking, it cannot be affirmed of God that He either did know, or that He will know, but simply, that He knows. For, in *Deum non cadunt prius et posterius*, there is no past nor future to Him.⁷ All is present and unsuccessive.

⁷ This is in accordance with the views of Plato, whose opinion on this point is stated by Cudworth (*Systema Intell.*, cap. 5, a. i. sect. 18). Augustine has expressed

himself to the same effect (*Enarrat. in Psal. cl.*, sermon ii. n. 10; and *De Trinitate*, lib. i. cap. 16).

The distribution of things into those that have been, those that are, and those that shall be, is indeed suited to the flux condition and to the limited faculties of beings like ourselves, whose estimates of duration are taken from the periodical journeys of an opaque grain round a lucid spot termed the sun; but can have no place in Him of whom it is declared that a thousand years are as one day, and one day as a thousand years. And even this declaration, magnificent as it is, falls infinitely short of the mark. When, therefore, I speak of *foreknowledge* as an attribute essential to the Deity, I speak, as St. Paul says, after the manner of men. The simple term *knowledge* would be more intrinsically proper; but then it would not so readily aid the conceptions of ordinary men. Though, for my own part, I would always rather call the Divine knowledge *omniscience*, than give it any other name."

Passages of similar import may be found in Bockshammer, *On the Will*, p. 109; and Macvicar, *On Human Nature*, 8vo., Edinburgh, 1853, pp. 70, 71.

Other arguments might have been stated and examined. But enough has been said to show the nature and difficulty of the question; and, instead of urging a decision on either side, it is thought better to subjoin a list of such authors on both sides, as may be most easily and advantageously consulted.

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"	<i>Correspondence with Dr. James Gregory</i> 1819	
Thomas Belsham	<i>Moral Philosophy</i>	1801

PART SECOND.

" Nulla vitæ pars vacare officio potest; in eoque et colendo sita vitæ est honestas omnis, et in negligendo turpitudo."—CICERO.

INTRODUCTION.

THE duties incumbent on man are so many and so various, that it becomes necessary to classify them.

A fourfold classification was long followed. At the head of each class of duties was placed one of the virtues which were called cardinal,—viz., Prudence, Temperance, Fortitude, and Justice. Prudence, or Wisdom, comprehended all those virtues which spring from a love of knowledge; and Justice, those which arise from a love of society. Fortitude, with its kindred virtues, was traced to a love of greatness; and Temperance, or Self-restraint, to a love of order and propriety. This classification is faulty in several respects, especially as it gives no proper place to those duties which are due directly towards the Supreme Being.¹

The scheme of classification suggested by Kant (*Metaphys. of Eth.*, 8vo. Edin. 1836, p. 250) proceeds upon the relation between the different living beings as to whom ethical obligement may be thought as subsisting, and stands thus:—

DUTIES.			
Of man to mankind.		Of man towards beings of another kind.	
To himself.	To others.	Towards beings inferior to man.	Towards superhuman beings.

This scheme may be characterized as exhaustive, but it is also redundant. The inferior animals, being destitute of reason, have no duties to discharge nor rights to acquire, and cannot well be regarded

¹ It seems to be alluded to in the Apocryphal Book of Wisdom (ch. viii. ver. 7). "Sobrietatem enim et prudentiam doceat (sapientia) et justitiam et virtutem (vel fortitudinem) quibus utilius nihil est in vita hominibus." The epithet *cardinal* was first applied to these virtues by St. Ambrose, who seems to have understood it in the sense of primary or principal.—RAYNANDUS, *De Virt. et Vitiis*, p. 95.

as bringing us directly under obligation to them. They are rather, like the inanimate parts of creation, to be regarded as subject to our will and subservient to our use. But even under this view it may be said,—1. That the inferior animals and inanimate things being useful to us and to others, wantonly to mutilate or destroy them may deprive ourselves of the means of discharging our duty. And 2. To inflict unnecessary pain upon a living creature tends to render us insensible to the sufferings of our fellow-men, and unfit us for discharging the offices of benevolence and sympathy.² As to those beings superior to man, who are said to be God's ministering spirits, the relation between them and us is so little known or understood, that no duties can rise out of it or be grounded upon it. But there are three relations in which man may be contemplated, which give rise to duties,—

- I. In reference to himself as an individual.
- II. In reference to his fellow-men as living in society. And
- III. In reference to God as his Creator, Governor, and Judge.

What the duties arising from these relations are, an Apostle hath indicated in the text (Titus, ch. ii. v. 12) which declares that the grace of God teacheth that we should *live soberly, righteously, and godly*,—*Sobriety* denoting all those duties which we owe to ourselves; *Righteousness*, all those duties which are incumbent upon us towards our fellow-men; and *Godliness*, all those which are due directly to the Supreme Being.³ This classification is simple and comprehensive, and in following it out, it will be seen that it will easily admit of our incorporating with it anything that may be convenient or useful in other classifications.

² Leibnitz tells us that he wrote a small treatise for the education of a prince, in which, among other things, he advised that, while young, he should not be permitted to torment or give pain to any living thing, lest he should contract a want of feeling for his fellow-men. And Mons. Joubert, in the classification of human duties, allots a separate head to the duties arising from the relation of man to the inferior animals, and to things inanimate. But these may very easily be included under the head of duties which man owes to himself, as charged with the preservation of his life, and the progress of his nature, and the happiness of his condition.

³ The same classification is to be found

in these words of Cicero (*Tuscul. Quest.* lib. i. cap. 26): "Haec (philosophia) nos primum ad illorum (deorum) cultum, deinde ad jus hominum, quod situm est in generis humani societate, tum ad modestiam magitudinemque animi erudit." Marcus Antoninus, too, has said (b. viii. 27), "We hold three relations in which to acquit ourselves: first, to the Divine Source of all things; second, to those among whom we live; and last, to ourselves." This classification is also to be found in the East. It is written in one of their sacred books, called *The Tunkla Nameh*, that "a Sikh should set his heart on God, on charity, and on purity."

With regard to the order in which the several divisions of human duty should be illustrated, as all duty and all obligation have ultimately a reference to God; and as the duties which we owe to our neighbour and to ourselves derive an additional authority and sanction from the religious principles and feelings, there might seem to be a propriety in giving the foremost place to those duties which are due directly towards God. But, with a view to the professional instruction of the students attending the Class of Moral Philosophy, it has been found expedient to follow the order suggested by the words of the Apostle, and to treat—

I. Of Individual Ethics; II. Of Social Ethics; and III. Of Natural Theology, or Theistic Ethics.

According to this plan, ample opportunity is afforded of illustrating Practical Morality and Natural Jurisprudence, which belong peculiarly to a Course of Lectures on Moral Philosophy; and which are not handled in any other Class of the curriculum through which professional students are appointed to pass. In so far as time will permit, Natural Theology, or that knowledge of God and our duty to Him which the light of nature teaches, will also be treated. And although it should not be fully overtaken, less inconvenience will follow from this than from imperfectly treating the other divisions of Ethics; because, while these do not recur in the prescribed course of study, Natural Theology may, as forming a preparation and introduction to Revealed Theology, the crown and climax of all study. The private student of Moral Philosophy can take up the several divisions of human duty in the order which appears to him to be most natural and proper.

BOOK I.

INDIVIDUAL ETHICS, OR DUTIES IN REFERENCE
TO ONE'S SELF.

"Mens sana in corpore sano."—JUVENAL.

THE notion of duty owing by man to himself appears at first sight to involve a contradiction (Kant, *Metaphys. of Eth.*, book i. Introd.); although nothing is more common than the saying, "I owe this to myself." When the party obliging and the party obliged are the same, the obliger having the power of dispensing with the obligation which he imposes, no duty would have place or be binding. But man being, by his nature, a law to himself—that is, a rational and responsible being—Conscience, the legislator, or promulgator of the law within him, in promulgating its own law, has always reference to a law higher than its own, and carries man out of and above himself. This brings us to the true conclusion, that all duty is owing to God, whose nature and will are the foundations of all obligation. And, therefore, when we speak of some duties as owing to God, of some as owing to our fellow-men, and of others as owing to ourselves, the meaning is, not that in some of these duties we are under obligation to God, in others to our fellow-men, and in others to ourselves, but that, while all duty is founded on the nature and will of God, some duties are discharged with immediate reference to Him, others with immediate reference to our fellow-creatures, and others with reference to ourselves, as rational and responsible beings, charged with the conservation and improvement of our nature.

In reference to himself, the whole duty of man may be said to consist in promoting the improvement and perfection of his nature and condition, and in thus attaining to happiness. Now, the improvement of man's nature, and the advancement of man's happiness, will lead to the Duties,—I. Of self-conservation; II. Of Self-culture; and III. Of Self-control or Self-government.

CHAPTER I.

OF SELF-CONSERVATION.

"**MAN**," says Mons. de Bonald, "is an intelligence served by organs." In other words, he consists of a soul and a body. Now, Kant has said, "that a duty owed by man to his body (as the subject obliging) is incogitable." But the mind, as the subject obliging, can make it our duty to take care of the body. "The body," says Mons. Jouffroy (*On the Distinction between Psychology and Physiology*, p. 19), "is the instrument without which we could not act on external objects, and without which most of our faculties could not be developed. We could not advance towards the end of our being, if the body be weak or diseased. It is by the instrumentality of the body that we obtain those sensations by which the external world is made known to us—so that the good of the *Ego* is intimately connected with the sound and healthy state of the body." The duties, therefore, incumbent upon man in reference to himself have more immediate respect, in some cases, to the body, in others to the mind, or partly to both. Let us consider them in order. Now, the duties of *Self-conservation* have reference primarily and directly to the body, but indirectly also to the mind; and have for their end the continuance and progress of man as a living being. And, in reference to his existence as a living being, man is bound—

1. To preserve his life, and to avoid everything tending towards death.
2. To promote his health, and to avoid sickness and disease.
3. To provide for his wealth or outward well-being, and to avoid poverty and want.

SECTION I.—*Man is bound to Preserve his Life, and to avoid everything tending towards Death.*

This duty may be violated, partially by *Self-mutilation*, or totally by *Self-murder*.

1. With regard to *Self-mutilation*, it has been thought warrantable when the purity and progress of the soul may be promoted by it; and we read of some who have made themselves eunuchs for the

kingdom of heaven. Origen, one of the early Christian fathers, is said to have adopted this course. But no good arguments in favour of it can be drawn from reason or from revelation. And if *Self-mutilation* cannot be defended on the ground of its tendency to promote the progress of the soul to perfection, still less can it be so when practised for selfish or sordid ends. In the history of Eastern nations, we read that particular places of trust could only be filled by persons who had undergone mutilation. But this is just an example of one vice begetting another. The effeminate and luxurious manners of the East gave rise to jealousy, and jealousy gave rise to the practice alluded to,—a practice humiliating and degrading to those who submitted to it, and bringing no security nor comfort to those who enjoined it.

The same practice has also been resorted to in cases in which the voice has been thought to be improved by it, and a greater price got for exercising it. In such cases the mutilation is inflicted at an early age, and not by the party himself. It is a social sin; for no one can have a right to make gain of the limbs or life of another. It has been questioned, however, whether a man may not voluntarily part with what belongs to his bodily frame, with a view to procure gain to himself or to do benefit to another—as by extracting a tooth, or cutting off the hair, to accommodate or adorn some other person. Such things cannot be commended, but must rather be condemned. It is plain, however, that to part with a diseased limb or member of the body may sometimes be a necessary and painful duty. “*Immedicabile vulnus ense recidendum, ne pars sincera trahatur.*”

2. If *Self-mutilation* is to be condemned, much more must *Suicide* or *Self-murder* be contrary to the duty which a man owes to himself.

As a sin against the State, which has a right to the services of all its members, *Suicide* has been discouraged and punished by the laws of all nations. But the question here is, whether it is contrary to the duty which a man owes to himself, as charged with the conservation of his bodily life. It may be answered—

(1.) That *Suicide* is contrary to one of the strongest of our natural desires.

Self-preservation is the first law of nature. It extends beyond animal to all organized existence. The functions of vegetable life have the preservation and continuance of that life for their end. The inferior animals have a natural discernment of the food which is con-

venient for them, and reject with unwavering firmness whatever would prove noxious. By a natural antipathy, they flee from their natural enemies, and avoid, with jealous caution, everything that threatens them with danger. They never spontaneously, it has been thought, do anything to shorten or terminate their existence.¹ And in the case of human beings, it has been questioned whether *Suicide* takes place except under the influence of temporary insanity. The love of life appears as early and as strong in man as in the inferior animals; so that *Self-murder* is in the fullest sense of the word *unnatural*, contrary to the constitution of human nature, and contrary, to the duty which the inheritor of that nature owes to himself.

(2.) *Suicide* is contrary to the end for which, and the condition under which, life is given.

Man is not born into this mortal life merely to eat and drink, and then lie down like the brutes which perish. He has a work to do, and a time in which to do it. The work is great, the time is short, and he has no right to shorten it. This life is a warfare. In this warfare every man has his post or station, and he is not at liberty to desert it. He is bound by more than military oath to keep it. This view of human life was distinctly taken and strongly exhibited by the ancient moralists. Pythagoras is represented as saying (*Cicero, De Senectute*), "That no one should depart from his station without the command of his general, that is God." Plato has said (*Phædo*), "That in this life we are placed as in a garrison, from which we must not retire nor withdraw ourselves." Cicero (*Somnium Scipionis*) has eloquently expanded the same sentiment.

On the other hand, both the Cynic and Cyrenaic schools of philosophy furnished their disciples with reasons for the justification of *Suicide*. Hegesias, surnamed Ηεισθάρας, or the death-persuader, wrote several books to prove the utter worthlessness and unprofitableness of life; "and so powerful," says Professor Butler (*Lectures on Hist. of Phil.*, vol. i. p. 459), "was the melancholy rhetoric of this advocate of the grave, that an Egyptian king was obliged to prohibit the publication of his discourses." Some Jewish writers repre-

¹ The case of the viper, which, when surrounded by flames, gradually retires to the centre of the circle, and dies by its own sting, may be a case of unconscious muscular contraction. The case of horses, tyrannized over by other horses, deliberately dashing out their brains against a

tree—and the case of the squirrel who dropped into the water to escape from the persecution of other squirrels—may perhaps be accounted for without calling them acts of *suicide*. (MOORE, *Power of the Soul over the Body*, pp. 238, 239.)

sent the cases of Samson and of Saul as excusable, or even justifiable. The later Stoics argued that a man was at liberty at any time to terminate his bodily life. Should his lot have been prosperous and happy, "yet if he had become weary of life, and satisfied with the share which he had had in its enjoyments," he was at liberty, like a guest who had been filled, to rise from the well-furnished table which had been spread before him, and make room for others. On the other hand, should a man's lot in life be unhappy—should his body be full of disease and pain, and his mind full of anxiety, and no prospect of relief—why should he not terminate his sufferings by departing from a scene wherein he can no longer take pleasure—as one leaves a house which has been found to be incurably smoky and uncomfortable. But their reasoning on this head was at variance with their principle of living in conformity with the course of nature and the arrangement of Providence; and with the precept of Epictetus, who professed himself ready, under all circumstances, to say, "I am in the station which God has assigned me." Cicero, notwithstanding his condemnation of *Suicide*, seems to have thought it excusable in the case of Cato, "who left life rejoicing that he was furnished with a reason sufficient to justify his resigning it." Augustine has expressed himself more guardedly: "*Hoc non fecisset nisi victoriam Cæsaris impatientur tulisset.*" The question remains, Should the success of Cæsar have so fretted him as to lead to such an act?³

Seneca anticipated his condemnation to death by committing *Suicide*; but he had previously obtained permission of the Emperor; thus giving a singular illustration of the fear of man, which bringeth a snare, and of the want of that fear of God, which tendeth unto life.

Among the early Christians those persons who exposed themselves to death in their attempts to deface or demolish the idols of the

³ The circumstances attending it have been thrown into the form of a tragedy by Mr. Addison, who has given as much plausibility as they can well receive to the reasonings of Cato. But it became not a man of good sense and good taste thus to wipe the hideous wounds and to garnish the guilty sepulchre of a suicide. And he who had substantially served the cause of piety and virtue by his other writings should have paused before he lent the graces of his diction to the proud sophisms of the Stoic, and gave to them the permanence and the currency of a public and

popular representation. "I would rather die by the wickedness of another than by my own," was the resolution of one (Darius) whom the sages of Greece and Rome would have called a barbarian; but a resolution which displayed more true wisdom and courage than all the vain-glorious musings and studied preparations of a Cato—a resolution which might have been more consistently embellished by the talents of a Christian author, and, if such things must be, more safely exhibited to the applause of a people calling themselves Christian.

heathens were forbidden to be numbered among the martyrs. And the *Circumcelliones*, who, out of a desire for martyrdom, would provoke others to kill them, or, being disappointed in that, would do so themselves, were reckoned no better than madmen.

Kant (*Metaphys. of Eth.*, 8vo., Edin. 1836, p. 261) puts the question,—“Can we regard it as a crime on the part of our late great monarch [Frederick II.], that he always bore about with him a poison, probably in order that if he should be taken in war (which he always carried on in person) he might not be compelled to accept conditions of ransom too burdensome to his country?” He also puts the case of a patient feeling decided symptoms of hydrophobia, who declared that, as this complaint was incurable, he would destroy himself, lest he should occasion some disaster to his fellow-men. It is demanded if he was wrong. Arist., *Eth.*, lib. iii. cap. 7; lib. v. cap. 11; Donne, *Biathanatos*, Lond. 1644; Adams, *On Self-Murder*, Lond. 1700; Madame de Staël, *Reflexions sur le Suicide*; Rousseau, *New Eloïse*; Hermann, *Disputatio de Autocheira*, 4to., Lips. 1809; Stoeudlin, *Hist. des Opinions sur le Suicide*, 8vo., Goetting. 1824; Tissot, *Manie du Suicide*, 1840; Hume, *Essays on Suicide and Immortality*, Lond. 1783; see *Life by Barton*, vol. ii. p. 13.

As man is to refrain from all attempts to mutilate his bodily frame, or to terminate his bodily life, it follows that he ought to resist all bodily violence when offered by others. According to the law of nature, he has a right to defend himself against all such violence. In defending himself he may do bodily harm to others; but he is justifiable in doing so, when the harm to himself cannot otherwise be prevented. Even although he should take away the life of others in defending his own, he may be free from blame. But the circumstances under which bodily violence may be offered and repelled, are so many and so various, that, in the progress of human society, they speedily come under the cognizance of positive law. And the rights and duties resulting will more properly be considered under the head of Social Ethics.

SECTION II.—*Man is bound to promote his Health, and to see that his Body is maintained in a sound and vigorous State, with all its energies duly developed. "No man hateth (or ought to hate) his own flesh; but nourisheth and cherisheth it" (or ought to nourish and to cherish it).* Ephes. v. 29.

The saying of Pascal is too true,—“In trying to make themselves angels, men have made of themselves brutes.” In aiming at an unnatural spirituality they have neglected or afflicted the body. Asceticism is of two kinds—viz., *theological* and *philosophical*. *Theological* asceticism proceeds upon the idea of expiation or atonement; and, regarding the Deity as offended and ready to exact punishment, seeks to appease his anger by voluntarily inflicting bodily pain. *Philosophical* asceticism seeks to free the soul from the servitude of the body and the degrading influences of external nature, and to raise it to its true destination, by making it superior to the pleasures and the pains of sense. Still, under almost every form of religion and philosophy, the great law of nature, that the health of the body must be cared for, has been acknowledged. The great attention paid all over the East to meats and drinks and divers washings had this in view. The public games and public baths, among the Greeks and Romans, were intended to promote the health and vigour of the body. In the Christian religion, although the contrast between the flesh and the spirit, and the duty of keeping the body under, and bringing it into subjection, are strongly insisted on, still there is nothing to make us indifferent to the preservation of our health. When the body is regarded as the abode and instrument of a mind, furnished with powers so noble, and capable of aspirations so lofty, it demands, and is entitled to, our greatest care. The prayer of the Moralist of antiquity, that he might possess a sound mind in a healthy body—*mens sana in corpore sano*—comprehends all that constitutes the perfection and happiness of man as a living being. A state of health is in itself a state of enjoyment; and it is necessary as a condition to every other enjoyment. So that man, without any higher motive than mere self-love, should be led to take care of the health of that living body which has been committed to his charge.

But the health of the body is necessary to the soundness and strength of the mind. Ill health may prevent that exercise and

discipline which are necessary to the first development of the mental faculties. After they have received their due development, sickness and disease may impede and impair their use. Ill health, when long-continued, incapacitates for the active discharge of the duties of life, and often begets a languor and listlessness which render us insensible or indifferent to the claims of others. Occupied with our own sufferings, we may become peevish and fretful—a burden to ourselves and to all around. These effects, no doubt, may be, and ought to be, guarded against; and ill health, when not occasioned by our own fault or negligence, should be borne with patience and resignation. But it is often difficult to do so; and it is obviously the duty of all who would lead a virtuous and happy life to take all reasonable care of their bodily health, as necessary to the strength and serenity of their mind, and to the active and cheerful performance of the part assigned to them in the business of life.

The knowledge of the means most suitable to preserve or to restore the health of the body belongs to the physician, and is given under the head of *Dietetics* or *Hygienics*. *Gymnastics* include such exercises as are calculated to give vigorous development to the bodily frame; while *Callisthenics* aim at making its movements easy and graceful. Of these the moralist does not treat. But there is one thing connected with the care and management of the body which may be said to partake of the nature of a moral virtue—viz., *Cleanliness*.

This is a duty to which we are prompted by our natural feelings, and is important, not only as contributing directly to the health and comfort of the body, but also to the strength and purity of the mind. Many diseases originate in a want of *Cleanliness*, and may be cured by attention to it. And it has been remarked that they who are careless about the clean and wholesome state of the body are not often distinguished by the purity or spirituality of their thoughts. Hence it is that attention to *Cleanliness* has often been conjoined with the observances of religion. This connection was strictly attended to under the Old Testament dispensation. And the words of the Apostle seem to intimate more than a merely local connection between having the heart sprinkled from an evil conscience, and the body washed with pure water.

Another duty which may here be mentioned is *Decency*—meaning by the word, in this connection, an attention to modesty in the dress and deportment of the body. This duty has reference to certain

natural feelings of shame, which lead us to regard some parts and postures of the body as unseemly. These feelings are liable to be altered and modified, and what is reckoned unseemly at one time and in one place may not be reckoned so at another. But every wise and good man will guard against giving offence to the feelings of others by any unseemly bodily demeanour or deportment. It shows a want of good sense and of proper respect to one's self to do so.

In relation to the duty of preserving and promoting health some cases of a casuistical kind have been put. "He who inoculates himself for small-pox," says Kant (*Metaphys. of Eth.*, 8vo., Edin. 1836, p. 261), "hazards his life on an uncertainty. Is such inoculation lawful?" There can be no hesitation to answer this question in the affirmative. The question whether this or any other form of disease or sickness may be voluntarily contracted or encountered, with a view to the general improvement of health, demands a little more caution and consideration. The flames of a fever have sometimes burnt out some poison lurking in the blood. Sea-sickness, though not without danger to some, has proved beneficial to others. These are cases for the decision of the physician. But the moralist must unequivocally condemn the advice, which is sometimes thoughtlessly given, and as thoughtlessly taken, of having recourse to rioting and excess, to give a stimulus to a torpid stomach. Prompted by benevolence, Howard plunged into the unwholesomeness of the dungeon and the infection of the prison-house, and met, himself, with the death which he wished to ward off from others. Florence Nightingale nearly lost her own gentle life in tending the wounded and the dying. But all are not capable of such heroic virtue—perhaps all are not called to exercise it. The education and experience of the physician make his professional visits to infected places less dangerous to him than to others. The minister of religion cannot, in every case, carry his consolations to the bedside of the sick and the dying with safety to himself. But the differences in bodily constitution and temperament, and in mental fortitude and firmness, are so great, that no positive or imperative rule can be laid down on this head, and every one must be left to his own sense of prudence and responsibility.

SECTION III.—*The duty of Self-conservation includes not merely the Preservation of Life, and the Promotion of Health, but also the Providing of the Means of enjoying both, by taking care of our wealth or outward estate.*

Dr. Johnson, in a letter to Boswell (*Life of Johnson*, 12mo. 1835, vol. viii. p. 143), “Resolve not to be poor. Whatever you have, spend less. Poverty is a great enemy to human happiness: it certainly destroys liberty; and makes some virtues impracticable, and others extremely difficult.” (See *The Rambler*, No. 202.) Wealth may tempt to sensuality and self-indulgence; but poverty also has its temptations and evils. No wise nor good man can be insensible to them. His sense or apprehension of them will not beget in him any undue love of wealth, nor prompt to any undue means of obtaining it. But it will lead him to secure, by diligent and honourable exertion, a competent portion of the good things of this life. The body, when deprived, through poverty, of necessary and suitable nourishment and clothing, may languish and decay, or be assailed by infirmity and disease; while the mind, filled with anxious and corroding cares, may become incapable of any good thought. With a view both to his virtue and his happiness, it is obviously the duty of a wise man to seek and to secure the means of living in a manner suitable to his condition and circumstances.

Wealth may come by inheritance, or it may be acquired by labour, and thus give rise to the duties of *Industry* and *Economy*. When it has to be acquired, this is to be done by devoting ourselves, with activity and zeal, to some fair and honourable calling, and thus providing things honest in the sight of all men. When wealth is already in possession, it should be husbanded with care, and expended with *Economy*, that poverty and its attendant evils may be averted from ourselves, and the wants of our poorer brethren supplied, in some measure, out of our abundance.

These duties of *Industry* and *Economy* are, in some sense, and to some extent, incumbent upon all. It is common, indeed, to speak of the industrial, and economical, and professional classes, in contradistinction to those who are not compelled to labour for their daily bread, nor called on to exert their talents in any particular department of art or science. But all are bound to avoid idleness, which is the rust of the mind, and the occasion of vice; and they who

wisely consult for their own happiness, will find that it is most likely to be promoted and secured by fixing on some fair and honourable pursuit, and prosecuting it with activity and diligence. In like manner, the duty of *Economy* is not to be confined to those whose resources are limited. Wealth and poverty are terms altogether relative. What is wealth to one man would be poverty to another. But, while all are under obligation to provide for the supply of their reasonable wants, it becomes those who are rich, as well as those who are reckoned poor, to husband their resources. So long as their expenditure is suitable to their condition in life, and proportioned to their income, they cannot be blamed. But they have no right to waste any surplus in extravagance or folly; and, having secured their own comfort, they should seek next, by *Frugality* and *Economy*, to increase the comfort and to better the condition of those around them, who have been less fortunate in this respect than themselves. For we are bound to look not merely to our own things, but every man also to the things of his neighbour.

Industry is opposed to indolence or idleness. *Economy* is opposed to prodigality or profuseness. *Frugality* is opposed to luxuriousness.

Some sound remarks on the duty of preserving our bodily health, and promoting our wealth or outward estate, may be found in Cicero, *De Officiis*, lib. ii. cap. 24. On the Advantages arising from Wealth, honestly acquired, v. Gilbart, *Lect. on Ancient Commerce*, 1847, pp. 166-8.

CHAPTER II.

OF SELF-CULTURE.

If the duties under the head of Self-conservation relate primarily and directly, though not exclusively, to the bodily life, those which come under this second head relate chiefly to the mind. It was called by Lord Bacon *Mental husbandry*, or the *Georgics of the mind*.

The mind, like the body, has powers and capacities which are native, and which are continually tending towards development. But this development may be retarded or promoted; and in doing what we can to promote it, the duty of *Self-culture* may be said to consist. The education which is given by parents and guardians

and teachers, may prepare for the discharge of this duty, but ought not to supersede it. Man, as a rational and responsible being, must educate himself. And his education, in this view of it, does not terminate with childhood or youth, but only with his life. So long as he lives he should be learning how to do his duty better, and how to improve his opportunities more fully. The field of knowledge is wide and various, and the field of action is no less so. Ignorance is to be dispelled and error avoided. Mistake and folly are to be guarded against. What is true and good is to be sought after, and what is right and prudent is to be done. The intellect is to be enlightened and strengthened, the affections purified and elevated, and the whole character brought under the cognizance and direction of Reason and Conscience, with a view to the discharge of duty and the enjoyment of happiness.

SECTION I.—*Self-culture may be regarded as including the improvement of the Intellectual Powers, or the Powers conversant with Knowledge.*

Man has a natural desire of knowledge, and powers fitted to acquire it. He is surrounded with objects which stimulate his curiosity and reward his research. These objects possess properties adapted to his nature and condition—fitted to supply his wants and multiply his enjoyments. It is obviously, therefore, the duty of man to cultivate those powers which have been given to him for the acquisition of knowledge and the promotion of happiness. (*Locke, On the Conduct of the Understanding.*) And the culture of the cognitive powers should extend not merely to the Intellect and its operations, by which knowledge is acquired, but should include the improvement of the Memory, by which knowledge is retained and recalled, and rendered subservient to our future use. It is through Memory that we obtain all the advantages of Experience. “It is thus we are enabled to appreciate dangers and the means of safety,—learn to fear and to hope according to probabilities, instead of being agitated by the suggestions of an extravagant imagination. By experience we bring many opinions to the test, become assured of their validity, or detect their fallacy; and, in our pursuit of other plans and other objects, we are encouraged to proceed with more boldness on the one hand, and warned, on the other, into more caution, according to former results in cases that appeared to be similar.” (*Cogan, Ethic Treat. on Passions*, p. 248.)

SECTION II.—*Self-culture may be regarded as including the improvement of the Powers of Taste.*

In addition to his bodily senses, which are the inlets of so much knowledge, and which may be the sources of so much pleasure, man has certain internal senses, or finer powers of perception, by which he is made aware of what is beautiful or sublime in the works of nature or the triumphs of art. The germ of these powers or capacities is to be found in every human being, and none of the powers or capacities of our nature are more susceptible of cultivation and improvement, or more capable of yielding pleasure. And this pleasure is open to all. The hardest and most laborious occupation¹ cannot render men insensible to the beauties and sublimities of nature. All may wander by the bank of some murmuring stream, or climb to the top of some rugged mountain, look round upon the green earth bedecked with flowers, or look up to the blue vault of heaven bespangled with stars. Such contemplations are accompanied by a pleasure which is not only pure in itself, but imparts its purity to the mind which indulges them. And it is to be lamented that the negligence of so many, more than their necessities, should prevent them from participating in this pleasure. For this adaptation between the works of nature and the mind of man is obviously designed as a source of human happiness; and it is as obviously the duty of all to cultivate those capacities from which this pleasure results.

With regard to the pleasure which is derived from contemplating the productions of the fine arts, all may not have it equally in their power to share. But it has been remarked that, "From the diffusion of the sense of beauty in ancient Greece, and of the taste for music in modern Germany, we learn that the people at large may partake of refined gratifications which have hitherto been thought to be necessarily restricted to a few." (Channing, *On Self-culture*, p. 17.) Still it may be said, in reference to the pleasure derivable from the fine arts, that, in order to the full and proper enjoyment of it, there

Ask the swain [day's Who journeys homewards from a summer's Long labour, why, forgetful of his toils And due repose, he loiters to behold The sunshine gleaming, as through amber clouds,	O'er all the western sky; full soon, I ween, His rude expression and untutored air, Beyond the power of language, will unfold The form of Beauty smiling at his heart."
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AKENBIDE.

is required a preparation and expense which all cannot encounter; but they who can have sources of exquisite delight opened up to them. Nor is this all. Somewhat of the purity and beauty which the mind contemplates is transfused into the mind itself, and the outward conduct assumes a gracefulness² and propriety from familiarity with the models of all that is graceful or becoming. They who by profession, and they who by inclination, are devoted to the fine arts, should see that the cultivation of them is productive of its proper effect upon the cultivation of their mind in other respects, and upon their general demeanour and conduct. For man is bound not merely to acknowledge what is True and what is Beautiful, but also what is Right. And—

SECTION III.—Self-culture may be regarded as including the improvement of the Moral Sentiments.

There is a moral Taste, a capacity of being affected by the contemplation of what is fair and becoming in moral conduct, which is somewhat analogous to our sense of the Sublime and Beautiful in the works of nature and the productions of art. The pleasing admiration with which we contemplate deeds of stern integrity or of generous kindness is somewhat the same in kind with that which arises from the exercise of our powers of Taste. And as a source of happiness and enjoyment it may be well to cultivate this moral sensibility. But it ought not to take the place, as Shaftesbury and others would have it to do, of the Moral Faculty properly so called. This faculty, or combination of faculties, includes discerning or judging as well as feeling. Like our other faculties it is gradually developed, and, in its development, it is very liable to be affected and altered by various influences. Hence the necessity and importance of attending to the cultivation of this master faculty. Conscience is in truth the great dispenser of happiness or misery to man. If conscience be clear, and its commands obeyed, all is peace and serenity. If conscience be doubtful, or its dictates disregarded, there

The attentive mind,
By this harmonious action on her powers,
Becomes herself harmonious: wont, so oft,
In outward things, to meditate the charm
Of sacred order, soon she seeks, at home,
To find a kindred order; to exert,

| Within herself, this elegance of love,
This fair inspired delight: her temper'd
powers
Refine at length, and every passion wears
A chaster, milder, more attractive mien."
AKENSHIE.

is nothing but confusion and every evil work. It is the duty, therefore, of every wise and good man to have his conscience so exercised as clearly to discern between Right and Wrong. All tampering with its dictates and all stifling of its feelings are carefully to be avoided; and it is to be preserved void of offence both towards man and towards God. For—

SECTION IV.—*Self-culture may be regarded as including the Improvement of the Religious Sentiments.*

Conscience, when truly enlightened, in laying down the law of Right and Wrong, has reference to a law higher than its own. It carries us out of ourselves, and above ourselves, to Him who is the Fountain of all law and all rectitude; and in doing so it opens up a fresh source of enjoyment. Man never attains to the true dignity of his nature till he rises to a sense and acknowledgment of God, and cherishes those sentiments of gratitude and reverence which are due from the creature to the Creator. In lifting his thoughts from things seen and temporal to those things which are unseen and eternal—in linking his weakness and insufficiency with the perfection and fulness of the Infinite—in looking on himself as formed in the image of the Divine immortality, and as destined to share yet more of the Divine goodness,—he is filled with lofty and pleasing anticipations, which shed serenity over his mind and purity over his conduct. He who neglects to indulge in such contemplations, and to cherish the sentiments which spring from them, neglects at once his duty and his happiness.

SECTION V.—*Formation of Opinions.*

Our *Opinions* have a powerful and extensive influence upon our conduct and happiness in life; and the formation of them is an important part of self-culture.⁸

Many of our *Opinions* are the result of early education, others are accepted in deference to authority, while others are acquiesced in through indolence, imitation, or example. But, whenever larger experience or greater knowledge shows any of them to be erroneous, we should dismiss them, and surrender our judgment to more correct

⁸ See Ferguson, *Moral and Political Science*, Part II. chap. i. sect. 8.

views. For it is only in so far as we form a fair estimate of our nature and condition, that our conduct can be virtuous, or our life happy. It is equally important that we should form right *Opinions* of those around us in the world, that we may give them credit for the good qualities which they possess, and cherish towards them the esteem which they deserve. To think that all human actions are prompted by selfishness, that benevolence is never disinterested, nor gratitude sincere, are *Opinions* which cannot promote the happiness of those who hold them; and a wise and good man will be on his guard against the hollow reasonings and delusive appearances which may be urged in support of them. To look upon this world as a scene of moral confusion and disorder, where vice is exalted and virtue depressed, is to take the exception for the rule, and to give way to views which fret and vex. And, therefore, he who wisely consults his happiness will be careful to form correct views of this life, and of the laws according to which it is governed. Trusting in the wisdom and goodness of Providence, he will seek and find his happiness in discharging the duties of the station which has been assigned to him, in bearing up under its difficulties and improving its advantages, in preserving the peace of his mind and the approbation of his conscience, and in cherishing a stedfast faith in the government of God, and a cheerful acquiescence in all its arrangements. (*Reid, Act. Pow.*, Essay iii. pt. 2, ch. 8; *Essays on the Formation and Publication of Opinions*, Lond. 1821).

SECTION VI.—*Of the Formation of Habits.*

It has been strikingly said by Paley, that “the art in which the secret of human happiness in a great measure consists, is to *set the Habits* in such a manner that every change may be a change for the better.” Unfortunately, however, many of our *Habits* are contracted in early years, and acquire such a power over us that they have been called a “second nature.” But although inveterate, they may be counteracted and overcome; and every wise and good man will endeavour to do so, in so far as he sees them to be vicious or wrong.

With regard to the formation of *Habits* in more mature years, the maxim of Pythagoras was—“Choose that course of action which is best, and custom will render it agreeable.” All, therefore, who have

it in their power to choose their path or profession in life, should choose that which is exposed to fewest temptations, and likely to be productive of the greatest advantages. Any inconveniences which may attend it will gradually lessen, and it will come to be persevered in with increasing satisfaction. And all who at any time have allowed themselves to do what is wrong should be on their guard, lest, by a repetition of the act, they bring themselves under the power of an evil *Habit*, but should study rather to secure this power in favour of virtue, so that the practice of it may become easy, and the effects of it beneficial and happy.

CHAPTER III.

OF SELF-CONTROL.

“ *Animum rege, qui nisi paret
Imperat.*”

MUCH of what may be said of *Self-control* or *Self-government* belongs to the cardinal duty of Temperance. This term has sometimes been employed, in a large sense, to denote that mediocrity or moderation in which, according to some ancient philosophers, all virtue consists. In the New Testament Scriptures the word which is translated temperance is *εὐκράτεια*, “ power over one’s self,” and comprehends the whole of *Self-government*. So that under this head may be included all those duties incumbent upon man regarded as an individual, which consist in restraining and regulating the active powers and propensities of his nature.

The end or aim of these duties is not to eradicate or extirpate, but to check or prune; not to obliterate any of the powers and propensities of our nature, but to regulate and govern them—to keep each and all of them in due subordination and order, and to make them, as they were intended to be, the useful stimulants to activity and improvement, and our guides and directors to those pleasures which have been provided for us, and of which it may be consistent with innocence and virtue to taste.

The duty of *Self-control* may be viewed—

SECTION I.—*In reference to our Natural Appetites.*

These are commonly reckoned to be three—viz., *Hunger*, *Thirst*, and the *Appetite of Sex*.

Hunger, or the appetite for food, has been given for the purpose of warning us to take, in due season and in due measure, the aliment which is necessary to sustain our bodily frame in health and vigour. The pleasure which attends it diminishes or disappears when the appetite has received its natural gratification, and therefore is not to be sought for its own sake, or rested in as an ultimate end; but is chiefly to be enjoyed in subservience to the purpose for which the appetite was implanted.

The vices to which the indulgence of this appetite may lead are *Gluttony* and *Luxuriousness*.

Gluttony is intemperance as to the *quantity* of food. It is a vice which is not more injurious to the bodily health than it is hurtful to the vigour and clearness of the mind. It reduces those who give way to it lower than the inferior animals, who are seldom oppressed or overpowered by the gratification of their natural appetites. It weakens the body, enfeebles the mind, and renders those who indulge in it the slaves of the lowest part of their nature, incapable of any generous aspiration or of any active and manly exertion, and the victims, very often, of a premature and unpitied death.

Luxuriousness is excessive delicacy as to the *kind* or *quality* of our food. In so far as one kind of food may be more agreeable than another, there can be no evil in preferring it. But to train and educate the senses so as to form strange and unnatural tastes—to spend much time and money in devising and procuring new articles of food and new modes of administering them—is altogether unworthy of a rational and immortal being. The plainest food is often eaten with a relish which the most costly and curiously prepared viands cannot give. The bread of the labouring man is sweet, while the banquet of the idle and luxurious is flat and insipid. Nature is sure to avenge the wrongs which are offered to her. The weariness and disgust which come to wait upon those who have run to excess in riotous living are much worse to bear than the cravings of hunger or the uneasiness of appetite not fully appeased. The state to which, all should aspire, and to which generally speaking, all may easily attain, is, that they may be able to live in a manner

suitable to their condition, and to do so with all moderation and thankfulness.

Fasting, or total abstinence from food for a time, is a practice which has prevailed in all ages and among all nations. It is plain, however, that, separate from the motives which may lead to it, or the effects which may follow from it, there can be no virtue in merely abstaining from food. Our duty and our happiness are to be found, not in running counter to our natural appetites, but in restraining and governing them—in seeing that they answer the ends for which they were given, and that they do not interfere with ends which are higher and nobler. There may be particular seasons or circumstances in which *Fasting* may be thought becoming and proper. There may be particular constitutions of body or of mind, or of both, to which it may be useful. But the duty to which we are called in reference to the appetite for food, is that of moderation, and not of abstinence. It may be a counsel of prudence, occasionally to abstain altogether from food; but it is the law of right reason to be at all times temperate and thankful in the use of it.

Thirst is another of our natural appetites which requires to be controlled and governed. It has been noticed that, in almost all countries, the means which are employed for quenching *Thirst* are means which lead to intoxication. And this is a circumstance which renders the exercise of *Self-control* peculiarly necessary in reference to the gratification of this appetite. To remove the uneasy sensation of *Thirst* is lawful and right; but it is wrong, in doing so, to superadd the delirium of intoxication. No vice can be named which is more productive of misery to man than drunkenness. It ruins the health, wastes the substance, and shortens the life. It alienates friends, raises up enemies, scatters discord and strife, and surrounds its deluded victims with utter wretchedness. Nor are the intemperate themselves the only sufferers. Their family and friends are often deeply involved in the calamity and ruin which flow from their vice. Their companions and associates are often led astray by their example; and when the intemperate pause in their mad career, and survey the ruin which they have drawn around them, they find that it extends far beyond their own wretched bosoms, and includes those, perhaps, to whom they should have been a protection and an example, or stretches to their whole neighbourhood, of which they have become the pestilence and curse.

Food and drink should be taken to refresh and invigorate nature,

not to oppress or overpower it; and the rule of *Self-government* in reference to these appetites is, that we should feel ourselves more ready for the discharge of any duty, after they have been gratified, than we were before.

Somewhat similar to the question as to *Fasting* is the question as to the duty of abstaining from the use of intoxicating liquors. It is a question on which every one must use his own discretion. Great though the duty be which we owe to our brother, that duty can demand nothing inconsistent with duty to ourselves. It cannot, therefore, be imperatively required of us altogether to abstain from things which it is lawful and right to take in due measure, merely because others go wrong in the use of them. Our neighbour has no right to expect or call for such a sacrifice of our natural liberty, or such an abridgment of our reasonable comfort, at our hands. That we may voluntarily make such a sacrifice depends upon the prospect of the advantage to result from it. If it cost us little or no effort, and occasion no harm or inconvenience to ourselves, while at the same time it may have the effect of rousing the careless or reclaiming the vicious, then it may not only be lawful but right for us altogether to refrain from the use of those things which are so commonly taken to excess. On the other hand, if our health is to be injured or threatened, if our comfort is to be diminished, and sickness and querulousness to ensue, or even if our ordinary habits of sober gratification, and the general tenor and usefulness of a temperate life, are to be broken in upon, we are under no obligation to abstinence. On the contrary, we are bound to consult our health and happiness and general usefulness, by the sober and temperate use of those gratifications which God, in his great goodness, has provided for us.

The *Appetite of Sex*, when duly governed, gives rise to the virtues of *Chastity* and *Continence*, and, when unduly indulged, to the vices of *Incontinence* and *Licentiousness*.

The duty of *Self-control* in reference to this appetite is much more extensive and important than it is generally thought to be. It extends to the regulation of the heart, and checks and excludes every impure feeling or imagination — to the government of the tongue, and forbids all loose and licentious conversation, as well as to all outward and actual violations of the rules of *Continence* and *Chastity*. *

The arguments in favour of *Self-control* in reference to this, and our other appetites are, it is the will of God, the dictate of reason,

the happiness of our nature, and the virtue of our condition, to be temperate in all things. And there is no species of intemperance which is more hurtful in its consequences than excess in reference to this appetite. They who give way to it surrender themselves to a slavery the most tyrannical and degrading. They ruin the purity and the peace of their mind, waste their health and substance, and expose themselves to contempt and infamy. They gradually lose all regard for everything good and reputable, and crust themselves over with a leprosy of iniquity, which renders them unfit and unsafe for any society but that of those whom they have rendered wicked and worthless as themselves.

When treating psychologically of *Appetite* (Part I.), it was noticed that there are several bodily tendencies which resemble our appetites. They originate in a state of body, and are accompanied by an uneasy sensation, which prompts instinctively to what is to remove them for a time. Such are, a tendency to activity, which is manifested by the young of all animals, a tendency to rest after fatigue, a tendency to sleep after long waking, and a tendency to seek warmth and shelter. The gratification of these tendencies, like the gratification of the natural appetites, is necessary to the preservation of life and the promotion of health. In illustrating them we would be led to show the salutary and restorative influences of air, exercise, and sleep. But such illustration would partake more of a physiological than a psychological character. As to the ethical view of the matter, it may be sufficient to remark, that the duty of *Self-control*, which we have illustrated in reference to our appetites, extends to the gratification of these natural tendencies and the supply of these natural wants, and that there is the same room and the same reason for moderation in reference to them. When they are too much yielded to they may give rise to the vices of *Restlessness* on the one hand, and *Indolence* on the other. And it is the duty of a wise and good man to guard against both.

The duty of *Self-control* may be viewed—

SECTION II.—*In reference to our Desires and Passions.*

Some of our *Desires* manifest themselves as primary and natural tendencies, carrying us to particular ends or objects, between which and our nature there is an original suitableness or adaptation. Others of them spring up, in the course of experience, towards objects which

have been found to be agreeable or useful, and thus come to be desired. In reference to both classes there is room for *Self-control*. If we have certain natural tendencies carrying us toward particular ends or objects, then it becomes us to see that those tendencies are not too much yielded to, and allowed to draw us away from things that may be more important. And watchfulness in this matter is the more necessary, because our *Desires* gives us no warning, as our appetites do, when the natural boundary of indulgence has been passed. They do not abate by the attainment of their objects, but "grow by what they feed on;" and *Desires* which in themselves are natural, and in some measure allowable, assume a secondary or excessive form, and give birth to new *Desires*, which it may be neither natural nor right to cherish.

It might be interesting and useful to take up in succession the several *Desires* and *Passions* of which we are susceptible, and to lay down the rules and restraints which, in the exercise of *Self-control*, should be imposed on each and all of them. A more general view must suffice.

Among the chief objects of human desire and human pursuit are—*Honour, Wealth, and Pleasure*.

It is natural and right to desire the approbation and esteem of others, and to seek those marks of distinction and *Honour* to which they lead. But the honours and applause of the world may be valued too highly, and sought too eagerly. And the duty of *Self-control*, in respect of these, will guard against valuing them too highly, and seeking them too eagerly—against being overjoyed by the attainment of them, or too much cast down by the loss of them.

Wealth is a fair and laudable object of desire and activity. It is a desire, however, which is very ready to grow by the acquisition of its object. And when the desire becomes excessive, the true use and value of the object, as a means of doing good, is lost sight of, and the mere possession of it rested in as an ultimate end. The loss of it is regarded as the greatest of all calamities, and is followed by the deepest dejection and misery. The office of *Self-control* is to restrain the inordinate love of *Wealth*, and moderate the anxious and excessive pursuit of it—to check the being too much elated by the acquisition of it, or unreasonably depressed by the loss of it.

It is lawful and right moderately to taste those *Pleasures* which gratify the innocent sensibilities of our nature, and temperately to join in those rational amusements which serve to recruit the mind

after great exertion, and to prepare it for future activity. As sleep is necessary to refresh the powers of the body, so relaxation and amusement are useful in restoring the energies of the mind; and the Scripture hath said that there is a time to dance and a time to sing. But there is great risk of running to excess in these things, and sinking into idleness and frivolity, or something worse. The office of *Self-control* is to guard against the gradual encroachments of a love of *Pleasures* and amusements, which, though not positively wrong, may come to absorb the whole heart and consume the whole time, rendering us insensible to our proper duties, and at length incapable of discharging them.

The duty of *Self-control* might be further illustrated as manifested in the regulation of the *Affections* and *Feelings*. But as the *Affections*, whether benevolent or malevolent, such as gratitude and resentment, compassion and friendship, have reference to our fellow-creatures, what may be said as to the regulation and government of them comes more properly under the head of *Social Ethics*. But there is still one very important topic, belonging to the head of *Individual Ethics*, which demands our attention. We have seen how the duty of *Self-control* may be manifested in reference to our natural appetites, and our natural desires and passions—the virtues which are called forth in resisting the solicitations of sense and the incitements to pleasure, and the vices which spring from sensuality and self-indulgence. But in the conduct of life we are called on not merely to resist temptation, but also to encounter danger and difficulty and to overcome pain and evil, or properly to bear them when they cannot be overcome. We have now therefore to consider the duty of *Self-control*.

SECTION III.—*In reference to the Trials and Hardships of Life.*

Much of what has been said of *Self-government* as manifested in reference to our natural appetites and desires belongs to the cardinal virtue of *Temperance*—the office of which is to strengthen the mind against the enticements of pleasure and those things agreeable to our nature, by which we may be drawn into excess and vice. Much of what is now to be said of *Self-government* as manifested in reference to the trials and hardships of life comes under the cardinal virtue of *Fortitude*—the office of which is to sustain and confirm the mind in

adhering to what is right, in opposition to pain and difficulty. *Temperance* regulates our desires and indulgences; *Fortitude* restrains our fears and sustains our weakness. It is necessary to the attainment and maintenance of all the virtues. The path of duty is encompassed with hardships, and he who walks in it must be prepared to encounter them. Hence said Cicero—" *Nemo justus esse potest, qui mortem, qui dolorem, qui exilium, qui egestatem timet.*"

Fortitude has been distinguished into *Active* and *Passive*, according as the evils against which it is directed are to be encountered and overcome, or endured and submitted to. This is nearly equivalent to the distinction between *Magnanimity* and *Equanimity*—two virtues much insisted on by the ancient ethical writers.

" *Magnanimity* is a certain greatness of mind which raises a man above the influence of the good or evil things of this world, so that he does not think the one necessary to make him happy, nor leave it in the power of the other to make him miserable." An animated description is given of it by Cicero, *De Officiis*, lib. i. cap. 20. It is not so properly a single virtue, as a state or disposition of mind from which *Fortitude* and other virtues may spring. It includes a superiority to the fear of danger and also to the fear of reproach. Fabius Maximus, who showed himself superior to both, is given as an example of *Magnanimity*.

Equanimity denotes an even, uniform temper of mind, amidst all the changes of life. One of this temper is not fawning and servile when poor and dependent, nor haughty and overbearing when rich and powerful—but kind and respectful in both conditions. Such was the character of him of whom Horace said—

" *Omnis Aristippum decuit, color, et status, et res.*"

" All parts and fortunes he alike became."

Great commendation is bestowed on *Equanimity* by Cicero, *De Officiis*, lib. i. cap. 26. In popular language, *Magnanimity* is employed to denote greatness of spirit in encountering and overcoming danger and difficulty, and so corresponds in signification to *Active Fortitude*; while *Equanimity* imports the suitable bearing of adversity, and so is equivalent in meaning to *Passive Fortitude*.

Active Fortitude comprehends *Resolution* or *Constancy*, and *Intrepidity* or *Courage*.

Resolution or *Constancy* is that steadiness with which a good man

regards his duty as binding and important, and the firmness with which he adheres to it, although he knows the calamities which the performance of it may bring upon him. The example of *Constancy* which the ancient ethical writers delighted to give, was that of Regulus, who dissuaded the Romans from exchanging prisoners with the Carthaginians, although he knew that by doing so he was to meet with a cruel death.

Intrepidity or *Courage* is firmness and presence of mind in the midst of danger. *Resolution* or *Constancy* is manifested under evil from which no escape can be hoped for, and implies a steady adherence to duty even when the consequences are foreseen to be fatal; whereas *Intrepidity* or *Courage* is manifested in the midst of dangers which may be overcome, and implies that command or composure of mind which can adopt means of escape. The soldier who remains firm at his post, when he knows that a mine is to be sprung under his feet, manifests *Resolution* or *Constancy*; while he who falls into an ambuscade, and retains that presence of mind which enables him to adopt means of escape, manifests *Intrepidity* or *Courage*.

The vices which are opposed to *Resolution* or *Constancy*, and to *Intrepidity* or *Courage*, are, *Irresolution* or *Inconstancy*, by which a man is easily diverted from the path of duty on the appearance of danger or difficulty; and *Cowardice* or *Fearfulness*, by which he is deprived of all self-possession, and shrinks from things which he ought to encounter and overcome. The extreme of *Intrepidity* or *Courage* is *Rashness*, which rushes upon danger and difficulty when they do not interfere with the discharge of any duty. *Resolution* or *Constancy*, when carried to an extreme, may degenerate into *Obstinacy*. But as the course in which *Resolution* urges us to persevere is presumed to be a virtuous course, we can only be said to adhere to it too constantly when it is seen that a higher duty will be violated by our doing so. This, however, is very seldom the case.

The manifestations of *Passive Fortitude* may all be included under *Patience*.

Humility is a temper of mind which makes us slow in taking offence at any slight or disrespect which may be shown to us. *Meekness* enables us to bear, with composure, wrong and injury. But both may be included under the general term *Patience*, which denotes the calm endurance of the evils to which we are liable. So long as any prospect of escape or relief remains, it becomes us actively to employ the means

of accomplishing it." But when hope of deliverance is altogether shut out, then it becomes us patiently to submit to the evil which has come upon us.

Arguments in favour of the exercise of *Patience* are derived from the fading and inconstant nature of all worldly advantages—from the insufficiency of them to constitute true or complete happiness—from the desirableness of having our minds under all circumstances tranquil and at ease—and from the misery and unprofitableness of fretfulness and murmuring. But the great argument in favour of the exercise of this virtue is derived from the fact, that the pains and evils to which we are here exposed form part of the moral government of God—that they are not designed unnecessarily to grieve or afflict us; but that they are intended and calculated to improve our nature and advance our happiness, and that it is at once our duty and our interest calmly and patiently to submit to them.

The vices to be guarded against under this head are *Discontentment, Murmuring, Fretfulness, Peevishness, and Impatience*. In guarding against these, there is much room for the exercise of *Self-control*, which may thus be viewed—

SECTION IV.—*In reference to the Temper.*

"I have always preferred *Cheerfulness* to *Mirth*. The latter I consider as an act, the former as a habit of the mind. Mirth is short and transient, cheerfulness fixed and permanent. Those are often raised into the greatest transports of mirth who are subject to the greatest depression of melancholy: on the contrary, cheerfulness, though it does not give the mind such an exquisite gladness, prevents us from falling into any depths of sorrow. Mirth is like a flash of lightning that breaks through a gloom of clouds, and glitters for a moment; cheerfulness keeps up a kind of daylight in the mind, and fills it with a steady and perpetual serenity."—ADDISON, *Spectator*, p. 381.

In some remarks which he makes on the influence of the *Temper* on Happiness, Mr. Stewart (*Act. Pow.*, book iv. ch. 4, sect. 3) uses the word *Temper*, "to denote the habitual state of a man's mind in point of *irascibility*; or, in other words, to mark the habitual predominance of the *benevolent* or *malevolent* affections in his intercourse with his fellow-creatures." It is here used to denote the prevailing tone or turn of a man's mind, not so much in reference to his intercourse with his fellow-creatures, as in reference to his individual

character and his condition or lot in life. "The balance of our animal principles (that is, of the desires, and affections, and passions), "I think," says Dr. Reid (*Act. Pow.*, Essay iii. pt. ii. ch. 8), "constitutes what we call a man's *natural temper*; which may be good or bad, without regard to his virtue." In the proper government of the *Temper*, whether it be naturally good or bad, there is a wide field for the practice of virtue and the promotion of happiness.

The causes which affect or alter the *Temper* are chiefly the following—viz., *Prosperity* or *Adversity*, *Health* or *Sickness*.

BOOK II.

SOCIAL ETHICS.

“ Philosophy consists not
In airy schemes or idle speculations :
The rule and conduct of all social life
Is her great province.”—THOMSON, *Coriolanus*.

THE duties which respect our fellow-creatures are commonly treated of under the two great heads of *Justice* and *Benevolence*. In adopting this division, let it be understood that acts of *Justice* should be done with a feeling of *Benevolence* or good-will towards those who are the objects of them, and that what we call acts of *Benevolence* are in truth acts of *Justice*—they are due to our fellow-creatures in the circumstances in which they are placed—they are due to our own social and rational nature—and they are in accordance with the arrangements of Providence and the will of God. When we call the one class duties of *Justice* and the other class duties of *Benevolence*, it is not meant that the ethical obligation to discharge the one is stronger than the ethical obligation to discharge the other. Both have their foundation in our moral nature and in our social condition, and, in the eye of the moralist, both are equally binding.

Mr. Hume says that “ *Benevolence* is a natural virtue, while *Justice* is an artificial or conventional virtue.” He confines the term natural to those virtues to which we are prompted by certain feelings and affections belonging to our constitution, which give strength and efficacy to the moral sentiments from which they derive their obligation. Thus, there are various affections and feelings in our nature which concur with our moral faculty in impelling us to kindness and compassion; but none, he thinks, that concur with that faculty in impelling us to *Justice*; and hence he would

call the one natural and the other artificial. It may, however, fairly be doubted whether a sense of *Justice* is not as natural¹ to man as a feeling of kindness or compassion. No sooner are we capable of framing the notion of what is just than we feel our obligation to do it. We are uneasy so long as it is not done, just as we are uneasy so long as distress is not relieved. The duty of doing justly is founded in our nature as deeply as the duty of showing mercy. They are both natural, and they are both binding. (See Reid, *Act. Pow.*, Essay v. ch. 5; Stewart, *Phil. of Act. and Mor. Pow.*, book iv. ch. 2.)

But many of the duties of strict *Justice* are enforced by positive or civil law, while those of *Benevolence* are not. A man can be compelled to pay his debts, but not to give alms. And this is one of the points of difference between *Morality* and *Jurisprudence*. Both rest upon the great law of right and wrong, as made known by the light of nature. *Morality* enjoins us to do what is *right*, because it is right. *Jurisprudence* enjoins us to give to others their *right*, with ultimate reference, no doubt, to the truth made known to us by the light of nature, that we are morally bound to do so; but appealing more directly to the fact, that our doing so can be demanded by our neighbour, and that his demand will be enforced by the authority of positive law. This difference is sometimes expressed by saying that what is enjoined by *Jurisprudence* is of *perfect obligation*, and what is enjoined only by *Morality* is of *imperfect obligation*. But these phrases are objectionable, in so far as they tend to represent the obligations of *Morality* as inferior to those of *Jurisprudence*; whereas the latter rest upon the former, and the law of nations derives its binding force from the law of nature.¹ The true ground of difference is that duties of the one class are *determinate*, and admit of being enjoined by positive law; whereas duties of the other class are *indeterminate*, and cannot well be enjoined by positive law.

The difference between *Morality* and *Jurisprudence*, as to extent of range, has been illustrated by the difference between the word *Right*, when used as an adjective, and when used as a substantive. (Whewell, *Elements of Morality*, No. 84.) The sphere of *Morality* is wider than that of *Jurisprudence*—the former embracing all that is *right*, the latter only particular *rights* realized or vested in par-

¹ "Nos ad justitiam esse natos, neque opinione, sed natura constitutum esse ius."—Cicero, *De Legg.* lib. I. § 10.

ticular persons. *Jurisprudence* comprehends not even the whole of social duty, but only those parts of it which have been made the subject of positive institution. It will be proper, therefore, to consider the *Social Ethics* under the two heads of *Justice* and *Benevolence*. But in treating of the former, it may be well to take advantage of such terms and distinctions as have been introduced by Jurists, as a help towards a more clear and precise delineation of the duties comprehended under it. (Reid, *Act. Pow.*, Essay v ch. 3.) And, if the duties of *Benevolence* be first treated of, we shall then have done with the purely ethical part. What remains under this head will partake partly of the moral and partly of the jural; for all the duties of strict *Justice* can be enforced less or more by the authority of positive law.

PART I.

BENEVOLENCE.

THE first great social duty is to acknowledge the natural equality of men. Aristotle argued (*Pol.*, lib. i.) that some were born to be masters and others to be slaves; and that the Greeks were destined to rule other nations. The Romans called those who were beyond the limits of the empire barbarians, and regarded them with indifference. The Jews confined their *Benevolence* to the descendants of Abraham. But Christians are commanded (1 Pet. ii. 17) to *Honour all men*,—to respect human nature, and the rights of that nature in the persons of all who share it. The law of *Benevolence*, or brotherly love, is universal, and knows no limits but those of the race for whose benefit it was established. The various relations of human life may modify, but ought never to confine it; and while we are duly attentive to the stronger claims of intimate connection, as the waves on the bosom of the waters spread wider and wider, so we are to extend our regards beyond the distinctions of friendship, of family, and of country, and grasp in one benevolent embrace the universe of human beings. God hath made of one blood all nations of men that dwell upon the face of the earth; and although the sympathies

of friendship and the charities of patriotism demand a more early and warm acknowledgment, we are never to forget those great and general relations which bind together the kindreds of mankind, who are all the children of one common parent, heirs of the same frail nature, sharers of the same unbounded goodness, and expectants of the same glorious immortality.

But as the exertions of any individual can only extend to a limited sphere, it would be wrong to exhaust, in wide and general wishes towards all, a *Benevolence* which may be useful if directed towards a few. And as it is more necessary to regulate our conduct than to guide our speculations, while no limit is prescribed, an object is proposed, to our charity, and we are commanded to love our neighbour. "The Scripture," says Bishop Butler (*Sermon on the Love of our Neighbour*), "not being a book of theory and speculation, but a plain rule of life for mankind, has, with the utmost possible propriety, put the principle of virtue upon the love of our neighbour, which is that part of the universe, that part of mankind, that part of our country, which comes under our immediate notice, acquaintance, and influence, and with which we have to do."

The commandment is that we *love our neighbour as ourselves*, according to the strict interpretation of which, our *Benevolence* should in degree be commensurate with *Self-love*. The two affections are directed towards beings of the same nature, perhaps equally deserving of love, and therefore the degree of feeling which they excite, and of activity which they prompt, should be the same. All this may be true; but it is equally true that we have a perception of what concerns ourselves, which it is impossible for us to feel in regard to what concerns others, without losing our individual existence. "Moral obligations," says Bishop Butler (*Sermon on Love of our Neighbour*), "can extend no further than to natural possibilities. Now, we have a perception of our own interests, like consciousness of our own existence, which we always carry about with us; and which, in its continuation, kind, and degree, seemis impossible to be felt in respect to the interests of others." But in as far as it is possible for us to enter into the views and feelings of our neighbour, in the same degree we are bound to promote his interest equally with our own, and, remembering our common humanity and its equal rights, whatsoever we would that men should do to us, that we are to do to them.

The duties to which *Benevolence*, or Brotherly Love, will prompt

may be considered under three heads, according as their more direct aim and tendency may be,— I. To increase Happiness. II. To alleviate Misery. III. To forgive Injury.

CHAPTER I.

BENEVOLENCE PROMPTING TO INCREASE HAPPINESS.

SECTION I.—*By our Conversation and Manner.*

This will give rise to the duties of *Civility* and *Politeness*. These belong to what have been called the lesser moralities; but still they are of considerable importance. The exercise of them is necessary to carry on the common intercourse of society with comfort and advantage; the neglect of them occasions uneasiness and mortification, and lessens the lustre of higher excellencies. According to Dr. Ferguson, *Civility* avoids giving offence, while *Politeness* seeks to please.

In order to *Civility* there must be the desire to avoid giving offence, and understanding to distinguish what is likely to be offensive. The knowledge of what is likely to be offensive may be very much cultivated by intercourse with society. But if there be the disposition to avoid giving offence, the duty of *Civility* will be easily practised. It lies not in any set form of words, or any studied peculiarity of manner. It is confined to no rank nor condition, but belongs to the peasant as well as to the finished gentleman. It springs from Benevolence, and is a branch of that charity of which an Apostle hath said, that “it vaunteth not itself, and doth not behave itself unseemly.” And he points to its true source when he connects it with brotherly love, and says (1 Peter iii. 8), “*Love as brethren, be pitiful, be courteous.*” The fault opposed to *Civility* is *Rudeness*. It implies a want of attention to the rights and feelings of others. It springs from a want of Benevolence, and is aggravated by want of discernment as to what is likely to prove offensive.

Politeness is a stronger manifestation of Benevolence than mere *Civility*. It not only avoids saying or doing what is disagreeable, but seeks to say and to do what may be gratifying to the feelings

of others. Dr. Ferguson has said that, "In Greek the polite was termed *'Αστεῖος*, and in Latin *Urbanus*; and, from the latter of these terms, we consider urbanity in contradistinction to rusticity." But true *Politeness* is the growth neither of town nor country, but of the heart. It springs from a sincere desire to order our conversation and deportment in the manner most likely to be agreeable to others. As to its forms, it may be distinguished into the *Absolute* and the *Relative*. "We look for the first," says Mr. Sheppard (*Notes to the Characters of Theophrastus*, 8vo., Lond. 1852, p. 114), "from every man with the feelings of a man: we describe it by the epithet *natural*; and are as little surprised to meet with it in the cottage as in the court. Its violation offends our moral sense, and we regard the offender with disgust. *Relative Politeness* varies as its circumstances vary. Each class of society has a different definition for it, and special rules determined by its own peculiar spirit. Hence the same action, so far as this *Relative Politeness* is concerned, may be perfectly conformable to one code of manners, while it violates another; and the same individual who observes all its requirements among his own class, if suddenly transplanted to another sphere of social life, will commit a thousand offences against its established proprieties. Of such contrarieties, perhaps the most obvious is that which subsists between town and country life, with their respective manners and habits." But let it never be forgotten that Good Manners and Good Breeding, as they have been called, should have for their foundation goodwill and kindly feeling towards others. Separate from a disposition to oblige and to please, mere *Politeness* is an empty form; when grafted upon it, or springing from it, is a high and valuable accomplishment.

Civility and *Politeness*, while they tend to promote the happiness of others, can scarcely be said to make any new contribution to that happiness. They make others more pleased with themselves and the advantages which they possess, but they confer no new advantage. They throw a garnish over the ordinary intercourse of life; but do not seek to distinguish it by great and shining acts of Beneficence and Kindness. This is a higher manifestation of the Benevolent principle, and implies a greater degree of strength and purity in that principle.

SECTION II.—*The Duties of Active Kindness.*

These are as many and various as the aims and the wants of men. But they all spring from the conviction that we are bound, every man to look not only to his own things, but also to the things of his neighbour, and that opportunities of doing good should be sought and seized.

Sometimes we may benefit our neighbour by advice, and sometimes by reproof. He may need encouragement and support, or admonition and warning. Perhaps we may be called on to undergo labour and exertion, or to encounter difficulty and danger, for his sake. Some great evil may be averted, or some great good may be obtained, through our intervention and activity. His reputation may be assailed, and we may have to defend it. His confidence may be abused, and we may have the delicate task of undeceiving him. He may have roused the resentment of others, and we must try to soothe and to allay it. He may have engaged in undertakings which are beyond his means and strength, and we must endeavour to relieve him. He may be thrown out of employment, and we must help him to procure it. He may be aiming at distinction and honour, and we must aid him in attaining them. In short, the duties to which a spirit of *Active Kindness* may prompt are as varied as the circumstances and relations of human life. The selfish man sits still, contented with his own enjoyments, and stirs not to promote the enjoyment of others. But a kind or benevolent man takes an interest in the happiness of all around him, and, without waiting to be solicited, exerts himself to promote it. He omits no proper opportunity of doing good to any, even to the evil and unthankful; but his benevolent affections prompt him to consult most carefully for the benefit of those who are bound to him by peculiar ties, whether they be natural, or social, or religious. Seneca has written eight books, *De Beneficiis*, in which he treats minutely of the manner in which *Kindness* should be shown and received. Cicero, also, in his Treatise *De Officiis*, has some excellent remarks on the same subject.

SECTION III.—*Liberality.*

Liberality, or the free communication of our means and substance to promote the happiness of others, is the natural fruit of Benevolence; yet it does not always accompany it. Many will give their time, and exertion, and advice, for the good of their neighbour, who grudge to give of their means and substance. On the other hand, many will freely give money for the good of others, but will take no pains to see it properly distributed. It is very much, however, to be desired that *Active Kindness* and *Liberality* should go together. Cicero (*De Officiis*, lib. ii. cap. 15) has instituted a comparison between those two manifestations of Benevolence, in which he gives the preference to *Active Kindness* over *Indolent Liberality*.

Let it not be supposed, however, that *Liberality* is confined to the giving of money for the doing of good. “*A liberal man deviseth liberal things, and by liberal things shall he stand.*” A fair and open demeanour—a candid consideration of the rights and feelings of others—a relaxation or a waiving of our own rights when the pursuing of them is likely to be injurious—an avoidance of all captiousness and contention—a scorning to take advantage, and a willingness that others should be benefited as well as ourselves,—these are some of the ways in which true *Liberality* will manifest itself. (Dr. Ferguson, *Mor. and Pol. Phil.*, pt. vi. ch. 5.)

In connection with *Liberality*, the ancient philosophers placed the virtue of *Hospitality*, as springing from Benevolence and goodwill to others. In an early state of society and in a thinly peopled country, when strangers and sojourners cannot easily find accommodation, this virtue is more called for. In the Scriptures of the Old Testament we have many touching examples of the simple and kindly way in which it was manifested. It is set down among the qualifications of those who bear rule in the Church, that they should be lovers of *Hospitality*; and all Christians are exhorted to use *Hospitality*, one to another, without grudging. In the early ages of the Church this duty was carefully attended to, insomuch that the heathens wondered at the kindness which Christians showed, not only to those who were of the household of faith, but to strangers. And in the midst of that long and dreary darkness which covered Christendom for centuries, the light of *Hospitality* was never extinguished. The exercise of it was in the vows of the clergy and

among the duties of knighthood. And although the changes of society have rendered it less necessary than it once was, *Hospitality* is still numbered among the ornaments of a Christian and a Gentleman.

The opposite of *Hospitality* is *Churlishness*, which, instead of sharing the bounties of Providence with others, and rejoicing in the happiness thus diffused, would confine the use of them to self, and eat its morsel alone. Nabal, who said when asked to relieve those who were suffering hunger, "Why should I give my bread and wine to men whom I know not?" is called, in our translation of the Old Testament, a *Churl*. And Shakespeare introduces one of his characters as saying,

" My master is of *churlish* disposition,
And little recks to find the way to heaven
By doing deeds of *hospitality*."

Churlishness is the characteristic of a narrow and selfish spirit, as *Hospitality* is of an open and liberal one. But in judging of others, we should be upon our guard against condemning them for a want of *Hospitality*, or any of those duties which are indeterminate. What we rashly think and call *Churlishness*, may in truth be a prudent and laudable economy, if all the circumstances of the case were fully known.

CHAPTER II.

BENEVOLENCE PROMPTING TO ALLEVIATE SUFFERING.

THIS will lead us—

SECTION I.—*To Cherish our natural feelings of Compassion and Pity.*

Although there is much suffering in the world it is not intended that it should be without alleviation. The relief which comes through length of time and the power of habit is a proof that God did not design that we should feel the full and unmitigated weight of the evils to which we are here exposed. The relief which we

derive from the sympathy of others in our sufferings is another provision of the same gracious kind. We might have been altogether without fellow-feeling, or the feeling which we had for the sufferings of others might have given pain *to us*, without giving any pleasure *to them*. But there is a melancholy satisfaction in the sorrow which we feel for others, while our sympathy is to them a great alleviation of their suffering. It is obviously our duty, then, to guard and cherish the compassionate feelings of our nature. There are many of the sufferings of others which we can do little or nothing to alleviate or remove. In such cases we can only *feel*. But the manifestation of our feeling is in itself a kind of relief, and the only relief of which such cases admit. This relief we should hold ourselves in readiness to give, by allowing due scope and exercise to the compassionate feelings of our nature. *Compassion* is the universal offering which all are bound to lay on the altar of suffering humanity. In many cases the rich are not required to bring more—and in no case are the poor required to bring less. So that it becomes all to cherish and to exercise those tender sympathies of their nature, by which so many of the sufferings of life may be alleviated, and which can be alleviated by nothing else.

SECTION II.—*To be Humane and Charitable in our Actions.*

The cultivation of our compassionate feelings is not only a duty in itself, but the preparation and prompter to the discharge of further duty. A sincere sympathy with suffering is the best and surest guide to the means of alleviating it. When the feelings are excited and interested, the judgment is stimulated and the invention quickened to find help to those who are suffering, and offices of *Humanity* and acts of *Charity* naturally follow, according to the circumstances of the case.

By offices of *Humanity* are meant those kind attentions which go to alleviate sickness, to soothe pain, to cheer melancholy, and to chase away the feelings of disappointment and despair. A humane man is not satisfied with merely expressing a tender sympathy in the sufferings of others, but proves the sincerity of that sympathy by doing what he can to relieve or to remove them. He will sit by the bed of sickness, and try to give softness to the uneasy pillow, and coolness to the close and heated chamber. He will walk with

the melancholy and desponding, and seek to revive their drooping spirits and to stir them up to activity and hope. He will visit the fatherless in their affliction, and by his kindness make them feel less painfully the loss of their parent. He will talk with the discontented and restless, and turn them from the path in which further misery or madness may lie. He will give counsel to those who are in perplexity, encouragement to those who are timid, and comfort to those who are mourning. In short, he will spare neither his time nor his exertions in doing what he can to alleviate the sufferings of others.

Should the sufferings of those around us be of a kind to require or to admit of pecuniary relief, we are further bound to administer it according to our ability. And so frequent and strong are demands of this kind that the term *Charity*, which is equivalent in meaning to *Benevolence*, or brotherly love in general, has come to be appropriated to this particular expression of it. The consideration of *Charity*, or *Almsgiving*, as a public remedy for the evils attendant upon poverty, belongs properly to Political Economy. With regard to the nature and obligation of the private duty, it may be remarked that acts of *Charity*—

1. Should proceed from sincere compassion for the wants and sufferings of others.
2. Should be performed in a kindly and affectionate manner; and
3. Should be guided by discretion and prudence in selecting the most needy and deserving objects.

There is also much room for discretion and prudence as to the amount of our *Charity* and the circumstances attending the distribution of it. But the cases of those who give and of those who receive *Charity* are so varied, that it would be difficult to lay down any rule upon this head, further than to say, that the feeling of Benevolence, from which acts of *Charity* take their rise, should accompany them throughout.

We are laid under obligation to be humane and charitable,—1. By the very constitution of our nature. “*Compassion* is a call, a demand of nature, to relieve the unhappy; as hunger is a natural call for food.”—Bishop Butler, *Sermon on Compassion*.

2. By the arrangements of Providence.

The unequal distribution of the good things of this world is designed to exercise the humility and resignation of the poor, and the

justice and liberality of the prosperous. In Scripture the rich and powerful are said to be as gods upon the earth. They are called to the godlike duty of dispensing happiness and alleviating misery. "*Homines ad Deos nulla proprius accedant quam salutem hominibus dando, nihil habet nec fortuna tua maius quam ut possis, nec natura tua melius quam ut velis, servare quam plurimos.*"

But to Christians, the strongest arguments in favour of the discharge of these duties may be drawn—

1. From the declarations of God's Word; and
2. From the mercy manifested in the scheme of Redemption.

CHAPTER III.

BENEVOLENCE IN REFERENCE TO INJURIES.

THIS will lead us—

SECTION I.—*To Moderate our Resentful Feelings.*

The moderating of our *Resentful Feelings* may seem, as a matter of Self-government, to belong to *Individual* rather than to *Social Ethics*. But the object of these feelings being not ourselves, but others, the regulation of them belongs more properly to *Social Ethics*, and may be referred to Benevolence rather than to Self-love.

Resentment is a feeling very closely connected with our sense of Justice. It springs from the conception that wrong has been done or meditated against us, and involves the idea that the doing or meditating that wrong deserves punishment, while it prompts us to inflict it. The final cause of our being susceptible of this feeling is to prevent and remedy injury. Within due limits, it may be lawful and right. But it is very liable to become excessive, and hence arises the duty of watching and regulating it. This duty may be viewed with reference to the occasion, the degree, and the continuance of our anger; which may be expressed and recollect by the Latin words, *Quando*, *Quomodo*, and *Quamdiu*.

1. *Quando*.—When are we warranted in feeling angry? A hasty man fancies himself injured when no real injury has been done to

him, and is ready to impute ill intention when there is none. A calm inquiry into these two points may go far towards checking or moderating our *Resentful Feelings*. These feelings, it is true, may be excited when we suffer through the mere carelessness of our neighbour. But unless this carelessness can be shown to have been culpable, the feelings should abate. It is also true that the mere fact of ill having been intended against us is sufficient to awaken unkind feeling towards him who intended it, but was prevented from accomplishing it. But this feeling is somewhat different from Resentment. Resentment involves the right to punish the wrong that has been done to us. But, when wrong has not been done, there is no right to punish. The ill intention is punished by the unkind feeling which it awakens; but, there having been no wrong act, there ought to be no retaliation or punishment, which, in the case of justifiable Resentment, may be necessary and proper.

2. *Quomodo*.—This question has reference to the degree or measure of our *Resentful Feelings*.

Granting that wrong has been intended and done against us, and that we have a right to be angry, it becomes us to see that our *Resentful Feelings* are in degree or measure proportioned to the injury received. It is the part of a wise and good man to be suitably affected by everything which befalls him. It is especially necessary that our *Resentful Feelings* should be well regulated, and that we neither tamely submit to injury, so as to encourage the repetition of it, nor repel one injustice by a greater. It becomes us, then, to form a calm and considerate estimate of the nature and amount of the injury which has been done to us, and of the degree of resentment which it demands and will justify. For, as nothing can be more ridiculous than to allow ourselves to be thrown into a violent passion by some trifling irritation, and thus to lead others to ask contemptuously, *What meaneth the heat of this great anger?*—so, on the other hand, it is proper to see that, even when we are really and seriously injured, we do not tamely submit to it; but manifest that degree of resentment which is suitable to punish, and likely to prevent the injury from being repeated. We have no right to be angry with our neighbour *without* a cause, and neither have we any right to be angry with him *beyond* the cause. Indeed, in so far as our resentment is excessive, it is causeless; and in order to guard against such excess, we must check our self-love, and thus diminish the magnifying medium through which injuries are repre-

sented to us—cherish our benevolent feelings, so as to make every allowance for the mixed motives under which our neighbour has acted; and resist the risings of angry passion, so that they do not hurry us into conduct disgraceful and ridiculous, and conduct not less unjust, perhaps, than that of which we complain and show resentment.

3. Quamdiu.—Another caution as to *moderating our Resentful Feelings* is, that we do not keep them too long.

The cause which warrants Resentment is injury done or intended. But if the cause be removed, the passion should cease. When the injury has been repaired, we have no longer any right to retaliate. When the ill intention has been explained as originating in mistake, or when it has been acknowledged to be wrong, and regret manifested on account of it, all unkind feeling should cease. It is in the consideration of these circumstances that the different tempers and dispositions of men are manifested. Some are severe and implacable, and seem to prefer the attitude of resistance and resentment to that of reconciliation and friendship. But the placable and forgiving disposition which Benevolence prompts, contributes as much to our own happiness as to that of our neighbour. Anger is a painful feeling. Even when it is justifiable as to its cause, reasonable as to its degree, and also as to its continuance, still, so long as it lasts, it is painful, and the sooner we can get quit of it the better.

Seneca, *De Ira*, has adduced *many excellent arguments* for restraining our *Resentful Feelings*.

1. Excessive anger is inconsistent with Benevolence.
2. It is inconsistent with a prudent regard to our own character and happiness.
3. It leads to the most hurtful consequences.
4. It is inconsistent with the long-suffering which we all experience at the hand of God.

SECTION II.—We are not only to Moderate our Resentful Feelings, but also to Forgive the Injuries which excited them.

Forgiveness, to be complete, implies—

1. The remission of the right to retaliate, when safe or proper.
2. The dismissal of the *Resentful Feelings* which injury may have excited.

3. The revival of those feelings of good-will which it becomes us habitually to cherish.

In the exercise of *Forgiveness* regard should be had—

1. To the amount of the injury, as great or small.
2. To the causes which led to it—mere carelessness and inadvertence, or deliberate ill-will.

3. To the conduct of the party offending—for the first time or repeatedly.

4. To the regret and penitence of the offender.

Arguments in favour of the exercise of *Forgiveness*—

1. They who have offended against us are proper objects of compassion. “No one,” says Bishop Butler (*Sermon on Forgiveness of Injuries*), “ever did a designed injury to another, but at the same time he did a much greater to himself. If, therefore, we would consider things justly, such an one is, according to the natural course of our affections, an object of compassion as well as of displeasure.”

2. The difficulty and excellence of the duty of *Forgiveness* should prove to every generous mind an argument for the discharge of it. Solomon could say, “It is the glory of a man to pass by a transgression.” And although it may be hard to bear down the selfish and *Resentful Feelings* of our nature, the true dignity that is attained by doing so should stimulate every generous mind not to be overcome of evil, but to overcome evil with good.

3. The fact that we ourselves are liable to offend against others, and to stand in need of their *Forgiveness*, should lead us to exercise it.

4. The fact that we all offend against God, and stand in need of His *Forgiveness*, should lead us to forgive offences committed against ourselves.

Our natural sense of justice and equity leads us to expect that we ourselves shall be dealt with as we deal with others. “There is something in human nature,” says Bishop Butler, “which fails in with that method of determination.” Living under the government of a great and gracious Being, whose laws we often disobey, we feel that it becomes us to be ready to forgive offences against ourselves, and that if we refuse or neglect to do so, it may be the worse for us, both in this life and in that which is to come. This natural anticipation of our reason is exactly in accordance with the doctrine of our Saviour and his Apostles, who have taught us, that with what measure we mete it will be meted to us again. And to keep us in continual remembrance of that great law of Divine equity,

according to which we are to be dealt with here and hereafter, we have been taught to pray that God would forgive us our trespasses, even as we forgive them that trespass against us.

CHAPTER IV.

OF GRATITUDE.

WHILE injury awakens *Resentful Feelings*, which it is our duty to moderate, kindness awakens feelings of *Gratitude*, which it is our duty to cherish.

Gratitude has been strikingly called the "memory of the heart." It supposes some kindness to have been done or intended, and includes a lively sense of the kindness, and a desire to requite it. It is true that he who does to us a kind office does not demand any return. But this only renders it more incumbent upon us to love and requite him. It is the natural impulse of our hearts to love those who have shown love to us. To check this impulse, and to forget the benefits which prompted it, is the proof of a base and ungenerous mind.

Paley has said (*Mor. and Pol. Phil.*, book iii. pt. ii. ch. 11), "Examples of ingratitude check and discourage voluntary beneficence, and in this the mischief of ingratitude consists." But there is a propriety and rightness felt in acknowledging kindness prior to any consideration of the effects of that kindness to ourselves, or of the effect which our *Gratitude* may have in continuing such kindness to ourselves, or in extending it to others. So that, both with regard to those who show and those who receive kindness, Paley has placed the obligation upon wrong grounds.

The way in which *Gratitude* should manifest itself will vary according to circumstances. But we can never be obliged to testify our *Gratitude* by violating any previous obligation. If it be not allowable to those who have shown us kindness reproachfully to remind us of it, much less can they be allowed to urge that kindness as a reason for doing anything that is wrong in itself. This is at once to dissolve all the obligations of *Gratitude*, and to convert what we were ready to look upon as a favour into a snare or a curse.

CHAPTER V.

OF FRIENDSHIP.

ANOTHER affection springing from Benevolence, which ought to be cherished, as giving rise to various duties, and as being a source of much happiness, is *Friendship*.

Friendship is the mutual esteem and regard cherished by kindred minds. It is very often begun, and always cemented, by the interchange of good offices. Hence it has been contended that *Friendship* originates in our weakness, and that, feeling ourselves insufficient for our own happiness, we seek the affection of others, for the sake of the advantages which may flow from it. This view of the origin of *Friendship* is strongly condemned by Cicero in his eloquent Treatise, *De Amicitia*.

Another erroneous view of the origin of *Friendship* springs from the fact, that the parties between whom this affection exists are often found to resemble one another in their general character. Hence some have represented *Friendship* as a form of self-love, and have held that, in esteeming the character of a friend, we are paying a covert homage to our own.¹ But in many cases the resemblance between those who are friends is not prior, but subsequent, to their *Friendship*, and is the fruit of that affection. What we esteem and admire in others we are apt to imitate and transfer into our own character; and hence they who are associated in the bonds of *Friendship* are gradually assimilated to one another. But to represent this subsequent assimilation as the prior cause of forming the *Friendship*, and call it a covert homage to ourselves, is just as unfounded as to represent the pleasing feelings and the great benefits which flow from *Friendship* as the original motive for cherishing this affection. It is disinterested and natural in its origin.²

¹ In ancient times the resemblance between friends was explained by Empedocles on the principle that "like loves like." Those cases in which the characters of friends were different were explained by Euripides and Heraclitus on the principle, "that throughout nature the most perfect harmony is produced between things different." Aristotle dismissed all such physical or physiological questions in reference to *Friendship*, which is a moral affection

in the power of man to cherish. (ARIST. *Eth* lib. viii. cap. 1.)

² Lord Shaftesbury has represented the system of morality which the Gospel inculcates as defective, in so far as it does not specially enjoin the duty of *Friendship*; and Soame Jenyns has argued for the Divine authority of Christianity, on the ground that it contains no precept founded upon false principles; and *Friendship* is regarded by him as an unwarranted restriction to a

Dr. Brown has said, that "The duties which relate to *Friendship* may be considered in three lights—as they regard the *commencement* of it, the *continuance* of it, and its *close*." This arrangement is the same with that of Mons. de Sacy (*Essay upon Friendship*, 12mo., Lond. 1704), and is clear and simple.

SECTION I.—*The Choice of a Friend.*

On this point there is room for caution and deliberation. We are not hastily to contract an intimacy with one whom we have only occasionally met with in the business or intercourse of life. He who is a pleasant companion may be an unsafe friend. It is desirable, before surrendering our affection and esteem, that we should have had ample and varied opportunities of estimating the worth of him to whom we are disposed to yield. For it would be much better to form no *Friendship* than one so hasty and ill-judged as to lead to speedy violation and disappointment. "Would you contract a *Friendship* that shall last a long time?" asks Mons. de Sacy. "Be a long time in contracting it." The old saying was, that "several bushels of salt should have been eaten with a man before you made him your friend,"—the meaning of which is, that you should have known him long and familiarly, and thus have had the means of judging of his real character.

1. "I lay it down as a fundamental maxim," said Cicero, "that true *Friendship* can only subsist between those who are animated by the strictest principles of honour and virtue." And as the strictest principles of honour and virtue are necessary to the very existence of true *Friendship*, they are essential to make this affection safe or advantageous. The manners and habits of our friend have a silent but powerful influence upon our own; and should they prove not to be in accordance with the strictest principles of honour and virtue, we may be led insensibly to imitate them, to the destruction of our own reputation and happiness.

2. It is also of the utmost importance that he whom we select for

single object of that benevolence which we should cherish towards all. In opposition to both these writers, it may be sufficient to remark, that among the small number whom He selected as the companions of His beneficent ministry, one was distinguished as the disciple whom Jesus loved. Lazarus

was honoured by Him with the appellation of friend. The Apostle Paul had a particular affection for Timothy; and these examples are sufficient to show that *Friendship* is quite compatible with goodwill to all men, and an affection which we ought to cherish.

our friend should not only possess sound and virtuous principles, but that he should act according to these principles, with all discretion and meekness. If he want moderation and prudence himself, he will be altogether unable to counsel us in our difficulties. If he be hasty and passionate, he may bring himself and us into embarrassment. Dr. Brown has remarked that much of what ought to be said under this head has been conveyed in a single line by one of our old poets,—

“ See if he be
Friend to himself, who would be friend to thee.”

3. Another rule laid down as to the choice of a friend, is to see that he be like ourselves. In conformity with this rule, they who are friends should be, (1.) Of the same rank or condition in life; and, (2.) Of the same opinions on all matters of importance and interest.

(1.) There have been splendid examples of *Friendship* between those whose condition in life has been widely different, and between whom this difference produced no diminution of respect and esteem. *Friendship* makes equal all between whom it is cherished, and the man of high rank regards his humbler friend with sincere affection and kindness. Still, as a general rule, *Friendship* is more likely to be true and lasting between those of the same rank and condition in life, because they have the same or similar tastes, habits, and pursuits—a thing which conduces much to the formation of *Friendship*, and to its continuance and cordiality,—

“ Among unequals what society
Can sort, what harmony or true delight?”—MILTON.

(2.) Cicero has said that *Friendship* may be shortly defined,— “ A perfect conformity of opinions on all religious and civil subjects, united with the highest degree of mutual esteem and affection.” An agreement between friends as to the great and fundamental views of matters civil and religious, if not absolutely indispensable, is highly desirable. Respect and esteem are cherished and increased by their meeting on common ground to propagate the same great truths and uphold the same great principles. When they are ranged on opposite sides in matters civil and religious, alienation and hostility are likely to be engendered. Even in the ordinary avocations and amuse-

ments of life, it is of importance that friends should not be widely separated from one another, as frequent and familiar intercourse, with participation of the same enjoyments, and gratification of the same tastes and likings, and following of the same habits and modes of life, will tend to strengthen and confirm their kindly feelings towards each other, and tighten the bands of affection and *Friendship*. “*Idem velle et idem nolle, ea demum firma amicitia est.*”—Sallust.

SECTION II.—*Duties during the Continuance of Friendship.*

The chief duties required during the continuance of *Friendship* are *Confidence*, *Counsel*, including *Advice* and *Reproof*, and *Kindness* and *Constancy*.

1. It was a saying of Bias, one of the wise men of Greece, that “we ought so to treat our friend as if he might one day become our enemy.” Cicero notices to condemn this saying, as at variance with the full and frank communication which *Friendship* requires; and later moralists have agreed in this, that there should be entire *Confidence* between friends. But the *Confidence* with which we ought to treat our friend will not warrant us in revealing to him what has been committed to us under the seal of secrecy. The mutual *Confidence* which ought to subsist between friends is for their mutual benefit, and is not to be perverted to the hurt of others.

2. The origin of all true *Friendship* being mutual esteem, it is plain that friends will watch carefully over the conduct of one another; and while they will be ready to admire and applaud perseverance in the paths of virtue, will be ready to administer or to receive *Advice* or *Reproof*, should circumstances render it necessary. “*Et monere, et moneri, proprium est veræ amicitiae*” (Cicero). *Advice* and *Reproof* are duties which we are bound to discharge towards those with whom we are associated in the ordinary intercourse of life. They are more especially incumbent upon one friend towards another; yet it is between friends that these duties are frequently neglected, and, from their being neglected, the *Friendship* lingers on in a sickly and unhealthy state, till, from the increasing, because unreproved, faults of one of the parties, it is brought to an abrupt and disgraceful termination. How much more accordant with all the ends and advantages of *Friendship* would it be for one friend faithfully to counsel and admonish the other, and thus save him

from ruin, and himself from painful and bitter recollections. Hence said Cicero—"There is one duty of *Friendship* which we must at all hazards of offence discharge, as it is never to be superseded consistently with the truth and fidelity we owe to our friend. I mean the duty of admonishing and reproving him—an office which, whenever it is affectionately exercised, should be kindly received." "Faithful are the wounds of a friend. Ointment and perfume rejoice the heart: so doth the sweetness of a man's friend by hearty counsel" (Prov. xxvii. 9).

3. Cicero mentions three rules which had been proposed to regulate the interchange of kindness, or of good offices, between friends, of no one of which can he entirely approve. But no special rule is necessary; for if our *Friendship* be founded upon virtuous principles, and directed towards worthy objects, it will not fail to prompt us to suitable conduct. "I lay it down," said Cicero, "as a rule without exception, that no degree of *Friendship* can either justify or excuse the commission of a criminal action"—"*Hac prima lex in amicitia sanciatur, ut neque rogemus res turpes nec fuciamus roguti.*" A more common and a more difficult case is for our friend to expect or request that we should exert ourselves to procure for him some place of honour or emolument for which he may think himself fit, but for which we do not think him fit. Now, where there is an utter incapacity or unfitness, we are not bound by *Friendship* to exert ourselves. Honours and offices are matters of public interest and concern, and should not be sought nor gained under the influence of private affection and feeling. Besides, instead of being an act of kindness, it would be an act of cruelty to place our friend in a situation for the duties of which he is unfit, just as it would be an act of folly and presumption to aspire to such a situation for ourselves. But whenever we see how a suitable benefit can be obtained for our friend, we are bound to assist him to the utmost in obtaining it. The happiness which he thus attains to is reflected back upon us, and the bands of mutual affection and *Friendship* strengthened and confirmed.

4. Cicero mentions it as a question which had been put, Whether the pleasure of acquiring a new friend is not preferable to the possessing of an old one? "But never," says he, "never, surely, was there a question proposed more unworthy of a rational being. It is not with *Friendships* as with acquisitions of most other kinds, which, after frequent enjoyment, are generally attended with satiety;

on the contrary, the longer we preserve them, like those sorts of wine that will bear age, the more relishing and valuable they become." They, therefore, who have gained a true friend should cherish him as the apple of their eye. It is a mark of a weak and fickle mind to be seeking out continually for new attachments. The inconstancy which we thus manifest towards others is sure to be visited upon ourselves; and he who neglects or abandons his friend, is sure to be neglected and abandoned himself. It is not maintained, however, but that in our progress through life new and fresh *Friendships* may be formed; but this may be done without manifesting any inconstancy or unkindness to our old and well-tried friends, so long as they continue to manifest the virtues which first attracted our affection.

SECTION III.—*Close of Friendship.*

Occasions, however, may and will occur on which it is not only expedient but necessary that *Friendship* should be broken or dissolved.

1. A change of circumstances in one or other of the parties frequently leads to an interruption or a dissolution of *Friendship*. At first they were equal in many respects, and their intercourse frequent and familiar. But one has been elevated or the other depressed, and distance and alienation ensue. A good man, however, will guard against allowing a mere change of outward condition to estrange or to separate him from one whose *Friendship* he valued more than all the gifts of fortune. And he who has been less fortunate should beware of being jealous of his former friend, or of accusing him of pride and want of kindness and consideration.

2. Another occasion on which *Friendship* is liable to be interrupted or dissolved is, when one of the parties has neglected or violated its obligations. To defend the character and promote the interest of a friend are plain and imperative duties. But when either of these is neglected, or not discharged with activity, this is regarded and resented as a want of true *Friendship*. In such cases, however, self-love is apt to mislead, and to make us hasty in our expectations and exorbitant in our demands upon the kindness of our friends. It is only when there has been a plain and culpable neglect of our honour, or our interest that we have reason to be offended. We

should be slow and unwilling to take any such ground of offence; and even when constrained to do so, it should be done without anger or bitterness. We may quietly and with regret withdraw our confidence and affections from one who is not willing to return them; but all violent upbraiding and bitter thoughts should as far as possible be avoided.

3. A worse case may be put. He whom we called our friend may not only have neglected to defend our character, or to promote our interest, but may have injured both. Or, without aiming at our hurt or ruin, he may have shown himself to be destitute of the good qualities which we thought him to possess, or, by yielding to the corruptions and temptations of the world, may have become unworthy of our respect and esteem. All our endeavours to correct or reclaim him have been fruitless, and we may be driven at last to the dire necessity of withdrawing ourselves from him. But even in such a case, we should separate more in sorrow than in anger. "The most advisable and prudent conduct, in situations of this kind," says Cicero, "is to suffer the intimacy to wear out by silent and insensible degrees; or, to use a strong expression, which I remember to have fallen from Cato, on a similar occasion, the bands of friendship should be gradually untied, rather than suddenly cut asunder,—always supposing, however, that the offence is not of so atrocious a nature as to render an absolute and immediate alienation indispensably requisite for one's own honour."

4. But although *Friendship* should survive the many shocks and accidents to which, amidst the chances and encounters of this mortal life, it may be exposed, it must at length be dissolved by the death of one of the parties. But the death of one friend calls for duties from the survivor. A request made by one dying has always been regarded as peculiarly solemn and sacred. And any such request, when acceded to, should be carefully fulfilled by the survivor. Nor is our duty to be confined merely to what has been specially devolved upon us. "The name of our friends, their glory, their family," says the Marquise de Lambert, in a passage quoted by Dr. Brown, "have still claims on our affection, which it would be guilt not to feel. They should live still in our heart, by the emotions which subsist there; in our memory, by our frequent remembrance of them; in our voice, by our eulogiums; in our conduct, by our imitation of their virtues."

PART II.

JUSTICE.

JUSTICE, as distinguished from Benevolence, has been defined to be *constans et perpetua voluntas jus suum cuique tribuendi*—the steady and lasting determination or disposition to render to every one his right. The Latin word *jus*, which corresponds to the substantive noun, *right*, has been defined by civilians—*Facultas aliquid agendi, vel possidendi, vel ab alio consequendi*—that is, according to Dr. Reid (*Act. Pow.*, Essay v. ch. 3), “A lawful claim to do anything, to possess anything, or to demand some prestation from some other person;” or, as Dr. Whewell has designated them—the “right of personal security, the right of property, and the right of contract.” To these he has added, in his classification of rights, the “right of government and the right of marriage.” The rights of government, as arising from the relation between magistrates and people, may be called *Political Justice*. The rights of marriage as arising from the relation between husband and wife, parent and child, master and servant, may be called *Economical Justice*. The rights of person, property, and contract, as arising from the relation in which all men stand as men and as members of society, constitute what may be called *Ethical Justice*.

Ethical Justice consists in giving to every one his right in respect of person, property, and contract. It may be regarded negatively and positively.

CHAPTER I.

ETHICAL JUSTICE VIEWED NEGATIVELY.

WITH respect to the rights of the person, this prohibits all acts of cruelty and oppression. One of the earliest enumerations of wrongs against the person is to be found in Exodus, ch. xxi. The basis of

all laws against these wrongs is the commandment *Thou shalt not kill*. Wrongous imprisonment and injury done to the health are also included in wrongs against the person.

The commandment, *Thou shalt not steal*, is the basis of all laws against wrongs to the possession or property of others. These wrongs may be done to property, real and personal, or to character and reputation.

The right to liberty of person, possession of property, and enjoyment of reputation, are called *natural*, because every man as man has a right to them, *against all men*. They are *natural*, and they are *absolute rights*.

The rights of Contract are *adventitious* and *conditional*. They are not *naturally* nor inherently vested in a man, but come upon him in consequence of an agreement; and hence they are called *adventitious*. They are not rights which one man holds against all men; but only against the parties with whom he may have contracted. Even against these the rights of contract are not absolute, but *conditional*—that is, the one party can only demand his right, on condition of rendering the right which he gave to the other party. The declining or refusing to do so is an injury against the rights of that other party, and therefore a violation of *Justice negatively* considered. But the fulfilment of contracts depends so much upon the conditions under which they have been entered into, that it may be better to consider this duty under the head of *Positive Justice*; because the rights which the parties may have acquired are not obvious and natural, like the rights of life, liberty, property, and reputation, but have previously to be ascertained by the enactments of positive law, as well as by the precepts of natural *Justice*.

But, “In the series of *absolute* duties, or such as oblige all men antecedently to any human institution, this seems to challenge the first and noblest place,” says Puffendorff (*Law of Nature and of Nations*, book iii. ch. 1, sect. 1), “That no man hurt another; and that in case of any damage done by him, he fail not to make reparation.”¹ It is an *absolute* duty that no man hurt another, and it is a duty *conditional* upon the fact of one man having done hurt to another that he make *Reparation* or *Restitution*.

The duty of *Reparation* consists in restoring things, as far as

¹ “Justitiae primum munus est ut ne cui quis noceat, nisi lacesitus injuria.”—CICERO, *De Officiis*, lib. i. cap. 1.

possible, to that state in which they would have been but for our injustice. And most assuredly, as soon as we see that we have done anything injurious to our neighbour, we must see at the same time that it is our duty, in as far as possible, to repair it. This is a duty, however, which men are frequently prevented from discharging by feelings of selfishness and false shame; and cases have been put, in which it is argued that *Restitution* may be dispensed with.

1. *The case of absolute inability.*—Life may be taken away, but cannot be restored, or property destroyed that cannot be replaced. And as no man can be under obligation to do what is impossible—*nemo tenetur ad impossibile*—it is argued that *Restitution* may be dispensed with. But, although the *Reparation* cannot be complete, it is binding to the very utmost which may be in the power of him who has done the wrong.

2. It sometimes happens that when an injury has been done, *the party injured is unwilling that anything should be done towards repairing it.* In such cases, it is argued that *Restitution* may be dispensed with, in accordance with the maxim—*volenti non fit injuria.* But this maxim may be carried too far. First to do an injury to another, and then to trust to his dispensing with *Reparation*, is doubly wrong. We may accept the remission of a debt, as we may accept the conferring of a favour. But both must be done freely. Before the duty of *Restitution* can be dispensed with, the claim to it should be cheerfully relaxed on the part of our neighbour, and we should be satisfied that he will sustain no serious inconvenience from the relaxation of it.

3. It is said, That *we are absolved from repairing any injury to our neighbour when we have received equal or greater injury from him.* But in returning evil for evil we are doing wrong. We have a right to resist and repel wrong, and in doing so we do no wrong to our neighbour, and owe him no *Restitution*. But if we go beyond the limits of reasonable resentment, and return excessive or injurious retaliation, *Reparation* is not to be dispensed with, any more than with reference to a first injustice.

CHAPTER II.

ETHICAL JUSTICE VIEWED POSITIVELY.

THIS may have reference to *Thoughts, Words, or Deeds.*

SECTION I.—*Justice in our Thoughts.*

This constitutes the virtue of *Candour* or *Fairness*. It may be manifested—

- I. In our thoughts of the character and conduct of others.
- II. In matters of inquiry and controversy.
 - I. In thinking of the character and conduct of others we may be too harsh or too indulgent. But *Candour* consists in forming a fair estimate of the character and conduct of others. To this they are entitled, and to this we are bound.

The chief obstacles to the discharge of this duty arise from Self-love degenerating into Self-conceit, and from Emulation running into Envy.

We are most liable to fail in the duty of *Candour* towards those who are eminent for the excellence of their character, or those who are defective and faulty in their conduct.

Those who are eminent for their excellence may excel in something on which we particularly value ourselves—they may be over-estimated and over-praised—and, notwithstanding their excellence, their character may not be free from defects and blemishes. These circumstances make the exercise of *Candour* in reference to them more difficult.

Those, again, whose character is regarded as defective or faulty may have been hastily condemned—due allowance may not have been made for the strength of the temptation to which they have been exposed, and without considering our own liability to fall, we may hastily join in bestowing our censure and reproach on what called more properly for our compassion and pity.

II. In matters of inquiry and controversy, *Candour* consists in a willingness to accept truth, from whatsoever quarter it may come, and howsoever contrary to preconceived opinions. The chief obstacles to the exercise of it arise—

1. From the influences of system.
2. From the authority of names.
3. From viewing doctrines with regard to their alleged consequences. And
4. From attaching too much importance to the ability or eloquence, the rank or influence, of those who defend particular doctrines, or the popularity which attends those who adopt them.

SECTION II.—*Justice in reference to our Words.*

This comprehends the duties,—

I. Of *Veracity*, or truthfulness in our ordinary conversation and testimony; and

II. *Fidelity*, or truthfulness in promises and contracts.

In treating of these duties in relation to the use of words, it is not to be understood that these duties are confined to such cases. But these are the cases in which the nature of these duties may be most fully and clearly understood. “A dumb man,” says Dr. Reid (*Act. Pow.*, Essay v. ch. 6), “cannot speak any more than a dog; but he can give his testimony by signs as early in life as other men can do by words. He knows what a lie is as early as other men, and hates it as much. He can plight his faith, and is sensible of the obligation of a promise or contract.”

Truth is *logical*, or, as it is sometimes called, *physical* and *moral*. Thus in Boswell’s *Life of Johnson* (12mo., Lond. 1835, pp. 354-5), it is said, “*Physical* truth is when you tell a thing as it actually is. *Moral* truth is when you tell a thing sincerely and precisely as it appears to you. I say such a one walked across the street. If he did so, I told a *physical* truth; if I thought so, I may have been mistaken, but I told a *moral* truth.”

I. With a view to *Veracity* or Truthfulness in our ordinary conversation, the use of obscure or ambiguous words should be avoided. The intentional use of them constitutes the vice of *Equivocation*. There may be Equivocation in *sound* or in *sense*. Both are contrary to Truthfulness.

The same thing may be said of *Reservation* or *Restriction*, which is *Real* or *Mental*. *Real Restriction* is when, if the words uttered be literally interpreted, they are not true; yet, if regard be had to the circumstances in which they are uttered, they are not false. In

Mental Restriction or *Reservation* the words uttered are untrue; but the speaker has some addition or explanation in his mind, by which they become to him true, but not to the party to whom they are addressed.

In *Equivocation* and *Mental Reservation* there is,—1. The saying of something the contrary of which, or something different from which, is true—that is, there is a lie; and 2. There is the intention or desire to mislead—whereas the use of language is to inform and direct. So that, both in form and substance, *Equivocation* and *Mental Reservation* amount to falsehood.

Simplicity and *Sincerity* of speech are opposed to *Equivocation* and *Mental Reservation*. And as a general rule, we ought not only to be plain and honest, but frank and full, in all our communications with our fellow-men. There are few things which contribute more to the comfort of social life than *Frankness*. The opposite of this is *Reserve* or *Closeness*, which is unamiable, and sometimes leads to mistake and mischief.

It is admitted, however, that there are cases in which we are not obliged to tell the whole truth. All that we say must be plainly and strictly true, but we may be under no necessity to tell all. We are always bound to disclose the case in hand so fully as to prevent our neighbour from falling into mistake, or receiving injury through our silence. But when we see that our speaking out fully may mislead or injure others, we are not bound to do so, or rather we are bound to refrain from doing so. On the question, Whether the physician is bound fully to acquaint the patient with his danger? opposite views have been taken. (See Mackness, *Moral Aspects of Medical Life*, 8vo. 1846, p. 281; Sir Henry Halford, *Essays*, p. 79.)

A question has also been put, Whether we are warranted in restraining from disclosing the truth, when the disclosure would be to our own disadvantage? Cicero (*De Off.*, lib. iii. cap. 12) has stated and argued a case of this kind. (See Whewell, book iii. ch. 15, No. 403.) Similar cases have been put in modern times. (Barrow, *Sketches of Roy. Soc. Club*, 8vo. 1849, p. 57.)

Another question under this head is, Whether the truth may be violated? That is, Whether there are any cases in which falsehood is admissible?

A man may depart from the truth,—1. With the design of injuring some one; 2. With the design of benefiting some one; or 3. With no fixed intention of good or ill, but for the purpose of

amusement. These have been technically designated, *Mendacium perniciosum*, *Mendacium officiosum*, and *Mendacium jocosum*.

1. The first form of falsehood is condemned by all. It is contrary to the will of God, inconsistent with the love of our neighbour, and injurious to society at large.

2. As to the second case, in which some have thought falsehood admissible, it may be doubted whether, in any circumstances, true, general, and permanent good can be gained by falsehood, or whether men in their individual and social capacity, ought not inviolably to adhere to the truth, and take the consequences, rather than by avoiding some near and striking inconvenience, to run the risk of remote and permanent evils far more embarrassing. The obligations under which we lie to speak the truth are prior, both in order and authority, to any obligation which can be drawn from a calculation of consequences. Of these, in their full extent, we are not competent judges; and to set up our short-sighted views in opposition to the sacred majesty of truth is as impious as it is unwise.

As to pious frauds, or falsehoods told to benefit the cause of religion, the thing is in itself absurd, and cannot be expressed but by a phrase which is self-contradictory. Religion is emphatically *the truth*, and seeks no aid but from sincere believers, and fears more harm from false friends than from open enemies.

The saying of what is not true, to soothe children or to calm the fears of the nervous, should be avoided. Paley has said that we are not criminal in telling a falsehood to a madman for his own advantage, to a robber to conceal our property, or to an assassin to divert him from his purpose. These are extreme cases. But, if any allowance can be made for them, it should be so made as not to give countenance to the maxim, "That we may do evil that what we think good may come of it."

3. Paley has said (*Mor. and Pol. Phil.*, book iii. ch. 15), "There are falsehoods which are not lies; that is, are not criminal, as, for example, where no one is deceived, which is the case in parables, fables, novels, jests, tales to create mirth, ludicrous embellishments of a story, where the declared design of the speaker is not to inform but to divert; compliments in the subscriptions of a letter, a servant's *denying his master*, a prisoner's pleading not guilty, an advocate asserting the justice, or his belief of the justice, of his client's case."

The use of parables and fables has prevailed in all ages and among

all nations of the world, and has been sanctioned by the highest authority.

With regard to novels the question is, Whether the best preparation for the duties and difficulties of life is not to be found by looking at them as they actually occur, or have occurred, in the moral government of the world, rather than as they may be arranged and represented on the pictured page of the novelist?

With regard to the compliments that pass in conversation, and the compliments that are commonly added in the subscription of a letter, we are still far below the poetical hyperbolism of the East. But there may be room for reform in these respects. (See *Spectator*, No. 103.)

As to the practice of a servant denying his master,¹ which is an old grievance, it would be much better, when the master did not wish to see visitors, to instruct his servant to say so, or something to that effect.

As no one is obliged to criminate himself, the plea of Not Guilty amounts merely to this,—that the accused party is willing to abide the issue of the trial, and to take the condemnation or acquittal which the evidence will warrant. And the advocate in advising such a plea, is not giving any opinion as to the *real* innocence, but only of the *legal* innocence of his client, or that the evidence against him will not warrant a conviction. (Gisborne, *Duties of Men.*)²

Paley has severely condemned a habit of fiction and exaggeration which many people indulge in serious discourse. The condemnation may be extended to the practice of framing jests, tales to create mirth, and ludicrous embellishments of a story.

The sum of the matter is, that truth is to be studied and preserved in all our communications with our fellow-men. Words are to be used in their plain and natural meaning, without ambiguity or equivocation, and without restriction or mental reservation. So far from intending or attempting to deceive, we are to guard against everything that may by possibility mislead, and in very simplicity and godly sincerity to have our conversation in the world.

¹ "Nasica cum ad poetam Ennium venisset, eique ab ostio querenti, Ennium ancilla dixisset domi non esse: Nasica sensit illam domini jussu dixisse, et illum intus esse; patiens post diebus cum ad Nasicam veniasset Ennius, et cum a Janua quereret, exclamat Nasica, se domi non esse. Tum Ennius, Quid ego non cognosco vocem, inquit, tuam? Hic Nasica: Homo es im-

pudens; ego, cum te quererem, ancillæ tue credidi te domi non esse, tu mihi non creditis ipsi."—CICERO, *De Orat.* lib. ii.

² Cicero maintained that, with a view to the protection of the innocent, it was necessary to plead the cause of those suspected to be guilty. But he was against defending any who were notoriously impious or wicked.—*De Offic.* lib. i. cap. 14.

II. Fidelity or Faithfulness.—*Veracity* is the preservation of truth with regard to the past or present; *Fidelity*, with regard to the future.

Pollicitation is a spontaneous expression of our intention to do something in favour of another. A *Promise* is made in consequence of a request made,—*Pollicemur ultra, Promittimus rogati*. A *Promise* implies two parties—the *Promiser* and the *Promissee*. A *Pact* implies two or more. In this respect it agrees with a *Contract*, which admits of more than two parties. But while all *Contracts* are *Pacts*, all *Pacts* are not *Contracts*. A *Contract*, to be legally valid, must include a *συνάλλαγμα*, or bargain, or, as it may be popularly expressed, a *quid pro quo*. Unless an agreement between two or more persons is come to upon sufficient consideration it is a *nudum pactum*—a bare pact, not clothed with the circumstances of mutual advantage, and cannot be legally enforced.

1. *Promises*.—The moralist has chiefly to do with *Promises*. Fully to constitute a *Promise* there should be, (1.) The deliberate intention of the *Promiser*. (2.) The expression or signification of that intention. (3.) The acceptance of it by the *Promissee*.

Paley deduces the obligation to fulfil *Promises* from the necessity of it to the well-being, or indeed to the very existence, of human society. But to keep a *Promise* is an act right in itself. We perceive a beauty and propriety in it. The breach of a *Promise* appears to us base, and occasions to us pain and dissatisfaction. To fulfil a *Promise* is thus shown to be our duty, by the constitution of our mind and the nature of the act. The good effects which flow from the discharge of this duty, show it to be in accordance with God's moral government, and the express declarations of His Word prove it to be in accordance with His highest will.

Promises are to be fulfilled in the sense in which they were given and accepted. As in our ordinary conversation we are to avoid all ambiguity or equivocation, and all secret restriction or mental reservation, much more should we do so in *Promises*. And if we endeavour to do so, there will be no great difficulty in accurately conveying our meaning, and thus the question concerning the sense in which *Promises* are to be fulfilled will be taken away. Should any such question be raised, then it must be said that, on the one hand, the *Promiser* has no right, on the ground of some forced or concealed meaning of his words, to satisfy himself with doing less than he promised—to keep the word of promise to the ear and break

it to the heart; and, on the other hand, the *Promissee* has no right to insist upon more being done than the fair and honest meaning of the *Promise* implies. Cases in illustration of this may be seen in Paley, and in Vertot. (*Hist. of Knights of Malta*, vol. i. p. 356.)

In some cases it has been thought that the obligation to fulfil a *Promise* may be relaxed or dissolved.

(1.) A *conditional Promise* is not binding if the condition fail; but the failure of the condition must be equally contingent to the *Promiser* and *Promissee*.

(2.) An *impossible Promise* is not binding; but the impossibility of fulfilling it must not have been known to the *Promiser* at the time, nor created by him afterwards.

(3.) An *unlawful Promise* is not binding. If the unlawfulness be known at the time, as when a servant promises to betray his master, the guilt lies in making such a *Promise*, not in breaking it. If the unlawfulness of the thing promised emerge subsequently, the *Promise* is not binding. A merchant promises to send goods abroad; before he can do so, the export of such goods is declared to be unlawful, but he is free.

(4.) *Erroneous Promises* are not binding. The maxim of the civil law is—*Errantis non est consensus*. There are some specialities under this case.

a. If the *Promiser* is misled by the *Promissee*, the *Promise* is not binding. "Who does not see," exclaims Cicero, "that a man is not obliged to stand to those promises which he made, being dishonestly deceived?" "A beggar," says Paley, "solicits your charity by a story of the most pitiable distress; you promise to relieve him if he will call again. In the interval you discover his story to be made up of lies: this discovery, no doubt, releases you from your *Promise*."

b. When both parties are mistaken as to the ground on which the *Promise* proceeds, the discovery of this mistake makes void the *Promise*. This brings the case under the *conditional Promise*. But it is not so when the *Promiser* only is under mistake, as when one promises to pay a sum of money on a certain day, and finds, when the time comes, that he cannot. Yet, if the failure to pay arises from circumstances unexpected and unforeseen, the case comes under the *impossible Promise*.

To the head of *erroneous Promises* may be referred the case of *Promises* made by persons under age. Such *Promises* are not legally

binding. But should *Promises* appear right to the parties who made them, after they have come to years of maturity and discretion, it remains to consider how far they are yet under obligation to fulfil them.

Persons who are insane not being responsible agents, *Promises* made by them do not come under the cognizance of the moralist. As to the temporary insanity caused by drunkenness, the law does not admit it as an excuse for the crimes to which it may lead. But Puffendorff has said (*De Jure Nat. et Gent.*, lib. iii. cap. 6, sect. 5), "There is a great difference between *crimes* committed and *promises* made by a man *drunk*." He would hold him accountable for the former, but not for the latter, unless they were confirmed by the man when sober. (*De Offic. Hom.*, lib. i. cap. 9, sect. 10.) But the ground of the distinction is not clear nor strong in the eye of the moralist.

(5.) As to *extorted Promises*, casuists are divided; but the prevailing opinion is that they are not binding. A highwayman threatens to murder you unless you promise to procure for him a sum of money. Is such a *Promise* to be kept? No, said Cicero, because a highwayman is the common enemy of mankind, and no faith is to be kept with him. Dr. Rutherford (*Institutes of Nat. Law*, vol. i. p. 190), says, Such a *Promise* is not binding; not on account of the promiser's fear, but upon account of the other party's injustice. No right can be founded on an injury. Every unjust act is void as to all the moral effects of it, and, consequently, can never produce a demand in the person who is guilty of it." Gisborne (*Mor. Phil.*, p. 261) controverts this view, and we know that *Promises* thus extorted have frequently been fulfilled. It may be an act of prudence to do so, but it can scarcely be called an act of duty, and the law of the land will protect us in neglecting it. If voluntary consent be essential to constitute a *Promise*, it cannot be extorted by one who has no authority, and for his own benefit. But a parent, a master, or a magistrate, in virtue of the authority with which they are invested, may exact from those who are subject to them *Promises* which are not always willingly given. Yet such *Promises* are binding, both because the authority by which they are exacted is lawful, and because the end of such *Promises* is not the selfish advantage of those who exact them, but the good of those from whom they are exacted.

2. *Contracts*.—In a **PROMISE**, one party only comes under obliga-

tion; the other acquires a right to the prestation promised. But we give the name of *Contract* to a transaction in which each party comes under an obligation to the other, and each reciprocally acquires a right to what is promised by the other. . . . The definition is, that *A Contract is the consent of two or more persons in the same thing, given with the intention of constituting or dissolving lawfully some obligation.*

Contracts originate in the fact that man is insufficient for his own comfort and happiness. Something is to be done which we cannot do; something is to be had which we cannot procure. We, therefore, state our wants and our wishes to those who can fulfil them; and on their agreeing to do so, we engage to remunerate them. So that the fulfilling of a *Contract* amounts to an act of Commutative Justice—the giving of a sufficient consideration for what we receive. The kinds of *Contracts* will be as many and various as the things which men may exchange; and it is easy to see that different usages will prevail in reference to the different kinds of *Contracts*. To enter on the consideration of these would lead into the details of Jurisprudence and Political Economy. They are noticed here only in so far as they are entered into by the use of language, and in so far as truth is to be preserved in reference to that language.

Now the same rules which were given for the preservation of truth in reference to *Promises* are equally applicable to *Contracts*. Language is to be used in its simple and direct meaning. There should be no ambiguity nor equivocation, and no concealment nor mental reservation. The obligations to fulfil a *Contract* are the same with those to keep a *Promise*. And the sense of these obligations should be heightened by the consideration of our natural helplessness and insufficiency to our own comfort, and of the many benefits which result from the various kinds of barter and exchange which are carried on by means of *Contracts*.

Contracts, being more formal than *Promises*, are generally made with more deliberation and care; and hence it might be thought that there are fewer cases in which they can be invalid. But the different kinds of *Contracts* have each their respective customs and usages, which are understood or supposed to be understood when they are entered into; and hence arises a variety of questions as to the fulfilling of *Contracts*. The same reasons which render a *Promise* invalid will render a *Contract* invalid,—such as force, or fraud,

the coming to see that it is unlawful, or impossible, or injurious to some party not concerned nor consulted.

3. *Oaths*.—In confirmation of *Promises* and *Contracts* it has been usual to administer *Oaths*. Sanderson (*De Juramenti Oblig. Praelect. Prima*), says, “*Juramentum est actus religiosus, in quo ad confirmandam rem dubiam Deus testis invocatur.*” But in general an *Oath* includes an imprecation. And hence Puffendorff defines it to be, “A religious asseveration by which we renounce the mercy or imprecate the vengeance of Heaven, if we speak not the truth.”

Oaths respect either the past, and are called *Assertory*, or the future, and are called *Promissory*. In one view, however, all *Oaths* respect the future. The *Assertory Oath*, or the Oath of *Evidence*, is to confirm a promise of giving true evidence; and the *Promissory Oath*, or *Oath of Office*, is to confirm a promise of discharging its duties.

An *Oath* creates no new obligation. It merely quickens our sense of the obligations under which we already lie. A promise to speak the truth is binding without an *Oath*, as well as with it. And, if we were not forgetful creatures, it would be equally binding without it as with it. But when a sense of our obligations has become faint, the sight of our fellow-creatures, and of the dependence which they place in our truthfulness, joined to the solemn recognition of the presence and authority of Him who is the author of all truth and right, has a direct tendency to check falsehood and injustice, and to strengthen our intention of speaking the truth. Accordingly, they who violate an *Oath* are reckoned more criminal than they who break a bare promise. The following circumstances are noticed by Paley (*Mor. and Pol. Phil.*, book iii. pt. 1, ch. 16) as aggravating the guilt of Perjury, above that of Falsehood:—

1. Perjury is a sin of greater deliberation.
2. It violates a superior confidence. And,
3. God directed the Israelites to swear by His name (Deut. vi. 13; x. 30), and was pleased, in order to show the immutability of His own counsel, to confirm His covenant with that people by an *Oath*; neither of which, it is probable, He would have done, had He not intended to represent *Oaths* as having some meaning and effect beyond the obligation of a bare promise; which effect must be owing to the severer punishment with which He will vindicate the authority of *Oaths*.

Many, however, think that *Oaths* are not warranted by anything

which God has represented himself as doing, or which He has required us to do; nay, they think that the practice is expressly prohibited in Scripture. The passage appealed to is in Matt. v 33-38.

But that the bearing of this passage is against needless and profane swearing,³ and not against solemn and judicial oath-taking, is argued from the following considerations:—

(1.) The forms of swearing which are specified are such as were common among the Jews.

(2.) The form of judicial *Oath* among the Jews was adjuration by the name of God. But as this form is not here mentioned, judicial oath-taking was not contemplated nor condemned.

In confirmation of this view of the passage it may be noticed—

a. That our Saviour when adjured, answer'd; and His doing so amounted to a solemn asseveration or *Oath*. (Levit. v. 1.)

b. The language of the Apostles, on several important occasions runs in the form of an *Oath*. (Rom. i. 9; Philip i. 8; 2 Cor. i. 18, 23; Gal. i. 20.)

c. The primitive Christians refused to swear by the genius of the Emperor, as idolatrous; but they gave evidence *sub attestacione veritatis*.

But while judicial oath-taking may be lawful and necessary, it should only be had recourse to in matters of importance, and should be gone about with solemnity and reverence. Epictetus said—“Shun *Oaths* wholly, if it be possible; if not, as much as thou canst.” And his commentator, Simplicius, added—“We ought wholly to shun swearing, except upon occasions of great necessity.” And in the *Institutes of Menu*, book vi. 5, 109, and book xii. 5, 16, similar sentiments are expressed. On the evils which flow from administering *Oaths* frequently and carelessly, see Hutcheson (*Mor. Phil.*, book ii. ch. 11) and Paley (*Mor. and Pol. Phil.*, book iii. pt. i. ch. 16).

Of late years many needless and offensive *Oaths* have been dispensed with. Quakers⁴ and others, who have conscientious scruples

³ The Greek word translated “at all,” in ver. 34, is δλως, which in 1 Cor. v. 1 is rendered “commonly;” and in ver. 37 the word λόγος, which means speech or common conversation, is used; whereas, if judicial testimony had been meant, it would have been μαρτυρία.

⁴ They interpret the precept, “Swear not at all,” literally. They also adhere to

the strict interpretation of the sixth commandment, “Thou shalt not kill.” Yet the Jewish law, in many cases, punished by putting to death. So that even although the precept, “Swear not at all,” were interpreted literally, it would not deprive the magistrate of the power to administer an *Oath* for confirmation, as the end of all strife.

as to the lawfulness of oath-taking, are allowed to make a solemn affirmation that what they say is true; and if they make a false affirmation they are liable to the penalties of perjury.

4. *Vows*.—*Vows* are promises made to God. The consideration of them therefore belongs to that department of duty which is due directly towards Him. We may make a *Vow*, however, to our fellow-creatures, or even to ourselves. In such cases *Vows* amount to firm purposes or promises to pursue some end, or to perform some act, solemnly made, as in the sight of God, and with an imprecation of punishment from Him should we fail through neglect. Care, therefore, should be taken to fulfil a *Vow* when it has once been made. The neglect to do so argues not only disregard of the good which the *Vow* bound us to follow, but want of reverence for Him whose name we invoked. It is better not to *Vow*, than to *Vow* and not pay. (*Eccles.* v. 5.)

SECTION III.—*Justice in reference to our Acts.*

This consists—

- I. In according to others all that is due by the laws and usages of the community; and
- II. In doing what is fair and equitable in those cases which the laws and usages of the community have not provided for.

It consists in following—1. The *τὸν νομικὸν*; and 2. The *τὸν ἴσον*—*Integrity* and *Equity*.

I. Strict or *Legal Justice* may seem at first to be an inferior species of virtue. *Quam exiguum est ad legem bonum esse*, said Seneca. But obedience to the law may spring not from fear, but from a conscientious feeling of obligation, and from seeing clearly, and feeling strongly, that it is only by maintaining the laws and institutions of society that the peace and happiness of its members can be secured and advanced. Among the moralists of antiquity it was a standing precept, *To obey the laws*; because, without this obedience, the framework of society would be dissolved, and social duty and obligation cease. The highest eulogium which the Greeks could pronounce over the heroes of Thermopylæ was to inscribe on their tombs—"They fell in obedience to the laws."

The duty of according to our neighbour all the rights with which the laws and usages of society invest him constitutes the virtue of *Integrity* or *Uprightness*—the manifestations of which are as many

and as various as the relations subsisting, and the engagements entered into, between the members of a community and the rights rising out of these. A man of *Integrity* will carefully respect them all.

Justice further requires—

II. To do what is fair and equitable in cases which are not provided for by law.

In his *Ethics*, book v. ch. 10, Aristotle has treated of *Equity*, and has shown that it is generically the same with *Justice*. It is called in to correct *Legal Justice*; and *Legal Justice* requires correction, because all laws must necessarily speak in general terms, and must leave particular cases to the discretion of the judge. He compares *Equity* to the leaden rule which was used in measuring Lesbian or rusticated building, in which the stones alternately projected and receded, but the rule bent accordingly.

There are two grounds on which the duty of *Equity* may be called for.

1. The law may be defective, and not reach to every case.

In an advanced state of society the relations and transactions between man and man are so exceedingly varied and multiplied, that it becomes impossible to frame laws which shall be applicable to all cases which can and do occur. Recourse is had to precedents, as a means of determining cases which may be similar. This presumes that the judgments adopted as precedents were in themselves just and wise, which may not always be the case. And it presumes further, that the matters formerly decided, and the matters now under deliberation, are precisely similar, which they may not be. Another expedient is to refer cases, which the law has not determined, to the decision of a jury, or of arbiters specially chosen. But neither in this way is there any absolute security against injustice. And the ultimate remedy for the defects of written law—defects which no administration of it can altogether remove—is to be found in the principle of *Equity* or *Fairness*. This principle will keep those who are guided by it not only from acts of injustice, but from many things which the wisdom of no legislator can provide against, and to which the sanction of no human law can ever reach. It will lead to the doing of what is fair and reasonable in the circumstances of every particular case, and to the refraining from taking any advantage, or seeking any refuge, from the defectiveness of legal arrangements. But—

2. The law may be erroneous as well as defective. Without requiring anything that is positively unjust, laws are frequently so framed that the rigorous application of them may issue in the grossest injustice. Hence the common saying, *summum jus, summa injuria*. In administering the law, judges are often compelled to lament that, by the authority of express statute, or of long-established precedent, they must give a decision which they feel to be at variance with true and substantial justice. Some of our courts, it is true, are courts of equity as well as of law, and the judgments pronounced may proceed, not on the strict letter of the law, but on a fair and equitable consideration of the whole circumstances of the case. But even judgments of this kind frequently fall short of the true and full merits of the case. And, after all, it appears "that a large portion of natural equity is left to be administered *in foro conscientiae*; because, in addition to the difficulty of propounding precise rules applicable to all cases, a greater detriment and inconvenience to the community would probably ensue from attempting to enforce it in the public courts, than from leaving it to the decision and the power of conscience, and to the various motives by which mankind are ordinarily influenced." (Smith, *Man. of Equity Jurisprudence*, p. 5.)

An equitable man looks not outward on a defective or erroneous law, of the mistakes or omissions of which he seeks to take advantage; but he looks inwards upon that law of rectitude which is written upon his heart, and seeks to be guided by its dictates. Whatsoever he would that others should do unto him in similar circumstances, he studies to do even so unto them.

ECONOMICAL JUSTICE

Includes the rights and duties of the family or household. These arise from—

- I. The relation of husband and wife.
- II. The relation of parent and child.
- III. The relation of master and servant.

CHAPTER I.

HUSBAND AND WIFE.

SECTION I.—*Marriage.*

FAMILIA was the word used by the Romans to denote the persons collected in the house along with their parents, and also with the servants. The head of the house was called *paterfamilias*; his wife, in general, *materfamilias*. (Whewell, *Elements*, b. iv. ch. 5.)

Marriage is defined by Dr. Beattie (*Elements of Mor. Science*, pt. ii.) to be “the strict and intimate union, for life, founded on mutual esteem, of one man and one woman, in one family, for the purpose of having children, educating them, and promoting the happiness of one another.”

Marriage is the parent, not the child, of civil society. Cicero called it (*De Off.*, lib. i. cap. 17) *Principium urbis et quasi seminarium reipublicæ*. Both among the Greeks and Romans *Marriage* was encouraged by law, and the neglect of it was discountenanced and punished. The whole scheme of nature and of Providence proceeds on the supposition that the human race is to be continued, that the helpless members of that race are to be protected and cherished, and that the various affections and feelings by which they are linked together should be cherished and purified. But while *Marriage* is natural, reasonable, becoming, or even binding, there are many things requisite towards rendering this union productive of its full and happy effects. Of these conditions every one must judge for himself. And it is better that the legislature should neither directly encourage *Marriage* nor unnecessarily impede it, but trust to the operation of those principles and feelings which are natural to man, and which are sure to accomplish the ends for which they have been inserted in our constitution.

But, when parties have agreed to live together, it is right that the law should interpose its authority to sanction and protect the union, as the living fountain of social happiness and virtue. In treating of *Marriage*, therefore, it falls to be considered in a *legal* as well as in an *ethical* light; because it is the subject of *Jurisprudence* as well as of *Morality*. It may be proper to notice—

SUBSECTION I.—*The Conditions and Circumstances necessary before Marriage is entered upon.*

Bodily defect and mental imbecility, hereditary disease, and extreme old age, have been thought sufficient to prevent those who labour under them from entering upon the married state.

I. But the first preliminary upon which the law can insist is, that the *parties shall be capable of giving a deliberate and voluntary consent*. On this ground forced marriages are invalid. The age at which *Marriage* may be legally contracted has been differently fixed in different countries. Nature has laid down no universal rule; because the period of arriving at maturity is not fixed. All that can be said is, that public opinion and law should discountenance *Marriages* entered into before the age at which it may reasonably be supposed that the parties fully understand and contemplate the conditions and duties of the married state.

II. Another point to which the laws of most countries have adverted is, *the relation previously subsisting between the parties*. By the Roman law, *Marriages* were distinguished as *Incestuous*, when the parties were too nearly related by *consanguinity*—that is, by being of the same blood, as brother and sister; or by *affinity*—that is, by being connected through *Marriage*, as father-in-law and daughter-in-law; *Indecorous*, when senators and sons of senators married those of inferior rank, or who followed any disreputable calling, or had suffered any public punishment; and *Noxious*, when, 1. Between a Jew and a Christian; 2. Between a guardian and his ward; 3. Between a public officer in a province and a native of that province.

As to the degrees of consanguinity and affinity within which *Marriage* was prohibited, the Roman law coincided pretty closely with the Levitical law, which is followed in this country. Dr. Hutcheson thinks that there is a natural instinct of aversion to *Marriages* within the prohibited degrees; and mentions with approbation the opinion that there was some early divine prohibition, the memory of which has been preserved among most nations more or less distinctly. There are various grounds of expediency on which such *Marriages* should be discouraged or prohibited.

(1.) The ties which bind society together are multiplied and strengthened when *Marriage* takes place between those who are not previously related.

(2.) The wealth of society is in this way more equally diffused

than when parties of the same kindred or affinity intermarry and confine their riches to a few families.

(3.) The children born of parents not previously related are generally more healthy and vigorous, both in body and mind, than those born of parents nearly related.

III. *Marriage* was defined to be the union of one man with one woman; and in all Christian countries the law provides, as a preliminary condition, *that both parties are free from any union with any other party*. And that Polygamy is contrary to the light of nature and destructive of human happiness and improvement, may appear from the following considerations :—

1. The proportion between the number of males and females who are born into the world being nearly equal, indicates that one man should have no more than one wife at the same time.
2. The primary end of *Marriage*, the continuation of the race, is best answered by the exclusive union of one man with one woman.
3. Children are more carefully attended to when they are the offspring of one *Marriage*.
4. Polygamy divides the affection of parents, and is ruinous to their peace and happiness.
5. Polygamy reduces the female sex to a state of degradation and slavery.

In the account which is given in Scripture of the origin of the human race, we read that God created only one woman to one man. “Had God intended Polygamy for the species,” says Paley, “it is probable that He would have begun with it; especially as, by giving to Adam more wives than one, the multiplication of the human race would have proceeded with quicker progress.”—*Mor. and Pol. Phil.*, book iii. pt. iii. ch. 6. And again, after the Deluge, when the speedy peopling of the earth was desirable, Noah was saved with only one wife, and his three sons each with his single wife.

The practice of Polygamy prevailed before the law of Moses, and under it. But there is nothing in the law of Moses permitting the practice, much less sanctioning or enjoining it. The text, Deut xxi. 15, according to almost every version but our own, refers to the case of a man, not who has simultaneously, but who has had successively⁶ two wives. It was expressly contrary to the law of Moses

⁶ “If the first-born be hers that was | passage refers to successive, not simultaneous,”—this expression shows that the *neous* wives.

that one woman should have more than one husband at one time. It was not till she received a bill of divorce from her first husband that she could marry a second. By parity of reasoning, a man could only have one wife at one time. The text, Levit. xviii. 18, is simply a prohibition against simultaneous Polygamy.

No mention is made of Polygamy in the New Testament Scriptures; and hence it has been concluded that, before the time of Christ, the practice had ceased among the inhabitants of Judea.⁶ It is altogether at variance with that spirit of purity and self-restraint which breathes throughout the Gospel.

SUBSECTION II.—*The Manner in which the Institution of Marriage has been Sanctioned and Celebrated has been very different in different Countries.*

The first trace of any religious ceremony at *Marriage* is to be found among the Romans. They had three forms of marriage. The most ancient, which was called *Confarreatio*, was instituted by Romulus. According to this mode, the parties, in the presence of ten witnesses, ate together a cake made of wheat, salt, and water, part of which was offered, with other sacrifices, to the gods. Certain priests, such as the *flamen Dialis*, a priest of Jupiter, and the vestal virgins, could only be chosen from those born in such marriages. (Dionys. Halicarn., *Inst. De Nupt.* ii. p. 95; Virgil, *Georg.* i. 31; *Aeneid*, iv. 104).

Marriage by *Confarreation* was almost obsolete in the time of Tiberius. (Tacit., *Annal.*, iv. 16). In place of it came *Co-emption*, in which the parties gave and received a piece of money, pledging their faith to each other; and *Usucapio*, when the parties, having lived together for a year, agreed to continue so, and thus made a valid *Marriage*.

Heineccius says that the mode of marrying by *Co-emption* was common among many nations, especially the Jews. (Gen. xxix. 18.) Among the ancient Assyrians their fair women were given in *Marriage* to those who offered the largest sums; and the sums thus obtained were distributed as dowries to those whose personal charms were less attractive. We see from Homer, that among the Greeks it was usual for the husband to give a price for his wife. Among

"Is it lawful for a Jew to have more than one wife?" was the first of the twelve questions which, on the 29th of July, 1806, were laid before the great Sanhedrim, as-

sembled in Paris, by order of Napoleon. The answer was, "It is by no means lawful for Jews to have more than one wife."

the ancient Germans, Tacitus tells us, “*Dotem non uxor marito, sed uxori maritus afferit.*” The same practice prevailed in the early history of France. And according to the old law of England, the husband laid down gold and silver for the wife, as though he *did buy her*.

Under the law of Moses, it does not appear to have been necessary that a priest or Levite should be present at the celebration of *Marriage*. Blackstone says, “The intervention of the priest in the marriage contract is merely “*juris positivi*, and not *juris naturalis aut divini*.” Among the primitive Christians, *Marriage* was sometimes solemnized by a minister of the church, but not *always*, as Bingham asserts. (Selden, *Uxor Hebraica*, lib. ii. cap. 9.) Tertullian, who lived in the second century, says that in his day *Marriages* were not reckoned reputable unless they were first openly proclaimed before the church. And at the close of that century, Soter, the fifteenth bishop of Rome, ordained that no woman should be deemed a lawful wife unless formally married by a priest. But this ordinance was temporary and local; and throughout the Roman empire contracts of marriage were long considered as rites of secular concern. “But in the twelfth century, Peter Lombard discovered the institution of seven sacraments, in the mystical expression of the seven spirits of God, which he understood as an assurance of the seven-fold operation of the Spirit, in *Baptism*, the *Supper of the Lord*, *Confirmation*, *Penance*, *Orders*, *Matrimony*, and *Extreme Unction*; and the Church of Rome soon countenanced this doctrine. This brought *Marriage*, which was originally of civil jurisdiction, under spiritual cognizance.”—Reynolds, *Hist. Essay on Govern. of Church of England*, p. 70. Towards the end of the twelfth century, the discipline and ceremonies of the Church of Rome were strenuously opposed by the Albigenses, who taught that the consent of a willing couple, without the formality of sacerdotal benediction, made a lawful *Marriage*. In the fourteenth century the Lollards, another party of Reformers, taught the same doctrine. But in the Council of Trent, which met in 1545 and sat till 1563, it was decreed, “That if any shall say that matrimony is not one of the seven sacraments instituted by Christ, and doth not confer grace, *Let him be accursed*. And if any shall condemn the benediction, and other ceremonies used in *Marriage*, *Let him be accursed*.”

At the Reformation, the Church of England did not adopt the

doctrine of the Church of Rome as to *Marriage* being a sacrament. Still it was regarded as an institution so sacred that it ought always to be celebrated by an ecclesiastical person. During the time of the Commonwealth in England, *Marriages* were solemnized by civil magistrates. The Act of 12 Charles II., cap. 33, declared to be valid all that were thus solemnized from 1st May, 1642, to 1660. At the Restoration, the Ecclesiastical Canons again came into use, and, strictly speaking, *Marriage* could only be solemnized by one in holy orders, within the walls of a church, and according to a set form of words. As the number of Dissenters from the Church of England increased, some change as to the law of *Marriage* was loudly called for. By successive statutes the grievances complained of have been removed, and Dissenters can now be married, both in England and Ireland, in their own places of worship, and according to their own forms: or in the Registrar's Office, where no religious ceremony is necessary.

In Scotland the Decrees of the Council of Trent never had authority, because the Reformation was carried before they passed; and *Marriage* was considered to be more of a civil contract than in England. It was usually, however, performed by an ecclesiastical person; and, till a period comparatively recent, in a church. Indeed, the severest penalty still lies against the performance⁷ of the *Marriage* ceremony by any other than an ordained minister. But, if parties declare themselves before witnesses to be married persons, the declaration constitutes a valid marriage as to all civil effect. Or if they appear before a magistrate, and confess that they have been irregularly married, in virtue of an Act of Parliament, he fines them for the irregularity, and an extract of the minute recording their having been fined is held to be evidence of their being married persons. But they are still subject to the censure and discipline of the ecclesiastical body to which they belong.

The law of Scotland recognises four different modes by which marriage may be constituted. 1. A public or regular marriage celebrated by a minister after proclamation of banns. 2. The deliberate exchange of matrimonial consent by words *de praesenti*

⁷ According to the first book of Discipline, marriages were to be performed on Sunday. But the General Assembly of 1579, deemed that "Bands being thrie several Sundays lawfullie proclaimit, the marriage may be any day of the oulk (week) solemnizat, swa that a sufficient number of witnesses be present."

without the nuptial benediction or *concupitus*. 3. Promise of marriage followed by *copula*, at least when declared a marriage by an action of declaration in the Court of Session. 4. Cohabitation as man and wife and being held and reputed as married persons." —Mackenzie, on *Roman Law*, p. 101.

Paley has remarked that, "as to one main article in matrimonial alliances, an alteration has taken place in the fashion of the world; the wife now brings money to her husband, whereas anciently the husband paid money to the family of the wife." In an early state of society, when the members of a family were all industriously employed, the head of the family would not be willing to part with any of its members without compensation for the loss of her labour. And he who wished to increase the resources of his household, by obtaining the help of a wife, would be willing, for that end, to part with a portion of the wealth which he had already acquired. But, as society advances, the maintenance of a family is accompanied with expense. Hence the husband expected that his wife should bring a dowry with her. The Egyptians, who were early civilized, were the first who gave dowries with their daughters. Pharaoh gave the city of Gaza to Solomon, as a portion to his daughter. It descended from kings to common life. And, as the principles of equity unfolded, it was thought right that the wife who brought a dowry should be secured in a jointure. Hence arose reciprocal rights and claims which were determined by positive law. But what is next to be noticed in reference to *Marriage* is—

SUBSECTION III.—*The Duties which it Imposes.*

These are,—1. Such as are common to both parties; and 2. Such as are peculiar to each.

Of the duties common to both, the first is Love, and the second is Fidelity. These are professed and promised by both.

Of the duties peculiar to each, it belongs to the husband to *rule*, and to the wife to *obey*. And while it is peculiarly incumbent on the husband to provide a suitable maintenance for his household, it is equally incumbent on the wife to see that the means and substance of the family be administered with prudence and economy. (See Foster, *Discourses on Nat. Religion*; Fleetwood, Delany, and others, *On Relative Duties*.)

SUBSECTION IV.—*Of the Duration and Dissolution of the Marriage Union.*

L. Is it temporary or permanent?

The end of *Marriage* is not merely to have children, but to prepare them for the duties of life. In Greek the family society was denoted by the epithet *παρπική*, signifying that the members were born of the same parents. Aristotle rejected this epithet, and called the family society *τεκνοποιητική*, signifying to educate and bring up children. (Donaldson, *Synopsis Oeconomia*, p. 34.) But supposing these ends to have been answered, *are the parents still bound to live together?* Mons. Barbeyrac (*Trans. of Puffendorff*, book vi. ch. 1) quotes Mr. Locke (*Treatise on Civ. Govern.*, pt. ii. ch. 6, sect. 2) and Algernon Sydney (*Discourse of Govern.*, ch. ii. sect. 4) as favouring the opinion that there is nothing in the nature or end of the *Marriage* union which demands that husband and wife should live together to the end of their lives, after having brought up children and furnished them with the means of maintaining themselves. Paley (*Mor. and Pol. Phil.*, book iii. ch. 7) has expressed himself to the same effect. But this view is both *defective* and *erroneous*.

1. It is *defective*, inasmuch as it supposes that the only end answered by *Marriage* is the bringing up of children. But the happiness and comfort of the married parties must also be admitted to be one great end of their union. And this end may be gained in cases in which the other has not been accomplished. The feelings of affection in which the union originated may continue and increase, till they settle into a love which age and infirmity cannot touch, and which can only be dissolved by death.

2. This view is *erroneous*, in supposing that the duty of parents towards their children is accomplished when they have fitted them for making their way in the world themselves. But, says Montesquieu (*Spirit of Laws*, book xxviii. ch. 2), "It is not enough that we have food; we need advice and direction. We may be able to gain a livelihood, yet not able to govern ourselves." The family circle is the school in which we are trained to cherish those feelings of subordination, and respect, and gratitude, which are at once the security and ornament of social life. But if that circle were rashly or prematurely broken up, those feelings would lose much of what nourishes and strengthens them. If the tent which sheltered us in childhood and youth were to be struck down, as soon as we had left it, to try our feeble strength amidst the jostlings and intrigues of the world, many of the best and kindest affections of our nature

would suffer. We should lack for ourselves that example of mature and purified love which sheds such a mellow light on the evening of wedded life. And we could bequeath no such inheritance to our children; but, as the ostrich leaves her young on the sand, and knows them no more, men would grow up a naked and callous brood, bereft of those soft and downy affections which spring up within the sheltered nest of a father's house, and spread their genial warmth through all the relations of social life. Society, instead of being made up of those who had learned to reverence the hoary head, and who looked forward themselves to receive from their children the honour and respect due to old age, would be composed of noisy and impatient brawlers, prematurely let loose from the school of nature. And the movements of society, instead of being carried on in good order and with kindly feeling, would be characterized by insubordination and selfish independence.

Granting that the *Marriage* union is naturally permanent, it may be asked—

II. *Are there no Reasons for which it may be Suspended for a time?*

The Apostle Paul (1 Cor. vii. 10) admits that there may be cases in which a separation may be expedient or unavoidable. “Let not the wife depart from her husband: but and if she depart, let her remain unmarried, or be reconciled to her husband: and let not the husband put away his wife.” Such separation is not allowed unless it be unavoidable. It is temporary, and does not exclude reconciliation; and therefore both parties are to remain unmarried. It seems further reasonable that such separation should not be made at the mere will and pleasure of the parties, but by authority and law. *Marriage* is a public act, involving not only the rights and interests of individuals, but of society at large, and therefore it ought not to be suspended, even for a time, without proper cause being shown.

III. *Can the Marriage Union be altogether Dissolved, and if so, for what Causes?*

In almost all ages and among almost all nations of the world, adultery has been deemed a sufficient cause for dissolving the *Marriage* union.

But, according to the Church of Rome, *Marriage* is a sacrament necessarily accompanied with grace, and is therefore indissoluble. Strictly speaking, according to the canon law, divorce was not a di-

solution of the *Marriage* union, but in many cases amounted merely to a declaration that this union had not been duly entered into, in consequence of some impediment subsisting at the time. When the *Marriage* had been strictly legal, even adultery could not dissolve it. All that the ecclesiastical courts did in such cases was to allow a separation *a mensa et toro*. But freedom to marry again could only be had by special dispensation.

This view of the *Marriage* union was vehemently opposed by the Lutherans and early Reformers, who maintained that the union was not indissoluble, and that adultery was a sufficient ground of divorce *a vinculo matrimonii*.

Besides adultery, Puffendorff contends that according to the light of nature, the malicious desertion of one of the parties is a sufficient ground for dissolving the *Marriage* union; and Hutcheson thinks this is warranted by the Apostle Paul (1 Cor. vii. 15-18). Obstinate and continued withdrawal of one of the parties being directly contrary to the ends of the *Marriage* contract, the law interferes to the extent of compelling the conditions of the contract to be fulfilled, or cause being shown why they cannot be fulfilled, and in Scotland, if the desertion be obstinate and continued for four years, it gives ground for a divorce. (Mackenzie, *Rom. Law*, p. 113.)

Paley says (*Mor. and Pol. Phil.*, book iii. pt. iii. ch. 7) that the law of nature admits of a dissolution of the contract in cases of attempts upon life, of outrageous cruelty, of incurable madness, and perhaps of personal imbecility. In these and similar cases the law of Theodosius and Valentinian, Christian Emperors of Rome, admitted the dangerous but necessary remedy of a divorce.

But the question on which there has been the greatest difference of opinion is, Whether incompatibility of temper, and dislike arising therefrom, should be held a sufficient ground for a divorce.

Milton has a treatise in which he maintains the affirmative. His arguments, which are understood to have been sharpened by his own bitter experience, are derived from the fact, that not only is the great end of *Marriage*, which is the happiness and comfort of the parties, frustrated, but misery inflicted. The liberty of divorce might prevent matters from coming to this extremity, or put an end to it when it did. But it is argued on the other hand—

1. If unsuitableness of temper were admitted as sufficient ground for a divorce, no attempt would be made to mend the state of matters by mutual accommodation and compliance.

The Court of Session, shortly after the Reformation, established the principle that divorce *a vinculo propter adulterium* was part of the common law of the land. From this time it was granted indiscriminately at the suit of the husband or the wife, and a little later (1573) an Act of the Scottish Parliament recognised another cause for divorce, likewise open to both spouses, that of malicious and protracted desertion by one of them. Erskine says this ground of divorce is approved of by St. Paul (1 Cor. vii. 15).

2. A separation of views and interests would arise.
3. The natural inconstancy of human affection would be encouraged.

So that even on views of expediency, and independent of the authority of Scripture, the only ground on which divorce is justifiable is the ground of adultery in either of the parties.

Bishop Burnet tells us that divorces were freely granted in the Canton of Berne; but any husband and wife applying for one were first required to pass six weeks together in one small room, furnished with only one chair, one plate, one spoon, one bed, and so on through the whole furniture, with the single exception of a small treatise on the duties of husband and wife, of which there was a copy for each. The Bishop adds, that, under this *régime* the parties, finding it necessary to accommodate one another, were soon on excellent terms, gave up the idea of separation, and were never known to make application again.

CHAPTER II.

PARENTS AND CHILDREN.

THE term *Parent* is applied equally to father and to mother; and the term *Child* is applied equally to son and to daughter. In all ages and among all nations the relation between *Parent* and *Child* has been regarded as that of Superior and Inferior, implying on the part of the one *authority*, or a right to command, and on the part of the other, *subjection*, or the duty of obedience. The power of the *Parent* is the earliest and most sacred recognized among men. It may therefore be proper to inquire into—

SECTION I.—*The Origin of Parental Authority.*

Without founding, as Grotius and others have done, on the fact that *Parents* may, in a subordinate sense, be said to be the authors of being to their *Children*, the nature and condition of man are such as necessarily to give rise to *Parental* authority. It rests on the natural affection which *Parents* have for their offspring, on the maturity of age and amount of experience to which they have come before their offspring can be born, on the helplessness and ignorance of *Children*, and on the gratitude and love which they naturally feel towards those who sustain, and guide, and instruct them. (See Miller, *On the Origin of Ranks*, ch. ii. sect. 1.) It is thus that the family becomes the nursery of the world—that the authority and submission which are exercised in domestic life prepare men for the restraints of public law and the benefits of public order; and the happiness and progress of society are seen to be consulted from the moment that its members are brought into being. They are born under a system of affectionate regard; they grow up under the restraint of wholesome control, and learn, by submitting to the kind counsels of their *Parents*, to yield obedience to the laws and regulations of that social life in which they are afterwards to take an independent part. Accordingly, it has been found, in the history of all nations, that the best security for the public welfare is a wise and happy exercise of *Parental* authority; and one of the surest fore-runners of national degradation and public anarchy and disorder is neglect or contempt of domestic happiness and rule. This linking of the public with private peace—this connection between the comfort of the Family and the welfare of the State—gives additional interest and importance to the proper exercise of the *Parental* authority. It may therefore be proper to inquire into—

SECTION II.—*The Nature and Amount of Parental Authority.*

The authority of *Parents* will be modified in its exercise and extent, according to the age to which *Children* have attained. Grotius has distinguished three periods.

I. *The first period is that of infancy and minority*, during which the authority of *Parents* and the subjection of *Children* are all but absolute.

Among the Romans, by the old law of *patria potestas*, the *pater-*

familias, as proprietor both of his *Children* and his slaves, had the right of life and death over both. He could sell them, expose or abandon them, or he might punish them, as a household judge, even capitally. The Twelve Tables ordained that every acquisition of the *filius familias* went to the *paterfamilias*, who was sole proprietor of the family goods. This absolute power was little, if at all, modified during the Republic. But, under the Emperors, the *patria potestas* was more and more restricted, both over the person and the goods of the *filius familias*. And, according to the light of nature, the *patria potestas* is by no means so extensive or so absolute as it has been held to be among many nations. *Parents* have no right to maim or mutilate, to neglect or alienate, to expose or enslave, and still less to kill their *Children*. But they have full power to consult and act for their good. And during this first period, *Children* being incapable of judging what may be best for them, any acts done by them, without the knowledge and consent of their *Parents*, may be set aside. Not proceeding from a mature judgment nor a perfect will, such acts are regarded as neither morally nor legally valid.

II. *With regard to the precise age at which the judgment should be reckoned to be mature, the will perfect, and the individual fully responsible, the light of nature furnishes no positive rule.*

The powers of the mind, like the powers of the body, are developed at different periods in different countries, and even in the same country in different individuals. By the law of most countries, however, a period is fixed at which every individual of sound mind is held to be capable of judging and acting for himself. From and after this period the *Parental authority* ceases to be absolute. "After the *Child* is able to think and to judge for itself," says Rutherford (*Institutes of Nat. Law*, book i. ch. 11), "it is no longer the duty of *Parents* to think and to judge for it; and consequently the will of the *Child* is no longer under the absolute control of their will."

But although during this second period *Children* are not subject to absolute and unreasoning authority, they are still bound to regard their *Parents* with sentiments of gratitude and reverence, and to pay every attention and deference to their direction and advice. Besides, during this second period, *Parents* as the heads of the family, possess a separate authority and a separate claim to obedience. If the *Children* left the parental roof, and were received into another family, they would be bound to respect and obey the regulations which were

laid down by the heads of that family; and they cannot be released from that respect and obedience by the fact that the heads of the family in which they remain are also their *Parents*, and entitled to their gratitude and reverence. But in yielding obedience to this double authority they are now entitled to judge how far that authority is exercised in conformity with the dictates of reason and the demands of rectitude, and are to govern themselves accordingly. If the interests of virtue or the rights of conscience are to be violated by obedience, they are not only not bound, but they are not at liberty to obey.

SECTION III.—*The Duties of Parents towards their Children*
Are chiefly discharged while they remain under the parental roof.
Parents are bound—

I. *To give to their Children a suitable Support and Maintenance.*
To this they are prompted by feelings of natural affection—to this they are urged by the voice of reason and conscience—and to this they are in some measure compelled by the law of all civilized nations. By the light of nature, *Children* have an interest and a share in the condition and circumstances of their *Parents*. If their condition and circumstances in life have been elevated and prosperous, the *Children* are entitled to be brought up in a corresponding manner. If their condition and circumstances have been depressed and poor, the *Children* must begin life in depression and poverty. But it may only be, by a hard and thrifty upbringing, to rise above the depression and poverty in which their birth made them share.

Under this head it may be questioned—

1. *Have sons and daughters a right to share equally the wealth of the family?* According to the light of nature it may be difficult to see any ground of difference. Sons may be better able to employ productively the portion assigned to them. On the other hand, daughters, not having so many opportunities of bettering their condition, should be made more independent of exertion.

2. “*As to the preference given to the eldest son, it is easier,*” says Mr. Grove (*Mor. Phil.*, vol. ii. p. 499), “*to show the commonness than the reasonableness of the practice.* If indeed, a particular title, rank, or character, is by law entailed upon the eldest son, to support which a larger fortune is necessary, in this case there appears a good reason for making a larger provision for him; since otherwise, his

necessarily greater expenses considered, he would have in reality less than the rest. But where this is not the case, *mere eldership* (or seniority) seems to have a just claim to no more than a deference from the younger, answering to his superior age, experience, and judgment."

The passage, Deut. xxi. 15-17, supposes the privilege of the first-born established by custom, and only provides that it shall not be interfered with out of mere partiality. And the fact of its being transferred from Reuben to Joseph (1 Chron. v. 1), shows that it was not regarded as naturally inalienable. While Turgot (see *Life by Condorcet*) and other philosophers have declared against all rights of primogeniture, and have contended that the property of parents should be equally divided amongst their children, others have thought "that the different *geniuses* of children, the different *professions* to which they are bred, their sex, different degrees of health, vigour, prudence, and many other circumstances, leave room for a father, consistently with the most perfect equity and an impartial affection, to make a difference in his distributions." (Grove, *Mor. Phil.*, *ut supra*.)

Parents are further bound—

II. *To give to their Children a good Education.*

This includes,—1. *Physical Education*, or the due use of all those means which develope and strengthen the bodily frame—such as wholesome food, healthy exercise, and proper alternation of rest and labour, activity and repose.

2. *Intellectual Education*. The mind is originally without knowledge, but furnished with capacities for acquiring it. And it is the duty of *Parents*, who have the best opportunities of observing the nascent faculties of their *Children*, to see that they be exercised upon such objects as are best fitted to give to them a happy and useful expansion.

3. *A Moral Education*. The distinction between right and wrong is perceived at a very early age; and *Parents* should be careful to impress upon their *Children* the importance of regulating their conduct in accordance with it. All practices or pursuits which have a tendency to obscure or weaken a sense of this distinction should be avoided. Even sports and amusements which are cruel, or inflict unnecessary pain upon others, should be discouraged. All tampering with the sacred majesty of truth, even in the way of amusement or jest, should be refrained from. All fraud or violence

towards the possessions, or property, or reputation of others, should be guarded against, and kindly feelings and the interchange of good offices encouraged. And, as example is better than precept, it is the duty of *Parents* to see that they exhibit nothing but what is strictly correct in their own moral conduct—*Maxima reverentia debetur puero*. And while *Parents* are to guard against doing or saying anything that may let loose the foolishness which is bound up in the hearts of *Children*; so when it breaks forth spontaneously, and in spite of their efforts to repress it, then it becomes their duty to check it by admonition and correction. These are sometimes neglected through weak and foolish tenderness, but can never be neglected with impunity. “The rod and reproof give wisdom; but a *Child* left to himself bringeth his mother to shame” (Prov. xxix. 15).

4. *Religious Education.* *Parents* are the natural guardians of their *Children*’s welfare, not only in reference to the life that now is, but also in reference to that which is to come. They have the first and best opportunities of awakening in them those sentiments of reverence and awe, and of gratitude and love, which are due from them towards their great and beneficent Creator. *Parents* are the appointed priests of the family, charged with the high office of preserving and continuing the knowledge and the service of God. They are called on to bring up their *Children* in the nurture and admonition of the Lord, to instruct them in the knowledge of the great and important verities of religion, and to teach them to live under their influence.

III. A further duty has been assigned to *Parents* towards their *Children*—viz., *to determine what their occupation or profession in life shall be*.

In some countries this point is determined by law or custom. The people are divided into castes, to which particular occupations or professions are allotted; and he who belongs to one caste cannot follow the occupation or profession of another. In this country the institution of castes never obtained; but there are some trades and professions to prepare for which a long apprenticeship or training is necessary. It is desirable that this should be got over as early as possible. And, in such cases, it has been thought that *Parents* may choose a trade or profession for their *Children* before they can judge for themselves. On the other hand, it has been questioned whether, according to the light of nature, *Parents* can do so. But this is a

question to which no determinate answer can be given. As a general rule, every reasonable being should be allowed to choose that path or profession in life for which he thinks himself best fitted, and in following which he has reason to expect most happiness and success. Men always labour most cheerfully in that for which they have a liking; and, if constrained to labour in what they have no liking for, they have comparatively less chance of succeeding or of enjoying happiness. When such cases occur through the interference of *Parents*, they have much reason for regret. On the other hand, should *Parents* see their *Children* eagerly bent upon a way of life for which they are altogether unfitted, there may be room for remonstrance or admonition, or even it may be for restraint. But it is impossible to lay down any general rule, further than to say, that *Children* are bound to obey their *Parents*, when they can do so with a clear conscience, and without any sacrifice of their permanent welfare; while *Parents* are not to provoke their *Children* by any indiscreet exercise of their authority.

IV. A still further right has often been assumed by parents, or assigned to them by law—viz., *to exercise authority in reference to the marriage of their Children*.

So long as the parties purposing to marry have not arrived at years of maturity and understanding, it may be right that they should be subject in this matter to the authority of *Parents*; and, according to the laws of most countries, they are declared to be so. But when they have arrived at legal majority, the happiness of the parties concerned, and of society at large, are so deeply involved in the forming of a relation which is to last for life, that it would require clear and strong reasons to justify *Parents* in interfering, either by compulsion or restraint, with that freedom of affection and choice which, according to the light of nature, belongs to their *Children* in such circumstances. There may be room and reason for admonition and advice; but there is no ground for the cruel tyranny which has frequently been exercised in cases of this kind. But these cases are too delicate and too varied for any general rule, and must be left for determination to the good sense and kindly feelings of the parties interested.

SECTION IV.—*Duties of Children towards their Parents.*

The duties incumbent upon *Children* towards their *Parents*, so long as they are members of the same family, may be summed up in the single word, Obedience ; and the nature and amount of that obedience has been illustrated in connection with the duties incumbent upon parents towards their children, so long as they remain under the parental roof. But there is a third period in the relation between *Parents* and *Children*—viz., that of *Foris-familiation*, when the *Children* have themselves become the heads of a household, or have become members of a household different from that of their *Parents*. And the duties incumbent upon them during this period may be summed up under the one word, Honour. “*Honour thy father and thy mother, that thy days may be long in the land which the Lord thy God giveth thee.*” This, as the Apostle remarks (Eph. vi. 2, 3), is the first commandment with promise.

The duty of honouring parents includes *Love and Reverence, Gratitude and Requital.*

1. *Children* are bound at all times to show *Love and Reverence, or affectionate respect*, towards their *Parents*.

“God, as being the first cause of all beings,” says Mr. Wollaston (*Religion of Nature Delineated*, sect. 8, p. 297), “is often styled metaphorically, or, in a large sense of the word, the Father of the world, or of us all. And, if we behave ourselves towards Him as being such, we cannot but *adore* Him. Something *analogous*, though in a low degree, to the case between God and his offspring, there seems to be between *Parents* and their *Children*. If that requires *divine worship*, this will demand great respect and reverence. The precept of *honouring Parents*, to be found in almost all nations and religions, seems to proceed from some such sentiments; for in books we meet with it commonly following, or rather adhering to, that of *worshipping the Deity*.^{*} In laying *Children* under this obligation they have all conspired, though scarce in anything else.” And when the Apostle says in one passage (Ephes. vi. 1), “*Children, obey your Parents in the Lord*: for this is right;” and in another (Col. iii. 20), “*Children, obey your Parents in all things*: for this

* We divide the tables of the Law, so that the fifth commandment (Honour thy father and thy mother) falls in the second; but the Jews reckoned otherwise. Abar-

banel tells us that the fifth commandment was the last of the first table, so that the love and reverence due to *Parents* were religious.

is well-pleasing unto the Lord,"—he invests the duty of *Children* towards *Parents* with a religious character, as if the discharge of it were in truth an act of worship towards Him who is the Father of all.

II. *Children* are bound to show *Gratitude* and make *Requital* for all the kindness they have received from their *Parents*.

This duty is obviously in accordance with the light of nature. An Apostle has mentioned it as a primary and important duty (1 Tim. v. 4), "Let them learn first to show piety at home, and to requite their *Parents*." The *Requital* which it may be in the power of *Children* to render to their *Parents* depends upon circumstances. In many cases the *Parents* may never need at the hand of their *Children* that they should supply their temporal necessities; and all the return which they can make will be affectionate respect, and the many kind and tender offices which spring from it. But should circumstances render it necessary, *Children* are bound, as far as in them lies, to provide for the temporal wants of their *Parents*. This duty is incumbent upon them by the light of nature, and may be exacted by the law of most civilised nations. *Children* who have the opportunity of discharging this duty, and neglect to do so, would be universally condemned. And it is when such opportunity is gladly seized, and every possible return made to them, that fathers become, in the language of Solomon (Prov. xvii. 6), *the glory of their Children*. For if there be one spectacle in social life more pleasing than another, it must be that of aged and helpless *Parents* receiving kindness and protection from those to whom they had formerly rendered them.

CHAPTER III.

MASTER AND SERVANT.

SERVITUDE has been distinguished as *Perfect* or *Imperfect*. *Perfect Servitude* is more commonly denoted by the term *Slavery*, and *Imperfect Servitude* denotes the state of *Limited and Voluntary service*.

SECTION I.—*Of Slavery.*

Slavery includes a right on the part of the master, not only to direct the labour, but all the actions of the slave, and to dispose of his person, and transfer his right over him to another.

No man is naturally a slave. Inequalities of original endowment, whether of body or mind, may lead some to submit to the direction of others; but they give no good ground for *Slavery*. But—

I. A man may become a slave by his own free consent. “As the law of nature allows one man to give to another a temporary right to direct him in some of his actions by contract or agreement, it will be difficult to prove that the same law does not allow him to make this right perpetual, and to extend to all his actions.” This kind of *Slavery* is thought to have originated in an early stage of society, when those who were poor and helpless solicited the protection of some powerful neighbour, by whom they were entertained as dependents in the first instance, and ultimately as slaves.

II. Another way in which *Slavery* may originate is, when one who has incurred debt or done damage to another, which he cannot repay nor repair, surrenders his labour and liberty to that other for his advantage.

III. *Slavery* may arise from the sentence of the law. To punish a criminal, and to restrain him from further offending, he may be deprived of his liberty, and have all his actions placed under the absolute control of others, for a longer or a shorter period; or he whose crime deserved death may have his life spared on condition of his becoming a slave.

IV. But the chief origin of men being made slaves is to be found in the fact of their having first been made prisoners of war. In early ages those who were vanquished in battle were commonly put to death, to satisfy the cruelty of the victor and to save the trouble of maintaining them. Sometimes, however, they were spared, from the consideration that their future labour might be useful. In this way *Domestic Slavery* seems to have been early established among the nations of antiquity.

The evils inseparable from *Slavery* were greatly alleviated by the diffusion of Christianity. Soon after the Reformation the nations of Europe abolished *Domestic Slavery* among themselves; but some of them seem still to be favourable to a system of *Slavery* in their

colonies. It can be shown, however, to be wrong in itself and ruinous in its consequences, contrary to the light of nature, and destructive of the progress and happiness of the human race.

SECTION II.—*Of Voluntary Service.*

Voluntary Service is generally entered on for a limited period, and for a specified kind or amount of work. Some have doubted whether one man has a right, entirely and perpetually, to transfer his service to another (Foster, *Discourses on Nat. Rel.*, vol. i. p. 155); and such service can only extend to things lawful. Taking it for granted that the contract is limited and lawful, reciprocal duties arise from the relation thus established.

SUBSECTION I.—*Duties of Servants.*

The first duty incumbent upon servants is *Obedience*.

This is the condition of the contract, and it should be cheerfully fulfilled. In the language of the Apostle,—“*Servants are not only to be obedient to them that are their masters; but are to do service with good-will.*” The master regards, as more valuable, service which is cheerfully rendered. And the servant feels his duty lighter, from the kindly way in which that duty is received.

The next duty incumbent upon servants is *Fidelity*.

It frequently happens that something more than the service originally enjoined, or something different from it, is expedient to be done. *Fidelity* requires that in such cases a servant should exert himself to the very utmost. He is not to satisfy himself with doing merely what may be sufficient to exempt him from blame, but should strive to obtain the approbation of his master by *Fidelity* and zeal in his service. Of the absence or ignorance of his master he is to take no advantage himself, nor allow others to do so. Want of skill, or want of success, in doing the work entrusted to him, may be excused in a servant, when it is seen that there has been a sincere desire and endeavour to do it; but want of *Fidelity* never can be excused, because it is a breach of an engagement voluntarily entered into, and the fulfilment of which masters are justly entitled to expect and demand.

SUBSECTION II.—*Duties of Masters.*

I. As servants are bound to yield obedience to their masters, so,

on the other hand, masters are bound to render the stipulated *Wages* to their servants.

It is necessity, and, in many cases, a painful necessity, which leads one man to surrender his will and labour to the authority of another. He who has acquired a right to the service of another has acquired, so to speak, a portion of the liberty and independence of that other; and, as he values his own liberty and independence, he should justly and readily render the remuneration which has been agreed upon. There is a sacredness in the *Wages* of labour which has been universally recognized. That which a man earns by the sweat of his brow should be secure and inviolable as the privileges which he buys with his blood. By the law of Moses, the *Wages* of labour were to be paid immediately upon the labour being performed. "The *Wages* of him that is hired shall not abide with thee all night until the morning" (Levit. xix. 13). "At his day thou shalt give him his hire, neither shall the sun go down upon it; for he is poor, and setteth his heart upon it" (Deut. xxiv. 15). The hope of receiving his hire has enabled him to bear up during the long and hard hours of labour. And now that these hours are over, he needs the refreshment and strength which it may be the means of ministering to him. It is one of the highest duties, and it ought to be one of the highest enjoyments, of a wealthy, or powerful, or elevated station, to reward and encourage the labour of others—to diffuse happiness among the deserving and obedient—and to open up to them a way of bettering their condition in life. When, therefore, service has been carefully and faithfully rendered, it is the duty, and should be the pleasure, of masters, not only justly, but cheerfully and generously, to recompense those who have served them.

II. Masters are bound, not only to pay to their servants the stipulated *Wages* without grudging, but also to treat them with *Kindness* and consideration during the progress of their work.

Servitude, in all its forms, is a humiliating and painful state, and they who occupy the relation of masters should spare as much as possible the feelings of those who are servants. They have a right to see that the prescribed work is done; but they should beware of being too harsh or rigid in their demands. They are entitled to obedience; but, in Scripture, masters are commanded to *forbear from threatening*. All tyrannical measures and all contumelious language are to be refrained from, knowing that they also have a Master, who is in heaven, and that there is no respect of persons with Him. The

distinctions of this transitory state are agreeable to the will of God, and are recognized in His Word; but they are not to be made the means of disquieting and oppressing one another. They who are masters are to temper their demands with discretion and kindness, and beware of unnecessarily wounding the feelings of those whose lot it is to serve them. They are not to be hard taskmasters, or to make the lives of others bitter with hard bondage; but are rather to sweeten the bitter lot of those who labour, by a kind and considerate bearing towards them.

BOOK III.

THEISTIC ETHICS, OR NATURAL THEOLOGY.¹

"The invisible things of God, from the creation of the world, are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead."—ROM. i. 20.

UNDER this head may be considered that knowledge of God and of our duty towards Him, which the light of nature furnishes.

The duty due from us directly towards the Supreme Being includes,—

- I. A firm and rational belief in His existence.
- II. Just views of His attributes and administration.
- III. Suitable sentiments and services towards Him.²

CHAPTER I.

OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

IN order to our having a firm and rational belief in the existence of God, we must have a clear and comprehensive view of the evidence of this fundamental article of all religion and duty. Now, all evidence of the being of God, which has not been communicated by

¹ This designation has been found fault with by Schlegel (*Phil. of Life*, p. 194), on the ground that all theology is supernatural. But the designation can be explained and vindicated; or the old designation of *Theologia Moralis*, or Moral Theology, may be revived.

² "Primus est Deorum cultus, Deos credere, deinde reddere illis majestatem suam, reddere bonitatem, sine qua nulla majestas. . . Vis Deos propitiare? Bonus esto; satis illos coluit, quisquis imitatus est.—SENeca, Epist. 95.

Revelation, must rest ultimately on the constitution of our rational nature. Some principle, which, as reasonable beings, we find it difficult or impossible to reject, lies at the foundation of all the arguments which the light of nature furnishes in proof of the existence of God.

These arguments have been arranged in three classes, which have been respectively designated, *The Metaphysical*, *The Physical*, and *The Moral*. The *Metaphysical* arguments are those grounded on ideas of the Reason. The *Physical* are those derived from the phenomena and order of Nature. And the *Moral* are those derived from the history and beliefs of the human race, and the history and transitions of the globe which they inhabit.

Without questioning the logical correctness of this classification, or the appropriateness of the epithets by which its divisions have been designated, it may be adopted as a convenient arrangement, according to which the several arguments may be successively stated.

SECTION I.—*Metaphysical Arguments.*

Metaphysical arguments have also been called *Ontological*. They proceed according to the *a priori* mode of reasoning, and have been characterized as demonstrative. They form essentially one argument, under different phases.

I. *The Argument of Plato.*

According to Plato, the only objects of science or certain knowledge are ideas. These can only originate and dwell in a mind; and as they do not originate in our mind, which merely apprehends them, they belong to a Higher. The faculty by which we have ideas of the true and real, of the fair and good, is Reason; and human Reason is an efflux of the Divine Reason. Man knows and loves because God is. It is in His light that we see light, and by His love that we are transformed into His image. He is the reason and cause of all being, the ground of all certainty, the pattern and source of all perfection. His existence is the foundation of all that exists, or that can be called into existence. Without Him there could be no being, no reality, no knowledge, no truth, no justice, no goodness.

The legitimacy of this argument was admitted by Augustine, and is alluded to by Anselm and Aquinas in the scholastic ages. In

more modern times it has been developed by Cudworth, *Intell. Syst.*, ch. v. sect. 106-112; by Bossuet, *Traité de Connaissance de Dieu et de soimême*, ch. iv. 5-10; by Fénelon, *Traité de l'Existence et des Attributs de Dieu*, pt. i. ch. iv. sect. 8; pt. ii. ch. iv.; and by Malebranche, *Recherche de la Vérité*, livre iii., *Eclaircissement 10, sur le même livre*.

These writers argue in this way. Those necessary and universal truths, which all men, everywhere believe, are eternally true, and imply an eternal mind. They were true before man existed to know them, and they would continue to be true though man were annihilated. Their home is the Divine mind; and man knows them by participation of the Divine Reason.

The doctrine that Reason is impersonal, or that man shares it with God⁸—a doctrine so strenuously maintained, of late years, by Cousin and others—may also be said to contain the Platonic argument.

II. *The Argument of Anselm.*

If, instead of regarding Reason as a faculty which is common to man with all rational beings, and which points to the Divine Reason as its source, we examine the primary ideas which it furnishes, each of these ideas gives ground on which to rest an argument for the being of God. Of these, one of the principal is the Idea of the *Reason*, which makes it impossible to conceive of anything as being made out of nothing, and compels us to ascend to something containing the elements of the thing made. The Idea of *Cause*, again, is that of a force operating voluntarily, and putting these elements into form. The *Reason* is the higher idea, being that of a force immanent, permanent, general; while that of *Cause* marks an act of this force—an act which is transient, contingent, and particular. God is the *Reason* of the world. Whatever there is in creation, of great or just, or beautiful or good, exists only as an emanation of greatness, justice, beauty, and goodness supreme. But although the world had not been called into existence, these perfections would have existed absolutely in God. He is also the *Cause* of the world, as He has manifested His perfections by putting forth His creative power. He willed to do so, but He might not have so willed.

The argument from the idea of the *Reason*, as distinct from that of *Cause*, was slightly touched on by Augustine. (*De Trinitate*, lib. viii. cap. 3.) From the contemplation of the visible and perishable Good which this world presents, he ascended to the supreme and

⁸ "Est homini cum Deo rationis societas."—Cicero.

imperishable Good, which is the *Reason*, or immanent source of all Good.

Anselm, who was born in Piedmont in 1033, and became Archbishop of Canterbury in 1109, in a tract entitled *Monologium*, argues in the same way. “The immense variety of Goods which we recognize as belonging to a multitude of beings, in different measure, could have no existence but in virtue of a principle of absolute Goodness, one and universal, of which they all partake more or less. . . So, starting from the Greatness inherent in everything, we arrive necessarily at a principle of Greatness which is absolute. . . In the same way the quality of Being, which belongs to all individualities, resolves itself into a principle of absolute being, by which they all necessarily exist.”

Having thus shown that the human mind has, and cannot but have, the idea of a being absolutely perfect, Anselm attempted, in another tract, entitled *Proslogium*, to prove the existence of the objective reality corresponding to that idea—that is, of God. His reasoning runs in the form of a *reductio ad absurdum*. Thus,—The idea of God has a place in the human intelligence; for he who denies the existence of God has yet the idea of God. This idea is that of a being absolutely perfect. But if this being did not exist, except in the idea framed of him by the human intelligence, then there would be room for the existence, in reality, of a being more perfect than one who is conceived of as absolutely perfect; which is absurd. Existence in reality, as well as in idea, is a greater degree of perfection than existence in idea only; and, therefore, in thinking of a being absolutely perfect, we must think of him as really existing, otherwise we contradict ourselves, and leave room for the existence of a being possessing more perfection than the being who is conceived of as insurmountably perfect.

In the third chapter the reasoning is slightly varied, thus,—It is impossible to think that God does not exist; for God is a being than whom one more perfect cannot be conceived. But I can conceive a being of whom it would be impossible to think that he did not exist; and this being would be superior to him of whose non-existence it was possible to conceive. Therefore, if you admit the possibility of thinking that God does not exist, there may be a being more perfect than God, who is thought of as absolutely perfect.

In the one form, *reality* of existence, and in the other, *necessity* of existence, is argued to be involved in the idea of a being absolutely perfect.

III. *The Argument of Descartes.*

The reasoning of Anselm was not universally accepted nor acquiesced in during the Middle Ages. It attracted great attention, however, when it was reproduced and enlarged by Descartes.

He reasons both from the *origin* of the idea of God, and from the *contents* of the idea.

1. It is in this latter view that the reasoning of Descartes coincides with that of Anselm. It is to be found in *Principia Philosophiae*, pt. i. sect. 14, 15, and in the fifth of his *Meditationes*. In reply to some objections made to it, he reduced it to the syllogistic form, thus,—“To say that an attribute is contained in the nature or in the concept of a thing, is the same as to say that this attribute is true of this thing, and that it may be affirmed to be in it. But necessary existence is contained in the nature or in the concept of God as a perfect being. Hence it may with truth be said, that necessary existence is in God, or that God exists.”

Leibnitz (*Nouvelles Lettres et Opuscules*, 8vo. Paris, 1857) thought this reasoning might be made plainer, by starting, not from *perfection*, but from *necessary existence*, as one of the contents of our idea of God; thus—A being whose essence implies existence exists necessarily. God is a being, &c. In this form it coincides with the argument from the possibility of God’s existence. If His existence be admitted to be possible, it must also be admitted to be real. For if God does not now exist, it is impossible that He ever can exist. So that to deny the actual existence of God, is to maintain that His existence is impossible.

But according to Dr. Samuel Clarke (*Answer to Butler’s Sixth Letter*), existence is not a perfection, but that without which there can be neither perfection nor imperfection. And although necessary existence be included in the idea of a perfect being, reality of existence must be proved or admitted, before that existence can be shown to be either necessary or dependent.

2. In arguing the existence of God from the fact that the idea of Him as an Infinite Being is in the human mind, the reasoning of Descartes rests ultimately on the truthfulness and trustworthiness of our faculties. It is thus stated in the Third Meditation,—“Though the idea of substance be in my mind, owing to this, that I myself am a substance, I should not, however, have the idea of an Infinite Substance, seeing that I am a finite being, unless it were given me by some Substance in reality Infinite.” This reasoning

was acquiesced in by Fénelon (*Of the Existence of God*, pt. ii. ch. 1); and we are told by Mr. Stewart (*First Dissert.*, pt. i. note, p. 91), that it was long considered by the most eminent men in Europe as quite demonstrative. (See Volder, *Disput. Phil. contra Atheos*, p. 37, Medioburgi, 1685.) Descartes admitted that our idea of the Infinite is not adequate, but still it is true and real, and also clear and distinct. And as to the way in which we receive it, he regarded it as innate; and said, "It is not to be wondered at that God, at my creation, implanted this idea in me, that it might serve, as it were, for the mark of the workman impressed on his work." Mr. Locke also has said,—"That if there be any idea to which the epithet *innate* can be applied, it is the idea of God." But the meaning of this epithet, as employed by Descartes, is, "that we have been so constituted that, by the natural use of our faculties, we attain to the idea of the Infinite, in which is contained the idea of God." And as we are naturally determined to believe in the reality and existence of those external objects of which our senses testify to us, so we cannot resist the conclusion that there are, and must be, objective realities corresponding to the ideas which Reason gives. This argument will be noticed afterwards.

IV. *The Argument of Clarke.*

Dr. Samuel Clarke's only postulate is, that "something now is," on which he grounds his First Proposition, "That something has existed from all eternity." And since something has been from eternity, either there has always existed some one unchangeable and independent being, or there has been an infinite succession of changeable and dependent beings. Such a succession of beings, having no reason or ground of existence either within itself or from without, is absurd. And thus is established his Second Proposition, "That there has existed from eternity some one unchangeable and independent being." The Third Proposition is, "That this unchangeable and independent being must be self-existent, that is, necessarily existing." The reasoning on this proposition consists of two parts. The Negative part of the reasoning lies in showing the impossibility of everything being dependent, by which we are forced to the conclusion that there must be something necessarily existing. But may not this necessarily existing something be the material universe? Now, "that the material universe does not exist necessarily," says Dr. Clarke, "is very evident. . . . For whether we consider the *form* of the world, with the *disposition* and *motion* of its parts; or

whether we consider the *matter* of it, as such, without respect to its present form; everthing in it, both the *whole* and every one of its *parts*, their *situation* and *motion*, the *form* and also the *matter*, are the most arbitrary and dependent things, and the farthest removed from necessity that can possibly be imagined." This part of Dr. Clarke's reasoning was known in the schools as the argument *Ex contingentia mundi*. The things that are seen are passing and phenomenal. They begin to exist, and we know that the cause of their existing is not in themselves. We can conceive of them as ceasing to exist, or as never having been called into existence; and, from their variable and contingent existence, we rise to the conception and belief of a Being who exists of himself, and by the very necessity of his nature.

This validity of this argument has been challenged by Dr. Brown (*Lecture xcii.*), and by Dr. Chalmers (*Nat. Theol.*, ch. 3), and accepted by Dr. Price (*Review, &c.*, ch. 10, and *Appendix*.)

The first or Negative part of Dr. Clarke's reasoning rests on the principle of causality, and runs thus,—We cannot contemplate commencing or contingent existence without being forced to the conclusion that there is a cause of that existence which is permanent and necessary. The second or Positive part rests on the principle of substance, and may be thus stated in the words of Bishop Butler (*Analogy*, pt. i. ch. 6), "We ascribe to God a *necessary existence*, uncaused by any agent; for we find within ourselves the idea of infinity, *i. e.* immensity and eternity, impossible, even in imagination, to be removed out of being. We seem to discern intuitively, that there is, and cannot but be, somewhat external to ourselves answering this idea, or the archetype of it; and from hence (for this *abstract*, as much as any other, implies a *concrete*) we conclude that there is, *and cannot but be*, an infinite, an immense, eternal being existing, prior to all design contributing to his existence and exclusive of it.

An argument similar to this of Dr. Clarke is enclosed in the *Scholium Generale* of Sir Isaac Newton—"Deus non est eternitas et infinitas, sed eternus et infinitus; non est duratio vel spatium, sed durat et udest,"—that is, God is not eternity nor infinity, but the eternal and infinite being, by whose existence the qualities of time and space are constituted. Dr. Reid had remarked that "this scholium of Newton probably suggested to his great friend, Dr. Clarke, what he calls the argument *à priori* for the existence of an immense

and eternal being." This is repeated by Mr. Stewart (*Dissert.*, pt. ii. sect. 3), and by Lord Brougham (*Nat. Theol.*, pp. 90, 150). "But the dull reality is," says Dr. Turton (*Nat. Theol.*, p. 269), "that Dr. Clarke's work came out in 1704, and the celebrated scholium first made its appearance in 1713, when the second edition of the *Principia* was published." Reasoning precisely similar to that of Dr. Clarke may, however, be found in a passage of Cudworth (*Intell. Syst.*, book i. ch. 5, sect. 3, par. 4). The only difference is that, by Cudworth, the reasoning is employed, not as proving directly the existence of God, but in answer to an objection of the Atheists, and as showing that, upon their admission that space was incorporeal and infinite, they must admit an incorporeal substance or being, of which space is a quality or mode.

Bishop Butler felt some difficulty in regarding Time and Space as properties or qualities. (*Fifth Letter to Dr. Clarke.*) But he got over the difficulty, and admitted the inference. (*Analogy*, pt. i. ch. 4.) In the *Collection of Papers* which passed between Dr. Clarke and him in 1715 and 1716, Leibnitz maintained that "Space is nothing but the order of things co-existing, and Time is nothing but the order of things successive." According to Kant, Time and Space are necessary forms of the human mind, by which we conceive of things as existing in space, and of events as occurring in time. Dr. Chalmers (*Nat. Theol.*, ch. 3) did not see how Time and Space implied a substance of which they were qualities. Lord Brougham (*Nat. Theol.*, pt. i. sect. 4) thought they could not be called qualities inferring the existence of a substance. But Dr. Clarke (*Answer to Butler's Fourth Letter*) has used the word *relation* as synonymous with quality; and the relation between the necessary existence of Space and the necessary existence of an infinite being is explained by him as the relation between a quality and its substance. At the same time, he admitted that this was not a very proper explanation; and he has spoken (*Answer to Butler's Sixth Letter*) of Space and Time as *made* or *caused* by the existence of an infinite being. So that the relation between Space and Time and an Infinite Being necessarily existing has been explained by Dr. Clarke, both by the relation between a substance and its qualities and by the relation between a cause and its effects. In this view, his reasoning resolves our belief in the existence of God into a natural judgment, suggested by the contemplation of Time and Space. (See Reid, *Intell. Pow.*, Essay vi. ch. 1.)

V. The Argument from Conscience.

Conscience, or the Moral Faculty, may be considered as Speculative, in furnishing us with the idea of what is right; and as Practical, in giving us the sense of obligation. In both views of it, it affords an argument for the being of God.

1. It is admitted that we are sensible of the distinction between Right and Wrong, and that we do some things because they are Right, and refrain from doing other things because they are Wrong. What we are conscious of in reference to ourselves, observation testifies in reference to others, who give evidence of being guided and influenced by ideas of Right and Wrong. From the faint ideas of Rectitude which consciousness and observation supply, we ascend to the idea of what is absolutely Right. And what is the idea of absolute Rectitude but the idea of God? Or, if God do not exist, how could the idea of absolute rectitude have come into the mind of man?

2. *Conscience*, in promulgating the law of Right and Wrong, not only asserts its own supremacy and authority, but has reference to a law higher than its own, and to a Lawgiver more powerful to punish and reward than itself. Hence said Bishop Butler, "When it has given its sentence, it *naturally* and *always of course* goes on to anticipate a higher and more effectual sentence, which shall hereafter second and confirm its own." In giving us a sense of obligation, it leads us to think of Him who is the obliger. We thus rise from the little tribunal which is in our own bosom to the sight of a higher judgment-seat. Hence said Tertullian, "*Conscientia optima testis Divinitatis.*" "*Conscience* is God's deputy; and the inferior must suppose a superior; and God and our *Conscience* are like relative terms" (Taylor, *Ductor Dubit.*, book i. ch. 1.)

Kant, while he challenged the validity of those arguments for the being of God which are furnished by the Speculative Reason, held the argument furnished by the Practical Reason, or *Conscience*, to be satisfactory. According to him, the Chief Good lies in our enjoying happiness as the result or reward of virtue. The Practical Reason reveals to us the moral law; and in doing so it speaks to us in the categorical imperative—that is, in showing us what is Right, it commands us to do it, and to do it at all hazards. In this life, however, they who follow virtue do not always attain to happiness, in proportion to their virtue. But as the moral law is absolute, and must be fulfilled, both as to the obedience of those who are under it,

and as to their ultimate happiness, it is a postulate of our Practical Reason, which reveals to us this law, that there is a Lawgiver, who will realize this law in all its fulness; and therefore we must believe in God, as a being possessed of moral attributes, such as to make the attainment of the chief good—that is, of happiness, as the result of virtue—possible even in this life, and infallibly certain in a future state. Thus God and Immortality are testified to by *Conscience*.

SECTION II.—*Physical Arguments.*

The *Physical Arguments* for the being of God proceed in the *a posteriori* mode of reasoning, and are chiefly two. The first is derived from the evidences of active power which the universe exhibits, and may be said to rest on the principle of Causality. The second is derived from the evidences of design which the universe exhibits, and may be said to rest on the principle of Order.

I. *Argument from the Evidences of Active Power, or the necessity of a Prime Mover.*

When we look around us we see some things beginning to exist, or changing from one mode of existence to another, or ceasing altogether to exist as individual beings. We can, in many instances, trace these changes to a cause; for we see that some things and some beings produce other beings, and different states of being. But these things or beings, which we regard as causes, were themselves produced by some antecedently existing cause; and as this regress cannot go on to infinity, the mind is forced to the conclusion, that there must be some cause which was not produced; in short, a First Cause of all being.

Again, among the beings which exist, some have the power of moving and others have not. These latter constitute matter. But matter is sometimes in motion and sometimes not. Now, the change from rest to motion argues the operation of a cause external to matter. For, if the power of moving were inherent in matter, no reason could be given for its operating at one time and not at another, without supposing the existence and exercise of a power which regulated the power of moving. It is true, there are beings who possess in themselves the power of moving. But these beings are compound—that is, they are made up of matter and something which has the power of putting matter in motion. At least, all motion

which is not communicated from one portion of matter to another, can be traced to the act of some being capable of voluntary motion. So that the movements of matter, which we contemplate, seem all to originate in some will or mind. We ourselves have the power of beginning voluntary motion. But there are many movements going on which do not originate in our will, and are altogether beyond our power. We are thus led to think that there must be some moving power which moves other things, and is not moved itself⁴—some being whose very life is action. And the only thing whose life is action is that which thinks, that is, mind. So that not only must there be a First Cause or Prime Mover, but that cause is different from matter.

Reasoning similar to this was employed by Plato in the *Timæus*, and also in his book *De Legibus*. It was also employed by Aristotle both in his *Physics* and *Metaphysics*. It goes merely to prove that matter is not the only substance; but that in order to explain its movements we must refer them to mind as their cause. Accordingly, many of the ancient philosophers believed in the eternity of matter, as well as of mind. Motion led them to believe in a Mover, and the moving power they thought must be mind. But while mind might originate and direct the phenomena of matter, they did not conceive of it as calling matter out of nothing.

II. *Argument from the Evidences of Design.*

By the preceding argument the phenomena of matter are shown not to be self-originated, but are referred to a Cause external to, and different from, matter. By this argument it is intended to prove that the Prime Mover, or First Cause, is an intelligent being, acting with design. It is commonly called the argument from Final Causes, and one of the earliest illustrations of it is given by Xenophon in the *Memorabilia of Socrates* (book i. ch. 4), quoted by Mr. Stewart. (*Phil. of Act. and Mor. Pow.*, vol. ii. book iii. ch. 1.)

Evidences of *Design* may be observed in the constitution and phenomena of matter, and also in the constitution and phenomena of mind; so that this argument consists of two parts. In so far as the constitution and phenomena of mind are concerned, the epithet *Physical* is inadequate and inappropriate, as designating this class of arguments, or must be taken in the abusive sense given to it by

⁴ Thomas Aquinas (*Adv. Gentes*, I. 44, iii. 23) has said—"Omnis motus a principio immobili." Shakespeare has made

one of his characters address the Deity thus—"Oh ! thou Eternal Mover of the heavens."

those philosophers who regard the phenomena of matter and mind as similar or analogous. But this does not affect the facts to be adduced, nor the reasoning founded on them.

1. Evidences of Design in the Constitution and Phenomena of Matter.

Antedate the existence of man, and suppose him to have been looking upon this earth when it was without form and void. The contemplation of the confused and quiescent mass might not have conveyed to him the notion of anything but matter.⁵ (See Dr. Brown, *Lect. xcii.*) But the first tumbling of that mass in the mighty waters, the first breath of wind which blew upon the bosom of the abyss, and the first heaving of its billows, must have suggested the idea of a cause. The mere fact of motion having supervened upon matter would have led man to think of a cause different from and superior to it.

Let us now suppose that the universal frame of nature had assumed its present form, and a human being carried up into the highest heavens to contemplate it. He now sees matter arranged in the most beautiful forms, and motion going on in regular and harmonious order. The heavens are no longer desolate, but bright with innumerable worlds. Star sparkles beyond star in the interminable glory; and all are moving in their path with regularity and order. Their bright and mystic dance goes on without interruption. There is no crossing or jarring in their course—no tumult nor disorder in their movements. All is silent beauty and magnificence. Their voice is not heard; but this is because man cannot take in the harmony of the spheres—that heavenly melody which rises from the regularity of their movements. It is for the ear of Him who is a Spirit. But can the heart of man shut out from it the conclusion, that a creation so fair and good must have had a wise and a benevolent Creator?

A supposition somewhat similar is quoted by Cicero (*De Nat. Deor.*, lib. ii. n. 37, *in fin.*) as having been made by Aristotle, in a part of his writings now lost. In several passages, in which he is expressing his own views, Cicero has used similar illustrations. (*De Nat. Deor.*, lib. ii. cap. 5.) Even a representation of the movements

⁵ Dr. Chalmers says—"It is not brute matter in lumpish and unshapen masses that indicates a Deity." But Sir John Herschel, from its molecular constitution, and being fitted for entering into endless

combination, calls it a *manufactured article*. And Dr. Woods (*The Existence of Deity*, Lond., 1860) thinks that the molecular constitution of matter indicates *Design*.

of the heavenly bodies, as in a *planetarium*, would at once be referred to intelligence—how much more the reality! He alludes also to the fear excited by any unusual appearance in the heavens as involving the acknowledgment of some power superior to the external frame of nature. “*Exterriti homines, vim quandam esse caelestem et divinam, suspiciati sunt.*”—*De Nat. Deor.*, lib. ii. cap. 6. The same acknowledgment is involved in the worship of the heavenly host, which is the earliest form of idolatry. And the arts of the diviner would never have been practised, the dreams of the astrologer would never have been indulged in, but from the belief that there was some mighty being who sat behind the canopying clouds, from whom it was possible to draw down intelligence.

But let us descend from the “bright empyrean” to this “dim spot called earth.” Let us contract our illustration from the wide compass of universal nature to the narrower bounds of this world, and we shall see that the more close the examination, the more clear will be the conclusion, that the arrangements and collocations of matter are neither casual nor necessary, but made by a power acting with intelligence and design.

The very aspect of our globe, so beautifully diversified, and yet so regularly harmonious, is fitted to convey the impression of design. Earth and air, land and water, hill and dale, rocks and mountains, flowery meadows and dark forests, are interspersed with one another in such beautiful variety, that it is difficult, if not impossible, to regard this as the result of blind necessity or chance. And not only are the great materials of our globe arranged in beautiful order, but every region and every element is stored with corresponding productions and suitable inhabitants; so that our earth, as it wheels around the sun, holding up first one side of her teeming surface, and then another, to the genial influence of his rays, is more like a kind mother consulting for the health and comfort of her offspring, than like an undirected ball, rolling blindly through the boundless fields of space. And, whether we regard it as one of the heavenly bodies, and consider the position which it occupies, and the movements which it undergoes; or whether we reduce its stubborn materials to their simple elements, and see the endless combinations into which they may enter; or whether we examine the organized and living beings, with their curious structures and wonderful appetencies, to whose growth and enjoyment these elements are subservient;—whether we soar into the lofty speculations of astronomy, or descend

into the minute and searching analyses of chemistry, or enter upon the interesting and endless researches of natural history,—we meet with innumerable instances of things and of beings, separate and independent, combining or conspiring to the attainment of ends which could not otherwise be answered. And as the contemplation of ends and the arrangement of means cannot be ascribed to things that are unconscious, or to beings that are not voluntary agents, we are shut up to the conclusion, that they were contemplated and arranged by an Intelligence and Power above them.

2. *Evidences of Design in the Constitution and Phenomena of Mind.*

Mind is one; but its powers and faculties may be regarded as means for accomplishing an end. And we have evidence of design—

(1.) *In the wonderful array of powers and faculties with which man is endowed, and the triumphs which they have achieved.* (Lord Brougham, *Nat. Theol.*, p. 69.) We may cultivate and improve these faculties, but we did not call them into existence. And the gradual way in which they attain to maturity shows that they were given with the design of being perfected by exercise. “He that planted the ear, shall he not hear? He that formed the eye, shall he not see? He that teacheth man knowledge, shall he not know?” The appetites and passions, the sentiments and feelings of which man is susceptible, are almost as wonderful as the array of intellectual powers with which he has been endowed; and the consideration of them leads to a similar conclusion,—namely, that these susceptibilities have not risen up at random, but have been implanted by a Being of infinite wisdom, and arranged and balanced with the design of promoting the progress and improvement of the beings in whom they are found.

(2.) Another view by which this argument may be illustrated is, *The suitableness between the constitution of the mind of man and the arrangements of that external world in which he lives.* Man has senses, and there are objects adapted to gratify them. (Crombie, *Nat. Theol.*, vol. ii. p. 57.) The pleasure which he derives from their exercise prompts him to use them frequently, and thus to increase his knowledge of Nature and her productions. His curiosity is stimulated by the new and wonderful appearances which present themselves. His judgment is called into exercise in endeavouring to explain them. And thus, by the mutual action and reaction between the objects and appearances of external nature and the powers and

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faculties of the human mind, the intellectual education of man is accomplished. In like manner the appetites and desires, the emotions of sublimity and beauty, and the affections of benevolence and sympathy, have suitable objects to call them into exercise; and the exercise of them is productive of wise and happy effects.

This argument receives further illustration from—

(3.) *The suitableness which subsists between the faculties of the mind and the powers of the body; and the subordination of the one to the other.* We know not how it is, but so it is, that a volition of the mind should have any power over the parts or muscles of the body. “Now, this subserviency of body to mind, the aptitude of the instrument to the purposes of the agent, and the promptitude with which the muscular power obeys the authority of the will, are utterly irreconcilable with the irregularities of chance or the blindness of necessity.”—Crombie, *Nat. Theol.*, vol. ii. ch. ii. sect. 7.

The supposition that the instincts, tendencies, and faculties with which man is endowed, and his desire to display them, gave birth in his body to corresponding and suitable organs is the romance of science falsely so called. (Godwin, *Lectures on the Atheistic Controversy*, p. 179.) Besides, Cuvier has shown that “every organized being forms an entire system of its own, all the parts of which reciprocally correspond, and concur to produce a certain definite purpose, by reciprocal reaction, or by combining to the same end.” (Whewell, *Indications of the Creator*, pp. 49, 50; Paley, *Nat. Theol. Illustrated*, vol. i. p. 335, note by Sir Charles Bell.)

The converse supposition, namely, that the aptitude of the organ led to its use, though carried to an unwarrantable length, by Lucretius⁶ and by later atheists, is to a certain extent true. There can be no doubt that the experience which man gradually obtained of the aptitude of his hand, as an instrument for executing the conceptions and purposes of his mind, led to its more frequent and successful use, in prosecuting the arts and elegancies of civilized life. But this only proves that the correspondence between the organs of the human body and the faculties of the human mind was designed. The faculties could not generate the organs, and the organs could not give birth to the faculties; and the subordination and suitableness of the one to the other prove that both originated in Intelligence and associated by Design.

⁶ “Nihil ideo quoniam natum est in corpore, ut uti Possemus; sed quod natum est, id procreat usum.”

It is no valid objection to these evidences of design to say that the human mind, with all its powers and faculties, may be merely the results of bodily organization. It is not denied that there is such a thing as intelligence or thought. "And whether this reside in a distinct and spiritual substance, which we call mind, or arise from some peculiar organization of body adapted to the purpose, will make little difference in our argument; for it will make little difference in the skill and power required to produce the system. It will equally prove a contriver, a donor, a Creator. The exclusion of spirit from the world does not exclude a Supreme Being."

But the properties of matter are so different from the faculties which are ascribed to mind, that it seems reasonable to conclude that the substances to which they belong are different. And, if the mind of man be immaterial, the Being from whom it is derived must also be immaterial. "So that from the contemplation of the mind of man we derive a proof, not only of the existence of God, but of His spiritual nature."

Different Views taken of the Argument from the Evidences of Design.—By some it has been characterized as altogether inconclusive and involving a *petitio principii*. (Coleridge, *Table Talk*, vol. ii. p. 29; Irons, *Dissert. on Final Causes*, p. 118, 8vo. Lond. 1836; *Quarterly Review*, No. ci. p. 217.) But this view of it rests chiefly on the defective or inaccurate way in which the argument has been stated. It consists of two parts:—

1. The contemplation of things independent of one another uniting to accomplish an end, suggests or develops in us the idea of order or fitness.

2. The idea of order or fitness between independent things implies an intelligent cause.

The fact that the things which unite to accomplish an end are independent of one another is not always expressed, in stating the argument from design; but it is always implied. It is not so much the correspondence of parts in a harmonious whole, as the independence of the parts so harmonizing, which proves the exercise of choice and intelligence—that is, of Design. The reasoning fully stated runs thus:—Order, or fitness between independent things, implies an intelligent or designing cause. There are examples of such order or fitness in the productions and phenomena of nature; therefore, these productions and phenomena have an intelligent cause.

But on what ground does the truth and certainty of the proposition, That Order, or fitness to an end between independent things, implies design, ultimately rest? It is either—

1. *A necessary inference founded on experience and analogy; or,*
2. *A first truth furnished by Reason, and forming one of the principles of common sense.*

The former of these views is taken by Kant, *Kritick der Urtheils-kraft*; Dr. Thomas Brown, *Lect. xcii.*; Dr. Crombie, *Nat. Theol.*, ch. 1, sect. 16; Dr. Prout, *Bridgewater Treatise, Introd.*; Lord Brougham, *Discourse of Nat. Theol.*, p. 44.

The second view is supported by Mons. Buffier, *Premieres Verités*, par. ii. ch. 16; Dr. Reid, *Act. Pow.*, Essay vi. ch. 6; *Edinburgh Review*, No. clxv. p. 67; Dr. Whewell, *Indications of the Creator*, p. 74. This latter view of the ground of the argument furnishes the readiest answer to the objections brought against it by Mr. Hume. These are derived from his views as to the ideas of Power and of Design. (See *Dialogues on Nat. Religion*; *Essay on a Particular Providence and a Future State.*)

I. According to Mr. Hume, all that Sensation and Reflection can furnish is mere succession, antecedence and consequence; one thing following another. As to the idea of a necessary connection between the two, or of power or energy in the one to produce the other, no such idea can be supplied by Sensation or Reflection. And without seeking any other source, he maintained that we have no proper idea of power; but that having frequently seen one thing followed by another, we come to imagine that there is a necessary connection between them; and, by the influence of custom and association, we call the one the cause and the other the effect, and conceive that the cause has power to produce the effect. But our notion of cause and effect being merely an inference from experience, we have no warrant to extend that inference beyond the limits of experience, or to pronounce that anything is an effect proceeding from a cause, except in cases where that connection is supported by the observation of cases similar or analogous. If we were to find a piece of mechanism, although we knew nothing about its origin, if it were similar or analogous to some other, the origin of which we knew, we might conclude that this new piece of mechanism was an effect produced by human skill, and our conclusion would rest, according to Mr. Hume, on its only proper basis, experience. But with regard to this earth, or the solar system, or the universe, observation and experience

are wanting. We have no ground on which to conclude that they are effects. We can only say, that they are existences, and they are to us singular existences. "The universe is an object quite singular and unparalleled; no other object that has fallen under our observation bears any similarity to it; neither it nor its cause can be comprehended under any known species; and therefore, concerning the cause of the universe, we can form no rational conclusion at all."

The answer to this is in the true nature and origin of our idea of Cause. Cause is power in operation; and we think of it, not so much as *preceding*, as *producing*, the effect. We conceive of it as containing a virtue or energy, which, when it operates, will be followed by change. It is only the change which we see; but our idea and belief of the change is not more clear and firm than is our conviction that this change has been produced by a cause. And it is not one change, or one kind of change, that gives us this conviction, but *any change* and *every change*. Experience may and does extend our knowledge of particular causes, in connection with their particular effects; but experience does not give, and cannot confirm, the conviction, that every change implies the operation of a cause. Experience furnishes the occasion by which this conviction is first developed, but not the grounds on which it rests. It is a primitive belief. It is an original element of our rational nature, without which there could be no search after causes, no discovery of particular causes, no philosophy, no knowledge.

If this view of the nature and origin of the idea of Cause be correct, the objection of Mr. Hume against the argument for the being of God, from the evidences of active power, can have no place. Our views as to cause and effect are not derived from experience, and are not to be limited by it.

II. In like manner, Mr. Hume derives the idea of Order, as implying intelligence, from experience. We question our fellow-men, and know that they arranged certain means with a view to certain ends. But we cannot question the Creator, and cannot know whether the ends which we assign were designed. Yet in innumerable cases we conclude that there was design, without questioning our fellow-men. Even when we do not know the end, the arrangement of means gives us the idea of design. And when the means employed are above and beyond human power and human skill, we must ascribe the use of them to a power and skill which are adequate, that is, Divine.

This resolving of our idea of design into an intuition, rather than an inference, which was adopted by Dr. Reid, and acquiesced in by Mr. Stewart, has been challenged by Dr. Chalmers (*Institutes of Theology*, vol. i. p. 93), as placing the evidence for the being of God on new and unsafe ground. As to the novelty of it, Dr. Reid quotes Cicero, as having employed it in ancient times, and Tillotson, in times comparatively modern. And no ground can be safer or more certain, on which to rest any truth, than that of a principle of common sense.

SECTION III.—*Moral Arguments.*

The *Moral* arguments do not assume a strictly logical form, nor affect to be demonstratively conclusive. Yet they appeal to the common sense and common feelings of mankind with a force which, to many, is little less satisfactory than strict demonstration.

I. *Argument from the general consent of mankind.*

The universality of a belief in Deity has generally been admitted. (Cicero, *Tuscul. Disp.* i. 13, *De Legibus*, lib. i.; Seneca, *Epist.* 118; Plutarch, *Adv. Colatem*, p. 1125, fol., 1624.) This belief can be traced back to the remotest times. And it has nowhere disappeared. So that it may be said that *all men*,⁷ in *all ages*, and in *all places*, have had some knowledge and belief of God.

Travellers, on a first and hasty visit to foreign countries, have reported that the inhabitants had no idea of God, and no word to denote the Supreme Being. But on a subsequent visit and intercourse it has been found that they had. (See Locke's *Works*, edited by Mr. St. John.)

The evidences of His existence are so obvious and so abundant, that all men, in the ordinary exercise of their faculties, have come to see and acknowledge their force. The facts and phenomena of nature are such as silently and insensibly to produce the conviction of this truth upon a rational mind. So that, constituted as men have been, and conditioned as men have been, a belief in the being of God has been the natural and universal result. Now, it cannot be supposed that this universal result is a universal delusion, and that all men have been made to believe a lie.

II. *Argument from a sense of Deity being natural.*

This argument differs from the preceding, in so far as *that* rests on

⁷ "Quod semper, ubique et ab omnibus," | Vincentius Lirinensis, and subsequently are the marks of universality laid down by | adopted.

a conclusion of the intellect or reason ; whereas *this* rests rather on sentiment. The one is founded on the religious *beliefs*, the other on the religious *feelings* of the race.

It has been maintained by Cicero (*De Nat. Deor.*, lib. i. cap. 16, lib. ii. cap. 5 ; and by Descartes, *Medit. 3* and *Medit. 5*), that the idea of God is innate. And a late writer, Sir B. Brodie, in *Psychological Inquiries*, has said—“The disposition of man, even in his most degraded state, to believe in supernatural agencies, is so universal, and so manifestly the result of his peculiar constitution, that we must regard it as having very much the character of an instinct.” (See also *Spectator*, No. cci.)

The nature and amount of this argument may be thus unfolded : We have the capacity of framing the idea of a Supreme Being, and of cherishing suitable sentiments towards him. Now, the existence of such a capacity argues the existence of its object. Our faculties and our feelings are not so many aimless powers, or so many blind and objectless appetencies. But why are we capable of conceiving of a Supreme Being, and of experiencing those feelings which such a conception is calculated to inspire, if no such Being exist ? On such a supposition, this part of our nature would be altogether inexplicable. If there be no God, then our religious feelings can have no object, our devotional susceptibilities are without end or aim ; and thus there would be an original and characteristic part of the human constitution, of which we could not merely say that we did not know the use, but of which we could say, that it was utterly and entirely useless.

That a sense of Deity is natural to man is proved by the fact, that among all nations, and in all ages of the world, some form of religion is found to prevail. (Doubleday, *Mundane Mor. Government*, ch. 10 ; Livingstone’s *Missionary Travels*, p. 158 ; *Quarterly Review*, No. ccxv. p. 132.) This is the true *differentia* which separates man from the inferior animals. That this sense of Diety may be obscured or obliterated merely proves that, although natural, it is not indestructible. See how “principles in human nature—as well intellectual as moral—which, although inherent in its structure, may and often do remain latent as to any effect, not in individuals merely, but in entire races of men,” in Isaac Taylor’s *Wesley*, p. 145.

The Bechuanas, a Caffre tribe, possessed formerly the word “Merimo,” to express “Him that is above,” or “Him that is in

heaven." But Moffat, the missionary, found it to have vanished from the language of the present generation in its original meaning, and to be used by sorcerers to denote a fabulous ghost. (*Trench, On the Study of Words*, pp. 16, 17). But although this fabulous ghost is a sad disfigurement of the unseen God, yet, in the mummeries of their services, there is the dark acknowledgment of a power superior to the elements of nature. And although a tribe should be found altogether destitute of any sense of religion, this would not prove that such a sense is not natural to man, but merely that, in their case, this sense has been checked or stunted in the springing; or that, after having sprung up within them, it has been choked by the noisome weeds of a barbarous and licentious life.

Plants and animals, when placed in circumstances unfavourable to their natural growth and development, degenerate. Man also is subject to the law of deterioration, both as to his physical frame, his intellectual faculties, and his moral and religious principles and feelings. "If in studying the true characters of a vegetable we ought not to look to a deteriorated plant, and if in studying the characters of an animal we ought not to look to a deteriorated individual or race, so, in studying man, and in asking especially what are his higher characteristics, we ought not to look to deteriorated tribes; for there we shall find certain qualities, if not in abeyance, at least in a very low state of development. If the plant cease to bear seed in extreme circumstances, we are not thence to infer that it is not the nature of the plant to bear seed; and so, even if we were to find a nation or tribe so degraded that we could not detect their acknowledgment of a God, we must not thence infer that man is not made to worship God."—Dove, *Logic of the Christian Faith*, pp. 151-155.

III. Argument from History.

In the traditions and annals of most nations, mention is made of a time when all things began to exist, or to assume their present form. Nor is the time very remote, and the presumption is, that if the present constitution of things had existed from eternity, the history of it would have reached farther back than it does. If men had existed on the earth from eternity, they must have walked round the circle of human knowledge, and left traces of their having done so; yet the arts and sciences which are now cultivated can all be traced back to their birth. (*Genesis*, ch. iv. ix. and xx.)

This argument is strongly put in *Lucretius*, lib. v., v. 325. Macro-

bius has unfolded it in his book on the *Dream of Scipio*, ii. 10. In Lord King's *Life of Locke*, vol. i. p. 242, the words of Cicero, "Neque ante philosophiam patefactam, quæ nuper inventa est," are quoted, on which Locke remarked,—"If philosophy had been, in Tully's time, not long in the world, it is likely the world is not older than our account."

It may be objected, that useful arts may have been forgotten or lost in the lapse of ages, or in some of those violent convulsions to which man and this globe have been exposed. And it must be admitted that arts and sciences have their periods of splendour and decay; and that the sun of human knowledge, after walking for a time in strength and beauty, has seemed to go down in darkness and debility. But if it has set on one quarter of the globe, it has only been to rise, in greater brightness, on some other. And it has been remarked, that "there is no reason to believe that any useful art which had once been invented was ever lost, unless another that answered the same end better were substituted in its room." As to those convulsions, by which they who contend for the eternity of the world would have us to believe that the human family, with all their treasured discoveries, have been successively swept away—if the destruction of this globe and its inhabitants were complete, then we ask, How came all things to be renewed, and man⁸ again to rejoice in the midst of them? And if the human race, or a few individuals of it, were saved from the calamity, the arts and sciences would be saved along with them, and transmitted to their posterity. But so far from there being any ground for the supposition that races of men may have existed at a period farther back than history can reach, and may have perished with all their improvements, in some of those convulsions to which this earth is liable, there is rather reason to suppose that, of all beings now living, man was the last that was called into existence. Sir Isaac Newton (*Life* by Brewster, p. 365) was of opinion that the inhabitants of this world were of short date; and alleged as one reason for that opinion, that all the arts—as letters, ships, printing, the needle, &c.—were discovered within the memory of history, and that there were visible marks of ruin upon it which could not have been effected by only a flood. This brings us to—

⁸ "When I asked him (Sir Isaac Newton) how this earth would have been re-peopled, if ever it had undergone the same fate it was threatened with by the comet of 1680,

he answered, 'That required the power of a Creator.'"—Mr. Conduit, *Notes of a Conversation with Sir Isaac Newton*.

4. The argument from Geology.

By laborious calculations respecting the form of our earth, Laplace (*Mecanique Celeste*, liv. iii.) came to the conclusion that it must originally have been in a state of fluidity. According to Cuvier, the primary rocks, which form as it were the bones and skeleton of our globe, show, by their crystallization, and even by their stratification, that they have been *formed in a liquid*. It appears also that while in this state they were exposed to a great degree of heat. The existence of animals or vegetables upon our earth, when in this state, would have been impossible. How, then, did life and organization begin? "It is demonstrable," says Dr. Buckland (*Vindiciae Geologicae*, p. 21), "that there was a period when no organic beings had existence; these organic beings must therefore have had a beginning subsequently to this period, and where is that beginning to be found, but in the will and fiat of an intelligent and All-wise Creator?" See also *An Argument to prove the Christian Revelation*, pp. 8, 9, by the Earl of Rosse.

Further, it appears that, of all living and organised forms man was the latest in being called into existence. The absence of all traces of the human skeleton in the inner crust of our globe, while it is full of other organized remains, shows that man did not exist till a comparatively late period in the history of the materials of which our globe is composed. "Geology tells us, out of its own records," says Professor Sedgwick (*Discourse on the Studies of the University*, p. 26, 3rd edit.), "that man has been but a few years a dweller on the earth; for the traces of himself and of his works are confined to the last monuments of its history." Lord Brougham thinks this fact conclusive, and has said in reference to it—"The atheistical argument that the present state of things may have lasted for ever is, therefore, now at an end." *Dissertations upon subjects of Science connected with Nat. Theology*, vol. ii. p. 190. See also Sir B. Brodie's *Psychological Enquiries*, p. 199.

5. The Argument from Astronomy.

Two centuries ago, Dr. Halley (*Miscellanea Curiosa*, p. 59) thought he could demonstrate that the opposition of the ether to planetary motion would in time become sensible. This has now been proved by the successive revolutions of Encke's comet. "It appears," says Dr. Whewell (*Bridgewater Treatise*, ch. 8), "that the effect of the resistance of the ethereal medium, from the first discovery of the comet (in 1786) up to the present time (1834), has

been to diminish the time of revolution by about two days. . . . The same medium which is thus shown to produce an effect upon Encke's comet must also act upon the planets which move through the same spaces. And the argument is, that if these bodies, of which our globe is one, had been moving from all eternity, their movements, being gradually impeded, would ultimately have been overcome; so that long before this time they would have lost the impulse by which they move forward, and would have been carried, by gravity, into the sun. . . . The doctrine of a resisting medium, once established, makes the imagination (of the world's eternity) untenable; compels us to go back to the origin, not only of the present world, not only of the earth, but of the solar system itself; and thus sets us forth upon that path of research into the series of past causation, where we obtain no answer of which the meaning corresponds to our questions, till we rest in the conclusion of a most provident and most powerful Creating Intelligence."

The true way to estimate the amount of evidence arising from these arguments is, not to compute the force or conclusiveness of each argument separately, but rather to look to the general effect of the whole. A rod, taken singly, may be twisted or turned aside yet, when bound up together with others, it may help to form *fascæ*, the authority of which cannot be legitimately resisted. And whatever may be thought of the strength of each argument viewed separately (and different minds will be differently impressed by the several arguments), yet when it is seen that they all co-operate and combine to the establishment of the same general conclusion, it must be admitted that the amount of proof furnished by the light of nature for the being of God is very considerable.

CHAPTER II.

OF THE ATTRIBUTES OF GOD.

"THE writers on natural religion commonly give a particular enumeration of attributes, which they divide into the Natural, the Intellectual, and the Moral." (Stewart, *Act. and Mor. Pow.*, book iii. ch. 3.) But they are all in one sense natural—that is, they are all essential to the being of God, and all equally so. "It may with as much reason and truth be affirmed of Him, that He is *by nature* holy, just, and good, as that He is immense or omnipotent, and that He always was so, and always will be so, and that it is impossible He should exist otherwise." (Chauncey, *Benevolence of the Deity Considered*.) Such of the divine attributes as are involved in the idea of a First Cause may be called *Natural*, to distinguish them from others which are manifested in the government of the world, which may be called *Moral*.

During the early part of the eighteenth century, Lord Bolingbroke (*Works*, vol. ii. p. 366) and others, while they admitted the being and *Natural* attributes of God, and a providence in the conserving and on-going of all things during the present life, denied that we have any evidence of His *Moral* attributes, or of a future state of rewards and punishments. In opposition to these arguments, see Leland, *View of Deistical Writers*.

SECTION I.—*Natural Attributes.*

Personality.—The Atheist speaks of the powers of nature, a principle of order, the laws of matter and motion, the processes of life and vegetation, and by doing so means to deny a personal agent. But, says Paley (*Nat. Theol.*, ch. 23), "That which can contrive, which can design, must be a person. These capacities constitute *personality*, for they imply consciousness and thought. They require that which can perceive an end or purpose, as well as the power of providing means and directing them to their end. They require a centre, in which perceptions unite and from which volitions flow; which is mind. The acts of a mind prove the existence of a mind, and in whatever a mind resides, is a *person*. The seat of intellect is a *person*." "Person, as applied to Deity, expresses the definite

and certain truth that God is a living being, and not a dead material energy."—Thompson, *Christ. Theism*, book ii. ch. 7. (See Ahrens, *Cours de Psychologie*, tom. ii. p. 272.)

Unity.—To explain the phenomena of nature, we find it necessary to ascend to a First Cause; and as all the phenomena can be explained by the existence of one intelligent and powerful Cause, we conclude that there is no more than one.

"Of the *Unity* of the Deity," says Paley (*Nat. Theol.*, ch. xxv.), "the proof is the uniformity of plan observable in the universe." "All things in the universe," says Mr. Hume, "are evidently of a piece; everything is adjusted to everything; one design prevails throughout; and this uniformity leads the mind to acknowledge one author, because the conception of different authors, without any distinction of attributes or operations, serves only to give perplexity to the imagination without bestowing any satisfaction on the understanding." Even the doctrine of Zoroaster and the Magi is no proper exception from the general belief in the *Unity* of the Deity. To account for the different events of human life, they had recourse to the supposition of two opposite principles, one of good and another of evil. But both Ahrimanes and Oromasdes were produced by the Supreme Being, to whom they gave the name of Akerenes. In him the universe at present reposes, and into him it was ultimately to be absorbed. (Bouillier, *Raison Impersonnelle*, p. 32.)

Incomprehensibility.—In speaking of the attributes of this one Supreme Being, we are speaking of what to us in our present state must be incomprehensible. Augustine has said, "God is such that, when we would speak of Him, we cannot do so; when we would comprehend Him, He cannot be comprehended; when we would compare Him, He cannot be compared; and when we attempt to define His nature, it grows beyond all our powers of definition."

Simplicity or Spirituality.—God is a *Spirit*. It is true that under almost every form of religion He has been represented by some material symbol. But this has arisen from the impatience of the human mind to rest upon any object which is not cognizable by the *senses*. And when God is spoken of in Scripture as possessed of a body and bodily organs, this is in accommodation to our weakness, and by way of helping us to conceive not so much of His *nature* as of His *operations*.

Eternity, like *Spirituality*, is a negative idea clothed with a positive name. It supposes a present existence, and denies a be-

ginning or end of that existence. Immortal, Everliving, are the epithets applied to the Supreme Being by the ancient poets and philosophers. Cicero said—“*Nos Deum nisi sempiternum intelligere qui possumus.*”

The *Eternity* of God implies his *Immutability*, or that He is without change or inconstancy in His nature and purposes. Plato argued thus—“All change must be either involuntary and upon necessity, or voluntary and upon choice. Now, God being the most powerful being, cannot by anything be necessitated to an involuntary change. And for any voluntary change, whereas it must be either for the better or the worse, it is not imaginable that any wise being should be willing to change for the worse; nor is it possible that any perfect being should change for the better; and therefore it is necessary that the Divine nature should be *Immutable*.” (Wilkins, *Nat. Rel.*, book i. ch. 8.)

Omnipresence.—The schoolmen distinguished *Ubiquity*, or the being somewhere, as—1. *Circumscriptive*, by which a body is so in one place that its parts are answerable to the parts of space in which it is, and exclude every other body; 2. *Definitive*, as when a human spirit is limited or defined in its presence to the same place as a human spirit to a human body; and, 3. *Repleteive*, as when the Infinite Spirit is present through every portion of space. This last is sometimes called *Ubiquity*, and means the Divine *Omnipresence*. (Leibnitz, *Nouv. Essais*, liv. ii. ch. 23, sect. 21.)

That the Deity is everywhere present in His person, substance, or essence, is termed the doctrine of *Essential Omnipresence*, to distinguish it from that of *Virtual Omnipresence*, which is held by those who maintain that presence in place cannot be predicated of mind at all, and especially of the Infinite Mind, which only acts everywhere by its power. Sir Isaac Newton, in the well-known Scholium (*Princip.*, lib. iii.), in which he sums up the divine attributes as legitimate inferences from the phenomena of nature, has said—“*Deus, semper et ubique, Omnipresens est, non per virtutem solam, sed etiam per substantiam; nam virtus sine substantia subsistere nam potest.*”

“*Omnipresence* only denotes the real presence of the Deity with all things actually existing. *Inmensity* denotes that He exists in all the extra-mundane spaces, beyond the utmost orbit of the universe; which spaces are supposed to be infinite.” (Foster, *Disc. on Nat. Rel.*, vol. i. p. 63.) The *Omnipresence* of God means His

presence with all things which have been created. His *Immensity* means His existence through all space, whether already peopled with worlds or waiting to receive new manifestations of creative power and wisdom.

The *Omniscience*, or Infinite Knowledge of God, follows from His universal presence. He made all things and He upholds all things, and therefore He must know all things.

The *Infinite Wisdom* of God arises from His Infinite Knowledge. The possession of knowledge in a limited degree does not necessarily infer the exercise of *Wisdom*. But when the knowledge possessed is unlimited, the *Wisdom* with which it is exercised must be infinite. In proving the existence of the Supreme Being His *Wisdom* is proved; for His existence is proved by the marks of Intelligent Design which appear in His works; and *Wisdom* is Intelligence and Design in exercise, to accomplish ends that are wise and good.

We reason in a similar way with regard to the *Omnipotence* or Infinite Power of God. "It is true that man can perceive only finite effects; and from finite effects we must not conclude infinite power; but when we consider that we see only a part of the immense universe, and reflect that when the eye, aided by the art of the optician, has travelled through immeasurable space, and finds no limit, if we do not conclude that creation is absolutely boundless—which seems to be a natural conclusion—we must at least feel that the power by which thousands of thousands of orbs, in number and magnitude exceeding all conception, were created, are moved, and are preserved, is, in respect to us, incomprehensible and infinite." (Crombie, *Nat. Theol.*, ch. 3, sect. 4; Tucker, *Light of Nature*, vol. iii. p. 195; Croly, *Div. Prov.*, p. 57; Chalmers, *Astron. Disc.*, p. 41.)

SECTION II.—*Moral Attributes.*

The *Moral Attributes* of the Deity are chiefly *Goodness*, *Justice*, *Holiness*, &c. They belong to Him as the Moral Governor, rather than as the Creator, of the universe. They have been called *Imitable* or *Communicable*—not because it is possible for creatures to attain to any one of these attributes as it exists in the Divine character—but because it is our duty and our destination to admire and imitate these perfections, as they are manifested in the works and ways of God, and by transfusing somewhat of them into our own character.

and conduct, to experience somewhat of that eternal peace which pervades His Infinite mind.

Some have thought that the *Moral Attributes* of the Deity may be proved from his *Natural Attributes*. "The original cause of all things being absolutely independent, being infinite in power and wisdom, must be Good, since evil is the result of want, weakness, or error. But He who is infinite in power can have no want; neither can He have any weakness; and He who created all things, and gave them the relations they possess, cannot but know them perfectly, and therefore must be incapable of error." (Southwood Smith, *On the Div. Govern.*, p. 74.) But a more plain and impressive proof of the *Moral Attributes* of the Deity may be derived from contemplating the manifestations of them in the constitution of nature and the appointments of Providence.

Goodness has always been regarded as essential to the Divine nature, or as included in the very idea of God. It means Benevolence, or a desire to communicate happiness. There are three elements which go to constitute *Moral Goodness*. Communication of happiness, not by blind impulse, but with knowledge and intelligence—not by accident, but by intention and with design—not at random or hazard, but with discrimination, and having respect to all the circumstances of the case.

This idea of *Moral Goodness* is the same, whether we apply it to men, or angels, or any created intelligence, or to the Supreme Being Himself. "Some, it is true, think that the *Goodness* and other moral attributes of God are not only different in *degree*, but in *kind* likewise from moral qualities in the creatures. But if, when we apply the terms *Good*, *Just*, and the like, to God, the qualities signified by these words as applied to men, or other created agents, are not the qualities intended, but other *inconceivable* ones of quite a *different kind*, we really mean nothing when we say that God is *Just*, *True*, and *Faithful*; but we ascribe to Him an unknown character." (Chauncey, *Benev. of the Deity*, pp. 14, 15, 8vo. Boston, 1784; Browne, *Divine Analogy*, 8vo. Lond. 1733.)

The schoolmen explained this matter by saying, that when the attributes of the Deity are expressed by the same terms which are applied to other beings, these terms are not to be understood in an *equivocal* sense, as denoting things altogether unknown or different, nor in a *univocal* sense, as denoting things identically the same, but in an *analogical* sense, as denoting things bearing some resemblance

and proportion. (Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theol.*, pp. 1, 9, 4, art. 3; Anselm, *Monologium*, cap. 65.) In short, the affinity between the attributes of the Creator and the qualities of created beings, is the affinity between an archetype and an image. The one truly but inadequately, represents the other. There is similitude, but not equality.

There is a difference between the *principle* of *Goodness* and the *exercise* of it. "We use, in common language," says Dr. Price, "the word *Goodness* sometimes in the former of these senses (*Benevolence*) and sometimes in the latter (*Beneficence*), and it is of some importance that we take care to distinguish them. Much may be said of the *principle* of *Goodness* in the Deity, which cannot, without great impropriety, be applied to the *exercise* of it in the creation and government of the world."

I. The *Divine Goodness*, as a *principle* in the Divine nature, is perfect and boundless; but the *exercise* of it in the Divine government is limited and incomplete, in consequence of the limited and imperfect nature of those towards whom it is exercised.

II. The exercise of the *Divine Goodness* must be in harmony with the other attributes of the Divine nature, such as Justice, Holiness, Wisdom, &c. (Chauncey, *Div. Benev.*, p. 42.)

III. The exercise of the *Divine Goodness* will be regulated by the moral character and conduct of its objects.

It is said in Scripture, that "the *Goodness* of God is over all his works;" and proofs of this perfection might be gathered from everything which He hath made. But as the aim of *Goodness* is the communication of happiness, happiness can be communicated only to beings who have the capacity of enjoying it. If the insentient parts of creation can be brought forward in proof of the *Divine Goodness*, it can only be in so far as these are subservient to the accommodation and enjoyment of living creatures. But living and sentient creatures are the proper witnesses for the *Goodness of God*. They must speak, if the expression may be permitted, to His character; and prove, by their delighted testimony, that the Being who made them made them to be happy.

The whole frame of the external world, so admirably suited to the living beings which people it—the arrangements by which the earth is fertilized and rendered fruitful—the abundant provision which is made for the health and subsistence of the various tribes of sentient creatures—the organs of sense and the instruments of activity with

which they are furnished—the instincts and appetites by which they are guided—the appearances of enjoyment and the indications of delight with which they discharge the functions and follow the propensities of their several natures—the song of the feathered tribes—the playful activity of some animals, and the gratified repose of others—the successful independence of the solitary, and the social habits of the gregarious—and the satisfied look of all, compel us to exclaim, “The earth is full of thy riches, O Lord! so is the great and wide sea, wherein are things innumerable, both small and great. These all wait upon Thee, that thou mayest give them their meat in due season. What Thou givest them they gather. Thou openest thy hand, and they are filled with good” (*Ps. civ.*).

Augustine has a very animated illustration of the *Goodness* of God in Creation (*De Civitate Dei*, lib. xxii. cap. 24); and there is a lively description of the happiness enjoyed by the inferior living creatures by Paley. (*Nat. Theol.*, ch. 26.)

But the most striking proofs of the *Goodness* of God are those which can be drawn from our own frame and constitution, and from our own life and experience.

Now, the first and most general proof which we have of the *Goodness* of God appears in His having called us into existence. He who is the greatest and the best of beings might have remained the only being; but His Benevolence prompted Him to extend the happiness which He enjoyed within Himself. It was pure Benignity which led Him to breathe upon the dust of the earth, and to make of it a living soul.

Should it be said that human life may be a state of suffering as well as of enjoyment, and that it may have been given by a malignant as well as by a benevolent author, then it can be shown that pleasure is the ordinary and general result of life, and must have been contemplated and designed by Him who gave it, and that the prompting and presiding principle in the mind of Him who called us into being must have been that of communicating happiness. Some of the proofs of this general position may be articulately stated.

1. *Pleasure is the result of the Organic Processes.*

The *Organic Processes*, such as the circulation of the blood, the digestion of the food, and the secretion of the various juices of the body, are in themselves insensible. But by a special provision, consciousness is indirectly connected with processes of this class. Branches

of sentient nerves are transmitted from the animal to the organic system, and we have the pleasurable consciousness which constitutes the *feeling of health*. The state of health is nothing but the result of the due performance of the *Organic functions*. "Processes in their own nature insensible, are rendered sentient expressly for this purpose, that, over and above the special object they serve, they may afford enjoyment." And when this pleasurable consciousness is interrupted we are warned that the *Organic Functions* are not going duly on, and led to look to our health. (Southwood Smith, *Phil. of Health*, ch. 3; Barlow, *Connect. between Physiol. and Intell. Phil.*, p. 8.)

2. *The satisfying of our Natural Appetites is productive of Pleasure.*

It is necessary that we take food; but it is not necessary that the taking of it should be accompanied with pleasure. Wholesome food is agreeable to the palate. There is a suitableness or adaptation between the organ and the object, and the result is pleasure." This is a constitution which, so far as appears to me," says Paley (*Nat. Theol.*, ch. 26), "can be resolved into nothing but the pure Benevolence of the Creator. Eating is necessary, but the pleasure attending it is not necessary."

3. *The exercise of our Senses is naturally productive of Pleasure.*

All the ends which our senses were intended to serve might have been served without the pleasure which usually accompanies, or flows from, the exercise of them. "Almost every different substance in the world offers a different flavour to the palate, a different beauty to the eye, or different music to the ear. Every successive season of the year, and almost every new day, brings a new pleasure within our reach; and in this endless variety and exquisite adaptation, which shall we most admire, the *Goodness* by which the system was suggested, or the *Wisdom* by which it was arranged?"—Will. Barrow, *Familiar Dissertations*, p. 37.

4. *The Pleasures which arise from the exercise of the Senses are multiplied and varied by the exercise of the Powers of Taste.*

In addition to the direct and immediate perceptions of sense, we are capable of being affected by the contemplation of the Sublime and Beautiful, in the works of nature and the achievements of art. Now, these sentiments always affect us in a way that is full of pleasure—pleasure of the highest and purest kind—and pleasure the objects and the springs of which are inexhaustible and endless, both

in themselves and in the combinations and associations to which they give rise. And whether the capacity of deriving pleasure from these sources be natural or acquired—whether it be the immediate gift of our Creator, or whether it arise from the general cultivation and improvement of our faculties—it equally proves His bounty and benevolence; for He should be considered as the author of all those enjoyments to which our faculties, whether mediately or immediately, enable us to attain.

5. *The exercise of the Intellectual Faculties is naturally productive of Pleasure.*

Man, who is conscious of possessing powers of acquiring knowledge, delights to exercise them. In the search after truth the mind tries and rejoices in its strength. The symptoms and expressions of this mental joy may not be very loud or manifest; but the joy is not, on that account, less deep and full. He who ran naked from the bath, and proclaimed, in an ecstacy of delight, that he had found the solution of a problem which had long puzzled him, was only giving vivid expression to those feelings of satisfaction which fill to overflowing the bosoms of men of science and contemplation. “There are moments in the life of a solitary thinker which are to him what the evening of some great victory is to the conqueror and hero—milder triumphs long remembered with truer and deeper delight. And though the shouts of multitudes do not hail his success, though gay trophies, though the sound of music, the glittering of armour, and the neighing of steeds do not mingle with his joy, yet shall he not want monuments and witnesses of his glory; the deep forest, the willowy brook, the gathering clouds of winter, or the silent gloom of his own chamber—‘faithful remembrancers of his high endeavour and his glad success’—that, as time passes by him with unreturning wing, still awaken the consciousness of a spirit patient, indefatigable in the search of truth, and the hope of surviving in the thoughts and minds of other men.”—Hazlitt, *Essay on the Principles of Action*, p. 133.

6. *The exercise of the Social and Sympathetic Affections is naturally productive of Pleasure.*

It is by the sympathetic part of our nature that we become capable of cherishing these affections, which are the highest and purest sources of happiness. “It has been said of charity that it is twice blessed—that it blesses him who gives, and him who receives; but Love has in it a threefold blessing—*first*, in the mental state itself;

secondly, in the like mental state which the manifestation of it produces in another; and *thirdly*, in the mental state inseparable from the consciousness of being the object of this affection. And this reflex happiness—this happiness arising from the consciousness of being the object—is even sweeter than any connected with being the subject of the affection.” The same remarks apply to the affections of esteem and respect—they are pleasing to entertain, they give pleasure to those towards whom they are entertained; and when the exercise of them on our part excites similar feelings towards ourselves, a new and distinct pleasure is communicated. And the pleasures which arise from reciprocal acts of kindness, and from the ready interchange of kindly feelings, are almost without number and without name. “There is not a more pleasing exercise of the mind than gratitude. Were there no positive command which enjoined it, nor any recompense laid up for it hereafter, a generous mind would indulge in it for the natural gratification which accompanies it.”—*Addison*.

7. The exercise of the Moral Sentiments is naturally productive of Pleasure.

The affections may be called *moral*, in so far as they are directed towards *moral* qualities in their object. And this is always the case with our best and highest affections. But in addition to the pleasing emotions which we derive from the contemplation of what is great and good in the character and conduct of others, there arises in our own mind a feeling of the highest satisfaction, when we are conscious that we have done what was right and becoming; and altogether independent of the intimation which this feeling gives of the moral character of God, it may be viewed as a proof of His Benevolence or of His design to render the life and condition of His creatures full of happiness and enjoyment. The moral part of our nature might have been so constituted as to guide us to what is right, without giving us any pleasure in doing it; just as our animal nature might have been so framed as to prompt us to do what is necessary to the preservation and continuance of our life, without imparting any gratification in doing so. The pleasing feelings, therefore, which accompany the performance of right actions are a proof that God intended us to be happy in the discharge of our duty.

8. The exercise of the Religious Sentiments is naturally productive of Pleasure.

By some a sense of Deity is regarded as an original and essential element of the human mind. And by all who are not atheists it is admitted that man never rises to the true dignity of his nature till he comes to the acknowledgment of the Supreme Being. Now, the feelings and affections which are excited by the acknowledgment of this truth are of the highest and purest kind. We look up with veneration and awe, but at the same time with confiding and cheerful submission, to Him who is the Father of all. The acts and exercises of devotion which excite and sustain these sentiments are engaged in with ardour and delight. And the delight which is thus experienced is not confined to the times and the places in which the truths of religion are strongly set before us, but pervades and hallows the whole character and conduct of those who, in the beautiful language of Holy Writ, are said "to walk before God"—that is, to live under a constant and sustaining sense of His continual presence and care.

"It would appear, then, from every view that can be taken of the constitution of human nature, that every faculty with which it is endowed, from the highest to the lowest, not only affords its own proper and peculiar pleasure, but that each, as it successively rises in the scale, is proportionately the source of a nobler kind and a larger amount of enjoyment." Because these fountains of enjoyment are open and free to all, because the means of human happiness are abundant and universal, we are apt to think lightly of them. But surely the thoughtlessness and ingratitude of man cannot diminish the Benevolence of God, in making him capable of receiving pleasure from so many sources. Let any of these sources of enjoyment be dried up, and we immediately become sensible of its value. The loss of any one of the bodily limbs or bodily senses is not only considered as a great evil by the sufferer himself, but excites a feeling of compassion in all who witness his misfortune. How miserable is the man who checks the social and sympathetic affections, and walks through life without having lover or friend! How dull and listless the career of him who is not emulous of the excellence of others, and desirous of securing the esteem and approbation of those around him! As to our intellectual endowments, the failure of them through infirmity and age is always regarded with compassion and regret. The loss of reason is generally and justly regarded as the heaviest of human calamities.

It should heighten our sense of the *Goodness* of God, to consider that it continues to be manifested to the evil and unthankful. God

hath never left Himself without a witness among men, but hath given to them fruitful and healthful seasons, and filled their hearts with food and gladness. They withhold from Him the gratitude and reverence so justly due—they abuse the powers and faculties with which He hath endowed them—they violate the dictates of reason and the suggestions of conscience—they deceive and oppress, they hate and murder one another—they mar the beautiful arrangements of nature and the benevolent intentions of Providence, and carry fraud, and violence, and bloodshed throughout the earth. And yet, although all these enormities lie naked and open before Him who seeth under the whole heavens, He bears with the wickedness and ingratitude of His creatures; and although they have sinned and come short of His glory, He hath never ceased to regard them with loving-kindness. The earth holds her wheeling course, the sun shines with undiminished splendour, the dews fall with unfailing richness, summer breathes her healthful gales, autumn waves her yellow gold, and nature continues to pour forth her bounties with as liberal a hand as if the bosoms which receive them had never known a sentiment but that of the firmest allegiance—had never felt a throb but that of the highest and purest gratitude to their munificent Creator,—as if man, who was anointed with the oil of gladness, to minister as a priest in this lower temple of the universe, had never broken his vows, nor neglected his worship, nor borne his faculties unmeekly, but had walked in piety and innocence, and kept from soil or stain that pure and glorious fillet with which his brow had been bound. It is impossible for us to reflect upon the carelessness and ingratitude which we have all, and so often, displayed, and to feel that, notwithstanding our numberless provocations, we have hitherto been spared, and protected, and cherished—without being most intimately convinced that God is not only Good, but that He is abundant in *Goodness*.

Objections

to the *Goodness* of God are drawn from the fact that *Evil* exists. *Evil* is distinguished as *Metaphysical*, *Physical*, and *Moral*.

Objections to the *Goodness* of God are drawn chiefly from *Metaphysical* and *Physical Evil*.

The phrase *Metaphysical Evil* is negative rather than positive in its signification. It means the absence or defect of powers and

capacities, and the consequent want of the higher enjoyment which might have flowed from the full and perfect possession of them. It denotes the fact, that of the sentient and living beings whom God hath created, the nature given to them is imperfect, the endowments of that nature are limited, and the condition of those beings less capable of enjoyment, and actually less happy, than it might have been. And the difficulty started is—Can it be consistent with the *Goodness* of God to have created beings capable only of a lower amount of enjoyment, when He might have made them capable of a higher, or, as it is alleged, capable of the very highest?

The following remarks are arranged so as to meet the different forms which this difficulty assumes:—

1. Might not God have made His creatures altogether free from limitation and defect?

To the difficulty, when urged in this form, the answer is,—That it is in the very nature of things impossible that created beings can be altogether free from limitation and defect. Limitation enters into the idea of a creature as essentially as absolute perfection enters into the idea of the Creator.

2. Would the Goodness of God have been best manifested by creating only the highest order of beings, and communicating to them at once the greatest happiness of which they were capable?

According to this supposition, the happiness of the universe could at no time admit of variation or increase. This looks like setting limits to that which has none. The fountains of the Divine Goodness are inexhaustible. (Balguy, *Div. Benev.*, p. 69.) After the greatest possible number of the highest order of beings had been created and made happy, there would still be room for a lower order capable of less happiness, and room for the *Wisdom* and *Goodness* of God to manifest themselves in devising various ways of communicating happiness to His creatures.

3. It is probable that the Wisdom and Goodness of God are better manifested by creating different kinds or degrees of happiness, than if only one order of beings, even though that order had been the highest, had been created.

In the world around us, we see that there are different orders of living beings, rising one above another in the amount of their endowments and in their capacities of enjoyment. And we see, further, that the existence and enjoyment of one order form no hindrance to the existence and enjoyment of the other orders. We

cannot prove it, but to many it has seemed probable, that the gradation which prevails here below may extend higher in creation; and that, as there is a gradual ascent from the lower orders of living beings up to man, so there may be from man a gradual ascent to higher orders of living beings, even to the highest that has been created. (See Locke, *Essay on Hum. Underst.*, book iii. ch. 6, sect 12; Pope, *Essay on Man*; *Spectator*, No. **DIXI**.)

The difference in the structure of the different parts of the material universe may be said to call for different orders of beings to inhabit them. The different elements and the different climates of our own globe are obviously fitted and designed for affording the means of life and enjoyment to different orders of beings; and accordingly, every element and every climate have their appropriate inhabitants. If, therefore, that gradation in the order of beings which prevails here below extend in the same way upwards, it is plain that the capacity for happiness in the universe will be enlarged. And if the capacity for happiness be enlarged, it is probable that the actual amount of happiness enjoyed will be greater than it would have been, if instead of this gradation and diversity of beings, fewer orders of beings, or only one order, had been created. (See Paley, *Nat. Theology*, ch. 26.)

One of the results of the scheme of gradation is, *That room is thus given for an interchange of benefits between the different orders of created beings*. In this world man and the lower animals are mutually beneficial; and the condition of each would be less happy without the co-existence of the other. (Cicero, *De Nat. Deor.*, lib. ii. cap. 52 and 53.) We cannot say how or how far the condition of man in this world may be better in consequence of the existence of higher orders of beings in the universe; but many have thought that it is.

Another result of the scheme of gradation is, *That it allows room for progress and improvement*. Man, it is argued, is destined for another and a higher state of being. And if man is gradually to rise in the scale of creation, why may not the beings above him rise also? or rather, it may be asked, *must* not they rise also? According to this view, the universe of living beings may be gradually rising towards, without ever reaching, the perfection of its Creator. And the carrying forward of this plan, prompted by infinite *Goodness* and devised by infinite *Wisdom*, may constitute the happiness of Him who is God over all, blessed for ever. (See *Spectator*, cxi.)

Physical Evil may be considered under the two heads of *Pain* and *Death*.

PAIN.—With the view of obviating the objection to the *Goodness* of God, arising from the *Pain* and *Suffering* in the world, it may be remarked—

1. *That there is more enjoyment than suffering in human life; and that the preponderance of the one over the other entitles us to hold by the conclusion, that God is Benevolent or Good.*

In making a comparative estimate of the sum of human happiness and of human misery, it should be noticed, *That suffering is, in general, more obtrusive and more affecting than enjoyment*; and also, *that enjoyments which are common are often but little thought of.* (Balguy, *Div. Benevol.*, pt. iii. sect. 4; Paley, *Nat. Theol.*, ch. 36). The evils of human life are thus liable to be exaggerated, and its advantages to be undervalued. But on a fair computation it will be found that there is in human life a preponderance of enjoyment over suffering; and this preponderance proves the design of the Deity to be benevolent. (Joseph Fawcett, *Sermons*, vol. i. p. 74; Price, *Sermons*, p. 277, *On Providence*; Paley, *Nat. Theol.*, ch. 26; Balguy, *Div. Benevol.*, pt. iii.) But if the good which is enjoyed in human life be accepted as a proof of a benevolent character, and of a benevolent design in the Creator, why may not the evil that is endured be admitted as evidence of an opposite design and of an opposite character? To the objection, when urged in this form, it is replied—

2. *That the good was intended, but the evil is incidental*; that is, that the evil to be found in the present state of things was not the direct object of the Divine contemplation, and is not the ultimate end of the Divine arrangements, but is a consequence, arising from the working out of a scheme which was framed with the design to produce good and to diffuse happiness. (Arthur, *Discourses*, p. 76; Paley, *Nat. Theol.*, ch. 26; Balguy, *Div. Benevol.*, pt. i.; Southwood Smith, *Phil. of Health*, vol. i. p. 160.)

In further vindication of the *Goodness* of God, it may be remarked—

3. *That He hath made provisions by which the evil of human life, even while it lasts, is alleviated.*

From not attending to the alleviating influence of *Habit*, or to that pliability which the human constitution, both of body and mind, has of accommodating itself to situations and circumstances

which are naturally and at first painful, many have been led to form the most erroneous and exaggerated views as to the amount of evil and suffering in human life. (Seneca, *De Providentia*, cap. 4; Arthur, *Discourses*, p. 61; Joseph Fawcett, *Sermons*, vol. i. sermon. 3.)

Hope, which there is a natural propensity to cherish under suffering, has great influence in mitigating its severity; and the consolations of *Sympathy* are extensively experienced and deeply appreciated.

There is thus evidence that God designed the happiness of his creatures; there is no evidence of any arrangement expressly and solely to produce suffering; and there is evidence of a design to alleviate it. Now, the guiding and governing principle in the Divine mind being thus shown to be Benevolence, or a design to produce good and to diffuse happiness, the existence of evil or pain should be presumed to be in some way necessary or useful towards the attainment of this end, rather than be brought forward as an evidence of malignity or defect. (Lord Brougham, *Essay on Origin of Evil*, p. 60.)

Accordingly it has been observed—

4. *That, in human life, pain often tends to the heightening and more full enjoyment of pleasure.* (Paley, *Nat. Theol.*, ch. 26; Tucker, *Light of Nat. Pursued*, first ed. vol. iii. p. 253.)

Lastly, *A mixed state, in which there is an excess of happiness over misery, proves Goodness, as well as a state in which there was the same amount of happiness, without misery, could do; and it proves Wisdom more clearly.* (Tucker, *Light of Nat. Pursued*, first ed. vol. iii. p. 251; Price, *Sermons*, p. 278, *On Providence*, p. 111; Balguy, *Div. Benevol.*, pt. i.)

DEATH.—It is appointed unto all men once to die. And it is asked, Can a decree so stern, and an arrangement so humiliating and painful, be compatible with the *Goodness of God*?

To this objection, Reason enables us to reply that the gift of life may be resumed at pleasure by Him who gave it; and that the shortness of our existence ought not to interrupt our gratitude for the advantages and enjoyments which it confers.

The objection, however, rests chiefly on the pains and inconveniences which accompany or flow from *Death*; and it is urged that such an appointment is at variance with the *Goodness of God*. It is only from Revelation that we learn how it came to be appointed unto all men once to die. But taking *Death* as a fact in the history of the human race, the wise and gracious provisions which have

been made for bringing about this event are sufficient to show that it does not proceed from any design, on the part of God, to inflict pain or evil unnecessarily.

The Goodness of God is manifested—

1. *In Concealing from Men the Time of their Death.*

It may be easy to suppose cases in which a knowledge of the future might be of use to us; and nothing is more common than to hear men saying that, if they had known what was to happen, they would have been better prepared for it. It may be fairly doubted, however, whether the removal of that veil which conceals futurity would add to the sum of human virtue, and it would certainly diminish the sum of human happiness. In itself, the weight of calamity would be doubly felt; and the prospect of a coming misfortune would disturb all our previous enjoyments, and damp all our previous exertions. Hope, too, would be deprived of its magic influence; and he whose spirits might have remained unbroken under a series of unforeseen calamities, might sink overwhelmed under the certain and saddening prospect of them. Even the most fortunate of men, it has been thought, could scarcely endure to have all the events of their future life placed before them; and, to most men, the prospect would be discomposing and painful.

“ How chances mock,
And changes fill the cup of alteration
With diverse liquors ! Oh ! if this were seen,
The happiest youth—viewing his progress through,
What perils past, what crosses to ensue,
Would shut the book, and sit him down and die.”

SHAKESPEARE.

It is especially happy for men that they are not permitted to know the time of their death. It has been remarked, that the instances recorded in Scripture of individuals having been made acquainted beforehand with the time of their *Death* were followed by the most melancholy effects. So that it would appear that to reveal to men the time and circumstances of their *Death* would have the effect of diminishing their happiness, without increasing their vigilance or their virtue.

“ Oh blindness to the future ! kindly given
That each may fill the circle marked by Heaven.”

POPE, *Essay on Man.*

God baffles all our foolish devices, and eludes all our idle curiosity concerning the time of our *Death*, because He wishes us to be watchful and happy; and if its occurrence were made more clear or certain than it is, this would only make us more careless and wretched. If the pilgrims who are continually treading the dark valley were selected by any more obvious rule than they are at present,—if, for example, one generation were regularly to be removed before another,—if the fathers were always to take precedence of the children in this melancholy procession—if the farthest on the list of life were uniformly to be first struck off, the fixedness and formality of such an arrangement would produce incalculable mischief. It would take away from the old every means of cheerfulness, and, instead of maintaining their spirits to the last, the approaching shadows of *Death* would wrap them in impenetrable gloom. How much more conducive to human happiness and to human improvement is the existing arrangement! None are marked out as the next victims; but all are permitted to live in the enjoyment of hope, and the discharge of their duty. The sick are consoled with the prospect of future health. The old need not despair; for, how far soever they may have advanced in the journey of life, they still see before them a point to which others have attained. The dark shadows are not let down upon them till they enter the valley of *Death*. The means of happiness are removed only with their existence; and every drop in the cup of life may be enjoyed before they come to taste the bitterness of *Death*; yet no encouragement is given to carelessness and security. Instances of sudden *Death* are exhibited to keep men always on their guard. And it deserves to be remarked, as a further illustration of the *Wisdom* and *Goodness* of God, that “if sudden *Deaths* were frequent, the sense of our constant danger would be too strong to allow of that ease and enjoyment which are intended for us, and human life would be too precarious for the business and interest which belong to it. There would not be sufficient dependence either upon our own lives or the lives of others to carry on the regular duties of society. But the manner in which *Death* is made to occur conduces to the purposes of admonition, without overthrowing the necessary stability of human affairs; and we are warned of the frailty and precariousness of our condition, without being shaken out of its duties and enjoyments.”

The *Goodness* of God is manifested—

2. *In the way and manner in which Death is ordinarily effected.*

Death has always been regarded by men as an object of terror; but while the fear of *Death* is necessary and useful as the safeguard of human life and the warrant of human duty, that fear is graciously alleviated or removed when the time of separation between soul and body approaches. Before entering the dark valley, men are generally conducted through trials which, while they are calculated to exercise and improve their virtues, tend greatly to diminish their love of life, and in the same proportion their fear of *Death*.

The infirmities of age, the failing eye, the shaking hand, and tottering frame, are kindly fitted to warn men of the change that awaits them. Misfortune, too, is often made the means of producing the like happy effects upon men. When they are deprived of their property and influence, and reduced to a state of comparative indigence and obscurity, life begins to lose its attractions and *Death* its terrors. But the great instrument employed to detach men from the love of life is sickness. Were they called to enter on the dark valley while high in health and spirits, surrounded with every means of enjoyment, and in possession of every relish for life, their removal would be accompanied with much more bitterness and grief than it usually is. There is a wonderful difference between the feelings with which men regard *Death* in the season of health, and those with which they view it from a sick bed. In proportion as they approach it, they begin to see light even in the dark valley; while the world, which once seemed so fair, appears to fade and vanish. The objects which formerly delighted them now lose their power to please. To the dull ear of sickness music has no charms, and eloquence no beauty. To the dim eye of disease gold has no lustre, and even the fair face of nature can convey no pleasure. The dusky twilight of the chamber of *Death* withdraws the world from their view, and prepares men for the falling of the last deep shadows. The closed shutter and the drawn curtain exclude, even from their eyes, those vanities which can no longer find a resting-place in their hearts; and, with regard to the objects of its former affection, their soul has become even like a weaned child. The ties which bound them down to earth are gradually loosened, till, at last, there is but a feeble thread to break, when they pass away and are at rest.

But it might have been the arrangement to tear men from the world when their attachments were strongest, their hopes brightest, and their feelings of separation likely to be most acute, without any

weakening or warning preparation. So that, considering *Death* merely as a physical fact or event in the history of man, it can be shown, from the way in which it is usually effected, that it gives no indication, on the part of God, unnecessarily to inflict pain or evil. On the contrary, there are proofs of great *Wisdom* and *Goodness* in the manner of bringing it about. The sentence is executed in a way which not merely proves that it proceeds from no malignity in the Judge, but which proves that, while He smites, He sustains and pities.

The *Justice*, the *Holiness*, and other *Moral Attributes* of the Deity, will be best understood by contemplating the means and measures by which all things are sustained and superintended.

CHAPTER III.

OF PROVIDENCE.

THE same arguments which prove the *Being* may be adduced to prove the *Providence* of God.

I. *Whatever is created can have no necessary nor independent existence; so that the same power which called it into being is requisite to preserve it in being; and if God be the Creator, He must also be the Preserver of the World.* Were not His everlasting arms underneath, all things would sink back into their primitive non-existence.

II. *If the beauty and order which appear in the works of nature prove that they are not the products of chance, but of an intelligent designing cause, the continuance of that beauty and order argues the superintendence of the cause which at first produced them.* The stated revolutions of the heavens and the regular vicissitude of the seasons proclaim the uninterrupted exercise of the power which ordained them.

III. *It would be inconsistent with our ideas of the Goodness and Perfection of God to think that He would call this world into existence, and then abandon it to uncertainty or chance.* It was pure Benevolence, or a design to diffuse happiness, which prompted Him to create, and why should it not also prompt Him to sustain and superintend all things?

With regard to the extent of *Divine Providence*, two views have been taken.

The Stoics thought that it extended only to great things—“*Magna Dii curant parva negligunt.*” Similar views have been held in later times. This is called the doctrine of a *General Providence*. Opposed to it is the doctrine of a *Particular Providence*, according to which everything, even the most minute, is embraced.

The arguments adduced to prove that there is a Providence go to prove that it is *Particular*. It results from the very nature of all created things that they must be continually upheld in their several places and properties by the power of Him who created them. It is not a question of *degree*, but of *existence*.

As to the distinction between *things great* and *things little*, it is a distinction which can have no place here. It proceeds upon the assumption that God must see and judge as we do, and that what appears great or little to us must appear so to Him. But, how miserably do we deceive ourselves when we carry the measurements of earth into the councils of heaven, and judge of the stupendous movements and magnificent results of the Divine administration by our feeble and perverted notions of what is glorious or godlike! How often do we see events, apparently the most trivial, accompanied by consequences the most momentous! The fate of empires and the peace and happiness of millions have often turned upon the pivot of the most trivial occurrences? Indeed, the history of man and of the world is made up of a chain of incidents so apparently powerless that not one of them, taken separately, could be assigned as an adequate cause for any great or striking result; and yet in their connection and dependence they have produced all that we reckon important or interesting. In saying that *this* seems to be worthy, while *that* does not seem to be worthy, of the Divine protection and care, we are transferring our ignorance and weakness to Him whose way is perfect, whom no littleness could elude, and no greatness embarrass—who sees the end from the beginning, and who never faints nor grows weary in making all the elements of nature and all the events of history work out the accomplishment of His mysteriously beneficent purposes. (Croly, *Div. Prov.*, p. 444.)

As to saying that it is unworthy of the majesty and glory of God to be occupied with the care of things little, the answer is, that ‘Whatever it was not too great a condescension in Him to create, it

cannot be too great a condescension in Him to *take care of*. It is proper to add, that with respect to God all the distinctions of high and low in the creation vanish. All beings are *infinitely*, that is, *equally*, inferior to Him.”—Price, *Dissert. on Prov.*, p. 7.

And if the distinction between things great and things little could be admitted to hold, it would stamp the character of God with great injustice or great imperfection to adopt the *dictum* of the Stoics, and to say that He was so occupied with things great that He did not or could not take care of things little.

But the truth is, that the phrase *General Providence* is either a mistake or a misnomer. They who support the doctrine denoted by it “would allow God to take care of the great affairs of kingdoms and commonwealths, but to have no regard to particular men or families, unless they made a great figure in the world; as if kingdoms and commonwealths were not made of particular men and particular families, or that God could take care of the whole, without taking care of every part; or as if there were any reason for taking care of the whole but to take care of those particulars who make up the whole. To talk of a *General Providence*, without God’s care and government of every particular creature, is manifestly unreasonable and absurd; for whatever reasons oblige us to own a Providence, oblige us to own a *Particular Providence*.”—Sherlock, *On Providence*, p. 85.

“All care and government, all direction and purpose, must be individual to all intelligent existences, or are but words without use or meaning. What is *general* is but a verbal expression for what is done for the larger number of individuals. It is specifically done to each, or it is not done at all; but being similarly done, the uniformity of the operations, separately, constitutes the generality of which we speak. It is *general* only inasmuch as it does individually operate to this extent. A *general* law is, therefore, that which acts on every individual thing that is comprised within its application; for it is no law to that on which it does not operate. A *General Providence* is, therefore, an individual Providence—a Providence acting on the same principles towards every individual that is subject to its agency.”—Sharon Turner, *Sacred Hist.*, vol. ii. p. 76.

Perhaps the best way to express the extent of Providence would be to say that it is *Universal*. This view is supported by Plato, *De Legibus*, and by Cicero, *De Nat. Deor.*, lib. iii.

CHAPTER IV.

OF MORAL GOVERNMENT.

ACCORDING to Bishop Butler (*Analogy*, pt. i. ch. 2), "The proper, formal, notion of government is the annexing pleasure to some actions and pain to others in our power to do or to forbear, and giving notice of this appointment beforehand to those whom it concerns." And (ch. 3), "Moral government consists, not barely in rewarding and punishing men for their actions, which the most tyrannical person may do, but in rewarding the righteous and punishing the wicked; in rendering to men according to their actions, considered as good or evil."

Now, men are contemplated, by the Providence of God, as moral agents, from the moment of their birth to that of their death. Some of the proofs and measures of this moral government may be articulately stated.

I. *The state of Subjection and Dependence in which men are born into this world is a proof that they are under the Government of God, and a means of carrying forward that Government.*

Our natural helplessness leads us to lean on those who are stronger, while it prompts them to help us. The gratitude and love which we cherish towards the authors of our being, and the guardians of our childhood and youth, give weight and efficacy to all their instructions, and we submit with patience to the corrections and reproofs of a father. There can be no doubt that this paternal authority is an institution, on the part of God, for the encouragement of virtue and the punishment of vice.

II. *The same thing may be said of the Subordinations and Arrangements of Civil Society.*

Man is by nature a social being, designed for a state of law and government; that is, a state in which vice should be restrained and punished, and virtue encouraged and protected. That this is the general tendency and effect of law and government cannot be denied; so that whether we look to the social nature of man, or to the arrangements to which that nature has given rise, we have evidence of the moral character of God, and of the moral character of His government.

III. The Arrangements of Civil Society, for the punishment of vice and for the protection of virtue, are supplemented and enforced by the natural feelings of the human heart.

Under the best framed and the best administered laws, some things deserving of punishment will escape or be overlooked. But they who escape the penalties of human law, and brave the authority of human power, do so only to incur the disgrace and reproach which their conduct deserves. On the other hand, they who may have suffered from the severity and injustice which are often mixed up with human law, are consoled and cheered when they find themselves supported by the sympathy of the wise and good. Now, those feelings of our nature, which thus rise up in aid of what is defective in human law, are a proof of our being constituted moral beings. And the effect which these feelings have in abashing the wicked and in encouraging the virtuous, is an equally strong proof that we are under *Moral Government*.

IV. The individual and private power of Conscience is another proof of our moral constitution, and its exercise another proof of our being under Moral Government.

The same reasons which lead us to approve or condemn the good or bad conduct of those around us, should lead us much more to judge ourselves. Conscience exercises a powerful sway within us, and its power is all in favour of virtue and against vice. The endowing us with such a principle is a proof that God loveth righteousness and hateth iniquity. Its operation is powerful and extensive, although, from its very nature, it is silent and unseen. The happiness and misery which it distributes, the reward and punishment which it assigns, are great and extensive, and show that the measures of that *Moral Government* to which we are subject are not easily eluded nor defeated.

And as our mind may be the source and seat of reward and punishment, it may be noticed, as another proof of the *Moral Government* of God,—

V. That our bodies are so framed as to be affected in a corresponding manner by our good or bad conduct.

All those practices and pursuits which are good and praiseworthy tend not only to promote the peace and serenity of the mind, but to preserve the health and strength of the body. And, on the other

hand, the indulgence of those propensities which reason and conscience condemn, not only fills the mind with uneasiness and disgust, but the body with disease and pain. All the ways of sin are so many approaches to death. Disease and pain, derangement and decay, sickness and languor, are the natural and appointed consequences of intemperance and excess. And it is plain that these consequences have been appointed as punishments and warnings—punishments for having yielded to temptation, and warnings to resist it in future. On the other hand, our bodies are so framed as to be preserved sound and healthful, by the exercise of temperance and sobriety; and it is equally plain that this is intended as an encouragement and reward to self-discipline and restraint.

Such are some of the means and measures of God's *Moral Government*. They are much more extensive and effectual than is commonly thought. By their operation, the amount of punishment and reward which is administered—that is, the amount of *Moral Government* which is carried forward in the world—is very considerable. (See Butler, *Analogy*, pt. i. ch. 3.)

Some of the reasons why the extent and efficacy of God's *Moral Government* in the world are not more clearly seen and acknowledged are explained, and some of the objections against the justice of Divine Providence drawn from the prosperity of the wicked and the adversity of the righteous are answered, in a small volume, entitled, *A Plea for the Ways of God to Man*, by Will. Fleming, D.D., 8vo., Edin. 1858.

But the full solution of difficulties concerning the Providence of God is to be found in the doctrine of a Future State. And Mr. Stewart has remarked (*Act. and Mor. Pow.*, b. iii. ch. 4), that "The consideration of the Divine attributes naturally leads our thoughts to the future prospects of man, and to the sequel of that plan of *Moral Government* which we see plainly begun here, and which our own moral constitution, joined to our conclusions concerning the perfections of God, afford us the strongest intimations, will be more completely unfolded in some subsequent stage of our being."

CHAPTER V.

THE IMMATERIALITY OF MIND.

WHEN we say that mind is immaterial, all that we pronounce concerning it is, that it is not matter, but something different from matter. One set of properties are manifested by, and referred to, a substance which we call matter. Other properties are manifested by, and referred to, a substance which we call mind. And these properties are so different that the substances to which they belong are concluded to be different also. Some of these distinctive properties may be noted.

I. *Self-consciousness and Thought do not inherently belong to matter, and therefore the mind of man, which is conscious and thinks, must be immaterial.*

Our senses tell us that much, indeed almost all, of the matter that is around us is destitute of *Consciousness* and *Thought*. And therefore there must be in man, who is conscious and thinks, something different from matter.

And as *Consciousness* and *Thought* do not originally or essentially belong to matter, so they could not be produced by any sublimation or refinement of it. Unless the vein be in the marble, no skill nor labour can make it appear.

Neither could *Consciousness* and *Thought* result from any peculiar collocation or modification of the particles of which matter is composed. You may increase the magnitude or change the figure of a piece of matter; but magnitude and figure are original and essential properties of matter, capable of undergoing change. And all the changes of which matter is susceptible can only lessen or enlarge the properties which essentially belong to it, but can never impart any new ones. This would be equivalent to an act of creation. "I see clearly, and acknowledge readily," says Dr. Hartley (*On Man*, vol. i. p. 512), "that matter and motion, however subtly divided or reasoned upon, yield nothing more than matter and motion still." "I can never believe," says Sir H. Davy (*Consol. in Travel*, p. 206), "that any division, or refinement, or subtilization, or juxtaposition, or arrangement of the particles of matter, can give to them sensibility; or that intelligence can result from combinations of insensate

and brute atoms. I can as easily imagine that the planets are moving by their will or design round the sun, or that a cannon-ball is reasoning in making its parabolic curve." (See Drew, *Essay on the Immateriality of the Soul*, p. 75; *Light of Nature Pursued*, vol. iii. p. 36; Belsham, *Essay xxv.*; Brougham, *Disc. of Nat. Theol.*, p. 102; Porteou's *Sermons*, vol. i. sect. 5.)

II. The unity or indivisibility of our perceptions and thoughts proves that the source or seat of them is one and indivisible, and consequently immaterial.

If the mind were material it would be made up of parts, and all the atoms or particles would have consciousness and thought. The parts of matter may be in connection or juxtaposition, but they have no essential communication. What the materialists call an organ, and speak of as a unity, is made up of innumerable atoms or particles, every one of which would be affected in the same way as every other. When an impression was made on any one of the external senses, every particle of the nervous system, or of the brain, or of whatever portion of the material frame is supposed to be the organ of thought, would have a sensation.

" If there are mere impressions made
 Upon material organs, every one
 Composed of particles innumEROUS,
 Which in the mass, examine as you will,
 Show no more symptoms of intelligence,
 Or aught that's vital, than a lump of clay—
 What, then, preserves the *unity* of mind,
 That *unity* we're always conscious of?
 Why start not forth ten thousand thoughts at once,
 Mingled, discordant, various, uncontrolled,
 And, clashing, make a chaos of the soul ? "

RAGG, *Poems of the Deity*, book i.

" Before we can attend to several things, as like or unlike, we must be able to apprehend each of these by itself as *one thing*. It may, at first sight, appear that this apprehension results immediately from the impressions on our senses, without any act of our thoughts. A very little attention, however, enables us to see that thus to single out special objects requires a *mental operation* as well as a sensation." (Whewell, *Hist. of Scient. Ideas*, third ed. vol. ii. p. 95.) That which reduces to *unity* the various impressions made upon bodily

organs and the varied succession of thoughts, must itself be one—that is, immaterial. (Sherlock, *On Immortality of the Soul*, p. 54.)

To this may be added the argument derived from—

III. *The Consciousness which we have of our own unity and simplicity as thinking beings.*

Every man feels himself to be one and indivisible. *Consciousness* cannot be divided, so that one part shall be here and another there. A man* may “go to buffets with himself”—that is, different and contending thoughts may rise up within him; but he never doubts that he, within whom this contest goes on, is a single, thinking, and conscious being. Now, matter can be divided, and its existence in parts multiplied. And hence it is contended that mind, being one and indivisible, must be immaterial.

“ That the mind is one and indivisible,” says Butler (*Anal.*, pt. i. ch. 1), “ is evidenced by the fact, that *Consciousness* is one and indivisible. If the motion of a particle of matter were so absolutely one and indivisible that it would imply a contradiction to suppose part of this motion to exist, and a part not, the subject of the motion, the particle above mentioned, must itself be indivisible. In like manner, since the perception or *Consciousness* of our existence is indivisible, the supposition that one part of it is here and another there, being a contradiction, the power of *Consciousness* and the subject of that power are indivisible too. Being thus indivisible, the soul is not to be identified with its bodily organization.”

This argument is illustrated by Dr. Brown, *Lect.* cxvi.

Another phase of this argument is to be found in—

IV. *The conviction of Personal Identity.*

No man in his senses doubts that he is the same individual being now that he was ten or twenty years ago. But the sameness or *Identity* of which we are conscious is entirely in the mind; for the body is subject to continual decay and change. The common supposition is, that the whole substance of a man’s bodily frame undergoes a change every three years. “ All that he before had has now entered into new combinations, forming parts of other men, or of animals, or of vegetable or mineral substances, exactly as the body he now has will afterwards be resolved into new combinations after his death. Now, this alternate waste and repair—this constant influx and efflux of material particles—this total change of our bodily

substance—is utterly inconsistent with the conviction of *Personal Identity* except upon the supposition that mind, which has this conviction, is altogether different and distinct from matter."

" This frame, compacted with transcendent skill,
 Of moving joints obedient to my will,
 Nurs'd from the fruitful glebe like yonder tree,
 Waxes and wastes. I call it mine, not me.
 New matter still the mouldering mass sustains ;
 The mansion changed, the tenant still remains,
 And from the fleeting stream, repaired by food,
 Distinct, as is the swimmer from the flood."—ARBUTHNOT.

" All anatomists agree that the whole structure of the brain is repeatedly *renewed* in the course of life, there being no particle of the same organ in manhood which had existed in youth. Yet an image impressed on the sensorium in early life is often recalled in age, after the whole material tablet on which it was engraved was removed. This would seem to indicate that memory is a function connected with something beyond the boundary of matter." (Johnson, *Econ. of Health*, fourth ed. pp. 164, 165.)

Another proof of the Immateriality of mind is drawn from—

V. *Its Independence of the Body.*

It is admitted that the sound or unsound state of the body, as a whole, has a great effect upon the operations of the mind. It is further admitted, that the state of particular functions and of particular parts of our bodily frame has an effect upon the mental energies. But the inference to be drawn from these facts is, not that consciousness and thought are organic functions, or the results of our bodily frame, but that the mind, which is conscious and thinks, is connected with the body, and employs the organs of the body as instruments in exercising its faculties ; and, as a consequence of this, it happens that when the bodily organs are deranged, the mental operations are frequently impeded. But although this were invariably and universally the case, it would only prove that a healthy state of the body, or of particular organs, was favourable or necessary to the operations of the mind. Certain states of the atmosphere are favourable to the exercise of the sense of seeing ; but the state of the atmosphere is not the cause of our having this sense. The *condition*, even when that condition is universally and indispensably necessary, is not to be confounded with the *cause*—the *instrument* is not to

be mistaken for the *agent*. While, for wise and good reasons, the mind is connected with the body, and affected by it in various ways —while the mind, as an agent, generally acts by the body as its instrument, there are many cases in which it asserts its *Independence*, and refuses to sympathize with the weakness of its companion. If the mind were material, or the mere result of organization, then, in every case when the bodily health was impaired, or the bodily organization deranged, the operations of the mind would be impeded. But serious injury or violence may be done to the body without much affecting the mind. In many diseases by which the body is brought down to the very gates of death, the mind continues calm and clear, collected and vigorous.

“The soul’s dark cottage, batter’d and decay’d,
Lets in new lights through chinks that time hath made.”

WALLER.

It is attempted to controvert or to weaken these views by saying, that in those cases of disease which prey upon the body without affecting the mind, the brain continues sound and healthy. (Elliotson, *Trans. of Blumenbach’s Physiol. Notes.*) Now, if mind were merely a function of the brain, as digestion is of the stomach, or respiration of the lungs, it would be easy to say, from seeing the injury done to the organ, how far the function of that organ would be affected. But it is impossible, from the examination of a diseased or injured brain, to pronounce respecting the state of mind of the individual; and there are many instances in which the brain has been materially injured, and yet the mind has been but little if at all affected.

It is said, in reference to such cases, that the organs of the brain are double, and that the functions go on if one-half remains uninjured, just as a man may see with one eye, or hear with one ear. But if the organ be double, how comes perception to be single? This shows, as in a former argument, that the mind or sentient principle is single. “Single consciousness, with a duplicity of organs,” said one favourable to materialism, “as well as the individualization of objects, whose various qualities are perceived by different organs of sense and intellect, together with the power we are conscious of possessing to direct our attention to various sensations, and to exert our will accordingly, force on our minds the

belief of some common centre of sensation." (*Somatopsychonologia, Introd.*, p. 8.)

It is true that, in cases of mental derangement, the brain is frequently affected; but, for anything that appears to the contrary, the diseased brain may have been the *effect* and not the *cause* of insanity. That disease of the brain is not the only cause of mental derangement is proved by the fact that violent insanity has continued for years, and no trace of diseased structure or action in the brain has been discerned. On the other hand, the same morbid appearances displayed in the bodies of those who have died insane, have been discovered in the bodies of persons who never were insane. And it not unfrequently happens that, in persons who are insane and in whom the brain is diseased, the disease of the brain ceases while the insanity continues. (See Burrows, *Inquiry into certain Errors relative to Insanity*, 8vo., Lond. 1820.)

As to those cases of insanity which have been ascribed, not to any supervening disease of the brain, but to some original mal-conformation of that organ, they do not furnish any argument for the materiality of mind. A mal-conformation of any of the organs of sense will cause a defect in the exercise of that sense. Now, the brain being the common sensorium, the organ, not of one sense, but of all the senses—the instrument by which all impressions of external things are communicated—it is easy to see that any original mal-conformation of this organ will leave the mind in a state of darkness and uncertainty as to the impressions derived from the external world, and consequently in a state of great weakness as to the conclusions to be drawn from these impressions, and the thoughts and reasonings which follow upon them. But if the skill of man reached to the removing, or the aiding of any imperfect or wrong conformation of the brain, as it reaches to the aiding and removing of defects in the organs of seeing and hearing, and thus renders the impressions made upon these organs more clear and distinct, then, in proportion as the instrument of communication with the mind was perfected, in the same proportion the subsequent operations of the mind would be perfected also. "We see with our eyes," said Bishop Butler, "in the same sense as we see with glasses,"—they are both instruments. Now the brain is as much an organ as any of the external senses are. The only difference is, that while each of the external senses is fitted to convey only impressions of a particular class, the brain is the common medium by which all im-

pressions of external objects are carried forward another stage—and the only other that we can trace—in their progress to being apprehended and appropriated by the mind and its faculties. “That which perceives is the subject of sensation, and therefore cannot have been caused by sensation. Without the anterior existence of an agent to receive impressions through the senses, sense could not be. Reason thus seems indubitably to demand our assent to the fact asserted in the common language of mankind as to the existence of a distinct agent as the actuating principle in a living human body.” (Moore, *Man and his Motives*, p. 34.)

With regard to the objection, that “what we call mind has never yet been seen,” this is an objection which would make sense the measure of all knowledge, and prevent us from believing in the existence of anything but what we could see or handle. Now mind is invisible, so is the wind; imponderable, so is electricity; intangible, so is light, if the one organ fitted to receive it be disabled: it is therefore no new thing to find an existing agency of potent efficacy which, as far as regards our senses, is invisible, imponderable, and intangible. (Barlow, *Con. between Physiol. and Intell. Phil.*, pp. 56, 57.)

But it is said that what are called the operations of mind are manifested only through an organized system; and hence Dr. Priestley and others contend that sensation and thought are the results of organization. It would appear, however, that organization, instead of being a cause, is itself a result—the result of Life. That Life is the formative principle, and organization the result, is plain from the reparation and reproduction which take place when a plant or animal has been injured. The cause exists prior to the effect. And when Life ceases in a plant or animal, disorganization speedily ensues. (Barclay, *On Life and Organization*, p. 32; Sir C. Bell, *Paley Illust.*, vol. ii. p. 408.)

Another argument for the immateriality of Mind has been drawn from—

VI. *The Phenomena of Dreaming.*

Sleep becomes necessary, to recruit the wearied powers of the body, after they have been long exerted. And if the mind and its faculties were material they would need repose as well and as frequently as the body. But the truth is that we are frequently more active when the body is asleep than when it is awake. The mind, as if freed from

something that clogged or chained it down to earth, expatiates in the regions of fancy with unwonted activity,—

“The spirit knows no gross impediments
In dreams; but, like a thing aerial,
She sinks, and soars, and glides away
Delighted.”—WILSON, *Unimore*.

“Our dreams,” says a writer in *The Spectator* (No. 487), “are great instances of that activity which is natural to the human soul, and which it is not in the power of sleep to deaden or abate. When the man appears tired and worn out with the labours of the day, this active part in his composition is still busied and unwearyed. When the organs of sense want their due repose and necessary reparations, and the body is no longer able to keep pace with that spiritual substance to which it is united, the soul exerts herself in her several faculties, and continues in action until her partner is again qualified to bear her company. In this case, *Dreams* look like the relaxations and amusements of the soul, when she is disengaged of her machine; her sports and recreations, when she has laid her charge asleep.”

“In our *Dreams*,” says Dr. Brown, “we are something more than ourselves, and the slumber of the body seems to be the waking of the soul. *Mens sine corpore ludit*.” It is true that the character of our *Dreams* depends upon the state of the body; and persons have not been wanting who have followed a particular diet to procure a particular kind of *Dreams*. The old books on Natural Magic give prescriptions, by the use of which you “may see marvellous things in your *Dreams*.” All this may be explained by the connection that subsists between the mind and the body; but it does not account for the mind continuing active while the body is asleep. It may further be true that the ideas of which our *Dreams* are made up are not new ideas, but ideas which originated during our waking hours. Still, however, these ideas are variously combined in our *Dreams*, and to say that these combinations are accomplished by bodily organs, which are steeped in slumber, and without the activity of the mind, is like saying that the different colours which lie upon the palette of the painter could blend themselves into some exquisite painting, without the intervention of his genius and skill.

The amazing celerity, too, with which the mind operates in *Dreams*—the quickness with which any impression upon the senses, strong enough to be felt without awaking, is caught up and made the groundwork of a new train of ideas, and the prodigiously long suc-

cession of images that pass through the mind with perfect distinctness in an instant of time, have been regarded as altogether inconsistent with the mind being material. (See Lord Brougham, *Disc. of Nat. Theol.*, p. 117; Abercrombie, *Intell. Pow.*, p. 273; Newton, *Dissert. on Prop.*, *dissert. 26.*)

An argument, differing from the preceding, in proof in the immateriality of mind, is derived from its possessing—

VII. *The Power of Will and being Self-moving.*

The characteristic of matter is a *vis inertiae*, or a resistance to a change of state. If it be at rest, it continues at rest—if in motion, it continues in motion. Of itself it has not the power of beginning motion nor of stopping motion, nor of changing the direction of motion. But the mind of man has a *Self-moving* power. It not only knows and thinks, but wills and acts. It can begin or stop motion. It can continue or change it.

"Now this thing that begins motion where it was not, and stops it where it was—that effects a change from rest to motion and from motion to rest—and that arbitrarily, can never be matter, which necessarily resists all change of its state either of rest or motion."—Baxter on *Immater. of the Soul*, sect. 1; Wollaston, *Relig. of Nat. Delin.*, p. 184.

It may be said, indeed, that the mind is impelled by motives just as matter is impelled by force, and consequently, that mind can no more act, or begin motion, without some external cause, than matter, and that the one may have no more of a *Self-moving* power than the other. It is plain, however, that moral suasion, the influence of motives, and the consideration of consequences, are very different from external force or the impact of one piece of matter upon another. All these are modes or operations of the mind itself, and are contained within it. And since the way in which mind acts or is moved is so very different from the way in which matter is put in motion, it is contended that the two substances are essentially different. Reason and argument, persuasion and influence, have no effect in moving matter. Syllogism and expostulation need not be addressed to it. So that even admitting that mind does not move arbitrarily, but only in the presence of motives, or in accordance with motives, still the influence of motives is an influence which is very much made or modified by the mind itself, and so different from external force as to indicate that what yields to the one must be essentially different from matter, which cannot resist the other.

CHAPTER VI.

OF THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL.

THE arguments in favour of the Immortality of the Soul have been divided into the *Metaphysical* or *Natural*, and the *Moral*,—that is, the argument from the very nature of the soul, and the arguments arising from the character of God, viewed in connection with the constitution and condition of man. It may be doubted, however, whether this division is correct or well founded, inasmuch as all the arguments which reason urges in favour of our future existence are of a mixed kind, and arise partly from the nature of the soul and the condition of man, and partly from the character and indicated intentions of God. The *Metaphysical* argument, or that which is derived from the very nature of the soul, is founded on the fact which it has been attempted to prove in the preceding chapter, —viz., that mind is Immaterial. It is commonly called the argument—

I. From the Spirituality or Simplicity of the Soul.

According to Lord Brougham (*Disc. of Nat. Theol.*, p. 100), “The immateriality of the soul is the foundation of all the doctrines relating to its future state. If it consists of material parts, or if it consists of any modification of matter, or if it is inseparably connected with any combination of material elements, we have no reason whatever for believing that it can survive the existence of the physical parts of our frame; on the contrary, its destruction seems to follow as a necessary consequence of the dissolution of the body.” But Mr. Locke has said, *Essay on Hum. Understand.*, book iv. ch. 3), “All the great ends of morality and religion are well enough secured without philosophical proof of the soul’s immateriality.” “On this point,” says Mr. Stewart (*Act. and Mor. Pow.*, book iii. ch. 4, sect. 1), “I quite agree with Locke.” In like manner, Bishop Porteous (*Sermons*, vol. i. serm. 5) has said, “It is not absolutely essential to the argument to prove that the soul is formed of a different kind of substance from the body, or, in other words, that it is immaterial.” And Lord Brougham has been severely blamed by Dr. Wallace (*Observ. on the Disc. of Nat. Theol.*, p. 84), for making the *immortality* of the soul depend upon the proof of its *immateriality*. The immortality of the soul does not result from its nature, but from the design or intention of its Creator. And the reason why so much

pains have been taken to prove that mind is immaterial is, that from this fact we derive great alleviations of the apprehensions which naturally stir within us on witnessing the dissolution of the body, and clear indications of the design of God that the soul should survive it.

The circumstances which accompany the dissolution of our nature are truly alarming. To the vigour of health and the bloom of youth succeed the languor of disease and the paleness of death. His breath goeth forth, and man returneth to the dust. Corruption embraces him as her son, and the worms feed sweetly on their elder brother. At this melancholy prospect the human heart takes the alarm, and, amidst its doubts and fears, is ready to pronounce that all is over, that the soul hath shared the fate of the body, and that the whole man has descended into the grave. Upon calm reflection, several circumstances suggest themselves to relieve these our natural apprehensions. But perhaps our greatest relief is derived from the fact that the mind is immaterial or spiritual. This fact being admitted, it is seen that the death of the body, so far from implying the dissolution of the soul, may strengthen and expand its energies, and so far from reducing it to a state of total insensibility, may introduce it into a field of action greatly more extensive—where, free from the incumbrances of matter, it may exert its powers without obstruction or limit.

In this way the spiritual, simple, indivisible nature of mind is calculated to afford relief from the fears excited by the dissolution of the body and other material substances. All the changes which matter undergoes arise from its compound and divisible nature. But the human soul, having no parts, is by its very nature indissoluble. It has no tendency in itself to annihilation. It cannot perish through any external force.

“The soul, secure in her existence, smiles
At the drawn dagger, and defies its point.”

Infinite power is required to change that which *is* to that which *is not*; so that, without an immediate act of the Omnipotent Creator to annihilate it, the soul must continue an active perceptive substance through all eternity. This is what is called the *natural*¹ immortality

¹ About the beginning of last century, Mr. Dodwell maintained that the soul of man was naturally mortal, but had immor-

tality conferred on it by baptism. He was answered by Thomas Miles, B.D., Oxf., 1707; and by John Norris, A.M., 1772.

of the soul—that is, an existence which cannot be limited or terminated by the agency of natural or second causes. (Baxter, *On Immortality of the Soul*, vol. i. p. 239.)

It is not maintained, however, that the soul is immortal independently of the will of the Almighty. Unless we are ready to maintain that matter and mind are eternal, it must be admitted that He who called them into existence can terminate that existence, and annihilate their substance. But annihilation is an act of which, even in reference to matter, we have no proof, and can form no adequate conception. Mind cannot be reduced to parts; for it has none; and therefore we conclude that its simple, spiritual, uncompounded nature is an indication of the will of God that it should live for ever. “*Cum simplex animi natura sit, nec habet in se quidquam admistum, dispar sui atque dissimile, non posse eum dividiri: quod si non possit, non possit interiri.*”—Cicero, *De Senectute*, cap. 21. (See John Smith, *Select Discourses*, Camb. 1673; Warner C. Search, *i. e.* Will. Cusack Smith, *Metaphysic Rambles*; Channing, *Sermon on Immortality*.)

Another argument for the immortality of the soul is drawn—

II. *From the Excellence and Extent of its Powers and Capacities.*

To form a fair estimate of the dignity and excellence of the human mind, we should turn our attention to some of those illustrious instances in which its powers and capacities have manifested the greatest vigour, and been carried to the highest pitch of improvement. When we look even to the general and more ordinary extent of the human intellect, we must be satisfied that it is framed for something higher than can be attained here below. Man is possessed of capacities of knowledge which are never filled, and he feels and laments the darkneses and imperfection of the present state. He is furnished with capacities of enjoyment which the objects and pursuits of this life cannot fully satisfy, and he pants after higher sources of felicity. But, in the midst of all his aspirations, he is suddenly cut off. And can we believe that an end is thus put to the noblest work of God—that his prospects of intellectual advancement are for ever darkened, and his desires of higher happiness completely disappointed? The same goodness which made us what we are, and gave us what we have, by placing us so much above our present state, seems evidently to have intended us for another, where our capacities of knowledge and our desires of happiness shall be fully satisfied. The wisdom of God cannot be vindicated but by the conclusion that in another and

a better state the powers of the soul shall be permitted fully to be developed, and its aspirations after enjoyment to be completely gratified, and that, freed from the darkness and impediments of its present condition, it shall advance in an endless career of happiness and improvement.

This argument is very much strengthened by considering—

III. That the Soul of Man is in a Continual Progress towards Perfection.

“A brute,” says Mr. Addison (*Spectator*, No. iii.) “arrives at a point of perfection that he can never pass; in a few years he has all the endowments he is capable of; and were he to live ten thousand more he would be the same thing he is at present. Were a human soul thus at a stand in her accomplishments, were her faculties full-blown and incapable of further enlargement, I could imagine it might fall away insensibly, and drop at once into a state of annihilation. But can we believe a thinking being that is in a perpetual progress of improvement, and travelling on from perfection to perfection, after having just looked abroad into the works of his Creator, and made a few discoveries of His infinite goodness, wisdom, and power, must perish at her first setting out, and in the very beginning of her inquiries?”

“The end of human life,” says Dr. James Hutton (*Principles of Hum. Knowl.*, vol. iii. p. 195), “is nothing but a term at which sensation, the first means of knowledge, ceases to be employed. In this view, death is only the beginning of a further existence, the institution of an immaterial, that is, an intellectual being, and the commencement of a purer progress, in which reason may proceed without an impulse from directing passion.”

In objection to this argument, it has been said that the faculties of the human mind seem here to have reached all the perfection of which they are capable, inasmuch as after a certain period of life they begin to decay. The answer to this is—That the powers of acquiring knowledge become less active in old age, because the bodily organs upon which they depend—not for their existence, but for their exercise—have become less capable of supplying them with materials upon which to work. And so soon as new means and appliances are furnished, the mind may start afresh in its progress to perfection. Besides, although the powers of knowledge may be impaired by the decay of the body, our moral susceptibilities suffer no declension by

age. Now, it is not knowledge, but piety and virtue which are the chief ends of man; and in these we seem susceptible of indefinite improvement. (Crombie, *Nat. Theol.*; Sherlock, *On Future State.*)

To this may be added the argument which has been drawn—

IV. *From the Natural Desire of Immortality.*

“The particular care that all men seem to have for things that are only to happen after their death is a strong evidence,” says Cicero (*Tuscul. Disp.*, lib. i.), “that Nature secretly gives for the immortality of our souls.” The desire of perpetuating our memory, by monuments and other means, is the effect of our *Desire of Immortality*. If we are not to be immortal, why should we have such a vain desire to counterfeit and covet immortality. What can it matter how soon we are forgotten, if we ourselves are to be nothing? Or why should we seek a good and shun a bad report, when we can feel neither the glory of the one nor the shame of the other? It would be an impeachment upon the character of God, to think or say that He had formed or encouraged us to cherish a hope only to be disappointed.

It has been said, however, “that God does not deceive men, but that they deceive themselves, and change the natural love of life and the principle of self-preservation into a *Natural Desire of Immortality*; and thus hastily conclude that they are immortal, because they desire to be so.” But it is plain that the principle of self-preservation and the *Desire of Immortality* are two different things. Man shares with the inferior animals the love of life and a horror of everything injurious to it. But he has something more. He has not only the desire to preserve life, but the desire that it may be indefinitely prolonged. And although he sees that his life here must terminate, so strong is he in the hope that it will be renewed hereafter, that he is at great pains to perpetuate the remembrance of himself among those from whom he knows he is speedily to be removed. There is nothing more remarkable in the habitudes of mankind as distinguished from the inferior animals, who are exclusively occupied with the present life, than a reference, which is everywhere more or less distinctly perceptible, to a state of existence to which they feel themselves to be destined after the determination of their visible career. The rites everywhere performed for the dead, the various ceremonies of sepulture, of embalming, of cremation,

funeral processions and pomps, the prayers put up for the living and the dead, in the churches of Christendom, in the mosques and pagodas of the East, as heretofore in the temples of the Pagan world, are proofs that all mankind are deeply impressed with the belief and desire of a future existence. (Prichard, *Nat. Hist. of Man*, p. 491, 492, Lond. 1845.) "The soul is ever stretching to a future existence as the centre and object of all its wishes, and towards which all its desires are directed. . . . And must there not, then, be some object in the universe, some future world, which all men so earnestly seek after? Can we suppose that in the most perfect of all God's works here below, we find a principle deeply implanted and universally prevalent, without any object corresponding to it?"—Rev. T. Watson, *Intimations of a Future State*, p. 39. "Throughout animated nature," says Coleridge (*Aids to Reflection*, p. 347), "of each characteristic organ and faculty there exists a pre-assurance, an instinctive and practical anticipation; and no pre-assurance common to a whole species does in any instance prove delusive. All other prophecies of nature have their exact fulfilment—in every other ingrafted word of promise, Nature is found true to her word, and is it in her noblest creature that she tells her first lie?"

In connection with this argument, or rather in continuation of it, may be noticed the argument arising from the fact—

V. *That the Social and Sympathetic Affections survive the Removal of their Objects, and thus point to a Future Re-union.*

We not only desire immortality for ourselves, but for all our friends. When they are taken away from us by death, all the resources of art and all the devices of ingenious affection are employed to perpetuate and prolong their memory. To this fond and natural desire may be traced the process of embalming the dead. The statue and the picture, the ring and the relic, are expressions of the same desire to cherish the memory and to regain the society of our departed friends. The pang which we experience at parting with them is mitigated by this hope, and the prospect of re-union to those whom we have loved and lost, reconciles us to the terrors of our own dissolution.

Now, we might have been so formed that when our friends were taken away from us by death, all our feelings and desires concerning them might have been at once extinguished. Such seems to be the case with the inferior animals. The horse and the dog, the most

sagacious and affectionate among them, speedily forget their former master, and readily lick the new hand which is stretched out to feed or to caress them. And if man's destiny were with the brutes that perish, his constitution would in this respect have been similar to theirs. But the continuance of his affections when their objects have been removed is a proof that the affections were designed to last, and that their objects shall be restored. The survivancy of the affections points to a re-union. On the supposition of an hereafter, everything in our constitution is wise and benevolent. If there be not, we are of all living beings the most miserable—with affections which survive when their objects are dead, and not only afflict us with unavailing regrets as to the past, but prevent us from enjoying the good which the present scene offers, and mock us with empty and deceitful hopes of another and a better. If our mouths are for ever to be filled with the dust of the tomb, we would not have been formed or allowed so eagerly to pant for immortality—not merely for ourselves, but for all the objects of our affection.

The argument drawn—

VI. *From the Moral Constitution and Condition of Man* requires much care to state it aright.

God hath given us moral principles and feelings, and hath taught us to judge, even of ourselves, concerning what is right. And this judgment is not a cold and unmoving conclusion. It is accompanied with feelings of approbation or disapprobation. Now, whence arise these feelings? Whence comes the glow of inward satisfaction which is felt on the performance of any good and virtuous action? Or whence comes the pang of compunction and remorse which follows the commission of anything that is unworthy or wrong? They proceed from the conviction that good conduct deserves and will obtain approbation and reward, while vicious conduct deserves and will receive condemnation and punishment. The judgment which Conscience exercises within us has reference to a higher tribunal and a stricter reckoning, and the feelings of satisfaction or of remorse which we now experience are indications and beginnings of what we may hereafter be called to suffer or to enjoy.

And since God hath made us capable of discerning betwixt right and wrong, and hath annexed to that discernment a susceptibility of suitable emotions, it is impossible for us to conclude that He himself should remain insensible to the distinction between good and evil.

It is natural, therefore, for us to expect that, in the government of the world, God should manifest His love of virtue and hatred of vice, by rewarding the virtuous and by punishing the vicious. And to a certain extent He does so. For the consequences which flow from virtue and vice should be regarded as rewards and punishments, so far as they go. (Butler, *Anal.*, pt. i. ch. 6.) They do not, however, go so far as our moral principles and feelings lead us to expect or wish. Those external advantages upon which happiness in this life so much depends are not dispensed in exact proportion to the good or bad conduct of men: The righteous often fail to secure a competent portion of the good things of this life, and fall under heavy trials and calamities; while the wicked are allowed to spread themselves like a green bay-tree, and, in the full luxuriance of their prosperity, to check and chill the growth of humble virtue. Such is the moral constitution of our nature that we cannot look upon this state of things with indifference. Our moral feelings take part with the righteous; and tell us that it ought not to be so. And seeing that it is so now, we are urged to the conclusion that it shall not always be so.

But in coming to the conclusion that there shall be another and a better state of things, where happiness and misery shall be distributed according to the character of men, it is of consequence to attend to the reasons why this is not done, and could not be done, in the present state. The present is a state of trial and probation, not of strict judgment and of full reward. The faculties we have been furnished with, and the circumstances in which we have been placed, prove this. The righteous and the wicked are here so connected and associated with one another that the one could not be fully punished, nor the other fully rewarded. To try and improve the virtues of the one, and to move the repentance and work the reformation of the other, they are allowed, for a season, to grow together, lest in rooting up the one, the other should be destroyed. But still we are at no loss to perceive which is the object of the Divine approbation, and which shall at last receive marks of the Divine favour. So that both from what God has done, to show His love of virtue and His hatred of vice, as well as from His not having done more, we arrive at the conclusion, that the promises and beginnings of His justice here will be completed hereafter.

Had we been so constituted as to see no loveliness in virtue and no turpitude in vice, or to feel no pleasure in the practice of the one or

no pain in the commission of the other, we would have had no conception of the moral character of God, and no expectation from the measures of a moral government. On the other hand, had the measures of God's moral government been complete in this life, there would have been less room and less reason to expect another. Had the righteous and the wicked been here punished and rewarded exactly in proportion to their respective character and conduct, we must have concluded that this was the final scene of the Divine administration. But when we learn, on the one hand, from the intimations of conscience and the arrangements of Providence, that the one is the object of the Divine approbation and the other of the Divine condemnation, and when, on the other hand, we see that they are here exposed alike to the trials and vicissitudes of life, we conclude that the present state is a state of discipline and probation, and admirably suited for the purposes of such a state. And while this is the true and correct view of the present life, it furnishes the clearest argument for a future life—where the virtues which have here been exercised shall be perfected and rewarded—where the vices which have been patiently borne with here shall be punished—where all irregularities shall be corrected, and all inequalities removed—and where every man shall receive according to the deeds done in the body, whether they have been good or evil.

The strength of these and other arguments in favour of the immortality of the soul has been so generally felt, that it may be noticed, in attestation of their reasonableness and force, and, at the same time, as constituting an additional or supplementary argument in itself,—

VII. That the General Consent of Mankind has always been in favour of a Future State.

The reasonings of the philosopher, the traditions of the historian, the fables of the poet, the fancies of the mythologist, and the manners of the whole human race, are full of the belief that man shall live beyond the grave. Distracted and divided by an endless multiplicity of opinions concerning almost every other subject, men have been unanimous in the persuasion that soul and body do not perish together. Useful arts and elegant accomplishments have been lost in the lapse of time; but this sacred opinion has remained entire, and the hope of immortality has continued to pour forth its steady and cheering rays amidst all the revolutions of time, and all

the changes of place and circumstance. Its illumination is wide as it is constant; for they who have visited the remotest corners of the earth have not penetrated a region so dark as to resist its beams; and the few reports to the contrary seem to be hasty and unfounded. (*Livingstone, Missionary Travels*, p. 165.)

There have, no doubt, in all ages of the world, been hearts so cold and perverse as to renounce this common hope—to abjure this common faith; but these have been comparatively few. And although the followers of Sadoc and Epicurus should raise their voices in one unhallowed cry of annihilation, it would not be heard amidst the shouting of the multitudes rejoicing in the hope of immortality.

Now, how are we to account for this universal belief? All the nations of the earth never met in general council to insert the doctrine of immortality as an article of their common creed. According to some, however, the belief in God, and in the immortality of the soul, and some other points, are derived from some primitive tradition, handed down through successive generations of men. Or, if this view be not taken, the belief of immortality must either be an impression originally stamped upon the minds of men by their Creator, or a belief so naturally arising from the constitution and condition of men, that few, if any, have been able altogether to resist it. If it be said that this consent is the consequence of an original impression made upon the mind, this is saying—

“ ‘Tis heaven itself that points out an hereafter,
And intimates eternity to man.”

If it be said that the evidence in favour of this truth is so clear and plain, that, constituted as men are, few, if any, have been able to resist it, the universality of the belief is a proof of its high authority, as we cannot think that men have been so framed as universally to believe what is not true.

It may be said, however, that men are liable to run into erroneous beliefs, and that this may be one of them. But the belief in a future state differs from any of the mistakes into which men have fallen, by its being permanent and universal. Wherever men have been found some system of religion has been found, and of every system of religion the belief of a future state forms a part. “ Any one of the religions professed by particular tribes of men may be false in whatever distinguishes it from other religions—that is to say, in whatever

is partial and peculiar; but the religious instinct, and the abstract belief of invisible creative power, is not false; and so any specific expectation of what awaits us after death may prove a dream; but not so the human expectation at large of surviving the dissolution of the body. Those sheer errors of which men, individually or nationally, have become the victims, are always of a kind that may be traced to artificial and accidental causes, such as the influence of interested impostors or enthusiasts; or they have sprung from the vanity and perversity of philosophers or founders of sects. But, on the contrary, the common or generic impressions, expectations, and opinions of man, spring unquestionably from the elements of his nature; and how much soever they may be warped or exaggerated, deformed, repressed, or denied, they reappear everywhere, and in every age, with unabated force, and with very nearly the same essential properties. These opinions and impressions must be substantially true, if there be truth and harmony in the scheme of the universe. Among such physical elements of human nature, the prime is the belief of an Intelligent First Cause; and the second, the belief of a future life and a retributive economy. To impugn, then, the doctrine of immortality, or of another stage of existence succeeding the present, is to find a species marked in the most distinct manner with the indications of a future transformation, and yet to affirm that no transformation awaits it."—Isaac Taylor, *Physical Theory of Another Life*, p. 161.

This leads to the notice of a class of arguments which may be called—

VIII. *Arguments drawn from Analogy.*

The question, Why should it seem a thing incredible that God should raise the dead? touches upon the principal difficulty connected with the *Immortality of the soul*. And it is to alleviate or remove this difficulty that the *Argument from Analogy* has been chiefly employed. At death, the soul ceases to be in any way cognizable through the instrumentality of the body, and we are ready to conclude that it has ceased to be, and cannot again be called into life. When we look abroad, however, on the face of nature, we see changes equally violent taking place, without producing the extinction of being. Everything around us is exposed to change, and the sentence of death has gone forth against the whole creation. The trees of the forest drop their leaves, and the flowers of the

garden part with their honours. The cold hand of winter benumbs and deadens the vegetable world, and the face of nature, at one time so bright, darkens into a desolated waste. But when the winds are over and gone, and the time of the singing of birds is come, the breath of spring passes along the fields, and nature again blooms in new charms. And why may not He who reneweth the face of the earth—who clothes the desolate fields of winter with the fresh beauties of spring—send his reviving energies even to the bottom of the grave, and make the dry bones live—make their dew as the dew of herbs, and cause the earth to cast forth her dead? (See Pearson, *On the Creed*, Art. XI.)

But perhaps it may be said that the argument drawn from this analogy is defective, inasmuch as the two things compared are not alike. “The destruction of a vegetable is an event not similar or analogous to the destruction of a living agent. The vegetable wants the power of perception and of action, which is the only thing we are inquiring about the continuance of.”—Butler, *Anal.*, ch. 1.

Let us turn, then, to the animal creation, and we shall see that many of the species undergo changes more wonderful than that which the *Immortality of the soul* implies, and resembling rather the resurrection of the body. Several of the insect tribes exist at first in a torpid state. At length they acquire the power of locomotion, and begin to traverse the clods. Soon, however, they lose this power, and, relapsing into torpidity, they seem to die. At last their final change approaches—they revive with new vigour, and mount into the regions of air. And why may not man experience similar changes? Why may not death be a process necessary to the continuation of his existence—a step in his progress to a higher state of being? The state of infancy or childhood is as different from the state of mature and perfect manhood as any two states of life can well be. To suppose, therefore, that we are hereafter to exist in a state different from the present is but to suppose that we have to undergo a change similar to what we have already undergone, and similar to what we see other creatures undergoing. “With the daily and hourly miracles (so to call them) of the vegetable and animal world before our eyes, with creations, renovations, transitions, and transmigrations innumerable, going on, while yet individuality and identity are preserved, nothing ought to be thought incredible or unlikely concerning the destiny of man which comports with these common wonders, and which in itself is only an analogous trans-

formation."—Isaac Taylor, *Physical Theory of Another Life*, p. 156.

The *Argument from Analogy* may be viewed in another light.

The further our researches have been carried, both in the natural and moral world, the more clear becomes the conclusion, that no absolute and uncompensated evil exists. Many natural objects, which were formerly thought to exist solely for the purpose of giving pain, have been found, by the researches of physical science, to answer the most salutary and important ends. The evils and calamities to which, in this life, we are exposed, are not intended to make us miserable, but conduce to the more lively enjoyment of the benefits provided for us, and contribute, in many ways, to our improvement as rational and moral beings. But if death is to be the termination of our existence, then the pains and sufferings by which it is preceded must be viewed as purely and gratuitously evil. The creature who suffers them can never be the better for suffering them, if he is not to exist hereafter. "Now, if it be a general law of our being that we be subject to no evil but what is calculated to produce good, is it probable that death, which is the last evil we must bear—an evil from which there is no escape—a catastrophe, both morally and physically painful and afflictive, will issue in no good, but prove to be a pure, gratuitous, and irremediable calamity? Is it not more probable that, like all our other sufferings, it will conduce to our benefit, and, by a temporary suspension of our existence, if it is to be suspended, tend ultimately to improve it, and advance us to higher happiness? This supposition will reconcile it with the general plan of the Divine administration. But that disorder and pain should be inflicted without the possibility of producing good, is wholly irreconcilable with the manifest purposes of Deity in the infliction of evil."—Crombie, *Nat. Theol.*, vol ii. p. 504.

It may be said, however, that the good which flows from the frailty and mortality of human life is to be seen in those who live rather than in those who die. And most assuredly, if the living would but lay it to heart, they might learn much wisdom from the death of those who are continually dying around them. It must also be admitted that it is quite according to the constitution and government of this world that the pains and inconveniences of one man should be productive of benefit to others. But, even in producing benefit to others by his example, he who suffers pain and inconvenience is, or should be, benefited himself. Yet, if we are to sup-

pose the existence of man to terminate at death, it is impossible that the individual can be benefited by the pain and suffering to which he has been exposed. It may be said, perhaps, that death is often a benefit to the individual, inasmuch as it may be a welcome release from pain and suffering. But this is a strengthening rather than a weakening of our argument; for if death is not only to be viewed as an evil in itself, but as an evil which is often preceded by pain and suffering so great as to make it welcome, how can all this pain and evil be reconciled with the analogy of nature, but by admitting that there is a life after death, in which the evil may be compensated, and the good effects of the pain and suffering made manifest? (And here it deserves to be remarked that, in the account which is given in Scripture of our future existence, the evil which we here endure is represented as compensated for by the enjoyment of the good to which we subsequently attain.)

There is till another light in which the *Argument from Analogy* has been put.

It has been observed that gradation is a general law of nature. Nothing is seen to spring at once to perfection. There are different stages of progression, through which the different classes of beings are appointed to pass. Even unorganized matter seems to pass through various transitions. Plants spring from seeds, and gradually advance to maturity. In like manner, animals go through several changes before they attain to the perfection of their nature. And when the different kinds of beings have arrived at what appears to be the perfection of their nature, a regular gradation seems to run through the whole. Dead matter is to be seen in various stages; some of it altogether rude and amorphous, and other parts of it so curious in its structure as to seem ready to be made the abode or vehicle of some kind of life. And when we ascend to living beings, we can trace a similar gradation, from the "dull weed that rots on Lethe's shore" to the passion-flower and the catchfly, and other sensitive plants that seem to possess a kind of vitality and to partake of animal life. In the animal creation the steps of the gradation are almost infinite, rising from the zoophytes, which connect the animal and vegetable kingdoms, to the most sprightly, and animated, and intellectual of living beings. Reasoning from analogy, we should be ready to conclude that the same gradation which we see here below should ascend higher, and that the subordination and uniformity which prevail in God's works here should be found in other parts of His dominions.

Man stands at the head of creation here, and from him the works of God descend through an endless and almost imperceptible gradation downwards. But why may there not be also an ascending scale of being? Why may there not be a class of intelligences immediately above man, as there are classes of beings below him? The probability is that man is not the last link of the chain, but that it ascends, in golden beauty, to higher orders of intelligence. But, if man is to cease to exist at death, this chain is broken, the gradation is interrupted, and a chasm introduced which we do not observe in the other works of God.

Such is a short view of the principal arguments which reason furnishes in favour of a future state. Whatever may be thought of the separate and independent force of each, it will surely be admitted that, when all combined, they furnish a very considerable amount of evidence. The light of each solitary ray in the illustration may not strike us very strongly; but when concentrated into one common focus, they are sufficiently powerful to dissipate the clouds of obscurity and doubt, and to open up a clear and happy pathway to the skies.

CHAPTER VII.

OF THE SENTIMENTS AND SERVICES DUE TOWARDS GOD.

HAVING seen that God is, and that He is the Preserver and Governor of men, not only in this life, but in another life to come, it remains to inquire what Sentiments and Services are due from us directly towards Him. For while all duties should be discharged from a regard to His authority and will, there are some duties of which He is more immediately the object.

SECTION I.—*Of the Sentiments and Affections due towards God.*¹
 The religious *Sentiments* or *Affections*, meaning by these terms the

¹ See Hutcheson, *Mor. Phil.*, b. i. ch. 10. Hon. Mr. Boyle, *Tract on Veneration due to God.*

general frame of mind which it becomes us habitually to cherish towards God, have been denoted by words which may seem, at first sight, to have a contrary meaning. The Fear of God, and also the Love of God, are phrases which have been employed to denote them. But this does not imply any contradiction. The feelings or affections which the contemplation of the natural attributes of the Deity is fitted to awaken, in the bosom of a being like a man, are certainly more allied to Fear than to Love. But, on the other hand, Goodness is the natural and proper object of Esteem and Love. The one class of feelings or affections, however, does not exclude the other. The truth is, that although we distinguish between the different attributes of the Deity they cannot be separated, and ought not to be regarded by us without reference to one another, but rather as constituting one glorious essence. The contemplation of the natural attributes of the Deity, such as Self-existence, Eternity, Immutability, Omnipresence, Omnipotence, Omniscience, &c., is a contemplation fitted to excite in us sentiments of the deepest *Reverence* and *Awe*; and these are sentiments which it becomes us to detain and cherish when they are awakened within us. Should these *Sentiments* at any time wax weak within us, and should we grow insensible to the august presence of Him in whom we live, and move, and have our being, then it becomes us to stand still and reverently to contemplate those stupendous proofs of power which the mighty movements of the universe exhibit, or those wonderful marks of wisdom which are scattered in such profusion around us. 'To beings weak and ignorant as we are the feelings of *Reverence* and *Awe* may always find their proper food and sustenance in those miracles of Divine Power and Wisdom with which we have been surrounded. And the fact of our having been so surrounded must leave us altogether without excuse, if we neglect to cultivate feelings which are so justly due from us to the All-powerful and All-wise Creator and Preserver of the Universe.

Our contemplations, however, should not be limited to the Natural Attributes of the Deity, but should extend to the Moral Attributes, in order that the *Sentiments* inspired by the former may receive their proper modification through the influence of the latter. Now, the Moral Attributes, such as Holiness, Justice, and Goodness, though they may be enumerated and spoken of as distinct and separate, are in reality inseparable in the Divine Nature. The possession of any one of them, in a perfect degree, implies the possession of all. Holiness

ness, without Justice, would not be Holiness; and Goodness, if manifested separately from Holiness, would no longer be Goodness. When the religious *Sentiments* or *Affections* are denoted by one term, it is not meant that they have respect merely to one attribute, or even to one class of attributes, belonging to the Divine Nature. The fact that the opposite terms of Fear and Love have been employed for this purpose, may serve to show that our contemplations, and consequently the *Affections* excited and sustained by these contemplations, should extend to the whole of the Divine Character.

In this view, and with this explanation, *Love to God* may be delineated and recommended as the sum and substance of those *Affections* which we ought to cherish towards Him. As Goodness is frequently employed as a summary expression of the Divine Nature, so Love may be employed as a summary expression of the Religious Affections. (Edwards, *Treatise concerning Religious Affections*.)

Goodness is the natural and proper object of Love; and he who can contemplate it without emotion, wants one of the most pleasing attributes of our species. We feel it as an act of natural violence and injustice to withhold our esteem from the man who is active and zealous in the promotion of human happiness; and when we ourselves enjoy the fruits of his benevolent exertions, the feeling becomes more intense,—esteem rises into affection, and our bosoms glow with Gratitude and Love. To creatures constituted, then, as we are, the character of the Supreme Being possesses the most powerful attractions. All His works, and the benevolent arrangements which pervade them, declare Him to be a Being of Infinite Goodness, while our own experience adds touching testimony to the same truth.

It has been said, however, that Gratitude should form no part of our *Love to God*. No sense of the effects of His Goodness should enter into our feelings; but we ought to love Him solely for the amiableness of His perfections, without any reference to the benefits which we and others may derive from the exercise or manifestation of these perfections. Such was the opinion of Fénelon and others in his day. (See Fénelon, *Maxims of the Saints*; Bonnel, *De la Controverse de Bossuet et Fénelon, sur le Quietisme*, Macon, 1850; Upham, *Life of Madame Guyon*.) Now, the human mind may, perhaps, be capable of such disinterested affection. The approbation which we bestow on the exertions of benevolence, even when we are entirely excluded from any participation in the benefits which flow from such

exertions, seems to show that we are, in some measure at least, capable of loving goodness for its own sake; and that if it had been possible for us to have been made acquainted with the Divine perfections without being made partakers in their fruits, we might still have admired and loved them. But it is idle, and worse than idle, for beings so needy and dependent as we are, to talk of considering the Goodness of God as separated from its effects. Without relinquishing those principles and feelings which are the glory of our nature, we cannot contemplate our Maker without recollecting the manifold obligations under which we lie to Him; and while gratitude shares a portion of the human heart, it would be sin to forget them. “To disconnect our interest from His Goodness is at once to detract from His perfections and to obscure the brightness of our hopes. Here modesty would be ingratitude, disinterestedness rebellion. It would be severing ourselves from Him in whom we live, and move, and have our being—it would be dissolving the connection which He has condescended to establish between Himself and his creatures.”—*Hannah More.*²

Love to God, with the best of men, is but weak, and in this scene of trial it is liable to be overcome by the severities of affliction. The surest means, however, which we have for preserving the strength and maintaining the steadiness of our affection, when we labour under the darkness of desertion, is a vivid recollection of the better days which are past, and a hope of their return. But if our Love is to rest upon mere abstract ideas of the Divine Goodness, exclusive of any regard to the benefits which we may derive from the exercise of this perfection, we cannot avail ourselves of the preceding resource to sustain or strengthen our Love, and must be liable to sink under the pressure of distress. “I had fainted,” said the Psalmist (xxvii. 13), “unless I had believed to see the Goodness of the Lord in the land of the living.” Nothing, therefore, can be more injudicious than to destroy, by superfluous refinement, the energy of this most important affection, and sacrifice its real strength to its fancied purity. Why paralyze our Love by excluding every affectionate view of the Divine character, as if we were not indebted to the exercise of His perfections, or as if thankfulness for the benefits which

² Molinos, a Spanish priest, taught that Christian perfection consisted in the pure love of God, without hope of reward or fear of punishment. His opinions were embraced and propagated by Madame

Guyon, who was prosecuted and imprisoned. Fénelon published a work in justification of her character and in explanation of the degree in which he agreed with her. Bossuet opposed him.

we derive from Him were a feeling proscribed by God. He hath formed us susceptible of gratitude, He hath preferred the strongest claims upon the exercise of this affection, and any attempt to repress it deprives Him of all which He requires, and us of all which we can render in return for His benefits. The most powerful, and therefore the most proper, form in which this duty can be stated, is to love God because He first loved us.

And surely, if the defective benevolence and imperfect services of man can excite our esteem and our gratitude, the love wherewith God hath loved us should awaken the most lively emotions. If our feelings rise in their intensity in proportion to the excellence of their object, we ought to look up to the uncreated source of all Goodness with the most ardent affection. In God every quality which can render benevolence amiable in man exists in perfection, while those circumstances which lessen the loveliness of human virtue are entirely excluded. The Divine Goodness is perfect, as it is infinite. It is sullied by no frailty; it is confined by no limit; it is neither withheld from unworthiness nor withdrawn from abuse; but is pure in its nature and unbounded in its exercise, so that in contemplating it nothing can intervene either to check our esteem or to retard our gratitude. But while Goodness is the proper object of love, and while God is to be loved chiefly for His Goodness, it should be remembered that this is not the only perfection of the Divine nature, and that the feelings which arise from the contemplation of it should be modified by the feelings which are inspired by the contemplation of the others. God is Holy, Wise, and Just, as well as Good; and when the view of His Goodness excites our affection, the thoughts of His Holiness, His Wisdom, His justice, and all His other attributes should be taken in to regulate, confirm, and purify the impression, till our hearts are penetrated by the chastened yet vigorous emotions of *Esteem*, *Gratitude*, *Admiration*, and *Awe*, and we bow in humility and reverence before that throne which is established in righteousness and upheld by mercy.

Love to God, then, is not the hurried impulse of blind passion, but the steady result of sober reason. It is not the product of disordered feelings nor of a gloomy imagination, but is equally remote, both in its origin and effects, from slavish fear and irreverent presumption, and leads neither into the dark mazes of superstition nor the wild extravagancies of enthusiasm. It recognizes the workings neither of constitutional fervour nor of constitutional fear, but admits

the liveliness of the one without its transports and the calmness of the other without its tremors. It is intimate but not presumptuous, respectful but not servile, warm without being ecstatic, and reverent without being timorous. Like every other feeling, it depends upon circumstances for the strength or weakness of its exercise; but it is founded on an abiding impression of the Divine Goodness, which is neither extinguished by languor nor exhausted by rapture. The shades of impending calamity may dim the flame of our Love, but, like the fire on the altar, it never expires. The breath of returning prosperity may rekindle its energies, but, like the light of heaven, it never fails. When we languish in adversity it may partake of the gloom which overspreads the soul, but it will not sink into distrust. And when we rejoice in the full tide of health and happiness, it may share in the gladness which pervades the heart, but it will not evaporate in ecstasy. It may have its seasons of depression and of elevation, but in both it will preserve its moderation. It neither impairs its strength by improper excitement, nor intermits its exercise by undue relaxation; but has the steady lustre of constant affection rather than the quivering gleam of transitory exultation. Under very awakening circumstances, it may rise to rapture, but it delights not so much in striking the high tone of passion as in sustaining a continued harmony of soul. It exerts its influence with equability, and has more of the uniformity of temper than the inconstancy of emotion. It is a disposition of mind rather than the feeling of a moment, and consists not so much in occasional rapture as in a settled frame.

Distinct, however, from mere speculative esteem, true *Love to God* is a vigorous and active principle, which engages the heart and influences the conduct. It does not rest satisfied with cold professions of respect or barren feelings of attachment, but shows the profoundness of the one and the sincerity of the other by making the mind pious and the life pure. It embraces and multiplies the opportunities of recalling and improving the affectionate views which it entertains of the Divine character and perfections; and while it rejoices in the strong emotions of delight which even its present imperfect contemplations can awaken, it solicits, with the most earnest desire, more enlarged and more transporting prospects. It looks forward with rapture to the time when all its anticipations shall be found to have fallen short of the reality,—when the object of its affectionate contemplations shall be unveiled in all the glory

of inconceivable excellence,—when He shall be seen as He is, and we shall know even as we are known.

In the meanwhile, it is plain that *Love to God* will lead him who cherishes it to follow after virtue and the true perfection and happiness of his nature. Esteem of the Divine perfections will lead to the imitation of them, and more especially of that all-diffusive Goodness which is the glory of the Divine character; while Gratitude for the share which we ourselves have had in the fruits of this Goodness will prompt to obedience. The ties which attach the soul to God bind it to virtue, and every sentiment which enters into the Love of Him is favourable to purity of life. It is true that men of a sanguine temperament have been too ready to indulge the warmth and to overrate the value of their feelings; and in such cases devotion has degenerated into pietism, and violence of emotion has been substituted for propriety of conduct. But if the ties which attach us to God be legitimate, they will bind us to purity. If the throbs which we experience in His love be true, they will beat to virtue; and in the highest swell of exultation, it will never be forgotten that our feelings are good and valuable only in so far as they prompt to good and virtuous conduct.

In accordance with this illustration, *Love to God* may be defined to be an exalted esteem of His character, founded on affection for His Goodness, strengthened by the consideration of His other attributes, tempered by that reverence with which our tenderest affections towards the High and Holy One who inhabiteth eternity ought ever to be intimately mixed, and expressed by a sincere and active obedience.

Such being the nature and operation of *Love to God*, it is obviously a duty of the *earliest* and *most urgent obligation*, and of the *utmost importance*, to cultivate this affection.

I. *Love to God is of Primary Obligation.*

The precedence of an obligation may be fairly enough estimated by the intimacy of the relations upon which it is founded; and none surely can be more intimate than those which subsist between man and his Maker. We are equally dependent upon the Goodness of God for the comforts of time and the blessings of eternity. In Him we live, and move, and have our being, and in Him we hope, and trust, and rejoice. He is the Former of our bodies and the Father of our spirits. He hath made us, and not we ourselves. We might have slept for ever in our native dust; but He opened our eyes upon

the light of day and the joys of existence. He formed us with powers of body the most convenient, and endowed us with faculties of mind the most suitable. He hath made us capable of pursuits the most rational, and attainments the most exalted. Raised above the beasts of the field, He has crowned us with glory and honour. Blessed with the prospect of immortality, He hath formed us for the enjoyment of Himself. With all the care of a father, He watches over His favoured offspring. He does not leave us alone to struggle with the difficulties of a world to which we are strangers, but preserves us by his visitation. Reaching from heaven to earth, his friendly arm supports us amidst the dangers of a life that is new to us. He supplies our wants before we can utter them. He relieves our pains before we can express them. He supports us amidst vanities of which we feel not the insufficiency, and preserves us amidst follies of which we know not the danger. His claims upon our affection are prior to every other. We owe Him the first-fruits of our feelings, and till these are consecrated to His Love, they are sacrilegiously perverted from their proper object. Till our hearts thrill under the touching influence of the Divine Goodness, they are guilty of a kind of moral prostitution in discovering a sensibility to human benevolence. The Former of our bodies, the Father of our spirits, has claims upon our Love earlier and stronger than any other. It is contrary to every sentiment of propriety that we should be more affected by the imperfect services of man than by the Infinite Goodness of God. It is contrary to every idea of right that we should be more ready to acknowledge the exertions of a benevolence which is feeble in its nature and limited in its effects, than of a benevolence which is perfect as it is unbounded. How can we with any consistency esteem our earthly benefactors, and look up without emotion to Him from whom cometh down every good and perfect gift? How can we be thankful to the bestowers of favours which are partial or defective, and show no Gratitude to Him who giveth us all things necessary both for life and for godliness. Shall our acknowledgments be last where our obligations are first? Shall our gratitude be weakest where our benefits are greatest? Or shall we relinquish our sentiments of propriety, and disregard these obligations merely because they are infinite? Shall we abandon our ideas of what is right, and refuse our gratitude because it is all which is required? Rather let us stir up all the energies of our soul, and strive to equal, by the strength

and supremacy of our Love, the glory and excellence of those Divine perfections which are the foundation of all our enjoyments and of all our hopes. We are capable of appreciating the beauty of moral character—we are susceptible of gratitude for benefits conferred on us—and it becomes us, as rational and consistent creatures, to cultivate this pleasing, this generous affection; for, till the *Love of God* be shed abroad in our hearts, we are living in the neglect of the first duty and the chief happiness of our life.

But *Love to God* is not only of urgent and primary obligation; to cherish this affection—

II. *Is a Duty of Supreme Importance.*

Other feelings may occasionally lead to obedience, but as this obedience is neither uniform nor sincere, these feelings are totally incompetent to the general direction of life. A fit of terror may drive a man to the discharge of his duty or the resources of religion; but when his fears subside his purposes relax, and he turns again to his folly. A sense of character restrains many from open and scandalous iniquity, while it cannot detach them from their secret though not less culpable transgressions. But *Love to God* is a powerful and abiding principle, which in all cases and at all times will direct us with propriety. It is not confined in its attention to any particular precept, nor limited in its operation to any particular season. Its influence extends to every duty, is exerted with equal force, and produces an obedience at once general and consistent. Other principles may maintain their authority, such as it is, so long as they are not opposed by the violence of passion or the strength of temptation. But *Love to God* preserves its sway amidst trials which would destroy their weaker influence. It subdues the strongest passions, overcomes the most formidable temptations, and enables us to persevere in the path of virtue with increasing strength. It generates that enlargement of heart which makes us run in the way of God's commandments—run and not be weary. He who is a stranger to this affection advances in the path of duty with slow and languid step, like one groaning under a burden which is heavy and grievous to be borne. But he whose heart is warmed with *Love to God* holds on his way active and rejoicing. He takes a pleasure in the duties of life. He submits with humble and cheerful contentment to the trials of his lot; and even in scenes of the greatest suffering and difficulty, he commits himself with confidence unto

God as unto a faithful Creator. That complete and unmurmuring surrender of ourselves and all that concerns us to the disposal of Divine Wisdom and Goodness, which *Love to God* leads us to make, is the highest and noblest act of which a human being can be capable; and in the eye of Him who judgeth righteously and taketh pleasure in those who hope in His mercy, must appear to be of great price. God looketh to the heart and requires its homage; and if this be withheld, everything else loses its value in His sight. Even in the external services of heathen temples, to offer a victim without a heart was reckoned impious and absurd. How much more so must it be with those who profess to offer a reasonable service, to withhold their affections from Him who claims and also deserves them. We may tread with restless foot the beaten path of a public and professing religion; we may mutter in stated accents the forms of regular devotion; but if the principle of Love be wanting to warm our heart and give life to our services, they are mere bodily exercise, which profiteth nothing, which can neither be pleasing to ourselves nor acceptable to God. We may walk with integrity and honour through the business of the world; but if we feel no regard to the character of Him whose truth is inviolate, whose purity is unspotted, and whose faithfulness never fails, our virtues may be rejected as defective, or as springing from inferior motives. We may receive, and perhaps deserve, the applause of men—we may be loaded with the attestations of those who have placed in us their confidence, and have not been disappointed—we may be greeted with the cordial salutations of those who have trusted to our sense of honour, and have had no reason to repent of doing so; but when we place ourselves, as it were, in the presence of God, and ask what we have done unto Him, what we have done out of respect to His character or in obedience to His will, and thus discover that we have been guided in the practice of those virtues solely by the opinion and applause of the world, that applause must be our only portion—that applause must be our deep condemnation, if, while describing a course of conduct which is outwardly honourable and upright, we have remained insensible to the charms of that moral excellence which adorns the character of the Deity, and, with the glory of God shining above our heads, have walked through the world guided only by the glimmering rays of virtue which the example or the history of man could furnish, and have never lifted our admiring eye to the beauty of that Holiness, the majesty of that Truth, and the glory

of that Justice, which would have given a higher pulse to our heart and shed a clearer light around our path.

We may display all the charities of a generous and noble nature—we may scatter around us, in godlike profusion, the bounties of an indulgent Providence—but unless our benevolence proceed from a regard to that Goodness which is over all God's works—unless our liberality flow from a sense and acknowledgment of His beneficence, it may procure and deserve the thanks of a needy and short-seeing world, but can find no favour with God, who recognizes no action as virtuous which does not spring from Love to Him. All the virtues which are practised and applauded in the world are of no account in the sight of God, except in so far as they imply the existence and operation of this principle. It gives a sincerity and worth to our conduct which no other principle can bestow.

Seeing, then, that *Love to God* is at once the most reasonable and the most important feeling which can animate us, let us study by every means to acquire and cherish it—to *keep ourselves in the Love of God*. With this view, let us think frequently and seriously of the Divine Perfections. Let us survey the Wisdom and the Goodness of God as displayed in creation, which is full of the most exquisite arrangements and the most kind provisions. Let us contemplate those Perfections as they are displayed in the structure of our bodies, which are fearfully and wonderfully made, or as they have been exemplified in the history of our own lives, which have been filled with expressions of His kindness. Let us think of the many comforts we have enjoyed and the many dangers we have escaped, and let the feelings of Gratitude and Love rise in our bosom towards Him who hath protected and blessed us. Let us think of what we are and of what we may become, and let the hope of immortality fill us with the deepest Gratitude. Let us waive as much as possible every inferior attachment, and fix and concenerate our affection on the only being who deserves the devotion of our heart and the service of our life. Every human character is marked with imperfection and folly; and though the cultivation of friendship be one of the noblest exercises of which we are capable, it is often accompanied by uneasiness and followed by disappointment. Friends may not return that affection which we entertain for them,—they may abuse the trust which we repose in them; and anxiety and pain are the fruits of the most judicious attachments we can form. The things of the world, which solicit our love, are but little suited

to the capacities of an immortal being, and often lead those who pursue them into conduct inconsistent with their dignity as rational and accountable creatures. How many have sought for glory in paths of danger, and after all their most successful exertions have only arrived at the feeling of its emptiness! How many have pursued in ways of duplicity the acquisition of riches, which in themselves possess not a single excellence, confer not a single felicity, which cannot even communicate the feeling of their insufficiency, but which continue to increase the desire and the misery of those who seek them, and which at last make to themselves wings and flee away, leaving their naked votaries with nothing but a recollection of the struggles, or it may be the crimes, by which they were obtained! In short, we may be mistaken in our estimate of the amiableness of other objects—we may be deceived in our judgment of the influence which the love of them may produce; but we know that we can never overrate the Perfections of God—that we can never be led astray by their Esteem; and we know that while every other love is unsatisfactory and precarious, the *Love of God* is attended by a joy which is solid and lasting—which not only sheds its cheering influence on the dreary paths of this life, but opens up the prospect of increasing endearment through the endless ages of eternity. For, while the ties of every earthly attachment shrink from the touch of death, and perish with their fleeting objects, the bands of heavenly affection survive the shock of dissolution, and are immortal as the Perfections to which they unite us. They who love the Lord shall be as the sun when he goeth forth in his might. Even in the dark and cloudy atmosphere of this world they give forth beams of a heavenly lustre. But when removed to their congenial skies, they shall be admitted to the presence of Him whom they have so deeply and fervently adored at a distance—their Love shall burn with brighter flame, and work with more transforming power. Yet, bright and powerful as their affection may be, they must for ever love and for ever improve. For what shall stop the career of a soul which may for ever admire and for ever imitate, yet remain for ever at an inaccessible distance from the infinite perfection of its object? The attainments and pursuits which now stimulate the desires and exertions of men shall lose their interest and their value. Even those heavenly gifts which, in this state of ignorance and sin, were necessary to bring men to the knowledge of the truth, must cease with the ignorance and sin which they

have subdued. The graces which are called forth in this state of probation can have no place in the next. Patience will have had her perfect work, Hope will have given way to possession, and Faith will be swallowed up in fruition. The virtues which illuminate the darkness, mitigate the hardships, or soothe the sorrows of this vale of tears, can find no room for exercise in a region of peace and joy. But Love is the citizen of both worlds; its privileges can never be impaired—its exercise can never fail; for God, who is its object, is immortal, and His Perfections are infinite. He hath made man in the image of His immortality, and for the imitation of His excellence. And all who love and obey Him here shall love and obey Him for ever.

Another class of our *Sentiments* towards the Deity spring from contemplating Him, not merely as the Great Creator and Benevolent Preserver, but as the Righteous Governor, of the universe. He hath not only called all things into existence, and made all creatures taste of His goodness, but He continues to direct and overrule all events for the most wise and gracious ends. The contemplation of Him as the moral Governor of the universe, is calculated to beget in us feelings of the deepest Humility and Submission to His wise and righteous appointments, *Sentiments* of Trust and Confidence in Him, and a desire to conform ourselves in all things to His holy will. In so far as we are able to do so—in so far as we feel that our conduct is in accordance with the plans of Divine Providence, it is a source of the highest and purest joy. And when we fall into any sin, and are made to suffer by those righteous arrangements which God hath made for the punishment of it in this life, and to fear heavier punishment in the next,—in all these situations and circumstances, our feelings towards the Moral Governor of the world should be feelings of mingled Reverence and Humility, Trust and Resignation.

Such being the *Sentiments* which are suitable to our conceptions of the Perfections and Government of God, it is easy to understand the *Services* to which they will prompt and stimulate us. We will delight in every opportunity of meditating upon these glorious Perfections, and of filling our hearts even to overflowing with the feelings which such contemplations are naturally fitted to inspire. We will take pleasure in surveying the displays of Divine Power, and Wisdom, and Goodness, and in giving way to those affections of Reverence and Admiration, of Gratitude and Love, which they

are fitted to awaken. Even when we are suffering the consequences of our misconduct, or when involved in some of those more signal punishments by which the Government of God is carried forwards, in the very depths of our self-abasement, we will strive to cherish just views of His Holiness and Rectitude, and to repose with humble Confidence on the Wisdom and Mercy of all His measures. Nor will we rest satisfied with silent contemplation and feeling; but as God is everywhere present overruling all things for good, and as we are continually dependent upon Him for every benefit which we enjoy, the natural dictate of our heart will be to pour out our feelings in *Prayer* to Him.

SECTION II.—*Services due towards God.*

Prayer has always been recognized as one of the duties of Natural Religion. In all ages and among all nations, it has been common, by some form or rite, to supplicate Divine protection and favour. Among the golden verses of Pythagoras we find the following :—

“In all thou dost, first let thy prayers ascend,
And to the Gods thy labours first command;
From them implore success, and hope a prosperous end.”

Prayer springs from a sense of our own weakness and insufficiency, coupled with the conviction that all things are under the Government of a Powerful, Wise, and Gracious Being. Men do not stop to inquire how or how far their supplications may influence the Government of God, or draw down blessings upon themselves; but, yielding to the natural impulse of their hearts, they proceed to pour out their wants and their desires before Him. The duty and the efficacy of *Prayer*, however, admit of clear and convincing illustration; and it would be strange indeed, if a practice which has been followed in all ages and among all nations of the world were not founded in truth and nature. “If there is an all-directing Providence, nothing can be more fit than to endeavour to engage it in our favour. If we owe our whole happiness to God, and the entire fate of our being is determined by His will, it must be inexcusable not to acknowledge and worship Him. If He governs all created existence, and nothing can come to pass contrary to his counsels, it is reasonable to seek His protection, to fly to Him in danger, to beg His aid in accomplishing our good designs, to implore His

blessing on our enjoyments, and to recommend to His care those who are dear to us. Nor can any person who has his mind duly impressed with a sense of the absolute dependence of all things on the Deity, omit those acts without offering great violence to himself." (Price, *Dissert. on Prayer.*)

Prayer has been divided into several distinct parts, according to the several acts of our mind when engaged in it. The chief are the four following :—1. *Adoration* of the Divine perfections and government, with humble acknowledgment of our dependence upon God for life, and breath, and all things. 2. *Thankful remembering* and recording of all the benefits which we have already received. 3. *Confession* of our ingratitude, forgetfulness, and sin. 4. *Supplication* for a continuance of the Divine protection and favour upon ourselves and others.

It is to the last of these that the term *Prayer* is commonly and specially applied ; but, whether we look to that or the preceding parts, the duty must appear to be reasonable and becoming. For what, it may be asked, can be more reasonable and becoming than that weak and imperfect creatures should humble themselves before the Infinite Excellence of the Creator ? And when He who is the Creator is regarded as the Preserver and Governor of all things, what can be more fitting than that we, who are sustained by His power and protected by His favour, should celebrate and adore the excellence and glory of His character. That we should thankfully acknowledge the special favours which we have received at His hand—that we should publish and declare with the voice of thanksgiving and of praise His marvellous loving-kindness towards us, is the natural consequence of our being formed susceptible of Gratitude ; and no reason can be thought of for restraining the expression of this Gratitude, unless it be that the Goodness which calls for it is unbounded. That we should be so slow to acknowledge this Goodness—that, in the enjoyment of the gift, we should be so ready to forget the giver, and to wander from that path of gratitude and obedience which He hath prescribed, must be a source of deep and bitter penitence and regret to every generous and ingenuous mind. Nay, the recollection of our carelessness and ingratitude is calculated to affect the most selfish, with the fear that the benefits which they have so feebly and infrequently acknowledged may be withdrawn, and that punishment may descend upon them. Hence it is that all feel the necessity and propriety of supplicating a continuance of God's grace and favour. In opposition,

however, to these views, which all go to represent *Prayer* as a natural and reasonable duty, various objections have been offered. The principal are the two following (see Ogden's *Sermons*) :—

I. *God is Omniscient, and knows all our feelings, and desires, and wants, and therefore it is needless to express them.*—If our feelings be devout and proper He will approve of them—if our desires be good and pious He will gratify them, without the formality of asking. On the ground of some such objection as this, there are some who would confine their devotion to the heart, and are apt to look upon the expression of it as immaterial or superfluous. Now, it is no doubt true that God looketh to the heart and requireth truth in the inward parts, and without sincerity no service, howsoever solemn, can be of any avail in His sight. This is the salt with which all acceptable sacrifice must be salted. Every act of worship which does not proceed from the heart must fail, because it is not, properly speaking, an act of worship at all, but an act of wickedness and hypocrisy. But, because the form without the spirit is useless, it does not follow that the form may be altogether dispensed with, and that we may rest in mere quietism and contemplation. It is the natural propensity of the human heart to give utterance to its wants and feelings. By prejudice or misconception this propensity may be resisted or overcome; but in yielding to it we discharge our duty and consult our happiness. God hath so constituted us that, by the mere act of giving utterance to our emotions, we experience satisfaction and relief. There is a natural and immediate propriety in expressing our gratitude, and in making known our desires to God. He, therefore, who feels the flame of devotion kindling within him, should give it vent by the sincere ejaculation of his feelings, and it will afterwards burn more brightly and more steadily within him. He will recur to his pious meditations with more frequency and earnestness, and with more benefit and success. He will find his views of the Divine character gradually purified and enlarged, and his sense of Divine things rendered more deep and lasting. His increasing piety will bring him gradually to see and acknowledge that it is not a vain thing thus to wait upon God in sincere and humble *Prayer*.

God, it is true, needs not to be informed of our wants or our desires. On the contrary, *Prayer* proceeds distinctly on the belief that all our wants and desires are known unto God, and that He can, if He thinks fit, gratify and relieve them. But the expression of

them is a thing natural and reasonable in itself—it is fit and becoming the relation which subsists between the Creature and the Creator, and it has a tendency to make our sense of the Divine sufficiency and our weakness more lively and strong, and in this way to form the heavenly tempers, and to draw down the heavenly blessings which we seek. Besides, *Prayer*, considered as an instrumental duty, has a tendency to produce watchfulness and activity. Hence it is that they are associated in Scripture, and that we are so frequently exhorted to *Watch* and *Pray*. The man who prays is more likely to be watchful than the man who does not pray,—even although the devotional feelings of the one should be as warm and lively as those of the other. By giving anything a place in our *Prayers* we bind ourselves over, as it were, to prosecute the matter. As the sacrifices of old were tied to the horns of the altar, we thus fix down our resolutions, which might otherwise prove unstable and fruitless. The mere act of offering up a petition against any vice has a tendency to keep us on our guard against the temptations to that vice. Hence it has been said that, If praying do not make a man leave off sinning, sinning will make him leave off praying. The inconsistency of desiring and imploring a deliverance from sin, and yet continuing to yield to it, is too gross to be got over. It is a state of things in which no man can rest long. His desire and *Prayer* for purity will either be overcome, and he will surrender himself to the dominion of sin; or, if he be sincere, his acts of devotion may add strength and steadiness to his resolutions, till at length they prove successful, and he attains, by vigilance and activity, to that state for which he prayed. But it is objected—

II. *That God is Unchangeable, and that the arrangements of His Providence cannot be affected by our prayers howsoever importunate.*—Now, God is unchangeable. He is without variableness or shadow of turning. We are not therefore to suppose that He can be wrought upon, or His purpose changed, by our *Prayers*; but as the free and sovereign dispenser of benefits, He has a right to fix the condition upon which He will dispense these benefits; and the condition is that we seek them in sincerity and humility. Now, God may require us to ask before we receive, because the very frame or disposition of mind which asking implies is necessary or proper towards the appreciation and improvement of these benefits. In short, we are to pray, not because the purposes of God can be changed, or because He wishes to

be importuned, but because He wishes us to be humble, and thankful, and watchful.

"It has been objected to *Prayer*, that it is unnecessary because God must know our wants whether we supplicate Him or not. True, He knows our wants, but not our humble supplications to Him for aid, unless we make such supplications. Now, it is to our *Prayers*, not our wants, that His gifts are promised. He does not say, *Need*, and ye shall have; *Want*, and ye shall find; but *Ask*, and ye shall have; *Seek*, and ye shall find."—*Whately*.

To a great and generous mind nothing can be more painful than to be under the necessity of sending away empty those who have expressed the fullest confidence in his kindness. With God, the stores of whose bounty are inexhaustible, no such necessity can possibly occur; and if we ask in sincerity and earnestness, and wait in humility and patience, we shall assuredly obtain all our godly desires. These—*Prayer*, and *Humility*, and *Watchfulness*—these are the conducting links which unite us with the full-charged Goodness of God. If we refuse to lay hold of them, we must remain in our native insulated poverty and weakness. But if we stretch forth our hands in *humble*, *earnest*, and *watchful Prayer*, the communication is established by which all the grace of heaven may pass into our souls.

Prayer, as to the circumstances in which it is performed, is *Private*, *Domestic*, or *Public*.

The same views and feelings which prompt us to engage in the acts and exercises of private devotion will lead us to engage in them in the family circle and in public. "If the chief interests of a family are to be consulted, or the first of all the relations in which we stand to one another is to be regarded, *Family Prayer* must be admitted to be reasonable and proper. No one can deny this who acknowledges the obligation to pray at all. Is it not right and fit that they who live together in the same house, and are connected with one another by the closest ties—who in common depend entirely upon God, need continually his care, and are always receiving mercies from Him—is it not fit that they should join together in owning their common obligations and dependence, in seeking that protection they need, and in paying homage to their great Preserver and Guardian?"—Price, *Dissert. on Prayer*. Masters and parents think themselves bound to provide for the temporal and bodily wants of their servants and children; but it is surely much more incumbent

upon them to provide for their spiritual and eternal necessities—to bring them up in the nurture and admonition of the Lord—to teach them to live under a sense of His continual presence and government, and to acknowledge Him in all their ways. No more effectual means can be taken to do so than regularly and seriously to perform the exercises of *Domestic Devotion*. What can be more proper than that they who dwell under the same roof, and enjoy in common the charities of domestic life, should meet and send up together their song of gratitude and praise to Him who is the Father of all the families of the earth? When regularly discharged, what happy effects might it have in checking the vicious and awakening the thoughtless—in forming the tender minds of the young—in cementing the virtuous friendships of the more advanced in life—in strengthening the affection and sweetening the counsel of all, and in diffusing peace, and purity, and comfort, through the whole house! How much would even the general intercourse of society be improved, if men went to it from their knees—not with the turbulent humours of a proud nature and an unsubdued temper, but with that meekness and brotherly love which religion requires and *Prayer* diffuses! How many of those angry contentions and rude encounters which mar the beauty and disturb the peace of social life, would vanish before the mild and softening influence of regular devotion! What a different scene would the stormy sea of this world present, if the tranquillizing spirit of *Prayer*, instead of resting in retired and peaceful bays, were allowed to move at large upon its dark and troubled waters! How much would our dull and heavy atmosphere be purified, and made healthful and fragrant, if it were more widely pierced by the voice of earnest *Prayer* and hearty praise! If every house were, what it ought to be, a sanctuary—if every parent were, what he ought to be, a priest—and if every hearth were, what it ought to be, an altar, around which were gathered families of humble and devoted worshippers, our earth might bloom a second Eden; the angels who, on timid wing, fly far from its infection, might safely renew their visits, and God Himself “might bow His heavens and come down” to dwell among us.

With regard to *Public Worship*, the first and principal argument in favour of it is to be found in the social nature of man. We are born for society, and delight to share the exercise of our affections with others. It cannot be said that the religious affections are the only affections which should be cherished in secret. On the con-

trary, there is an obvious fitness and propriety in those who share the same nature and the benefits of the same society, who have the same common interests and views, meeting together, and sending up their united expression of gratitude and love to Him who is the Father of all. Besides, men are subject to the Providence of God not only as individuals but as communities. The measures of God's Providence have reference to men as associated together in states and nations. In that public or collective capacity, it becomes men to acknowledge their dependence upon God, and to supplicate his protection and favour. They who refuse to do so do in effect withdraw themselves from the government of God, reject His authority, deny His Providence, and declare that they have no dependence upon Him. If all were to do so, the consequences would be most disastrous. *Social Worship* has a powerful tendency to cherish and strengthen the devotional feelings, and thus to diffuse a religious spirit over the face of society, and to draw down the benefits of religion upon its members. If it were altogether neglected in a community, it might not only provoke signal judgments upon that community, but the neglect of it would, in the natural course of God's government, have a tendency to reduce the members of that community to a state of utter barbarism.

It has been shown that a sense of Deity is natural to man. He alone of all creatures here below has this sense. The inferior animals are altogether incapable of rising to any idea of the Invisible and the Infinite; but man is formed to look upwards, and to seek communion with his Maker. He is appointed to be, as it were, the High Priest of nature; and is placed in this lower temple of the universe that he may offer up the incense of prayer and praise for himself and the other parts of creation. He is called on to give utterance to that hymn of gratitude which the hills and valleys, and the cattle which graze on them, cannot articulate; and to add that higher song which his higher endowments and higher enjoyments demand. To neglect the offices of this priesthood, for which he has been specially qualified and consecrated, and to remain dumb through stolid indifference or dull ingratitude, is to contemn the highest glory of his nature, and to cast away the highest privilege of his condition.

Under the law of Moses a solemn and peculiar mode of offering worship to God was prescribed. Even amidst the wanderings and wars of the Israelites the services of the tabernacle were strictly

observed. And when the kingdom of Israel was fully established, and the temple of Jerusalem erected, a worship of the most gorgeous and costly kind was carried on. When the time came that men were no longer to worship God on Mount Gerizim or at Jerusalem, but everywhere in spirit and in truth, still a public and solemn profession of faith was indispensable. Christians were not only commanded to believe the truth in their hearts, but to confess it with their mouths. They were specially enjoined not to forsake the assembling of themselves together for *Public Worship*. And God, by the course of His Providence, has shown that those nations which honour His name shall prosper, and that such as neglect or profane His worship cannot prosper.

But the great duty which we owe to God is that of aiming in all things at a conformity to His will, and following those laws of righteousness which He has written upon our heart and conscience, and which He has illustrated in the moral government of the world. In other words, the highest worship which we can offer to Him is to imitate and obey Him.

Those virtues which are suitable to our rational and moral nature, and to our condition as the subjects of a moral administration—those virtues which become us as partakers of an intellectual and spiritual being, and as expectants of an immortal and glorious inheritance, have previously been briefly stated and illustrated.

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